decent video covering the work of kitty horrorshow. for the most part he just goes through each game and relays the plot, but it is interesting to see them all laid out together, how they are similar and how her work has evolved and the common themes that she keeps revisiting in each one. his analysis mainly focuses on the Places that she explores in her games; the environments, the haunted houses, and how they are all "built wrong." he talks about haunting of hill house, house of leaves, myhouse.wad, vivarium, and a few other movies towards the end.
my own ramblings about some of the games under the cut :-)
one thing i've always projected onto haunted houses, and especially some of the hostile, haunted places prevalent in kitty horrorshow's work, is a trans narrative *everyone pretends to be shocked*
sagan does mention this briefly in the video, and he admits that it's not his personal interpretation that he plans to talk about (which is totally fine) but that is very obviously there, these themes of autonomy and transformation in these works all go hand in hand with gender identity, with the trans/nb experience.
so when people talk about a house being "built wrong" it always reminds me of the trans narrative of "born in the wrong body." i know this isn't necessarily a mindset a lot of people still agree with anymore now that our language around being trans has evolved, but i also know there are some people that do still feel this way regardless, and even if we don't completely consider ourselves "born in the wrong body" i think the majority of us do have a very... contentious relationship with our bodies.
i always see a house that is intent on haunting you as a body that is inhospitable.
we see people in kitty horrorshow's work that try and change the world around them, or failing that, that literally change themselves. in rain, house, eternity, the structure we've been traversing is someone who has broken free of her physical form and been reborn into something that she chose for herself, after her community forced her down a path that she did not want. sagan brings this up again at the end of his analysis, where he talks about the way the environment is molded by the player as well as the way the player is molded by the environment. he mentions the movie vivarium, and how people are forced into these littles boxes (ie the nuclear family, gender roles, preconceived stereotypes, etc), whether they want it or not, by their environment and the societal expectations that are a part of that.
but again, the environment can also be molded by the player; it is influenced by the characters within the narrative. the environment grows flesh and teeth and has a heartbeat and i like this idea that our environment is alive and is also flesh and blood that can be reflected back at us. it could be cathartic or horrifying depending on how you feel about your body, about your experiences, about how society perceives you. in the end we can become the structure, we can change ourselves and become our environment, undefinable and infinite, or we can be restricted by it, and forced into something we don't want-- made inhospitable.
there is both a lack of agency in the house being built, but a reclamation in the haunting as someone or something transitions and fills the empty rooms with a new form. stone to flesh or flesh to stone as it is in rain, house, eternity, or drywall to glitches and blood like in anatomy. inhospitable but at least it's mine.
in 000000FF0000, the game itself doesn't even want to be found. it's a living thing that's hidden itself away and is in great pain. it's restricted by its own code, it longs for the seasons and the sea but it can only think about the cages it's been locked in. the only agency it finds is in shutting itself down after the player reaches a certain point. we are forced to be perceived by others, by society, even when we are in pain, even when we aren't really ourselves, due to how we look, how we were born, or whatever other cages society has put us in. the lack of autonomy, the lack of control in our own creation... this game is actually one of the ones that have stuck with me the most, i think it's extremely well executed and impactful and is possibly her second best behind anatomy.
and then there's circadia-- the girl returning to her childhood home, seeing her childhood and memories and her body reflected back at her in this house. wanting to hurt it, feeling trapped by it and how she used to be. the people there that don't really see her as she is now, the trauma literally in the walls. she laments her apartment, missing it "like a lover" because that's the place she carved out for herself versus this house she was forced into, this house that's always there and always waiting for her to come back even though she clearly never wants to come back.
when you're trans, there are always people trying to get you to "come back," to be like you used to be. looking back at yourself, childhood photos and old memories of when people treated you differently. your body a new space now but there are still the bones of that old house you left behind. the world trying to force you back into the house even if it doesn't fit anymore, even if it's painful, even if all you can do is haunt it.... the code in 000000FF0000 confining the game to exist in one way even though it hurts them, no other option but to bury themselves deep in various folders within your computer and hoping to never be found. hiding from the world because there are people that insist these things are hardcoded into your biology, that predetermine how you have to live and there is no other way for you to live. and if you go against that code it breaks the game for them... does that make sense?
and in rain, house, eternity, she demolishes the house and turns herself into stone, she finds autonomy despite what the game wants and what the world wants. indefinable and infinite because there is no binary and the walls of this house are your house to destroy and rebuild as many times as you want in any way that you want.
i definitely recommend kitty horrorshow's work if you've never played any of her games before. she's most well known for anatomy, which i didn't really touch on because it's so popular (for good reason) she does have a few twine games, hornets and wolfgirls in love, and then circadia is just a 5 page flash-fiction. and of course i also super recommend rain, house, eternity, and 000000FF0000. i already linked her itch page up there but here it is again! check her out.
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How I got scammed
If you'd like an essay-formatted version of this post to read or share, here's a link to it on pluralistic.net, my surveillance-free, ad-free, tracker-free blog:
https://pluralistic.net/2024/02/05/cyber-dunning-kruger/#swiss-cheese-security
I wuz robbed.
More specifically, I was tricked by a phone-phisher pretending to be from my bank, and he convinced me to hand over my credit-card number, then did $8,000+ worth of fraud with it before I figured out what happened. And then he tried to do it again, a week later!
Here's what happened. Over the Christmas holiday, I traveled to New Orleans. The day we landed, I hit a Chase ATM in the French Quarter for some cash, but the machine declined the transaction. Later in the day, we passed a little credit-union's ATM and I used that one instead (I bank with a one-branch credit union and generally there's no fee to use another CU's ATM).
A couple days later, I got a call from my credit union. It was a weekend, during the holiday, and the guy who called was obviously working for my little CU's after-hours fraud contractor. I'd dealt with these folks before – they service a ton of little credit unions, and generally the call quality isn't great and the staff will often make mistakes like mispronouncing my credit union's name.
That's what happened here – the guy was on a terrible VOIP line and I had to ask him to readjust his mic before I could even understand him. He mispronounced my bank's name and then asked if I'd attempted to spend $1,000 at an Apple Store in NYC that day. No, I said, and groaned inwardly. What a pain in the ass. Obviously, I'd had my ATM card skimmed – either at the Chase ATM (maybe that was why the transaction failed), or at the other credit union's ATM (it had been a very cheap looking system).
I told the guy to block my card and we started going through the tedious business of running through recent transactions, verifying my identity, and so on. It dragged on and on. These were my last hours in New Orleans, and I'd left my family at home and gone out to see some of the pre-Mardi Gras krewe celebrations and get a muffalata, and I could tell that I was going to run out of time before I finished talking to this guy.
"Look," I said, "you've got all my details, you've frozen the card. I gotta go home and meet my family and head to the airport. I'll call you back on the after-hours number once I'm through security, all right?"
He was frustrated, but that was his problem. I hung up, got my sandwich, went to the airport, and we checked in. It was total chaos: an Alaska Air 737 Max had just lost its door-plug in mid-air and every Max in every airline's fleet had been grounded, so the check in was crammed with people trying to rebook. We got through to the gate and I sat down to call the CU's after-hours line. The person on the other end told me that she could only handle lost and stolen cards, not fraud, and given that I'd already frozen the card, I should just drop by the branch on Monday to get a new card.
We flew home, and later the next day, I logged into my account and made a list of all the fraudulent transactions and printed them out, and on Monday morning, I drove to the bank to deal with all the paperwork. The folks at the CU were even more pissed than I was. The fraud that run up to more than $8,000, and if Visa refused to take it out of the merchants where the card had been used, my little credit union would have to eat the loss.
I agreed and commiserated. I also pointed out that their outsource, after-hours fraud center bore some blame here: I'd canceled the card on Saturday but most of the fraud had taken place on Sunday. Something had gone wrong.
One cool thing about banking at a tiny credit-union is that you end up talking to people who have actual authority, responsibility and agency. It turned out the the woman who was processing my fraud paperwork was a VP, and she decided to look into it. A few minutes later she came back and told me that the fraud center had no record of having called me on Saturday.
"That was the fraudster," she said.
Oh, shit. I frantically rewound my conversation, trying to figure out if this could possibly be true. I hadn't given him anything apart from some very anodyne info, like what city I live in (which is in my Wikipedia entry), my date of birth (ditto), and the last four digits of my card.
Wait a sec.
He hadn't asked for the last four digits. He'd asked for the last seven digits. At the time, I'd found that very frustrating, but now – "The first nine digits are the same for every card you issue, right?" I asked the VP.
I'd given him my entire card number.
Goddammit.
The thing is, I know a lot about fraud. I'm writing an entire series of novels about this kind of scam:
https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250865878/thebezzle
And most summers, I go to Defcon, and I always go to the "social engineering" competitions where an audience listens as a hacker in a soundproof booth cold-calls merchants (with the owner's permission) and tries to con whoever answers the phone into giving up important information.
But I'd been conned.
Now look, I knew I could be conned. I'd been conned before, 13 years ago, by a Twitter worm that successfully phished out of my password via DM:
https://locusmag.com/2010/05/cory-doctorow-persistence-pays-parasites/
That scam had required a miracle of timing. It started the day before, when I'd reset my phone to factory defaults and reinstalled all my apps. That same day, I'd published two big online features that a lot of people were talking about. The next morning, we were late getting out of the house, so by the time my wife and I dropped the kid at daycare and went to the coffee shop, it had a long line. Rather than wait in line with me, my wife sat down to read a newspaper, and so I pulled out my phone and found a Twitter DM from a friend asking "is this you?" with a URL.
Assuming this was something to do with those articles I'd published the day before, I clicked the link and got prompted for my Twitter login again. This had been happening all day because I'd done that mobile reinstall the day before and all my stored passwords had been wiped. I entered it but the page timed out. By that time, the coffees were ready. We sat and chatted for a bit, then went our own ways.
I was on my way to the office when I checked my phone again. I had a whole string of DMs from other friends. Each one read "is this you?" and had a URL.
Oh, shit, I'd been phished.
If I hadn't reinstalled my mobile OS the day before. If I hadn't published a pair of big articles the day before. If we hadn't been late getting out the door. If we had been a little more late getting out the door (so that I'd have seen the multiple DMs, which would have tipped me off).
There's a name for this in security circles: "Swiss-cheese security." Imagine multiple slices of Swiss cheese all stacked up, the holes in one slice blocked by the slice below it. All the slices move around and every now and again, a hole opens up that goes all the way through the stack. Zap!
The fraudster who tricked me out of my credit card number had Swiss cheese security on his side. Yes, he spoofed my bank's caller ID, but that wouldn't have been enough to fool me if I hadn't been on vacation, having just used a pair of dodgy ATMs, in a hurry and distracted. If the 737 Max disaster hadn't happened that day and I'd had more time at the gate, I'd have called my bank back. If my bank didn't use a slightly crappy outsource/out-of-hours fraud center that I'd already had sub-par experiences with. If, if, if.
The next Friday night, at 5:30PM, the fraudster called me back, pretending to be the bank's after-hours center. He told me my card had been compromised again. But: I hadn't removed my card from my wallet since I'd had it replaced. Also, it was half an hour after the bank closed for the long weekend, a very fraud-friendly time. And when I told him I'd call him back and asked for the after-hours fraud number, he got very threatening and warned me that because I'd now been notified about the fraud that any losses the bank suffered after I hung up the phone without completing the fraud protocol would be billed to me. I hung up on him. He called me back immediately. I hung up on him again and put my phone into do-not-disturb.
The following Tuesday, I called my bank and spoke to their head of risk-management. I went through everything I'd figured out about the fraudsters, and she told me that credit unions across America were being hit by this scam, by fraudsters who somehow knew CU customers' phone numbers and names, and which CU they banked at. This was key: my phone number is a reasonably well-kept secret. You can get it by spending money with Equifax or another nonconsensual doxing giant, but you can't just google it or get it at any of the free services. The fact that the fraudsters knew where I banked, knew my name, and had my phone number had really caused me to let down my guard.
The risk management person and I talked about how the credit union could mitigate this attack: for example, by better-training the after-hours card-loss staff to be on the alert for calls from people who had been contacted about supposed card fraud. We also went through the confusing phone-menu that had funneled me to the wrong department when I called in, and worked through alternate wording for the menu system that would be clearer (this is the best part about banking with a small CU – you can talk directly to the responsible person and have a productive discussion!). I even convinced her to buy a ticket to next summer's Defcon to attend the social engineering competitions.
There's a leak somewhere in the CU systems' supply chain. Maybe it's Zelle, or the small number of corresponding banks that CUs rely on for SWIFT transaction forwarding. Maybe it's even those after-hours fraud/card-loss centers. But all across the USA, CU customers are getting calls with spoofed caller IDs from fraudsters who know their registered phone numbers and where they bank.
I've been mulling this over for most of a month now, and one thing has really been eating at me: the way that AI is going to make this kind of problem much worse.
Not because AI is going to commit fraud, though.
One of the truest things I know about AI is: "we're nowhere near a place where bots can steal your job, we're certainly at the point where your boss can be suckered into firing you and replacing you with a bot that fails at doing your job":
https://pluralistic.net/2024/01/15/passive-income-brainworms/#four-hour-work-week
I trusted this fraudster specifically because I knew that the outsource, out-of-hours contractors my bank uses have crummy headsets, don't know how to pronounce my bank's name, and have long-ass, tedious, and pointless standardized questionnaires they run through when taking fraud reports. All of this created cover for the fraudster, whose plausibility was enhanced by the rough edges in his pitch - they didn't raise red flags.
As this kind of fraud reporting and fraud contacting is increasingly outsourced to AI, bank customers will be conditioned to dealing with semi-automated systems that make stupid mistakes, force you to repeat yourself, ask you questions they should already know the answers to, and so on. In other words, AI will groom bank customers to be phishing victims.
This is a mistake the finance sector keeps making. 15 years ago, Ben Laurie excoriated the UK banks for their "Verified By Visa" system, which validated credit card transactions by taking users to a third party site and requiring them to re-enter parts of their password there:
https://web.archive.org/web/20090331094020/http://www.links.org/?p=591
This is exactly how a phishing attack works. As Laurie pointed out, this was the banks training their customers to be phished.
I came close to getting phished again today, as it happens. I got back from Berlin on Friday and my suitcase was damaged in transit. I've been dealing with the airline, which means I've really been dealing with their third-party, outsource luggage-damage service. They have a terrible website, their emails are incoherent, and they officiously demand the same information over and over again.
This morning, I got a scam email asking me for more information to complete my damaged luggage claim. It was a terrible email, from a noreply@ email address, and it was vague, officious, and dishearteningly bureaucratic. For just a moment, my finger hovered over the phishing link, and then I looked a little closer.
On any other day, it wouldn't have had a chance. Today – right after I had my luggage wrecked, while I'm still jetlagged, and after days of dealing with my airline's terrible outsource partner – it almost worked.
So much fraud is a Swiss-cheese attack, and while companies can't close all the holes, they can stop creating new ones.
Meanwhile, I'll continue to post about it whenever I get scammed. I find the inner workings of scams to be fascinating, and it's also important to remind people that everyone is vulnerable sometimes, and scammers are willing to try endless variations until an attack lands at just the right place, at just the right time, in just the right way. If you think you can't get scammed, that makes you especially vulnerable:
https://pluralistic.net/2023/02/24/passive-income/#swiss-cheese-security
Image:
Cryteria (modified)
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:HAL9000.svg
CC BY 3.0
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en
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