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wartakes · 9 months
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F-35: The Flying Money Furnace
This essay was first posted on March 2nd, 2021, and is the culmination of my long-time hate-affair with the F-35 Lightning II "Joint Strike Fighter."
The sad thing is I don't necessarily think the F-35 itself was a bad idea as an aircraft, but that the program and the system that birthed it and nurtured it are so twisted and corrupt and incompetent that turned it into an abomination. But anyway, I'll let you read me say that with more words now.
(Full essay below the cut).
The past two weeks have been an interesting one if you’re either a military aviation enthusiast or an advocate for not spending Olympic swimming pools worth of liquified money on imperialist military adventures – or in my case: both. And it all revolves around one particular weapons system that has deservedly been a lightning rod for attention when it comes to waste, corruption, incompetence, and all manner of other sins in the Military Industrial Complex (MIC): The F-35.
What is the F-35, for those of you who are not already familiar? The F-35 Lightning II was the winner of the military’s Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program in the early 2000s, designed and intended to replace a whole host of combat aircraft across the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. An advanced, 5th generation multi-role fighter aircraft, the F-35’s advanced avionics, stealthy profile, and a number of other features claimed by its proponents were supposed to make it the backbone of U.S. military aviation for most of the 21st century – destined to be make up the majority of the military’s fleet of fixed-wing combat aircraft. It was to be capable of doing anything and everything that the military would need and doing it better than anything else.
So, what have the results been in practice, after twenty-something years of development?
If someone were trying to be diplomatic about it, they’d probably say “less than satisfactory.”
How would I put it though? As someone who has followed the development and (attempted) fielding of the F-35 since I was a kid, I think the results of the F-35 program are emblematic of everything currently wrong with the United States – both as a whole, and more specifically in the military and the broader national security establishment. What the MIC has produced is an aircraft that is the personification of the United States: a declining empire stumbling through late-stage capitalism gripped by crisis after crisis. How else can you describe things when the world’s richest and most powerful (supposedly) country has been running the most expensive weapons development program in human history for twenty plus years and yet it can’t even produce a working plane?
Trouble in “Paradise” (AKA Lockheed Martin Corporation of Bethesda, MD)
The inciting incident that started the current discussion and debate about the F-35 came on February 17th in the form of an article from the defense news website Breaking Defense (several other publications picked up the story in the following days). In the article, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Charles “CQ” Brown was quoted by Breaking Defense saying that the Air Force was launching a new study with CAPE on the future composition of the service’s fleet of tactical aircraft.
For those of you who don’t have a cipher handy for the Pentagon’s alphabet soup, CAPE is Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation – essentially an independent think tank within the Office of the Secretary of Defense whose job is to look at procurement and acquisitions, ask questions about cost effectiveness, and if necessary to develop alternatives to service plans for new weapons systems and force structure (something that in my opinion they should be doing far more often and far more robustly, but I digress). When you have your grubby little fingers in a big juicy defense contract, and CAPE starts asking questions, you should start getting worried.
And in this case, its anyone who is involved with the F-35 who should be worried. This is based on several key statements Breaking Defense quoted Brown on from a conversation he had with the Defense Writers Group on the 17th. In particular, Brown stated (on the topic of the study):
“This will help inform the decisions that I think I need to make internal to the Air Force, and what I would recommend that force mix might be,” Brown told the Defense Writers Group late this afternoon. “Now, I will also tell you I don’t think that everybody’s going to exactly agree with what I say. But I want to actually have a starting point as a point of departure, a point of dialogue.”
Brown didn’t stop there:
The study will include a “clean sheet design” for a new “four-and-a-half-gen or fifth-gen-minus” fighter to replace the F-16, Brown elaborated. Rather than simply buy new F-16s, he said, “I want to be able to build something new and different, that’s not the F 16 — that has some of those capabilities, but gets there faster and uses some of our digital approach.”
That’s the paragraph in particular that says it all about the F-35, without actually saying the name of the F-35 – in fact, the original article itself only mentions the F-35 once, in the context that the General still believes that the service will need some fifth-generation fighters like it. But despite the fact that both Brown and the article take pains not to make this discussion about the F-35, don’t be mistaken; this is all about that particular grift of an aircraft. This was driven home further on February 25th, when the Air Force informed Breaking Defense that not only is their future tactical aircraft fleet under review, but so are those of the Navy and Marine Corps – who are also receiving F-35s to replace the vast majority of their fighter fleets. A memo obtained by Breaking Defense also noted that Undersecretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks had specifically ordered CAPE to review the F-35 – in addition to several other major acquisitions efforts.
Now, I’m not the first one to write about this (Forbes already published a piece by David Axe that basically came to the same conclusions as I have, as has Charles Pierce over at Esquire). But seeing as I probably have a slightly different take on all this even if I overall agree with them, I’m going to go ahead and take a stab my own, rambling analysis.
The most important thing to note here is that as the F-35 was intended to whole-sale replace the F-16 – a line that the DoD has stuck to until now – and suddenly the professional head of the Air Force is talking about something else replacing the majority of those aircraft, it suggests that the military’s confidence in the F-35 overcoming its prolonged “teething issues” has finally begun to wane to levels that probably has Lockheed Martin – the manufacturer  of the F-35 and the F-16 that it is replacing – starting to sweat. It has already been waging a battle – both directly and through various proxies – to prevent the Air Force from buying 144 new F-15EX multirole fighters to replace aging 70s and 80s variants of that fighter (which was supposed to have been replaced by the now curtailed F-22), seeing it as a threat to their current monopoly on building new fighter aircraft for the military.
These new statements by Brown have clearly already dumped some gasoline on the fire beneath Lockheed Martin’s feet. Since the story broke, Brown has had to walk back his statements slightly, asserting that the F-35 is still the Air Force’s “cornerstone fighter” and is not a “failure.” The fact that he came under any sort of pressure to do so, however, should tell you that the level of confidence those involved in that program have is currently very low and likely fragile (as should the fact Lockheed Martin is scrambling for good news on the F-35 in other areas).
Failures of the Flying Money Furnace
“So, what’s the deal with the F-35?”  You ask in your best Jerry Seinfeld impersonation, canned sitcom laughter echoing all around you.
In a nutshell: the “deal” is the fact that after over twenty years of development and over a trillion dollars spent – making it the most expensive weapons development program in human history – the F-35 is still suffering from numerous technical issues and shortcomings – with new ones being discovered consistently. Yes, despite twenty years and $1.727 trillion dollars, the F-35 has still not actually entered full-rate production – something it was scheduled to do in 2020, and has since been delayed indefinitely, with the plane remaining in low-rate initial production instead. This has left the F-35 – despite the fact that 563 of the aircraft have already been produced as of September 2020 – remaining little more than a “massively expensive prototype”, as the Project on Government Oversight (POGO)’s research puts it. This is reinforced by the fact that despite setting modest mission-capable rates for the aircraft, the F-35 failed to reach that rate by the prescribed deadline of September 2020 (the Marine Corp’s F-35B actually saw its mission capable rate drop. Ouch. Nice job, leathernecks).
POGO’s research on the F-35 program shows that the primary reason for the delays have been the persistent technical flaws and issues that have plagued the F-35 throughout its development – with the most serious having been discovered only after the initial production aircraft have arrived at units for operational testing. According to the latest annual report on the F-35 from DoD’s Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) published in October 2020, the F-35 has 871 unresolved deficiencies – a decline of only 2 from 2019. Of these deficiencies, ten are classified as Category 1, the most serious classification of flaw, meaning that they could cause severe illness, injury, or death – as well as major damage to or the loss of the weapons system in question, with a negative impact on combat readiness.
The report (not surprisingly) does not go into any real detail on the nature of the F-35’s flaws, but it does point to significant stability issues with the aircraft’s software, with the solving of one bug by developers creating more bugs in the process at a rate faster than they can keep up with. This is not the only way in which software is a liability for the F-35. Its heavy dependence upon computerized systems and networks means it is essentially a flying vector for cyber-attacks – as is its ground-based support system (which we’ll get to in a moment, along with its other flaws). If you think the problems are only with software though, don’t speak too soon: POGO points out that the F-35 has suffered from numerous mechanical breakdowns over the years too – the key driver behind that abysmal mission-capable rate that we touched upon earlier.
Even as the rate of breakdowns has declined, the F-35 suffers from being a notoriously hard plane to repair, with even experienced ground-crews reportedly taking twice as long as should be necessary to repair the aircraft when its broken. This then translates into incredibly high costs as well. When the F-35 can fly, it apparently costs $44,000 per hour to keep it in the air – over twice as much compared to that A-10s and F-16s that it is supposed to replace in the Air Force. When POGO extrapolated that out over the expected 8,000 flying hour lifespan of each F-35, it came out to $352 million to operate one jet, effectively making it nothing more than a flying money furnace (and conveniently, a great title for this essay).
Then there are the problems with the plane that aren’t with the plane itself but are with the entire infrastructure needed to support it. Despite having 14 years in change to prepare, contractors have been unable to complete the simulators and ranges necessary for further testing and training – part of the reason why the aircraft has remained in low-rate production. The F-35’s Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) has also been notorious for its failings – which included forcing maintainers to work excessive hours just to create workarounds to avoid the system creating false deficiencies and ordering incorrect parts. The Pentagon finally admitted in 2020 that the system was beyond salvaging and now plan to spend $550 million over the next five years to build a replacement system for it. Oh, and by the way, that replacement system (which is called “ODIN”; try not to roll your eyes)? DOT&E is already saying that DoD’s expectations and deadlines for the replacement are unrealistic, calling it “high risk” in its F-35 report. Its already reportedly running into some issues out of the gate, cutting corners and creating potential problems later on down the line.
I usually try not to get sucked into “time is a flat circle” despair, but I can certainly see why some people do when I start to do a deep dive on the F-35.
Finally, even when you look past the design deficiencies and flaws that have emerged after the F-35 has entered production and operational testing, there’s the fact that the F-35s superiority is dependent upon a quality that the United States can no long take for granted: stealth. When the F-35 began development, the United States was still the only country in the world with stealth aircraft, which it had used to bomb Iraq with impunity during the 1991 Gulf War. The F-35 was to utilize the stealth developments of past aircraft like the F-22 fighter, B-2 bomber, and F-117 strike aircraft to allow it to get the drop on any and all adversaries.
The problem there is, in the twenty years it has taken to develop the F-35 and put it into production, stealth isn’t what it used to be. Russia and China – and even U.S. ally Germany – have claimed to have developed new and advanced radar systems that may be able to detect stealth aircraft like the F-35 and F-22. Even certain kinds of existing radars may also have an ability to detect stealth aircraft as well by utilizing technology and techniques from as far back as the 1950s. These systems have all obviously generated some scrutiny, and I’d remiss if I didn’t say we should take any claims from Russia and China that they can defeat the stealth capabilities of U.S. aircraft with a grain of salt. But even if these radars are only partly effective, those marginal abilities be used as part of a suite of systems that could counter stealth aircraft. Its easy to forget Serbia was able to down an F-117 stealth fighter during Operation Allied Force in 1999 – they actually hit another too, in a less well-known story – though that one didn’t crash).
Now all this doesn’t mean stealth is completely useless or obsolete.  But assuming stealth will always be assured is a risky move to make, especially when you’ve gambled big on it being the chief advantage of your primary airframe – like with a certain 5th-gen fighter we’ve been discussing. So, what is the F-35 like when you take away that advantage?
Well, for one, the F-35 doesn’t carry a lot of munitions – at least if you want to maintain that stealth profile to begin with. If you do want to maintain stealth, you need to carry all your ordinance internally. This not only cuts down the amount of ordinance you can carry but limits you to only one kind of air-to-air missile – the AIM-120 AMRAM and one kind of bomb – the JDAM  (as of 2019 Lockheed Martin appears to have found a way to increase the number of missiles the F-35 can hold from four to six, probably feeling the heat from competitors or curtailed construction). It’s also slower than the aircraft its most likely to go up against, like the Russian MiG-29 and Su-27 families of aircraft – even when it’s not restricted from supersonic flight to avoid damaging itself in the process. Hell, it’s even slower of the F-15s, F-16s, and F/A-18s that its slated to either replace or supplant in U.S. service.
On top of those points, the F-35 is also far less maneuverable than 4th generation fighters, easily outfought by aircraft from both the United States and abroad. Some proponents of the F-35 have argued that this doesn’t matter, as the age of the “dogfight” is dead. The problem with their comeback is, their argument – by their own admission in some cases – hinges upon the F-35s stealth capability, assuming that most of its kills would be undetected and beyond the sight of its enemy. This brings us back to our original question “well, ok, but what if you don’t have stealth?” This presumption that the F-35’s stealth advantage will go unchallenged now or in the future, further lends credence to the fact it is a double-edged sword: its main advantage, but also potentially its downfall in combat.
All these factors (and more that I could go deeper into if this wasn’t already shaping up to be the longest essay that I’ve written so far) add up to tell you one thing: when you take away the stealth advantages, the F-35 is pretty much just a middling fighter jet with a lot of expensive computers in it. Those expensive computers may offer some key advantages, but don’t offer enough on their own to justify the price tag. With its overdependence on stealth – an advantage the United States will not have a monopoly on forever – the F-35 is the perfect fighter for an imperial power that has convinced itself it has a God-given right to military superiority.
Why Should We Care?
I could go on about the technical and conceptual failures of the F-35 for hours. Literally. I could. I have before (ask my poor friends who have been subjected to shit like this in our DMs and hours-long voice calls). I had to throttle myself back on how much I bombarded you all with from the DOT&E report and POGO’s analysis of it and other F-35 data, out of the fear I may scare even more of you off (if you’re still reading this essay this far in, bravo to you). If you want to really geek out about this like I do, I suggest you go back and read both of those documents (I’ll link them both here in case you missed them before) to soak up all the other failings of the DoD and Lockheed Martin that I wasn’t able to describe here lest this turn into a full-on book that even less people will read than already are.
But again, I digress. I’ve thrown a lot of boring NatSec nerd shit at you about aircraft and procurement and testing and etc. So, what you may be wondering is “KD, why should we care about this?”
I feel like some of the answer to that is already implicit in everything that’s occurred, but it’s still a fair question and I’ll break down my own personal feelings – which is that resources wasted on this program and the attempts to casually shrug it off after spending insane amounts of money on it that could have been put to countless other better uses, enrages me to my core both as a national security professional and as a leftist. I’m going to try and break down why it gets to me in both those facets, separate from one another – though there is arguably some crossover.
As a leftist, it should be pretty obvious why this gets to me – or anyone really. We’ve entering year two of life under lockdown due to COVID-19, where the amount of financial support from the government has been absolutely pitiful in scale, with our leaders dithering over providing people with what are essentially band-aids to put on financial sucking chest wounds (by the way, on that topic: where’s my fucking $2000 Joe? Not $1400, $2000), let alone a minimum wage increase. Additionally, government response to the myriad of other natural disasters over the past year has also been laughable, the most recent example being Texas’ response to a blizzard that resulted in multiple deaths – that response consisting more of blaming the Green New Deal (which is still just a proposal and isn’t even a law yet) while casually ignoring their own lack of investment in protecting their infrastructure and their insistence on having their power grid be isolated from others in order to avoid Federal oversight.
The message we get from all of this, is that the government can’t afford to spend money on health care, unemployment, raising the minimum wage, natural disaster recovery, improving infrastructure and utilities, or any of those things that maybe a modern country should have in the 21st century. But what it can do, is spend north of a trillion dollars over twenty years or so on a shitty fighter jet that doesn’t even fucking work. They can’t spend the money to – at bare minimum – prevent people from dying in their own homes during a severe weather event, but they can continue to throw money at the failed jet in a desperate attempt to make it work. Then, as it to kick additional dirt in our face, they can casually suggest that maybe the $1 trillion jet was a bad idea and we should try building something else, without a hint of remorse or guilt, as they wring their hands over a single $1400 check that they somehow expect will be enough for people suffering throughout this trash fire of a year to live on until the pandemic is over (whenever the hell that may be).
If you’re not a leftist already, I don’t see how this would do some serious leg work in pushing you further there. The money spent on the F-35 compared to just about anything else we need in this country truly reinforces a feeling that at best, our leaders our simply oblivious to the plight of the most vulnerable and the repercussions of the ongoing crises, and at worse they are fully aware and just don’t give a shit about people’s suffering as long as they remain in power and they – and their rich friends – get what they want to get out of it. Even before I became a leftist, I thought the F-35 was a wasteful boondoggle that made me sigh and shake my head. Now it makes me spew out several thousand angry words about it in text form because I have to do something in order to keep the rage from completely consuming me.
So, that’s my rant about the F-35 as a leftist. Pretty standard. But what about as a national security professional? From that angle, the F-35 angers me because it just points to the utter breakdown of the defense establishment since the end of the Cold War – and in particular since the start of the War on Terror after 9/11. If any of you who have read some of my other pieces by now, you know that despite my politics, I am under no illusions that we’d still very much need a military under a leftist political system. War, as I have said and will continue to say, is not going anywhere. Despite what tankies on twitter may try to tell you, countries like China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are not your friends and do not have good intentions. There are plenty of other legitimately bad actors out there too who have ill-intent. We shouldn’t seek out fights, but we should be prepared to defend ourselves and others from aggression. Likewise, while I don’t think we should be spending the astronomical amounts of money we currently pay into defense, I do think that we’ll need to spend some money on it and will need new capabilities in the future.
But what the F-35 debacle shows me is, is that the MIC has gone fully rampant under the current system. The fact that the F-35 hasn’t been able to work out its problems, wasting two decades and nearly $2 trillion in money that could have gone to any number of more worthy causes or more practical weapons systems, does not bode well. Especially when you remember that the F-35 is only the latest in a long line of failed, major procurement programs to replace Cold War-era hardware – such as the Crusader artillery system, the Comanche scout helicopter, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, Future Combat Systems, and many, many, many more (which maybe I’ll do a separate piece on some day; or two, or three). The defense establishment’s ability to actually produce a working, effective product, for a price that isn’t outrageous, has dropped off drastically since the end of the Cold War.
Don’t get me wrong, I’m not wearing rose colored glasses. Procurement and acquisitions in the military has always been flawed and corrupt. But during the Cold War  we were still at least able to produce some working products that fulfilled their purpose to a satisfactory end. The Army managed to get its “Big Five” systems into production in the 1980s – the M1 Abrams tank, M2 Bradley IFV, AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopter, and the Patriot missile system – and now those aging systems and others like them continue to form the backbone of the military, as countless attempts to replace them have failed – not before wasting billions of dollars of public money that could be paying for people to stay home right now, of course.
Why are things like this? It’s not a simple answer, and beyond answering concisely in one article. A lot of reasons combined, is as simple as I can put it. Incompetence and mismanagement within the DoD itself to start. Then add in a healthy mix of greed, corruption, and feelings of impunity on the part of both the defense contractors and their allies within DoD. This is all mostly baseless speculation on my part, admittedly – but it doesn’t take a genius to look at how these programs work and know there’s shady shit going on behind the scenes. Really, this is all shocking to me, as I have constantly been told that capitalism breeds innovation, so I can’t believe that the F-35 has turned out the way it has in the hyper capitalist state of affairs that we’ve grown to live in today (in case you can’t tell, rest assured, that is sarcasm).
Turbulence Ahead
Is this the end of the F-35? Probably not. Enough of them have been built at this point that we’ll be cursed with them for a good long while. But even if DoD curtails or cancels the rest of its production, the issues that produced it in the first place remain, and we may already be getting a preview of what our next big fuck-up might be as we circle back to the statements of good ol’ General Charlie Brown that kicked off this extended rant-fest.
If you remember from way towards the start of this article, General Brown said he might want a “clean sheet” replacement to the F-16. That line made my eyes just about roll back into my head and let out an existential scream, because it shows that the DoD has either learned nothing or learned just enough to realize they made a huge mistake but not enough to not repeat it. All I know is, if I were General Brown, I wouldn’t be so eager to launch into a new multi-year, multi-billion clean-sheet aircraft procurement program if I’d just candidly admitted that the one I was mired in was a complete and total shitshow that wasn’t getting the job done. If you didn’t want to just buy a new F-16 – and hey, critical support to not buying anything from Lockheed Martin – you could find another jet that’s probably just as good if not better. Why does it have to be clean sheet? Why is good ol’ Charlie Brown once again ready for Lucy to pull the football away again right as he’s about to kick it?
Here’s where I rapidly jump back between one of the two wolves inside me – the Nat Sec analyst – the other one – the leftist: the obvious answer seems to be that you need to keep the defense companies fat and happy. Sure, you could just buy some existing, upgraded fighter aircraft – like the Air Force has already done with the F-15EX. But if the F-35 debacle has proven one thing, its that having a long, drawn out, big ticket weapons development project like the F-35 gives you a lot more opportunities to drain the taxpayer for every cent even if it turns out to be a failure – maybe even especially if it turns out to be a failure. God forbid any of that money to building a road or a working power grid.
Maybe I’m giving the defense companies too much credit when it comes to supervillain plots, but it’s hard not to be cynical and jaded at this point. Especially when we could have done things so much differently.
The United States was the only great power in the world to decide it was going all in on 5th generation stealth fighters as the backbone of its military air forces at the dawn of the 21st century. Practically every other major military power in the world – including Russia, China, and a lot of U.S. allies and partners – decided it would be a lot safer bet to wait and see when it came to 5th generation fighters, and they were right. Many of them decided to simply upgrade their 4th generation fighters or build advanced new ones, waiting for us to work out all the kinks and make all the missteps – much like me watching my brother go through multiple early generation iPods as a kid before I finally bought a later model one that still works to this day. Even the countries that participated in the global effort to build the F-35 or buy it probably got a better deal out of it than if they’d tried to build their own. After all, the United States was the one expelling the lion’s share of the blood, tears, sweat, and treasure in the project. Even if those participating were getting a subpar fighter, they at least were getting it having paid far less – and were learning from U.S. mistakes. Now, as the United States buys the F-15EX and consider an alternative to replace the F-16, it arrives twenty-something years late at the obvious conclusion that a bunch of its friends and most likely adversaries have long already figured out.
At any rate, who knows what this CAPE report will end up leading to. Maybe it’ll go nowhere, ending up as a big nothing sandwich. Whatever happens, it doesn’t change the fact that the F-35 is a fundamentally flawed and wasteful project that lays the worst qualities of the MIC and of our country as a whole. It is indicative of behavior that is not only harmful to this country’s national security, but more importantly, is harmful to its people and their needs. The F-35 is indicative of America’s dying imperial power. The system that leads to corporate grifts like the F-35 program need to be ended and replaced. Otherwise, much like a faulty F-35, this country will quite simply crash and burn in a horrific and disastrous fashion.
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defensenow · 2 days
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nosferdoc · 3 months
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“I think he has been wrong on nearly every major foreign policy and national security issue over the past four decades.”
— Robert Gates, former Defense Secretary, referring to then Vice President Joe Biden.
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bixels · 6 months
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Always an experience watching the leftism leave FNAF fans when someone mentions that Scott Cawthon financially backed fascist politicians.
The switch from posting hardline leftist tweets about boycotts and signal boosts and critical takedowns of politicians and celebrities to ‘ohhh, well. everyone makes mistakes. who can blame him, listen he. he donated money to gay charities too. that makes it ok! a millionaire in his forties is allowed to have political beliefs. does it even matter? just let it go!’ is whiplash inducing. The antivaxxer celebrities have got to go, but this one horror dev who quietly handed wads of cash to antivax lawmakers? He’s chill, he can stay.
The charity thing is so funny too because suddenly utilitarian positive-negative point counting is the way to go. Maybe an abacus would help calculate the net good of donating to the Trevor Project minus donating thousands of dollars to Mitch McConnell and Donald Trump. -10 points if I push a kid in a lake but +11 points if I help an old lady across the street, so I’m chill. You can’t judge me. Hey, maybe. Just don’t push a kid in the lake period. How fucking low is the bar when we’re excusing maxing out the possible dollar amount of donations to Mitch fucking McConnell. That should be like. Default you’re a bad person.
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compacflt · 5 months
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If you want, and only if you want to, could you explain about making Logistics a big part of Ice's career path? Not only did fit so well with your Ice's characterization, it was just so neat I've made it my HC for Ice's career path.
yes!
I got REALLy deep into the defense policy weeds in this post so I’m putting a cut to save people’s dashboards
1. when i was rewriting chapters 8 &9 last winter i did literally the bare minimum of research about the current set of high-level officers. the commander of the pacific fleet at the time had previously been the director of pacific fleet logistics ordnance & supply. So that was easy to yoink. a proven chain of succession.
2. but also: it fit ice’s (or his alter ego admiral Kazansky’s) neat, orderly, effective, collected, strategic characterization. And as professional tactics go, there would be no better promotion for a high-level officer looking to take over the fleet than DFLOS. understand the fleet by the numbers, you comprehensively understand the fleet.
3. In terms of secret-keeping logistics, ice is supposed to be kind of the best. like, because of his logistical thinking, he & maverick get away with it. Or that’s how I would’ve written it if I were a little smarter. Obviously in practice a bunch of people find out so it’s not great. but the navy AS A WHOLE doesn’t find out.
4. The field of military logistics is rigorously bureaucratic, boring, soulsucking, selfdefeating, notoriously corrupt, and yet entirely necessary for the military to succeed at any level (in the very first draft of WWGATTAI i included a famous US marine corps maxim that most people have heard at some point: “amateurs talk tactics. professionals talk logistics.” but that was literally the only good thing about the original chapter 6 which got entirely rewritten a month after i published it). So logistics as a field of specialization fit in perfectly with my secondary character thesis that rising through the boring bureaucratic ranks of the Navy sucked all the humanity & will to live out of ice one day at a time.
a couple related interesting things that I’ve never talked about on this blog & might never get the chance to again:
a) ice canonically joins the navy as a fighter pilot & ends his career as a glorified bureaucrat. that sucks. obviously the struggle to rise in the ranks is a notoriously cutthroat, political, sleazy business (you do not get to the top of the United States Navy by being nice to people), but i would also not be the first person to say that—for exemplary officers—leadership is an EXPECTATION that can counterbalance someone’s natural drive to excel, if that makes sense. You get promoted because you’re good at something (flying), but you get promoted away from the thing you were good at. There is an extent to which you have to fight for a promotion—but there is also an extent to which commanders above you pick you for the job, suck you up along the pipeline. Loss of agency—a major major component of joining the military—does still apply to upper-level officers.
B) to that end, i am reminded of one quote from Todd Schmidt’s 2023 book “Silent Coup of the Guardians: US Military Elite Influence on National Security.” This is an Army training & doctrine commander speaking: “the military has a lot of two- and three-star senior leaders that were confident, charismatic commanders at the O-6 level. But that’s the end of the story. One in fifty, maybe one in a hundred, truly have what it takes to operate successfully at the strategic level and make a real difference for their service. The problem is that they all tend to think that, since they have stars on their shoulders, they’re the one.” —I’ve been writing ice as “The Chosen One,” the officer unicorn, for two reasons: one, it provides him cover for his illegal relationship (and also asks an interesting chicken-egg question: does he get away with his rlnship because he’s so good, or is he so good JUST to get away with his relationship?); and two, he’s “the chosen one” in canon, i.e. he already has four stars in canon: canonically he is not a mediocre officer. But most officers (cough cough maverick) are not cut out for high-level leadership.
C.) in Thomas E. Ricks’ book “The Generals,” Ricks argues that (at least in the Army) mediocrity in the general/flag officer ranks is unfortunately by design. In WWII, if you were a mediocre officer, you got relieved! You got fired! It’s part of why we won: merciless culling of the general officer ranks! But between WWII and Korea, officer relief began to be associated with shame & wasted resources. Mediocre officers got promoted anyways. The military elite pipeline sucks mediocrity up the chain of command. Ricks blames this issue for (at least the Army’s) shit leadership in every post-WWII war, including but most especially Iraq and Afghanistan. There’s no penalty for mediocrity. That in turn reflects on military strategy (mediocre strategists at the helm) & the outcome of every military foray (mediocre outcomes).
D) additionally. There’s a whole neverending debate in the field of civil-military relations (an extremely interesting field of study btw) about the corporatization of the military—lots of high-level talk over the years of “running the military like a business.” If you get kinda into defense policy like me (am i still antimilitary? Idk! but i CAN easily tell you i am against the navy’s littoral combat ship program! It sucks!) then you will know that the navy is struggling right now on a lot of different fronts (procurement [shipbuilding esp. is a disaster—ford-class carriers are under budget though 👍🏽], recruitment, theatre prioritization, general preparedness, readiness against major adversaries [China in particular]). Simply, the navy is pretty mediocre at the minute. I talk a big game about ice being COMPACFLT & SECNAV, but if those are true, & if he “exists” in our current timeline, or even canon timeline (COMPACFLT in 2020), then he’s complicit in a lot of why the navy is sucking ass right now. He didn’t do his job very well. LOL. So, because I love (especially my version of) ice too much to see his legacy suffer, I am stating for the record that my timeline is a different timeline where ice saves the navy from itself and fixes all its issues & solves all its problems & makes it the pride of the armed forces & the tip of the spear of American defense :) because I said so
E.) unrelated but important. It sounds obvious but it must be said. Ice dies on the job in TGM canon. To the extent that in earlier drafts of the script, not-his-sister-Sarah even points out to maverick that ice is still active duty, in the same breath as she tells him ice is sick again. (A wise move to remove that line.) ice does not resign his commission. Ice does not retire to spend time with his family at the end of his life. Ice dies as commander of the pacific fleet. He dies on the job; he dies FOR the job, bureaucratic as it is. If you were wondering why I wrote ice so dormantly suicidal, it’s because canon (i argue) has made it clear that—since the second ice signed up to be a fighter pilot during the Cold War to the second he died active duty—ice has ALWAYS been ready and willing to die for his honorable Navy career.
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gothicprep · 7 months
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"criticisms of israel are antisemitic" is almost always a defensive derailment of practical policy discussions or criticism of how bibi and his new friends want what's worst for everyone. that said, since the israel-gaza war broke out, i've been seeing a lot of commentary that does legitimately seem antisemitic and it's knotted my stomach a bit.
i wish i could find the tweet again that i'd saw a few days ago, but the initial one was, "pay attention to media bias during this conflict!" with an attached screenshot that said "x number israelis killed, x number gazan palestinians dead". and i see this and i think, fair, fair to pay attention.
he replies to his own tweet with "here's a substack thing i wrote about how israel and hollywood work together to spread pro-israel propaganda" with this very ~graphic design is my passion~ ass art that's the hollywood sign and the israel flag.
look, i watch a lot of movies. some may call it a hobby. but i can't remember the last time i saw a new release that so much as mentioned israel. i know all nations propagandize but this felt really... off.
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oldworldwidgets · 4 months
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got a new laptop case so that means new stickers :]
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workersolidarity · 3 months
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[ 📸 U.S. troops go on patrol at al-Tanf air base in eastern Syria. The Syrian government considers the United States presence in its eastern third as an illegal occupation, and wants U.S. soldiers out of the country.]
🇺🇲⚔️🇸🇾 🪖 🚨
US TO CONSIDER WITHDRAWAL FROM SYRIAN OCCUPATION
The United States is considering a withdrawal of its forces from Syria, according to an article published in Foreign Policy, an online news periodical with ties to the U.S. Defense establishment.
Citing four sources from within the U.S. departments of State and Defense, Foreign Policy claims active internal discussions are ongoing within the Biden administration on a troop withdrawal from Syria, a notoriously illegal occupation of nearly one-third of Syrian territory, which the United States has used to siphon tens of billions of dollars worth of oil out of the country.
The piece was written by senior fellow and director of the Syrian Counterterrorism and Extremism Programs at Middle East Institute, Charles Lister.
The organization itself, the Middle East Institute, is funded by a who's-who of U.S. proxy-governments, Intelligence sources, elite Universities, and giant corporations including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, ExxonMobil, George Soros's Open Societies Foundation, Morgan Stanley, and Princeton University.
The article itself presents the decision on the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria as an impending disaster, warning that the Islamic State is waiting in the wings for an opportunity to take back control over the Levant, with the title of the published article "America is planning to withdraw from Syria- and create a disaster."
Lister warns that the withdrawal should be "cause for significant concern" and that, while no decision has yet been reached by the Biden administration, the White House is "no longer invested in sustaining a mission that it perceives as unnecessary."
"Notwithstanding the catastrophic effect that a withdrawal would have on U.S. and allied influence over the unresolved and acutely volatile crisis in Syria, it would also be a gift to the Islamic State. While significantly weakened, the group is in fact primed for a resurgence in Syria, if given the space to do so," Lister summerized.
Lister claims that the United States's "unprecedented intervention" launched in 2014 by the Obama administration, alongside "80 partner nations," was "remarkably successful," without ever mentioning Iran's intervention to organize a strong resistance to the Islamic State in Iraq, nor the Russian Intervention to strengthen and reinforce Syria's military and air defenses.
Lister claims the situation in Syria is "more complex" than that of Iraq's, adding that "with approximately 900 troops on the ground, the United States is playing an instrumental role in containing and degrading a persistent Islamic State insurgency in northeastern Syria, working alongside its local partners, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)."
Again, Lister ignores the role played by the Russian military in providing air cover and tactical strikes on behalf of the Syrian military, warning that the threat from IS remains a serious cause for concern.
Lister points to a rocket attack launched against a prison maintained by U.S. proxy-forces to warn of the dangers in Syria, elaborating on the heroic defense of the so-called "Syrian Democratic Forces," comprised of a mix of jihadist groups, some with ties to al-Qaeda, that ran amok, sowing chaos and destabilizing Eastern Syria, until the Russian Intervention in September 2015, when U.S. proxy-forces were largely sequestered into the illegally U.S.-occupied territory in the eastern-most third of Syria.
Lister goes on to raise alarms over the security situation in western Syria too, where Syrian government forces, with the help of the Russian military, have since regained control of much of its territory formally under the control of jihadist groups.
"While U.S. troops and their SDF partners have managed to contain the Islamic State’s recovery in Syria’s northeast, the situation is far more concerning to the west—on the other side of the Euphrates River, where the Syrian regime is in control, at least on paper," Lister claims.
Lister, pushing for the U.S. to remain in Syria, says that "In this vast expanse of desert, the Islamic State has been engaged in a slow but methodical recovery, exploiting regime indifference and its inability to challenge a fluid desert-based insurgency."
Lister's alarmism goes on, describing the supposed regrouping of IS in various government-held regions of Syria, even going so far as to claim that the Islamic State has only been quiet in recent months due to employing a strategy of concealing its operations, never pointing to specific examples that might back those claims.
"For the past several years, the Islamic State has purposely concealed its level of operation in Syria, consistently choosing not to claim responsibility for attacks that it was conducting," the article claims, inversely suggesting the absence of activity by the extremist group is actually evidence of their malfeasance.
Lister also claims that the situation in the Gaza Strip is fueling the groups return, stating that the "war in Gaza and a spiraling regional crises are adding fuel to its fire and creating opportunities for the terror group to exploit the situation for its own advantage," without ever giving any concrete examples of how, where and in what way the group is returning, only citing research from his own shadily-funded organization's projects as evidence.
"According to the Counter Extremism Project, in 2023 alone, the Islamic State conducted at least 212 attacks in Syria’s central desert region, killing at least 502 people. As covert threats and overt attacks increase, reports are emerging with increasing frequency of desertions within regime ranks," Lister says.
Lister then claims that the United States is the only thing holding the region together even as he admits there's little the U.S. can do within territories controlled by the Syrian government.
That claim, that the U.S. is the glue holding Syria together, flies in the face of the countless warnings by both the Syrian and Russian governments that say the United States is in fact the source of instability in the region.
"While there is little that U.S. forces can do to alter Islamic State activities within the regime-controlled regions of Syria, U.S. troops are the glue holding together the only meaningful challenge to the Islamic State within a third of Syrian territory. Were that glue to disappear, a significant resurgence in Syria would be all but guaranteed, and a destabilizing spillover into Iraq a certainty."
Interestingly, Lister goes on to point to Iraq as an important player in the future of the Islamic State group, admitting that increased tensions created by the U.S. occupation in Iraq, along with the U.S support for Israel's ongoing genocide in Gaza, is creating a new push in the country to remove U.S. forces from Iraq by its parliament, creating a supposed opening for extremist groups in the region.
Lister puts the blame squarely on Iran for these openings, and for Iraq's growing impatience with Washington, adding that a troop withdrawal would be a bad idea, even invoking the collapse of U.S. proxy-forces in Afghanistan to warn of the dangers of a troop withdrawal from Syria.
"Ultimately, events since October have placed the U.S. deployment in northeast Syria on a fraying thread—hence recent internal consideration of a Syria withdrawal," Lister says, adding that "Given the disastrous consequences of the hurried exit from Afghanistan in 2021 and the impending U.S. election later this year, it is hard to grasp why the Biden administration would be considering a withdrawal from Syria."
Lister concludes that "no matter how such a withdrawal was conducted, it would trigger chaos and a swift surge in terror threats."
"There can be no denying the clear sense in policy circles that it is being actively considered—and that it has been accepted as an eventual inevitability," Lister claims.
Lister emphasized that anyone considering a collaborative approach with the Syrian government are making a big mistake, because "that would not only be a phenomenal boon to the Islamic State, but simply impossible on its own terms."
Lister explained that "part of the SDF may have periodic contact with Assad’s regime, but they are far from natural allies. The regime would never allow the SDF to sustain itself, and Turkey would do everything possible to kill what remained [of Washington's proxies]."
"The last time that the Islamic State surged in Syria, in 2014, it transformed international security in profoundly negative ways. Should a U.S. withdrawal precipitate a return to Islamic State chaos, we will be relegated to mere observers, unable to return to a region that we will have placed squarely under the control of a pariah regime and its Russian and Iranian allies."
#source
#OnListersOrganizationsFinances
@WorkerSolidarityNews
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moki-dokie · 3 months
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how to make 19 year old boy who came of age during the pandemic and never had a real real job before now realize he needs to Chill The Fuck Out and be Less eagar about working for free holy shit he is impossible to wrangle
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craycraybluejay · 6 months
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Some people have a skewed idea of the difference between self-defense and revenge, and you can immediately tell they've never had to seriously defend themselves from an ongoing threat to their life and livelihood.
#also revenge is valid anyway#but thats not my point#literally its always 'just ignore it' and 'learn to deal' and 'move on' and 'dont fight back'#when someone throws the first punch#right up until someone actually dies#and then its all#'i never couldve seen that coming'#'thats so horrible! i wish someone was there to help them'#'wow that was very unexpected'#as with suicide so the same with abuse and even just general toxicity#everyone turns the other cheek and criticizes 'bad victims' until they are dead#at which point they 'mourn' them and act like it was such a big surprise#bad victims#fight mode forever. either i survive or we both die 👍#self defense isnt just the classic someone currently is trying to engage me in a gun fight#self defense is not taking any kind of beating sitting down. its showing people that youre not scared to hit back harder#bullying is an easy example. they will not leave you alone if you 'just ignore them' but will try harder to make u kys#but they just might leave you alone if you deck one of them in the face so hard their nose will never look the same again.#sometimes if you're lucky all you have to do is set a precedent-- an example of your no bullshit policy#and you get rid of several potential threats at once. like a group of bullies#other times people aren't so aware of each other so you will have to fight for yourself again#and you WILL have to do it. because the people who should be doing it dor you are closing their eyes and deciding to see nothing#listen. its not enough to go through the motions and hope to survive. you have to be motivated to love yourself enough to protect yourself#there is nothing in the world more freeing than to say 'i deserve better than this' and smash some heads#sometimes metaphorically sometimes literally#you are worth it#you do not deserve to be bullied abused betrayed talked down to etc.#and if someone decides to make you feel lesser than you do it back. they decide to hit you hit back.#obv not always the course of action if theyre a lot stronger than u or have something rly serious over u#but at every real opportunity fight like hell
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mariacallous · 1 year
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wartakes · 9 months
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"What Should It Look Like?" Part I: The Big Picture (OLD ESSAY)
This essay was first posted on November 10th, 2021, and is the first in my "What Should It Look Like?" series that I'm still working to complete to this day (lol).
The jist of the "What Should It Look Like?" series is assuming that (eventually) get some kind of more equitable, democratic socialist society in America, is what kind of foreign and defense policy we forge from that and what kind of military force we build to carry it out and how its different (and in some cases, not that different) from what we have today. This first entry established the overarching assumptions for the series before the following segments drill down into the different military domains and spheres of warfare.
(Full essay below the cut).
Everyone has their weird little hyper fixations or odd things that are soothing or enjoyable to think about but that make other people arch and eyebrow. For me, a big one of those is thinking about military structures and organization. That’s been the case for me thinking about things both in real life in regard to my actual job or my work here, and also as a hobby when I think about writing stories or doing worldbuilding or what have you. It’s just my thing.
Inevitably, over the past year or so as I’ve approached the topics of war and military matters from a left perspective, I’ve found myself wondering to myself or talking with like-minded folks I know about how existing military structures and organization should be changed, replaced, or just killed with fire under a more just and equitable system. It’s something I’ve wanted to write about for a long time and have hinted at in bits and pieces before, but have continuously had to push back because inevitably some new crisis or conflict emerges that I feel compelled to write about while the iron is still hot. Finally, I decided there is no time like the present and I should at least get started on it.
This essay will be the first in a series of essays on how I think the United States Armed Forces should be structured and organized if it were under a government and overall socioeconomic system that didn’t make me want to crawl into a corner and cry several times a day about how we are living in a dogshit timeline. I knew from the beginning that there was no way in hell I was going to be able to cram everything I wanted to write about into one essay if I wanted to do it all justice, so I’ll be dividing up this study across about a half a dozen parts or so in the coming months. It will likely be interrupted by current events here and there, as with how things are currently going in the world, I don’t expect the madness to slow down anytime soon. But I’m going to keep fitting in chapters of this series where I can until its done.
With that in mind, I felt a fitting place to start in the first chapter of this series is to address the big picture items that you need if you’re going to design – or re-design – a military force. Once we get that out of the way, in the ensuring chapters we’ll look at each of the military services or major components of the Joint Force and the ways in which they would change to fit a different strategy and overall mentality of not only the military, but the people that it serves. So, without further ado, let’s get started.
Strategy: Let’s Try Not to Be Dicks
If I learned one useful thing about national security in two very expensive years of graduate education and more than a few years working in the field, you can’t structure and build a military force without first thinking of a strategy (I mean, you can, but it probably will fail or not be very useful in the end).
Strategy is the point from which everything else flows in military thinking, laying out the main objectives that a country or entity seeks to accomplish, as well as the overall big-picture approach to achieving them. Once you have a strategy, you then need to visualize some of the most likely scenarios that may occur in the course of executing it. Then, from there, you can actually start thinking about how you will plan out and then develop and build an effective military force to fight and succeed in those scenarios in service of the strategy (and most importantly for a different mentality about this, the people it’s meant to protect). I’m simplifying and abstracting this process a lot for those of you who don’t live among the DoD PowerPoints like I do (don’t cry for me I’m already dead) but that’s the basic idea at the end of the day.
So, in a better world, what would be the main U.S. defense strategy?
In contemporary times, every U.S. administration will put out a series of different defense and security related strategies. These include a National Defense Strategy (NDS) that hits on the high level national security objectives, a National Military Strategy (NMS) that explains how the military will implement the objectives laid out in the NDS. For purposes of our conversation I’m gonna kinda mesh them bother together (I don’t really see why they need to be separate anyway).
The objectives listed within the NDS range from straightforward and obvious to very much open-ended and murky (which leaves a lot of room open for interpretation), as well as ranging from practical and sensible to openly imperialistic. We can see this in the most recently published NDS from the Trump administration in 2018 (the Biden administration is still working on their replacement, though they’ve thrown together some interim guidance). For example, “defending the homeland from attack” has been in every National Defense Strategy in recent memory and seems both straightforward and like something we should be doing. Meanwhile, “sustaining Joint Force military advantages, both globally and in key regions” could be taken to mean a lot of things to anyone. And don’t even get me started on “Maintaining favorable regional balances of power in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere.” Oof.
So, in the better world we hope for, where President Leftist has just been elected with his/her/their big lefty Congressional majority or whatever, what should the objectives be? I’m not going to list out a dozen different objectives or more like there usually is in an NDS because I could spend days pacing around my room just trying to figure out what those should be and frankly a lot of those will change reflective of the time a strategy is written in. But what I can do is think of a few, key objectives that will likely be enduring throughout time and offer some a persistent reference point from which other objectives would come and go in future iterations of the strategy.
To identify a few key objectives, I think back to some of my earliest essays and the main themes that have persisted throughout them. Fundamentally, as a defense strategy, I feel that it should actually be truly defensive. Moreover, it should not seek to only defend territory and certainly not be intended defend nebulous “interests” abroad. At its core, the strategy should be about defending people and the means that they need in order to survive and lead happy and fulfilling lives free from fear. We should be seeking to do this not only in our own country, obviously, but in other countries too. Essentially, wherever a people come under unprovoked, unjustified, uncalled for armed aggression, we should be prepared to offer assistance and to provide it if the people under attack accept our help. In past essays I have referred to this more politely as the “Don’t Start None, Won’t Be None” strategy, and less politely as the “Fuck Around and Find Out” strategy (choose whatever one you’d rather say among friends, I’m gonna go with the saltier one because of reasons).
More than anything, this would be a strategy not about “interests” but about people and principles, chief among them being the principle of solidarity with people around the world. As part of that solidarity, we should also support those throughout the world that want to live under a better system. I should be careful to say this should not involve invasions, occupations and regime change, nor should it involve working to incite or provoke rebellions, uprisings and civil wars through covert action and manipulation. But what I do mean is when a people in a given place decide that they have had enough, are denied peaceful ways of enacting change for the better and are left no choice but to turn to force of arms against forces of authoritarianism and fascism in order to create a better more just system to live under, we should be ready and willing to support them in their struggle. The choice to embark on this path must lie with the people in question and the support we offer should be aimed at enabling them to achieve what they want instead of dictating to them how and what they should be doing.
That same logic should apply to supporting nations and peoples across the globe in a “steady state” peacetime environment. The United States and other countries often pay lip service to the idea of allies, but only when allies align with our interests. Instead, we should be supporting allies based on shared principles. We should be supporting those with similar systems who value the same principles we do – the principles that often also get paid lip service to but would be great if we actually lived up to them. Principles like true democracy and self-determination, justice in every sense of the word and for all peoples, freedom – not simply to do certain things, but freedom also from want, fear, privation, etc. We should be supporting other nations, not only by pledging to stand beside them in battle should they ever request it, but also by doing our best to help them stand on their own two feet and defend themselves so it may not be necessary for us to come to help in the first place. We shouldn’t be keeping allies on a short leash or turning everything into a quid pro quo situation of “what can you do for me”. We should be helping them because it’s the right thing to do (there’s that whole “solidarity” thing again).
This whole strategic concept is kind of ironic because I realized after the fact that it reminds me a lot of the realist (realist in the I.R. theory sense) concept of “offshore balancing” that’s been around for a while but really came into vogue in the immediate post-Cold War period (I’m sorry to link Wikipedia here but I really cannot find a good source that isn’t behind a paywall, because my field is truly inclusive and welcoming to all lmao). Under offshore balancing, a great power would maintain a sort of informal federalist empire and avoid deploying its own military forces forward to the maximum extent possible by providing certain key actors in regions of interest (ex: Europe, Southwest Asia, Northeast Asia) with economic and military support as long as they act in accordance with the great power’s interests. Under offshore balancing, the great power at the epicenter of the empire “passes the buck” to its local agents to deal with regional conflicts, only intervening itself when it absolutely has to in order to minimize the cost to itself.
Now obviously this is extremely fucky and imperialistic almost by admission. But what we’ve come up with here is actually fairly similar in structure, but completely different in purpose. Again, the key here is not interests, but principles. The state at the center of this web in our system is not trying to act as the heart of an empire – in fact, it would be trying not to be the center of a web at all. It would be supporting local powers to better defend themselves because that would benefit everyone involved in terms of safety and stability and would be doing so without preconditions (aside from maybe encouragement to continue on with reforms to make a more free and fair society if it is a country that is still in a transition from a previously more authoritarian existence). The goal would be to create a series of interlocking hubs and spokes of like-minded states and peoples that are supporting one another in being independent and self sufficient in their defense, but also stand ready to intervene on their behalf should that become absolutely necessary. In that case, the strategic concept supporting the Fuck Around and Find Out overall strategy is less Offshore Balancing and more Offshore Solidarity. Yes, I know way too much international relations theory for my own good. How could you tell?
Remember the ‘90s?
Ok, so we have a strategy. But we can’t get to the fun stuff of tanks, jets, ships, brigades and etc. just yet. Because before we can get to those details, we need to think about what executing this strategy would mean in practice in a broad way. We need to think about what the force as a whole would need to do in order to carry out the key points of the strategy before we can think about what it would need in terms of system and units to support it.
An important thing to keep in mind when attempting to build a force is no that no military force can cover every single potential military eventuality you may encounter. It’s just quite simply impossible to think of every possible conflict you may find yourself in, and even if you could, you wouldn’t be able to be fully prepared to excel in all of them. Even the United States military now, spending more money than God on its capabilities, isn’t capable of winning everywhere all the time at everything (as this summer probably made painfully obvious). This is where scenarios come into play, forcing us to think about the most likely and plausible instances in which we will find ourselves on the battlefield. By necessity and for practicality’s sake, you’re going to end up having to make trade-offs when building a force, assuming risk in one area in order to be stronger and more effective in another. Obviously, these are tough choices to make, and will depend a great deal on the types of situations you anticipate your force ending up in. So, that begs the question, under this hypothetical strategy, what do we see our force doing?
We’ve already fleshed this out some in the strategy itself – as well as in past essays – but we can add a bit more granularity here. The main recurring scenario, as I’ve described before, that seems to come to mind when I’m thinking of the Fuck Around and Find Out strategy is when a hostile nation (we’ll say Country A) launches an unwarranted attack on a neighbor (Country B). For purposes of our planning, we’ll assume this attack is going balls to the wall and Country A has the intent of fully invading, occupying and forcibly integrating Country B. We’ll assume also for the sake of our planning that Country A isn’t a small country with a bottom tier military, but at least a regional power with a fairly robust military capability across multiple domains.
Thankfully for my own sake here, I don’t have to work from scratch with visualizing this, because some of this work has been done for me before in a far-off time known as the “1990s.” Several studies were done on this type of war in that mystical hyperpower period of the “end of history” that occurred between the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 when the U.S. military was trying to find out what the fuck to do without itself in the coming decades. One such study undertaken by the RAND Corporation from 1993, examined the changing role of airpower in what they called “major regional conflicts” – with their primary example being a hypothetical Gulf War style conflict in Southwest Asia against an abstracted Iraq or Iran sized adversary (at least they had the good sense in this study to make it abstract or that potentially could have been awkward later on down the line let me tell you).
While it pains me to say this, a Gulf War style scenario – both the actual one and the one outlined in this study – is a pretty good reference point for what we want to do under this strategy in terms of actual operational execution. Now, obviously, as good leftists, we want to do this without helping out several corrupt and authoritarian oil-rich absolute monarchies in the process (and the oil companies of course) and also try to commit little or no war crimes as we do it (I would hope). But in terms of the operational goals and execution, it’s a pretty decent blueprint. Now, things we’ll change for us looking out into the future in terms of the exact capabilities and systems brough to bear, and its exact application would change based on the location and adversary involved, but we’re talking about the same basic thing: enemy invades country and occupies it, we move in and liberate the country and forcing the enemy out. Politics aside, it’s a pretty damn good framework (ok that’s the last of my praise for now I swear).
Now, assuming you want to halt and roll back the invasion that is occurring before the enemy can complete it, a number of pieces are required and need to fall into place at certain times. RAND’s scenario – as does mine – assumes no US forces being forward deployed when the attack occurs (though for some reason ‘no’ doesn’t account for an entire fucking carrier battle group, which they consider ‘modest’, but whatever I guess – I’m going to assume ACTUALLY nothing). This means right off the bat that air forces – as they tend to be in modern warfare – are crucial. Air forces are the forces that will be able to reach the war zone the fastest and have the most immediate impact. This includes – but is not limited to – fighters that establish the air superiority that all other functions will occur under the umbrella of, attack aircraft to work to slow down or stop enemy ground advances (and eventually assist friendly ground forces in a counter-attack), ISR collection aircraft to get a better picture of the situation, and of course transport aircraft bringing in the first waves of troops and equipment to support allies and assist in stopping the enemy advance and establishing a defensive line until heavier forces arrive.
This leads into the types of ground forces you’ll need as well. Obviously, you’ll need some forces that are light enough to be airlifted quickly into a conflict area and achieve enough mass and have enough capabilities to be able to work with local forces to stop – or at least slow down – a numerically superior enemy advance. However, you’ll then need to be able to bring heavy mechanized and armored forces to bear that will pack the firepower, protection and mobility necessary to push back enemy forces out of friendly territory. These forces will need to be backed up by long range fires, as well as all the less sexy aspects of warfare, including logistics, medical, and other support that you don’t usually see in action movies and video games.
And of course, if you want to move heavy forces into the theater, you’re going to need sealift (not unless you want to be flying in tanks two at a time on constantly running transport flights, which is not ideal). Even if the country you’re trying to help is landlocked, if you want to get in the bulk of the equipment and materiel you’ll need to fight a major war – which is all heavy as fuck, it’ll have to come by boat and then move overland. That means, in addition to sealift capacity, you’ll need some naval forces to make sure said sealift gets from point A to point B in one piece – especially if the enemy you’re fighting has a navy of their own. If the opposition does have their own navy, you’ll also need your own navy to ensure the enemy can’t use their own navy to launch attacks on your forces in all domains. Even if the enemy doesn’t have a navy, naval forces still bring another means of delivering long range fires on target (for reasons I’m about to get into).
Long-range attack from the air and sea becomes all the more important if the enemy has a robust anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) network of anti-air, anti-ship and surface-to-surface missiles, attempting to block you from bringing in forces to the fight. That importance is further accentuated if the enemy succeeds in the invasion and this operation becomes a war of liberation to free the ally under occupation, with the enemy having time to move their A2/AD assets into the occupied territory to solidify their gains. This is also another reason why air forces are so important in the same regard. Firing long range missiles from ships and planes outside the “bubble” of A2/AD may end up be one of your only ways of being able to “pop” the bubble or make a crack in the dome, allowing you to flow forces in to help your ally. That, or finding ways to get inside that bubble without your enemy being none the wiser. It’s a tough nut to crack.
But I’m starting to get ahead of myself here, as this is all stuff I’m going to talk about as I get deeper into the different domains and services in subsequent essays. There’s also lot of other capabilities I haven’t mentioned because they don’t necessarily have to be flowed into the theater (like space assets, cyber, information warfare, and etc.) that will all play a critical role in any campaign as well, and they’ll be getting their due later too. I also kind of hand waved all the support elements that would be necessary to focus on the sexy, pointy things, but rest assured they’ll be covered as well and are crucially important. But I wanted to first give you a big picture idea of the kinds of key things you’d need in order to carry out this Gulf War style campaign to stop the invasion of a friendly country, roll it back, and also destroy enough of the enemy’s capabilities to ensure that they wouldn’t be able to try that shit again for a while (fuck around and find out, after all).
The Stage is Set and the Game is Afoot
Well, we have the beginnings of a strategy and at least one supporting concept for it. We also have a rough idea of what I think would be a pretty likely scenario that would be carried out under the auspices of that strategy. I think we have a ball game, folks.
Now, this isn’t the only scenario that could happen, but as I said before you can’t plan for everything and this is also only our first foray into this adventure. What I tried to do here was throw out something that seemed like it would be the most plausible and also fairly stressing. There are a few other edge cases that may occur. I’ve mentioned before the possibility of intervening in an internal conflict to prevent a genocide – that may bring some unique difficulties. Likewise, you could fight a conflict like the one I laid out against an even more powerful nation. But I only have so much space to work with and so many hours in the day, so I just threw out what seemed like a plausible, believable scenario – both in the past, but also under the hypothetical system that we’re imagining here.
I also want to point out that obviously this isn’t going to be as robustly researched and analytically rigorous as a well-polished research report or book. Honestly? I’d love to do something like that and maybe someday I will. But between my day job and my other hobbies and responsibilities, I’ll need to stick a pin in that for now and reach for what’s possible. Rest assured I’ll do my best not to talk completely out of my ass and back up my assertions with what I can find in terms of supporting research. Some folks will obviously disagree with my conclusions and that’s fine. I welcome some constructive feedback. In fact, that’s the only way things like this work. When you just get one person – or several succumbing to groupthink – working on these sorts of things and carrying them out, well, that’s how you get just about every U.S. military and foreign policy failure since ever in the history of ever. So, I look forward to feedback from friends and comrades as I continue on in this series.
Unless you’re just gonna be a dick about it and lecture to me about how drones are going to solve everything or whatever. In that case: lol lmao.
Well, I think I’ve pretty much run out of gas on this for now. Next time I return to this series, we’ll be starting to get into what each of the services or key domains of warfare would need to look like to make all of this happen – starting with everyone’s favorite green machine: the Army. Until then: stay safe, stay alert, and remember to log off once in a while.
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defensenow · 10 days
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carewyncromwell · 10 months
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"You try to be cool -- you look like a fool to me..."
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As Chiara finished reading the letter, a loud thud resonated from the table. Both [Chiara and Carewyn] looked to see Diego's head faced down on the table, his teacup knocked over on the side. Muttering could be heard, yet he dared not to make any movements. "Uh, Sire…?" Chiara called, Borf walking over to the King before nudging his foot. "Are you okay?" More mumbling from the King. "That's twice…twice I messed up my impression to her…stupid Diego, how could you be so stupid?!" ~"Flowers for Your Garden," a ficlet by @ariparri
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HPHM Cardverse AU developed by @ariparri​ // Carewyn's dress inspiration
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LMAO, I'm sorry -- while reading Ari's recent drabble about Diego trying and failing to court Veruca, I just was consumed with this overwhelming urge to draw this part during my breaks at work today. 😂 ​Poor boy really cannot win, can he? It's just like him trying and failing to befriend Carewyn when they first met, except worse.
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I'm sorry, but the idea of Drama King Diego embracing his inner Tamaki Suou and just having the most over-the-top, anime-esque reactions to things just cracks me the hell up. 🤣 Don't worry, Diego -- the Host Club king eventually "gets the girl" in the end too! Hang in there!!
Much love, Ari!! And to everyone else, hope you have a lovely evening! xoxo
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appendingfic · 4 days
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Britta drags the study group into defending Metal against charges that he has violated Greendale's new policy on using AI to write papers
"I try to avoid having to defend people who are demonstrably guilty, Britta!"
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jvzebel-x · 6 months
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🦋
#seeing idiots phrase things re:biden as 'bUt TrUmP wOuLd bE wOrSe' 'hEd dO tHe SaMe tHiNg BuT kIlL pPl hErE tOo--'#makes me feel filthy. just reading the thought process makes me feel like i bathed in blood.#remember when biden first took office&ppl (ESP ppl from places w history being torn the fuck apart by usamerican presidents+policy)#were openly trepidatious about it bc trump had gone thru 2 separate secretary of defenses (one of which was fucking mad dog mattis)#specifically bc hes a toddler who couldnt sit thru meetings about international policy#while biden already had A Lot of history that left international blood all over his fucking hands#&ppl SCREAMED about 'WUT ABOUT US???? SO YOU JUST THINK WE SHOULD ALL DIE??? YOU JUST THINK WE SHOULD LET TRUMP KILL US ALL???'#'WE'RE JUST TRYING TO SAVE OURSELVES--'#the selfishness was palpable&disgusting when it was happening&seeing ppl in real time transmit that feeling directly into#'yeah theres a genocide going on BUT THINK ABOUT WHAT WE HAVE TO GO THRU WHAT YOU THINK TRUMP WOULD BE BETTER???#YOU WANT US ALL DEAD??? YOURE ALL SO MEAN. >:('#makes me feel disgust that i usually reserve exclusively for pigs+billionaires.#im glad nothing ever disappears on the internet. i hope these cunts are haunted by their centrism in the times that come.#palestine will be free and when historical revisionism tries to make all these ppl feel better about themselves by downplaying#their complicity in this horror there will be no running from their own fucking record of selfishness.
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