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aeide-thea · 1 year

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very much an off-the-cuff post so there may well be bugs, i'm still workshopping my thinking here, but—

i seem to see posts fairly regularly in which a member of some marginalized group A is objecting to attempts by less marginalized group B to make connections between discrimination against A and harm experienced by B (the main thing i have in mind here is when people attempt to align themselves with visibly-trans people by pointing out the ways that transphobic legislation also impacts gnc cis people, theatrical crossdressing, &c, but there are definitely also examples along other axes)—

and like. the main objection i've seen from A is 'why do they have to connect my experience to their experience in order to care about it? why can't they just agree that i shouldn't be discriminated against as a matter of, like, compassion for fellow humanity?'

and this reaction does honestly always just seem a little, idk, naive to me?? like, i don't know, it's gotten very popular ime to complain about normies' clumsy attempts to Understand Instead of Just Accepting [this feels potentially linked to like. the way many of us now prefer silently clicking 'like' to producing our own original, maybe clumsy, responses? but don't @ me on that point], probably because a lot of the time they aren't genuinely seeking to Understand but just to point out all the ways our queerness &c doesn't fit their received (unexaminedly conservative) understanding of the world, which feels to us (very reasonably!) like renewed pressure from the establishment to make ourselves fit that established framework, and so we resist… but at the same time, idk, maybe i'm just outing myself as lesser-than-thou here, but for every sort of person i was raised to distrust and have since arrived at genuine loving acceptance/appreciation of, it's involved first coming to understand their frame of reference at least a little? not to say that there isn't a place for shutting up and listening while you're still working to understand, because there definitely is! but i do kind of think this idea that's become popular in certain liberal circles of like, 'you don't have to understand my experience, you just have to respect it,' is fine and true for keeping peace with strangers, but really isn't a recipe for winning friends or influencing people—it's a recipe for keeping people at arm's length where they can't hit you. and then people turn around and want to apply that rule to coalition-building, and get all shocked-pikachu-face when others seek to identify more active points of connection.

...

another ~Radical Objection to Liberal Approaches~ i've seen, though often not specifically in this context (of discussing the way attempts to oppress A have knock-on effects for B), is like—'there's no point in deconstructing their logic because it's fundamentally illogical! insert that sartre quote abt anti-semites!' and like. no, there's absolutely no point in debating their logic with them. but fundamentally when people assert a logical resistance to bigoted positions they are not doing it to Own The Bigots, imo, or at any rate shouldn't be; they're (we're) doing it to reaffirm the basis of their/our own camp's position, namely, we see your knee-jerk fears and reject them; we substitute instead a patient allegiance to logic, that reasons its way into compassion.

that said, obviously there's a conversation to be had here about, like, platforming bad positions, and to what extent deconstructing them is implicitly platforming them! but. i do think that complaining that logic won't win over bigots is missing the very fundamental point that the logic isn't for the bigots: it's for us. we're talking to ourselves; we're affirming ourselves. and yeah, we need to understand that this sort of intra-party discussion doesn't, on its own, constitute sufficient activism! messages need to be communicated beyond the bounds of the party! but i do think i disagree that there's no place for it.

#anyway i'm just sticking this all under a cut bc it got very long and i didn't arrive at a nice tidy overarching conclusion #but i guess i just think like. i'm not convinced that resisting people's attempts to understand a struggle as linked with theirs #is ever going to be a strategy that makes any sense—#i just think it's coming from a place of woundedness that wants its pain to be Seen and Matter In Itself #and not get ignored until someone else is also impacted #and like. that's SO emotionally valid! god! but also like. that's feelings and not a basis for politics???#and the second point here—#which honestly could've been its own post; i was just thinking abt the two points together bc i saw a post that made them together—#really feels to me like. showing up at an internal org meeting and then complaining that it doesn't constitute effective public messaging #like yeah‚ people pass posts around on here that aren't gonna convince conservatives #but like. (a) how much convincing of conservatives do you really think is gonna happen on tumblr anyway?#and also (b) then make your own posts that *are* angled at convincing conservatives! or‚ you know‚ do something that isn't posting!#(in b4 'some of us have disabilities' yeah‚ me too! i emailed my representatives the other day! there's stuff you can do!)#but like. everybody just wants to critique other people's efforts (and obviously as per this very post i'm not immune!)#when it's like. most of what we're doing *isn't* activism—what it could be is the tentative social basis for a real coalition #on which activism could then be founded #but most of us would rather suspiciously snipingly in-fight than let these tentative social filaments thicken into binding ties!#anyway. a great example of a post by someone with adhd that will probably be prohibitively difficult for other ppl with adhd to read!

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ardentperfidy · 6 months

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#it's both kind of funny and genuinely shocking #how many self proclaimed leftists there are i see on here and social media more broadly #who nonetheless wholeheartedly buy in to this almost fukuyama-n sense of american power #this stated or implied sense that if american elites wanted something to happen in the world it would happen #and look to be clear i disagree wholeheartedly with biden's handling of the ongoing genocide in palestine right now #it's clear that the US does have plenty of leverage it could be using and isn't #but it's so silly to me that people can't also see the us isn't running this show #instead like. the us is a declining imperial power #that's already shown it can't reliably project sufficient power to secure its preferred policies in the middle east #and it now has an unruly fascist-trending semi-client state armed with nuclear weapons #with substantial cultural and financial influence on us domestic politics #and the aspiring fascist leader of which has made sure to maintain significant ties with other far-right/fascist leaders like putin #and when the us has given the SMALLEST amount of pushback israeli officials have just straight up refused and contradicted it #that's why you've got israeli ambassadors giving interviews just fully admitting there will be no two state solution #biden administration pushes for timelines and bibi goes on tv and says nah #i fear we rightfully critiqued the lack of ethics in realpolitik and then forgot to inject a sense of reality into a politics based on ethi #*ethics #anyway rant over will probably delete later

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maybeilikenumbers · 1 year

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Reflection: On the Social Contract

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in On the Social Contract, writes on the nature of freedom, oppression, humanity, and government, outlining the “social compact” as a means to measure and attain what he values most in polity—independence. Rousseau critiques his contemporaries, particularly Hugo Grotius, for sophist justifications of slavery, criticizing their understanding of power and politics, and contending that the ultimate sovereign authority for any state lies in the collectivized will of its people.

Rousseau begins his work with a brief, poetic description of the human condition regarding independence—“Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains”—an eloquent phrase outlining the nature of social existence: only in one’s infancy is the individual unshackled from their social obligations (141). At face value, law and order would seem to be the enemy of autonomous agency in light of this observation. This extends beyond the level of the individual. Society is as shackled in its growing into maturity as the persons who constitute it, according to the philosopher. This imprisonment is avertable, though, and the author resolves to construct a mechanism by which a state may orient itself according to the united will of its people, referred to as the “social compact.” To more fully understand this, an examination of Rousseau’s ethic of force is requisite.

Interstitial to On the Social Contract is a striking critique of unexamined Machiavellian notions of force and power. Rousseau targets the work of Hugo Grotius, in particular, as an example of the philosophical inadequacies of such a base understanding of social order. The first four chapters of Book I (Subject of the First Book, Of the First Societies, On the Right of the Strongest, and On Slavery) are dedicated to dismantling such naturalist positions that justify the “right to rule” on the basis of force alone. He writes, “Grotius denies that all human power is established for the benefit of the governed, citing slavery as an example. His usual method of reasoning is always to present fact as a proof of right. A more logical method could be used, but not one more favorable to tyrants” (142). This reveals a few of Rousseau’s primary complaints: that his contemporaries 1) confuse status quo for status potissimus, making out the current state of affairs to be equivalent to a perfect (or at least reasonable state), and 2) do so in favor of their own self-interest, as a political action that substitutes a conscientious desire for good with a cowardly craving for security, acting much like the tyrants who they tacitly support. Rousseau asserts his aversion to this framework, noting that inequality does not stem from innate qualities of persons, but rather that “force has produced the first slaves.” [1]

Grotius’s position seems to follow a misguided line of reasoning about just acts in war, which Grotius uses to construct an understanding of compliance and obligation that makes the two synonymous. He concludes that, in war, one man has a right to kill another, and exercises that right through force. Grotius then notes that a more “legitimate” act, in such conditions, is the enslavement of the overpowered adversary, because it allows for more “profit” to both parties. [2] Further, he derives from this so-called legitimate act in war a privatized right of those in power to dictate the actions of those who fall prey to them, and considers the impulse to obey such commands to be the slave’s moral duty. Rousseau finds this argument to be ill-devised, in large part because war is divorced from the individual’s moral capacity—it stems from the state; a state cannot enslave a people since it is, by nature, composed of those people. Rather, should a people be oppressed under a state’s authority, that state is ruled by private opinion, by the minority, and is no longer a legitimate extension of such oppressed peoples’ moral power. Rousseau asserts that this state is not sovereign, or even a nation in any real sense: regarding this, he argues, “I see nothing but a master and slaves; I do not see a people and its leader. It is, if you will, an aggregation, but not an association. There is neither a public good nor a body politic there” (147). Persons under this condition have been robbed of their right to autonomy and cannot, as such, possess a duty to their masters. Still, Grotius’s standpoint contends that slaves have donated their right to life and must adhere to the mandates of their oppressors independently (i.e. as moral agents), as a pseudo-indemnification to repay their captors for their continued vital state.

Grotius’s rationale is ironic, since it posits a “donation” of rights that nevertheless indebts the donor to their charitable recipient. Moreover, in a state of war, the principle right at stake for the citizen is their life, and autonomy by extension, yet Grotius does not consider the ethical liability relinquished alongside its source. Again, he confuses the prima facie state of things (that a slave apparently has a duty to obey a master) with the correct state of things (that a slave is obligated, through force).

This, of course, is a shallow argument, and fails to consider the relative moral weight of obedience compared to duty. The former, Rousseau contends, is morally empty; in On Slavery, he writes, “Removing all liberty from [a person]’s will is tantamount to removing all morality from his actions” (145). One cannot consider themselves to be a complete moral agent if they’ve surrendered their agency. Since liberty is necessary for any person to consider their thoughts, actions, and duties to be rational, sound, and binding, such a person, in Rousseau’s eyes, has surrendered not only their agency, but their own moral burden as well.

Rousseau’s introductory statement is further developed in this—one shackled under the yoke of society is free from some moral burden beneath it, as their ethical instrumentality is limited. To exemplify this, one may consider that a person who does not belong to a collective justice system may have a proper burden to seek retribution should another commit a crime against them. However in a body politic, this otherwise just act is criminalized as vigilantism and substituted with a systemic means of seeking restitution limited by a right to due process, afforded by some sovereign body. We will discuss this example at greater length later, as it gives additional insight into the nature of Rousseau’s argument. For now, it serves to illustrate that the subject in question emancipates themselves from their burden of retribution by their collaboration with their body politic.

Grotius has a response to this—he notes that a people can choose subjugation in giving themselves over to a particular sovereign. From this, Rousseau dissolves his opponent’s claims as, he points out, in order for a people to choose to collectively become subjects, they must be a collective in the first place. This is implicit in Grotius’s claim, and Rousseau finds common ground here to establish a “true foundation of society” (147). From this, Rousseau begins a positive construction of his social compact wherein the state of nature’s limitations on humanity’s maintained existence are overcome through an “alter[ed] mode of existence” (147). Of course, this mode of existence ought to preserve the goods inherent to the state of nature, in particular, freedom. To accomplish this, Rousseau composes the following basis for a proper, reasonable society: treating each person’s will as a variable which is optimized summarily with their peers, a society exists when this sum maximizes, positing a basis for sovereignty contingent on a sort-of “Pareto Optimality” of freedom. The philosopher refers to this maximal state as the “general will." Put in simpler terms, “true” society arises when each person acts in their greatest free capacity, insofar as that capacity does not, on the whole, inhibit the will of another, and limits on peoples’ will are agreeable if each person’s most possible free state is actualized by those limitations. [3]

Returning to the previous example, the person who forgoes their right to retribution in exchange for a right to due process has not given up much freedom on the whole but ensures that, by their sacrifice (and the sacrifice of each member of their state), the whole of society affords greater freedom by means of a fair justice system, where revenge and retribution are not as readily confused. Further, by unshackling that person from the duty to enact retribution, moral culpability for the action is the whole of that society's, motivating it and empowering it to construct systems that should be more capable of fulfilling those moral obligations bestowed upon it by the surrendered agency of its constituents.

Rousseau does not consider the general will to be a guiding moral principle. It is, at most, a means to test the validity of governance. This is clear in Book II, Chapter VIII, entitled On the People, where Rousseau considers that a people may freely choose vice, even collectively, and still act according to the general will, citing King Minos in Crete as a good lawmaker who “disciplined nothing but a vice-ridden people.” Of course, Rousseau considers this to be the exception, rather than the rule. Rousseau regresses in his argument when evaluating this case, proclaiming that a nation where the general will covets evil and has already undergone violent reform, needs a “master,” since “liberty can be acquired, but it can never be recovered” (166).

This notion is applied by Rousseau axiomatically, and (unsurprisingly) stirs up controversy. For one, astute readers will point to many nations which have undergone successive revolutions, such as France, China, Germany, etc.. This is an understandable misconstruction. The nations, at each of those revolutionary junctures, take on the same name as their predecessor, giving the illusion of continuity. Should the peoples’ general will allow it, they may even take on some of the same laws and customs. Yet each nation is born anew through these changes, and one cannot reasonably assert that the nations in question are constituted in the same way—the body of law discharged at these moments of change is altered too significantly to consider the nation to be the same, and indeed the context of the nation changes just as much with the passage of time. Were nations men and time a flowing river, Heraclitus’s famous words would come to mind, that, “No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it is not the same river and he is not the same man.” At every point, the changing of a nation’s general will necessitates a new understanding of what that nation is.

The former notion of Rousseau’s is the more suspect of the two, though—that a state which revolts unsuccessfully against a corruption of morality or authority requires a master, rather than a liberator. His analysis of Peter the Great will assist us here. He notes that, in response to the Russian citizenry’s “barbarousness,” the monarch attempted to civilize his people prematurely (166). The philosopher’s assertion here is not that Peter was wrong in attempting to follow the general will of his people, but that in his imitations of Europe, he failed to allow his peoples to form a collective will of their own. As such, Rousseau seems to believe it would have been better for the Russians to have remained "un-westernized" until they’d established their cultural identity by forming a social order without the prompting of the monarch. This allows for a more true expression of the general will, in Rousseau’s eyes. In lieu of political turmoil, Rousseau seems to share this sentiment—that it is better for an infantile nation to constitute itself, and that a “master” acts as some necessary evil, a holdover until such a nation reaches the vigor of its youth.

Rousseau's critique of Grotius and his contemporaries can be seen as a call to reject the naturalistic justifications for oppression and to instead embrace a more collectivist understanding of the social contract. By emphasizing the importance of the social compact and the need for a legitimate and moral authority to oversee it, Rousseau seeks to provide a framework for creating a society that is both free and just. While his ideas may not have been fully realized in his own time, they remain relevant today as philosophers continue to grapple with questions of freedom, power, and oppression in contemporary societies.

Notes:

[1] Notably, Rousseau is not altogether modern in his stance here. In the same breath he asserts that “[Slaves’] cowardice has perpetuated [slavery].” Obviously, this is not aligned with the true nature of slavery, but it is consistent with much of Rousseau’s argumentation. For instance, in his discussion of a prince’s apparent wrongly-extended right to avoid usurpation on the pretense of peace, Rousseau notes that the apparent compliance of that sovereign’s people who he deceives and silences appears indicative of the favor of the general will, contrary to the matter-of-fact. Rousseau places the responsibility to circumvent this pattern in the hands of the people, though, in gathering and collaborating in their collectivized aspirations. This is much like his assertion about slavery—he regards the prince and the slaver as immoral actors, but does not see such judgements as actionable outright—the recipients of these injustices must, in Rousseau’s eyes, respond with clarity and purpose.

[2] This profit extends, in Grotius’s point of view, beyond material gain. His position contends that there is further value in subjugation insofar as it brings about a state of security; a slave’s master offers protection. This rationale is common to tyrants and warring states, and Rousseau argues that a polity that truly craves peace over autonomy is mad, and thereby not reasonable enough to be considered a people in the first place, since “Madness does not bring about right.” (144) One can find placid environments in all manner of undesirable places, such as dungeons and caves, but Rousseau seems to find that Grotius and his contemporaries would hardly vouch for those conditions on account of this one merit—so enforced order clearly cannot be the keystone metric for societal flourishing, given this exception. However, Rousseau is not consistent in this analysis, as he notes that a silent peoples’ consent to private will can be equated with the general will (154) despite these peoples not expressing a general will or even acting according to his own definition of a political “body.” (150). Further, his position here runs counter to the argument discussed in [1] regarding the devious prince.

[3] Note, this is distinct from each person’s desired willful state—Rousseau does not believe that each person, left to their own devices, will act according to the general will, as humans are wont to neglect the freest possible state of a collective in favor of the freest possible state of the self. It is best not to conceive of the general will as the abstracted private will of any one citizen or group of citizens, but rather as a social order constructed to optimize the autonomous capacity of its people, by treating them, at times, as subjects. However, this does not mean a state of anarchy is impossible according to the social contract, as is evidenced in the final paragraph of the third book where he writes “For if all the citizens were to assemble in order to break this compact by common agreement, no one could doubt it was legitimately broken” (203).

Bibliography:

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “On the Social Contract,” in Basic Political Writings, Edited and translated by Donald A. Cress, 141-204. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987.

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mystacoceti · 11 months

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last night I went to a trans meetup thing put on by the local gay org and. man, like... the impression I get is that most their events are probably defacto segregated.

#I've hardly been any space that wasn't about half white half mexican for like five years now #and it's fucking weird to be in a room that's a hundred percent white.#I don't think most people have twigged yet that this retreat into *their own race* is totally in line with the rest of the reactionary tren #or people Have but they can't form a critique of that that isn't just a commandment to socialize with white people #I really am gonna flip my shit rejoining polite liberal society. not a thing right about it

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homophyte · 1 year

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im ngl the way some ppl on this site talk abt christianity is really baffling

#myposts #text of kin #my whole life ive been an atheist #with a strongly ex-catholic anti-theist mother and even she would disagree w some of the shit said abt christians on here #nevermind that like. im pretty sure people will just straight up lie about stuff thats a 'christian thing' or not #idk i dont actually think christianity is the bogeyman its made out to be #and i really struggle to think that im someone who at all FAIR to christians. trust me that i hate christians #its just like. comically absurd at a certain point #are you absolutely sure that its an exclusively christian thing to do squints social control? they invented and are the only ppl to do that?#youre sure? alright well if youre sure!#and im also completely sidestepping like. possible critiques to be offered to other religious structures. like even without saying #'hey its not the only bad one'. its literally gotten to a point just w christianity that some of u sound insane #honestly id love to see more. well frankly interesting discussions abt christianity happening on here #where is the investigation of christianitys role in colonialism? the discussion of the systemic violence its many forms have legitimized #it honestly seem like this site is hung up on #the role christianity plays in american politics and making that the end all be all #of both american politics and the effects christianity has had on the world--even just the political world #perhaps its naive of me to think this website would care abt anywhere other than american nevermind nonwestern contexts but. idk #it smacks to me of....ex christians particularly white ones making themselves into the only and biggest victims of it #which i would know because. again. anti-theist ex-catholic mother ive lived my whole life with.#idk how true that is. thats what it reads like to me largely #but i recognize for it to even read that way to me its getting parsed through my experience w my mom so thats a bias i know i have #all this to say. damn i hate christians but some of yall hate christians so much i think youve just started lying #and then also centering your particular experience of christians in an american WASP context #rather than discussing like any other (worse) form of harm christianity has been party to in say the global south

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majokko120 · 6 days

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Syndrome: America

Liberalism gave birth to America, and American culture spreads like a fungus. It cuts off roots where it sets, devours distinct identities, values, souls of nations, and homogenizes them into one big mass of faceless and soulless consumerism.

American culture today offers the shallowest forms of Christianity, riddled with heresies and errors; thug culture, the antithesis to culture; worship of money, hatred of the poor, and countless bastardizations of the occult.

A monstrous abomination in the middle of the Atlantic ocean, younger than the printing press, seeks to dictate to the ancient world what to live. Its gospel preaches Atheism, its missionaries spread death, its priests bless the wicked.

#america #culture #politics #globalism #religion #history #economy #social justice #foreign policy #cultural critique

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blueheartbooks · 4 months

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Unraveling Humanity's Foibles: A Journey Through Gulliver's Travels

Jonathan Swift's "Gulliver's Travels into Several Remote Nations of the World" is a literary masterpiece that takes readers on a captivating voyage through the eccentric and fantastical realms of satire and social commentary. Originally published in 1726, Swift's novel presents the extraordinary adventures of Lemuel Gulliver, a ship's surgeon who finds himself shipwrecked on four distinct and peculiar lands, each inhabited by beings with their own peculiar customs and ideologies. Through Gulliver's encounters with the Lilliputians, Brobdingnagians, Laputans, and Houyhnhnms, Swift employs biting satire and biting wit to critique various aspects of human nature, society, politics, and religion.

The novel's first section, set in the land of Lilliput, offers a scathing commentary on the pettiness and absurdity of human politics and power struggles. Through Gulliver's experiences as a giant among tiny inhabitants, Swift exposes the folly of war, bureaucracy, and the arbitrary nature of authority. The absurdity reaches its peak with the absurd ritual of Lilliputian politics, including the infamous "Big-Endians" versus "Little-Endians" dispute, which serves as a thinly veiled critique of religious schisms and sectarianism.

In contrast, the second section of the novel transports Gulliver to the land of Brobdingnag, where he becomes a miniature among giants. Here, Swift shifts his focus to a critique of human vanity, arrogance, and the flawed nature of humanity itself. Through Gulliver's observations of the benevolent yet morally repugnant Brobdingnagians, Swift highlights the inherent depravity and moral corruption of human civilization, challenging readers to confront their own flaws and shortcomings.

The third section of "Gulliver's Travels" takes Gulliver to the floating island of Laputa, a realm inhabited by impractical intellectuals and absurd scientific endeavors. Through biting satire and absurd scenarios, Swift lampoons the folly of intellectualism divorced from practicality, as well as the dangers of unchecked scientific experimentation and technological hubris. The Laputans' obsession with abstract theories and impractical inventions serves as a cautionary tale against the pursuit of knowledge at the expense of humanity's moral and ethical obligations.

Finally, in the fourth section of the novel, Gulliver finds himself in the land of the Houyhnhnms, a society of rational, equine beings who govern themselves with reason and virtue. Through Gulliver's interactions with the Houyhnhnms and their brutish human-like counterparts, the Yahoos, Swift offers a stark critique of human nature itself. The Houyhnhnms' rationality and virtue stand in stark contrast to the base instincts and moral degradation of the Yahoos, leading Gulliver to question his own humanity and the nature of civilization itself.

In conclusion, "Gulliver's Travels" is a timeless work of satire and social commentary that continues to resonate with readers today. Through Swift's masterful storytelling and biting wit, the novel offers a profound exploration of human nature, society, and the follies of civilization. By presenting readers with a series of fantastical yet eerily familiar worlds, Swift challenges us to reflect on our own flaws and shortcomings, making "Gulliver's Travels" a compelling and thought-provoking read for audiences of all ages.

Jonathan Swift's "Gulliver's Travels into Several Remote Nations of the World" is available in Amazon in paperback 16.99$ and hardcover 22.99$ editions.

Number of pages: 344

Language: English

Rating: 9/10

Link of the book!

Review By: King's Cat

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blueheartbookclub · 4 months

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Unraveling Humanity's Foibles: A Journey Through Gulliver's Travels

Jonathan Swift's "Gulliver's Travels into Several Remote Nations of the World" is available in Amazon in paperback 16.99$ and hardcover 22.99$ editions.

Number of pages: 344

Language: English

Rating: 9/10

Link of the book!

Review By: King's Cat

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lilghostboy123 · 8 months

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BREAAAAKING DOOOWN THE WALLS OF JERIIICHOOO no kidding, breaking down the capital by karl marx..ism shabubluluh hulul hulu hini anyways here I ago, now, are you sitting down, let's go, right now, okay now,

The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as “an immense accumulation of commodities,”[1] its unit being a single commodity. Our investigation must therefore begin with the analysis of a commodity.

the wealth of those soctiites in which the capitalist mode of prudction preveails

what does this mean? the wealth of those socuties, means the wealth of a country, now adays there isen't much socities that aren't states or countries, put it simply, the wealth of a state, like how much cash does the goverment or the head of the state have

or hmm "wealth of societies " it can mean both the wealth of the head of the state and it can mean everyone in the society so median income, not medium income, but median income

let's think in a smaller way, imagen if you had a friends group and you made a society somehow, just you and your friends, you are let's say 5 people and you all work and bring home money, one is the leader, let's say you and you take a % is the wealth of the society your group, no this isen't a great anology, but grammatically,/fundametally/ litereally like how it's spelled and written it's not you that is dumb, it's the text that is vague and literally/grammatically/spelling wise, spelling wise it can mean both, how much the head of the state has and how much everyone has, let's ask chatgpt,

first of all yes, The wealth of those societies, leaves 2 alternatives up for interpretation, it's not you who is stupid, it's the text, that leaves it up for interpretation,

after lots of tweaking on chatgpt this is what I got: Grammatically, when looking at the text alone, the phrase "the wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails" refers to the overall economic wealth of the societies where capitalism is the dominant economic system. In the context of the passage, it doesn't specifically denote median income or individual wealth. It is a broader reference to the collective economic resources and assets within such societies.

Grammatically and based solely on the text, the phrase "the wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails" does not specify whether it refers to median income, individual wealth, or the overall economic wealth of the society. It is a somewhat abstract and general statement that serves as an introduction to Marx's analysis of capitalism.

To understand the specific meaning in context, one needs to delve into the broader discussion and analysis provided by Marx. In his work, Marx goes on to explain the characteristics of commodities, exchange value, labor, and how these elements relate to the wealth and economic structure of capitalist societies. It's through this analysis that the specific concepts and meanings become clear.

so if we have a group of friends that forms a society, your friend group is a society, it's the overall wealth of your friends group, all your tools and money, if someone were to come into your home what would they see, they would see all the stuff, the soffa the tv and all the stuff, they woulden't see the money

chatgpt friend group analogy, I'm gonna make it shorter and explain it like above later but for now this will do

Certainly, let's break down the phrase "the wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails" using a simplified analogy with a small friend group mini-society:

Imagine you have a close-knit group of friends who decide to form a mini-society where you all work together and share the results of your work. In this mini-society:

Wealth: "Wealth" refers to all the resources and benefits that your group collectively generates through your work. It includes everything you produce and share within your mini-society, such as the food you grow, the items you make, and the services you provide.

Societies: "Societies" refers to your entire group of friends who are part of this mini-society. It encompasses all members involved in producing and sharing the wealth.

Capitalist Mode of Production: In your mini-society, the "capitalist mode of production" could be a specific way you've organized your work. For example, you might have decided that each person contributes their skills and labor, and in return, you distribute the results of your collective efforts based on individual contributions or needs.

So, if you were to use the phrase in this context, it would mean the total resources, benefits, and goods generated by your friend group mini-society through your collaborative efforts. It doesn't specifically refer to the income or wealth of individual friends within the group but instead focuses on what your group as a whole produces and shares based on the agreed-upon rules of your mini-society's economic system.

#das capital #karl marx #communism #socialism #karl marx: capital a critique of political economy

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