#Boeing’s Fatal Flaws

[xtruss]

What Has Happened to Boeing Since the 737 Max Crashes

— By Priyanka Boghani and Kaela Malig | March 13, 2024

A still from "Boeing's Fatal Flaw," a new FRONTLINE Documentary with The New York Times.

Five years ago, 346 people were killed in two crashes involving Boeing 737 Max planes within the span of almost five months: first off the coast of Indonesia in October 2018 and then in Ethiopia in March 2019.

Boeing’s Fatal Flaw, a 2021 FRONTLINE investigation with The New York Times, examined how commercial pressures, flawed design and failed oversight contributed to those devastating tragedies and a catastrophic crisis at one of the world’s most iconic industrial names.

In recent months, Boeing has come under renewed scrutiny after a door-like panel on a Boeing 737 Max 9 operated by Alaska Airlines blew off just a few minutes after takeoff in January 2024. An updated version of our documentary examines the impact of this latest crisis.

“This was supposed to be one of the most highly scrutinized planes in the world. And here you are with another incident that was risking passengers’ lives,” the Times’ Sydney Ember says in the updated documentary.

Here we take a brief look at what has happened to Boeing since the deadly 2018 and 2019 crashes and the recent Alaska Airlines incident.

Change in Leadership

Dennis Muilenburg had been CEO of Boeing since 2015. In the aftermath of the crashes, he testified before U.S. Senate and House Committees in October 2019, acknowledging the fatal accidents happened “on my watch” and saying he and the company were accountable. He told the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, “If we knew back then what we know now, we would have grounded [the 737 Max] right after the first accident.”

Two months after the congressional hearings, on Dec. 23, 2019, Muilenburg was fired by Boeing. The company described the move as “necessary to restore confidence” in Boeing “as it works to repair relationships with regulators, customers, and all other stakeholders.”

David Calhoun stepped into the role of CEO in January 2020 and continues to fill the position.

A $2.5 Billion DOJ Settlement and Challenges

On Jan. 7, 2021, the Department of Justice announced that Boeing would pay a $2.5 billion settlement, resolving a DOJ charge that the company had conspired to defraud the Federal Aviation Administration’s Aircraft Evaluation Group.

The DOJ’s criminal investigation focused on the actions of two employees who Boeing said in court documents “deceived the FAA AEG” about the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) onboard the 737 Max — a system the DOJ said “may have played a role” in both 737 Max crashes. The DOJ said the employees’ “deception” led to information about MCAS being left out of a key document released by the FAA, as well as airplane manuals and pilot-training materials.

As Boeing’s Fatal Flaw recounts, congressional investigators found internal documents showing that, after Boeing realized the impact MCAS would have on pilot training and FAA certification, some Boeing employees suggested removing all references to MCAS from training manuals.

“Boeing’s employees chose the path of profit over candor by concealing material information from the FAA concerning the operation of its 737 Max airplane and engaging in an effort to cover up their deception,” said David P. Burns, the acting assistant attorney general of the DOJ’s criminal division when the settlement was announced.

The company entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ, in which Boeing agreed to pay a nearly $244 million fine, to set up a $500-million fund for the families of people who died in the two crashes, and to pay $1.77 billion to airlines that had been affected by the 20-month grounding of the 737 Max that began in March 2019.

Boeing also agreed to continue cooperating with the DOJ’s Fraud Section on “any ongoing or future investigations and prosecutions” and is required to report any alleged violation of fraud laws by Boeing employees when dealing with foreign or domestic agencies, regulators or airline customers.

Boeing declined FRONTLINE’s request to be interviewed for the documentary. In a statement, the company said safety is its top priority and it has worked closely with regulators, investigators and stakeholders “to implement changes that ensure accidents like these never happen again.”

Former Boeing Pilot Found Not Guilty for Fraud

In October 2021, a federal grand jury criminally indicted Mark Forkner, Boeing’s Former Chief Technical Pilot for the 737 Max Airplane, on fraud charges. Forkner, who became the first and so far only individual to face criminal charges after the two fatal crashes, was accused of providing “materially false, inaccurate and incomplete information” to FAA regulators about flight-control software involved in the 2018 and 2019 crashes. Forkner was later found not guilty of all charges in federal court.

Forkner declined to be interviewed for the documentary, but his lawyer told the Times that his communications with the FAA were honest and that “he would never jeopardize the safety of other pilots or their passengers.”

Lawsuits by Families of Crash Victims

By November 2019, Boeing was facing more than 150 lawsuits filed by families of people who had died in the two crashes — over 50 of the suits stemming from the Indonesian crash and about 100 from the crash in Ethiopia, according to the Associated Press’ review of federal court records.

In July 2020, Boeing told a U.S. federal court that claims related to 171 of the 189 people killed in the Indonesia crash were either partially or fully settled, although the settlements were not publicly disclosed.

As of June 2023, cases related to 68 passengers from the Ethiopian Airlines crash were pending.

The Grounding and Return of the 737 Max 8 and Max 9

In the days after the second 737 Max crashed in March 2019, regulators around the world — from China to the European Union and several other countries — grounded the plane. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration followed suit on March 13, 2019, after initially saying the planes were safe to fly.

When the FAA retested and approved the 737 Max 8 and Max 9, ending the grounding in November 2020, it required airlines to take the following steps before putting the planes back into service: installing new flight-control-computer and display-system software; incorporating revised flight-crew procedures; rerouting wiring; completing a test of the “angle of attack” sensor system, which had contributed to both the 2018 and 2019 crashes; and performing an operational readiness flight.

The FAA, in conjunction with aviation agencies from Canada, Brazil and the European Union, also concluded that pilots operating the 737 Max would need to complete special training. It is not clear who would pay for this additional training, which reversed one of Boeing’s original sales pitches to airlines for the 737 Max: that the plane would require minimal pilot training.

A December 2020 Senate committee report criticized Boeing and the FAA’s handling of the 737 Max recertification testing, saying that, based on whistleblower information and testimony, it appeared Boeing and FAA officials had “established a pre-determined outcome,” and that Boeing officials “inappropriately coached” test pilots in the MCAS simulator. The report alleged, “It appears, in this instance, FAA and Boeing were attempting to cover up important information that may have contributed to the 737 MAX tragedies.”

The FAA responded at the time, saying: “Working closely with other international regulators, the FAA conducted a thorough and deliberate review of the 737 Max.” The agency added it was “confident” the issues that led to the two crashes had been “addressed through the design changes required and independently approved by the FAA and its partners.”

“We have learned many hard lessons” from the crashes, Boeing said in its own statement at the time. The company said it took the committee’s findings seriously and would continue to review the report in full.

Following the Senate report, families of the 2019 Ethiopian crash victims wrote to the FAA and the U.S. Department of Transportation in a letter dated Dec. 22, 2020, and reviewed by Reuters, asking for the 737 Max approval to be rescinded and for an investigation to “determine whether the MAX recertification process was tainted.”

A Brazilian airline was the first to fly a 737 Max after regulators there followed the FAA in ungrounding the plane. On Dec. 29, 2020 — a week after the families’ letter — the 737 Max flew paying passengers in America for the first time after nearly two years of being grounded. A month later, Europe’s aviation authority also gave the 737 Max clearance to fly.

On Aug. 26, 2021, India lifted its ban on the 737 Max after “closely” monitoring the plane’s performance elsewhere and noting “no untoward reporting.” China, which was the first country to ground Max jets after the deadly crashes, resumed commercial flights with the model in January 2023.

The 737 Max 10

On June 18, 2021, Boeing’s new model 737 Max 10 took to the skies for its first flight. The Max 10 is larger than the Max 8, which was involved in the 2018 and 2019 crashes, and the Max 9. According to Boeing’s technical specs, the Max 10 is 14 feet longer than the Max 8 and can seat a maximum of 230 people, compared to the Max 8’s capacity of 210.

At the time of the test flight, Boeing was already working on additional safety features in the Max 10 requested by European regulators, according to Reuters.

“We’re going to take our time on this certification,” Stan Deal, who became president and CEO of Boeing’s Commercial Airplanes division in October 2019, said at the time of the Max 10’s first flight, according to The Seattle Times. “We’re committed to make further safety enhancements.”’

The FAA cleared the Max 10 to begin test flights, a step towards certification, last November.

Alaska Airlines Plane Incident

On January 5, an Alaska Airlines jet made an emergency landing in Portland, Oregon, after a portion of its fuselage blew out and left a door-sized hole in the side of the aircraft while it was around 16,000 feet in the sky. None of the 171 passengers and six crew members were seriously injured. The FAA temporarily grounded more than 170 Max 9 jets so they could be inspected.

In the aftermath, Boeing CEO David Calhoun has said, “Boeing is accountable for what happened.”

A Feb. 6 preliminary report from the National Transportation Safety Board said that the bolts meant to secure the door-like panel appeared to be missing before the flight.

Later the same month, the FAA released a long-awaited report that found that Boeing’s safety culture has been “inadequate” and “confusing.” The FAA gave Boeing 90 days to come up with a plan to address quality control issues.

The FAA conducted a six-week audit after the Alaska Airlines incident, and on March 4 said that it found Boeing had allegedly failed to comply with manufacturing quality control requirements.

Boeing now faces legal trouble in relation to the Jan. 5 event, including lawsuits filed by passengers and shareholders.

On Feb. 21, Boeing told employees that Ed Clark, who led the 737 program since 2021, would be replaced. The memo announcing Clark’s departure and other changes said the company was focused “on ensuring that every airplane we deliver meets or exceeds all quality and safety requirements.”

The Justice Department has also begun a criminal investigation into Boeing in the aftermath of the Alaska Airlines incident, as reported first by The Wall Street Journal.

“Cultural change doesn’t happen overnight, especially at big corporations like this,” David Gelles, one of the Times reporters featured in Boeing’s Fatal Flaw, says. “If Boeing wants to get back to that place of grandeur where it was for so long one of the most important American companies, it’s going to take not four years, but it might take 14.”

#Boeing #Frontline #737 Max Crashes #Priyanka Boghani and Kaela Malig #Leadership #A $2.5 Billion DOJ Settlement #Mark Forkner | Boeing’s Former Chief Technical Pilot | 737 Max Airplane #Lawsuits By Families #Grounding | Returning | 737 Max 8 | 737 Max 9 #737 Max 10 #Alaska Airlines | Plane Incident #Boeing’s Fatal Flaws #The New York Times #U.S. Senate and House Committees #House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure #Dennis Muilenburg | CEO of Boeing | Fired #New CEO | Boeing | David Calhoun #Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) #150 Lawsuits Filed By families | 50 By Indonesian Families #MCAS Simulator

[thatgirl4815]

I wasn't expecting Ray and Sand's final conflict arc to be driven by Sand's inability to say no to people he cares about, but I feel like I should have been expecting it. In retrospect, it's a pretty obvious problem have to come up and it clearly applied to Boeing like it does to Ray.

You're right, that does seem to be Sand's fatal flaw in all of this. Coming fresh off of the episode, I think I've been so frustrated at Sand for even engaging with Boeing at all, let alone allowing him to come back to Ray's place with them. There's definitely tension there, but Boeing has knowingly inserted himself into SandRay's dynamic and it is Sand's job to take care of that. I did not witness Sand's developing love for Ray these past few episodes just to have that completely upended by an ex that, inferentially, has been out of Sand's life for quite a while. Yet NOW is when Boeing decides to swoop back in and try to get Sand back? What changed? What made Boeing see that what he did was wrong?

These are all the questions that Sand should've asked immediately. Maybe I'm projecting my own reaction onto Sand, but from an objective standpoint Sand needs to call Boeing out the same way he needed to call Ray out for his shitty behavior. Sand might have difficulty saying no to people, but saying no to Boeing means defending his relationship with Ray.

#only friends the series #only friends #ofts #sandray #raysand #raysan #sanray #boeing #sandboeing #only friends ask #ask #only friends episode 11

[chawarin-panich]

while writing sandray's divorce fic and as i scramble to try and save their marriage - something about the way their dynamic never fundamentally worked for me has revealed itself. Sand kind of stays coolly above Ray through the whole show. Even when he isn't, even when he's directly responsible for Ray spiralling out of control and almost killing himself, he's still the good guy. He saves Ray! He's never meant to take it this far!

Sand never stops being the good guy and so Ray never stops being the bad guy. But most importantly we gloss over how Sand is wholly aware of how to manipulate Ray and nothing is stopping him from doing it again other than his infallible goodness.

Ray's entire measure of goodness at the end boils down to how good he can be to his most terrible friends (I still hold by how not forgiving Boston has been the most fatal character flaw that the show could have served Ray with) and how good a boyfriend he can be to Sand.

As much as i admire Khaotung's acting that therapy scene was so disappointing because it was about Sand. I know I was the one who said Sand taking the place of Ray's mother in Ray's life was tantamount to Ray's healing but jeezos they didn't have to take it THAT far. Instead of taking charge of his pain, Ray takes upon this grotesque goal of being and acting more like Sand. Of pleasing him even at the cost of himself. This wasn't entirely bad because Ray's ability to think sympathetically with other people was a point of growth he needed and I found the pool scene with Boeing oddly...sweet. It was how his final arc was once more dictated entirely by Mew and motivated entirely by Sand which has always been my problem. And that's where the show leaves him. One therapy session that was about Sand and a future that is entirely about Sand. By the end of the show this man hasn't batted a single eyelash towards his own trauma, his own familial issues that were at the root of his every problem with Sand anyway. And this is how I find myself writing about Ray desperately struggling to find himself in a decades long marriage with Sand. And then asking myself - who's causing this conflict that they're in? Why have they stopped communicating? And the fic is from Sand's POV so let me tell you that this narrator is not only unreliable to *you* (if you've read it that is) but he's unreliable to me. He's hiding things from me and I *will* find out what. Sand's infallible goodness will become fallible if it's the last thing I do!!! (also its the only way to save their marriage imho so if you want me to give them their happy ending you have to be on board lol)

#sandray fic #sandray fanfic #only friends meta #sandray meta #sandray #nani's writing shenanigans

[whilomm]

these are claims from a different whistleblower than the one that was totally not murdered by boeing

(disclaimer, im not an expert and this article doesnt go into a ton of detail on the specific issues, so i could be a lil off, these are very much non-expert speculation rambles. anyone who understands better, feel free to correct me/add more deets).

if im reading it right these claims get into the way boeing has been outsourcing more and more manufacturing of parts to other companies, such as for the fuselage (the plane body as a whole, big tube u sit in). if those parts dont quite fit together right (and keep in mind the margins of error on these things can be VERY small in some cases, though im not sure exactly how much wiggle room they got here), that can lead to too much stress on certain parts.

like, for example, if one part of the fuselage is just baaaarely too big for the next part it connects to, it might all seem to fit together perfectly fine, but every time it takes off and lands or goes thru compression cycles (that is when they take off and land, going from low pressure-high pressure-low pressure), it just puts a BIT too much pressure on where they join. and over the years, that pressure just adds up until theres microscopic stress fractures, which become slightly larger stress fractures, until they get big enough that once a plane reaches a high enough altitude theres a midair disentegration, which is. exactly as bad as it sounds.

(sidenote: compression cycles can be more important for determining an airplanes lifespan than flight hours. the usual metaphor is bending a paperclip back and forth until it breaks, how many times can you bend it before metal fatigue sets in and it just snaps. holding it in a more bent position however will take a lot longer to snap it generally.)

now to be clear, every single plane has an intended service life, and its well known that planes can only take so many compression cycles before they start to get really hard to maintain without going kablooey. a plane may be rated for like, idk, 50k compression cycles (so, taking off and landing 50k times before its retired, because after that its no longer worth the maintenance vs just making a new plane). but if it turns out that plane has some flaw in its build that means itll develop fatal stress factures at only 20k cycles, well. thats bad. not sure exactly how the schedule on looking for stress factures looks like for maintenece crews (do they do it regularly for all planes on a set schedule? do they only do it occasionally for new planes, and start to ramp up checks as the plane gets older? dunno!) but well. generally speaking, a plane having a fatal flaw that gives it an explosive midlife crisis is Bad. i would hope theyd catch it! but i dont know enough about the deets of fuselage maintenence to know the specifics.

and OH YAY COMPOSITE MATERIALS. now, before anyone gets too freaked out thinking about the uh. submarine. use of composite materials is actually far more common on planes than on subs for a buncha reasons. one, planes just generally undergo a lot less in terms of pressure (that futurama joke, "this spaceship can handle between one and zero atmospheres", vs subs that have to deal with tens to potentially hundreds of atmospheres) but also because apparently, for complicated material engineering reasons, composite materials work much better under tension (high pressure INSIDE pushing OUT, like airplane) than under compression (high pressure OUTSIDE pushing IN, like submarine). heres a vid from someone who wrote their masters on composite materials under compression if you wanna hear from someone slightly smarter on the subject. im not gonna pretend like i understand the full deets, but "composites do OKAY with tension" is enough for me, go read the fancy scientific papers if you want more.

now, so that people do freak out at least a little bit: hm. dont like that they are using Way More Composite Than Usual on this plane. how much is the usual? idk, i assume composites are much more popular with low altitude small aircraft (bc well, weight and less pressure worries), dunno whats considered normal for high altitude longhaul crafts. but, apparently, the dreamliner is "more than usual". which, yeah cool, lighter weight airplanes use less fuel which is better for longhaul flights. is it. well tested enough though???

...anyway. im not an engineer, idk the full Deets, but well. havin lotsa fun hearing the engineers talk about how the parts of the giant metal skybirds dont fit together quite right and theyre using materials that fail more catastrophically than metal with less warning, experimentally, and we dont quiiiite have the data to know if. its a problem. thats really fun! LOVE hearing about how much theyre outsourcing parts, given how bad quality control of things as tiny as the titanium in some bolts or a little bit of the engine blades being not properly vacuum forged has lead to catastrophic failure in the past, and knowing how important sourcing of parts in airplanes is. all VERY yay!

#boeing #airplanes #aircraft #flight #boeing 787 #boeing 787 dreamliner #787 dreamliner #seriously the amount of incidents that were just like. 'oh this ONE SINGLE PART had a manufacturing defect' #u use bolts to small and the captain is sucked out of the windsheild (he lived tho dw) #the titanium in the engine blades has a small impurity and it Breaks causing uncontained engine failure and severes the hydraulics #oh a single part of this bit isnt lubed properly so it gets stuck and the plane ends up nosediving #but hearing that the FUSELAGE ITSELF may be improperly fitted is #What The Fuck #yeah no why just outsource your bolts when u can outsource the ENTIRE MAIN BODY #TO MULTIPLE COMPANIES #buzzy

[tvrundownusa]

tvrundown USA 2024.03.12

Tuesday, March 12th:

(exclusive): Steve Treviño: "Simple Man" (netflix, stand-up comedy special), Boat Story (freevee, BBC thriller series available, all 6 eps), Never Seen Again (Para+, true mysteries, season 5, all 10 eps), "Turning Point: The Bomb and the Cold War" (netflix, docuseries, all 9 parts)

(streaming weekly): Shōgun (hulu), Father Brown (BritBox, penultimate)

(also new): "The Lionheart" (HBO, motorsports documentary, ~2hrs)

(hour 1): FBI (CBS), Night Court (NBC) / . / Extended Family (NBC), The Cleaning Lady (FOX), Crime Nation (theCW, 2hrs)

(hour 2): FBI: International (CBS), The Voice (NBC), Alert: Missing Persons Unit (FOX), The Oval (BET, season 5 finale), Wildcard Kitchen (FOOD, competition series premiere), Crime Nation (theCW, contd)

(hour 3): FBI: Most Wanted (CBS), Password (NBC, gameshow season 2 opener), Shōgun (FX, ~82mins), Zatima (BET), Frontline (PBS, "Boeing's Fatal Flaw")

(hour 4 - latenight): The Graham Norton Show (BBCAm|AcornTV|AMC+), Shōgun (FX, contd)

[repeats: Will Trent (ABC), The Rookie (ABC), The Good Doctor (ABC) ]

#SteveTrevino #PasswordNBC #television

[iviarellereads]

Harrow the Ninth, Chapter 14

(Curious what I'm doing here? Read this post! For detail on The Locked Tomb coverage and the index, read this one!)

(Ninth House icon) In which far more questions are posed than truly answered.

Some paragraphs are spent describing the Mithraeum's perch in an asteroid field. Harrow's assigned rooms have never been used(1), and are decorated tastefully in greyscale. To Harrow, who has lived on ten thousand years of family history her whole life, it's a bit strange but exciting. There are no servants, no constructs, only the Lyctors and their God. Mercy, August, and God himself cook, and Ianthe is learning from August, but Harrow doesn't eat for pleasure so doesn't foresee herself learning the skill.

God is fully Teacher now, and invites Harrow for lessons, or just tea, or to sit in silence together in his sitting room. The rest of his chambers are forbidden, and despite her usual attraction to forbidden tombs, this one repels her.(2) She finds him once with flimsy all over his table, and he admits he thinks about the loss of the warships. He assumes the BOE did it, a cult they learned of about five thousand years ago, who hate the Nine Houses. Apparently they have nukes in storage, and he suspects they were behind Cytherea's appearance at Canaan House.

They discuss Cytherea. Teacher remembers her as eager to volunteer for the hard jobs, remembers that he didn't realize until too late that she'd worked herself too hard. Harrow calls it a Seventh House flaw, a "fatal longing for the picturesque." Teacher doesn't seem impressed that the Houses have crystallized into such formal and separate tropes. Still, he thinks the BOE got to her, despite that they hate necromancy as the core tenet of their beliefs.

God pivots the conversation and asks how many in Harrow's family, with her parents dead. Harrow is horrified that he knows that they're dead, with the lengths she went to hide it from the other Houses. Still, she looks into his face, and admits that she was an only child, after many miscarriages. He asks how she was born. He knows that she was awake and performing necromancy on her first trip into the River, and he tells her that only one other person did that their first time in, and she went on to found the Sixth House.(3) He knows Harrow wasn't a normal necromancer even before she became a Lyctor. He asks how they got her.

Harrow explains the slaughter of the children, her mother using the thanergy to modify her own ovum. God relates this to using a nuclear detonation to power a sewing machine, tells Harrow that her parents performed a small sort of Resurrection, and calls Harrow a miracle. She's a little baffled, because she's just said she's the product of a genocide. He touches her shoulder, very gently, but reminding herself of the very few and all terrible gentle touches her parents ever gave her. He says that he will take on the burden of the two hundred dead, and the crime of her parents. He asks her to consider it his crime, since they were his people, and pledges himself to making it right somehow.

You said, "Lord, you can't." "Teacher." "Teacher, have mercy on me. Please don't tell anyone." A child's plea. Nobody has to know. To God! For a moment, he changed. He grew angry, and you thought it was at the rank foolishness, the irresponsibility of what you'd said. [...] For a moment you perceived a hint of his great immortal age--of an enormous distance between you, of an ignition too bright for you to conceive. You were an insect standing before a forest fire. You were a cell beholding a heart. "Harrowhark, nobody has the right to know," he said fiercely. "Nobody has the right to blame you. Nobody can judge. What has happened, has happened, and there's no putting it back in the box. They wouldn't understand. They don't have to. I officially relieve you from living in fear. Nobody has to know."(4)

That night Harrow will not weep, though her body will try to produce tears.

God treats her gently afterward, and she wants to tell him about the Tomb, but can't quite bring herself to. Instead, she asks what BOE stands for. Blood of Eden, he says. She asks who Eden is, and he responds "Someone they left to die,"(5) and tells Harrow to remember that once you turn your back on something, you no longer have a right to act like you own it.

At the time, that had made perfect sense to you.(6)

=====

(1) How odd. Is that why they're decorated so neutrally, or does the greyscale palette run in the Ninth and the rooms were decorated purposefully but their intended owner never got a chance to use them? (2) Respect for divinity has our Harrow. (3) This could go a long way to explaining why Pal formed such an instant friendship with Harrow, despite her outward demeanour. Not that he'd know this detail, of course, but Harrow is a prodigy, and the Sixth can dig it. (4) I just love how he's so protective of Harrow. Of course it's not YOUR fault what your parents did, and you ARE trying to honour the deaths and do the best you can with that legacy. You are Doing The Work, and nobody will judge you for their fuckery in my universe. I know a lot of people in the fandom see him as kind of manipulative (think of the way he gave Harrow a choice, twice, and then told her there was no choice at all) but this, this is the scene that cemented me as a Jod Simp for life. (For anyone new to the fandom, yes, his name is John and he is God. Jod. It will be appearing again because it's the main name I think of him as, so I might as well get it out of the way now.) (5) How curious. What could that mean? (6) When and why does this change?

#the locked tomb #tlt #harrow the ninth #htn #harrow the ninth spoilers #htn spoilers #harrowhark nonagesimus #emperor john gaius

[smrbhagare97]

NY Times and "Frontline" win Emmy for Boeing coverage

NY Times and “Frontline” win Emmy for Boeing coverage

The New York Times and “Frontline” won the News & Documentary Emmy for outstanding business, consumer or economic coverage for “Boeing’s Fatal Flaw.” The other finalists in the category were: 60 Minutes CBS for “A New Model”; ABC News Originals for Hulu for “GameStopped”; Bloomberg Quicktake Bloomberg News for “The Paycheck: The Systemic Overtaxing of Black Homes in America”; and FRONTLINE and…

View On WordPress

[haverwood]

Boeing’s Fatal Flaw Thomas Jennings USA, 2021 ★★★

#Boeing’s Fatal Flaw #Thomas Jennings #2021 #documentary #photoset #title card #PBS #Frontline PBS

[skyfire85]

I've been posting these on opposite-lock.com and drivetribe.com, and I wanted to share this one here too.

An F-94C belonging to the 27th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron in New York being readied for a flight in 1955. | Photo: USAF

FLIGHTLINE: 112 - LOCKHEED F-94 STARFIRE

Developed from the T-33 Shooting Star trainer, the F-94 was a first-generation jet fighter/interceptor which fought in Korea but was quickly retired.

In 1948 the newly independent USAF released a specification for a radar-equipped jet fighter/interceptor to replace the WWII-era F-61 Black Widow and the early post-war F-82 Twin Mustang. Lockheed responded with a design based on their T-33 jet trainer, which was in turn based on the F-80 Shooting Star fighter. Two existing TF-80C (the original designation for the T-33) were modified with a new nose containing the guns, radar and fire control systems. The original Allison J33 engine was replaced by and uprated J-33-A-33, which was fitted with an afterburner, the first American production aircraft to be so equipped. These two YF-94s retained approximately 75% commonality with the earlier T-33 and F-80. The first flight of a YF-94 was on 16 April 1949, several months after a production contract had been signed.

The second YF-94A, serial number 48-373. | Photo: USAF

PRODUCTION, TEETHING PROBLEMS, AND UPDATES.

The F-94A entered service in May 1950, with 109 produced. This first model was armed with four .50 cal Browning machine guns in the lower nose, and like the F-80 and T-33 was normally fitted with a pair of 165 gallon drop tanks on the wingtips to increase range. Aircrews were not fond of these planes, and there were numerous issues with the early design. The afterburner-equipped J33s were not reliable, with issues plaguing the igniter and flame-holder. These problems caused a number of ground aborts and other in-flight emergencies. The F-94A was also unstable in flight and had poor high-altitude maneuverability. Finally, crews found the cockpit cramped and difficult to enter in an alert or scramble situation. There were also clearance issues with the ejection seats, resulting in several fatalities.

F-94A s/n 49-2548 of the 2nd FIS at McGuire AFB in 1952. | Photo: USAF

Lockheed began deliveries of the improved F-94B in January 1951. This aircraft was outwardly similar to the F-94A, but the cockpit was reworked to improve crew comfort and performance, as well as to correct the fatal flaws with the ejection seat clearance. The J33 engine was much improved as well, becoming a much more reliable power plant. A new instrument landing system (ILS) was added, and a gun pod was developed that would add two additional 50 cals under each wing, bringing the total to eight guns. As the new F-94Bs were introduced, older A models were returned to Lockheed and updated to the B standards. As newer aircraft replaced the F-94 in service, the planes were passed down to Air National Guard units, where they served until the late 1950s.

An F-94B from the 61st FIS at Selfridge AFB in Michigan, some time in 1952.

SERVICE AT HOME AND ABROAD.

As befitting the F-94s intended role as an interceptor, the aircraft were mostly flown under Air Defence Command auspices, equipping some 26 squadrons. The F-94s replaced older F-82F Twin Mustangs, which had been hurriedly pressed into service after a 1949 display by the USSR of the Tu-4 (NATO code name "Bull") bomber, a reverse-engineered copy of the Boeing B-29. The F-94 turned out to be somewhat inferior to the Twin Mustang however, having shorter legs than the F-82, as well as relying more on ground-based radar to guide them to targets. Despite these shortcomings, procurement of the F-94 continued, with air groups around the country replacing F-47 Thunderbolts, F-51 Mustangs, F-80 Shooting Star and F-86A Sabre day fighters with F-94As and later updated B models. Three Air National Guard (ANG) units, the 121st FIS (DC ANG), 142nd FIS (Maine ANG), and 148th FIS (Pennsylvania ANG) received F-94Bs and were placed on active duty to guard the Washington, DC airspace during the Korean War.

Two F-94s fly in formation with an F-82 Twin Mustang in 1950. | Photo: USAF

F-94s also saw deployment to Japan and South Korea as the Korean War heated up, with the first F-94Bs arriving in Japan during March of 1951 to train pilots on the new jet. Flights of Soviet MiG-15 fighters over Seoul in December of that year saw some of these aircraft being detached to Suwon Air Base to defend the South Korean capital. By March of 1952, F-94s from the 319th FIS were flying escort missions for B-29 bombers. Early encounters with Soviet MiGs indicated that they had been equipped with radar warning receivers, as the communist fighters would begin evasive maneuvers once the US aircraft locked-on. USAF F-94s were credited with several kills during the conflict, including the first jet-versus-jet night intercept. After the 1953 Armistice, F-94s remained in South Korea and Japan to fly air defense missions, finally being replaced in 1954 by radar-equipped F-86D Sabre Dogs.

An F-94B belonging to the 68th FIS at Suwon Air Base. This aircraft suffered an engine fire in December 1952 and crashed, killing both crew. | Photo: USAF

YF-97A STARFIRE.

Even before the F-94 started seeing service, Lockheed began work on a massively redesigned and improved interceptor. This new plane, tentatively designated the YF-97 Starfire, retained the fuselage of the F-94, but had a new, thinner wing, along with swept horizontal stabilizers. The troublesome J33 was replaced by the Pratt & Whitney J48, a license-built copy of the Rolls-Royce Tay turbojet which powered the Dassault Mystère IV fighter/bomber. The fire-control and radar systems were also upgraded, resulting in a larger nose. Also fitted in the nose were four trays of six 2.75" FFAR, which fired out through four fold-in doors. The Browning machine guns were deleted. In service, firing these rockets tended to blind the crew, and there were issues with the engines ingesting rocket exhaust and flaming out. In response, pods were developed that fitted to the wing along the leading edge, each of which carried 12 FFAR. The nose trays were then left empty most times. This new aircraft was eventually designated the F-94C, gaining the nickname Starfire, which eventually became applied to earlier models of the F-94 as well. Lockheed began delivery of the F-94C in 1954, and they were quickly incorporated into the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) air defense system. As Starfire deliveries ramped up, the earlier F-94Bs were passed down to ANG units, then were retired.

One of the YF-94C prototypes with the nose rocket doors open. | Photo: USAF

An F-94C, with its FFAR loading trays open, being services by two USAF Airmen. | Photo: USAF

STARFIRE ECLIPSED.

Despite being an advanced aircraft at the time of development, the rapid pace of aviation in the 1950s soon saw the F-94s made redundant by more capable interceptors like the F-86D Sabre Dog and the F-89J Scorpion. The Starfire was removed from front-line USAF service in 1957, after just 3 years, and the type was phased out of ANG service in 1959. A number of aircraft have been preserved around the US, among them a YF-94A prototype at Edwards AFB which is awaiting restoration, two F-94As, and 11 YF-94C and F-94C examples.

PRUNED BRANCHES OF THE FAMILY TREE.

In addition the fighter/interceptor variants, Lockheed also pursued other missions for the F-94. F-94C s/n 50-963 was retained by Lockheed for a possible photo recon variant. The EF-94C ("E" for Exempt rather than "R" for reconnaissance because it was a self-financed research program) saw the radar and missiles replaced by cameras and sensors. The USAF was not interested, and the plane was later scrapped.

The EF-94C, possibly at Lockheed's plant. | Photo: Lockheed Corp.

In January 1951, Lockheed received a contract for 113 single-seat fighter/bombers based on the F-94C. The existing fuselage, tail and engine of the Starfire would be mated to a new, larger nose containing 8 .50cal machine guns and a new wing that was 50% larger. The fighter/bomber, designated the F-94D, would be capable of carrying 4,000lbs of bombs and rockets, and would have had a refueling probe for increased range. Two F-94Bs were modified with the new nose and wing to trial various configurations for the YF-94D. The USAF canceled the F-94D project on 15 October 1951, preferring that Lockheed focus on the F-94C interceptor instead. One of the F-94Bs from the program, s/n 51-5500, was later bailed to General Electric for use as a testbed for the T-171 (later M61A1) Vulcan cannon.

F-94B s/n 51-5500, late of Mass. ANG, modified with an experimental nose and wing for the stillborn F-94D program.

#aircraft #aviation #avgeek #cold war #airplanes #cold war history #airplane #usaf #coldwar #aviation history #korean war #1950s #1950s aesthetic #50s #the fifties #Lockheed #f94 #f94 starfire #interceptor #1st gen

[apelyon]

my Mercymorn thought for the day is that she believes she saw Cassy die. I can think of two very good examples of Mercy's dissembling capabilities, and the purpose behind them both was utility over, say, self preservation.

1) she lies to the Erebos placement who tries to prevent her from taking Harrow before the meeting John is in is over, pretending to back off before she knocks them out via blood pressure fuckery (she is evil for this if nothing else)

AND

2) she lies to John about forgiving him if he'll do one thing for her, so she can get close enough to deconstruct him on a cellular level

one of Mercy's fatal flaws is never believing anything unless she can see it herself. she doesn't believe Harrow is doing theorems in the river, she doesn't believe BOE about the decay proof corpse.

so what I'm getting at is bringing up Cassy's death in the river is a) not expedient to an end goal, and b) she was actually there, and she saw. she already knows what RB presence does to ghosts, so she would never have believed that if she hadn't seen it.

#mercy my girl

[ogwrld]

Boeing 737 Max wins regulator approval to return to skies

Myka Pinckney 

The Boeing 737 Max won the approval from Federal Aviation Administration to use this aircraft again on Wednesday morning. 20 months have passed since U.S. regulators grounded the plane , after two crashes that killed 346 people. Lion Air Flight 610 was flying for only 13 minutes until it fell into the Java Sea off of the coast of Indonesia, in October 2018. Not even five months later,  just six minutes into the flight Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crashed near the addis Ababa airport killing all on board. Both crashes were caused by an automated flight control system misfiring. Due to the crashes Boeing decided to rewrite not only the system, but the entire flight computer software.”Safer that the safest airplane flying today,” Boeing CEO Dave Calhoun said. Investigators released a scathing report which dismissed technical flaws, and management failures etc. The Boeing 737 is said to soon fly with paying passengers in December. Airlines are now only tasked with training their pilots, which is a process that could take months. American Airlines is the only U.S. airline who will begin flights on the Boeing 737 max. Even though they are trying to create something new, the remnants of what happened will still be very prevalent.

I choose this article because I found it very interesting. A plane company that is trying to fix their mistakes and win the trust back of nearly all of American flyers. I am a very frequent flyer traveling from Detroit to Atlanta to visit my dad. I began to fly by myself when I turned 8. So I'm a comfortable flyer now. I don’t even think I trust this plane with two crashes back to back not even within a year. The significance behind this is huge. You need to know when you travel, your flights are going to be safe. When you hear that a plane has crashed twice within two years, how could you trust it. It’s normal for companies to have to gain the trust of their consumers back after an accident has happened. But this accident was fatal and the occurrences were too quick.The company should have tested the plane and fixed it straight away. Then to top everything off the everything the n2nd crash was even more fatal than the first. I would not trust this plane as a traveler myself until I see that it’s doing good for about 3 years.

Question: Are you gonna trust this plane ?

Reference: 

By:Mina Kaji, Amanda Maile, and Sam Sweeney

November 18, 2020, 7:53 AM

https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/boeing-737-max-wins-regulator-approval-return-skies/story?id=74261174&cid=clicksource_4380645_1_heads_hero_live_headlines_hed

[phroyd]

Weeks after the first fatal crash of the 737 Max, pilots from American Airlines pressed Boeing executives to work urgently on a fix. In a closed-door meeting, they even argued that Boeing should push authorities to take an emergency measure that would likely result in the grounding of the Max.

The Boeing executives resisted. They didn’t want to rush out a fix, and said they expected pilots to be able to handle problems.

Mike Sinnett, a vice president at Boeing, acknowledged that the manufacturer was assessing potential design flaws with the plane, including new anti-stall software. But he balked at taking a more aggressive approach, saying it was not yet clear that the new system was to blame for the Lion Air crash, which killed 189 people.

“No one has yet to conclude that the sole cause of this was this function on the airplane,” Mr. Sinnett said, according to a recording of the Nov. 27 meeting reviewed by The New York Times.

Less than four months later, an Ethiopian Airlines flight crashed, killing all 157 people on board. The flawed anti-stall system played a role in both disasters.

Boeing is facing intense scrutiny for the design and certification of the Max, as well as for its response to the two crashes. There are multiple investigations into the development of the Max. And in recent days, unions representing pilots from American Airlines and Southwest Airlines have received federal grand jury subpoenas for any documents related to Boeing’s communications about the jet, according to three people with knowledge of the matter.

The Federal Aviation Administration is also under fire for its role in approving the Max, and its decision to wait for days after the second crash to ground the plane. At a Wednesday congressional hearing, lawmakers will grill federal regulators about how the Max was certified.

Boeing declined to comment on the November meeting. “We are focused on working with pilots, airlines and global regulators to certify the updates on the Max and provide additional training and education to safely return the planes to flight,” the company said in a statement.

American Airlines said in a statement that it was “confident that the impending software updates, along with the new training elements Boeing is developing for the Max, will lead to recertification of the aircraft soon.”

The hourlong November meeting, inside a windowless conference room at the Fort Worth headquarters of the American Airlines pilots’ union, was confrontational at times. At the table was Mr. Sinnett, along with Craig Bomben, a top Boeing test pilot, and one of the company’s senior lobbyists, John Moloney. They faced several union leaders, many of them angry at the company.

Michael Michaelis, an American pilot, argued that Boeing should push the F.A.A. to issue what is known as an emergency airworthiness directive.

The F.A.A. had already issued one directive after the Lion Air crash, instructing airlines to revise their flight manuals to include information on how to respond to a malfunction of the anti-stall system known as MCAS. But Mr. Michaelis pushed Boeing to consider calling for an additional one to update the software.

Such a procedure would have required Boeing and airlines in the United States to take immediate action to ensure the safety of the Max, and would have likely taken the jet out of service temporarily.

“My question to you, as Boeing, is why wouldn’t you say this is the smartest thing to do?” Mr. Michaelis said. “Say we’re going to do everything we can to protect that traveling public in accordance with what our pilots unions are telling us.”

Mr. Sinnett didn’t budge, saying that it remained unclear that the new software, which automatically pushes the plane’s nose down, was responsible for the Lion Air crash. He added that he felt confident that pilots had adequate training to deal with a problem, especially now that pilots — who were not initially informed about the new system — were aware of it.

“You’ve got to understand that our commitment to safety is as great as yours,” Mr. Sinnett said in the meeting. “The worst thing that can ever happen is a tragedy like this, and the even worse thing would be another one.”

The pilots expressed frustration that Boeing did not inform them about the new software on the plane until after the Lion Air crash.

“These guys didn’t even know the damn system was on the airplane, nor did anybody else,” said Mr. Michaelis, the union’s head of safety.

Another American pilot, Todd Wissing, expressed frustration that no mention of the system had been included in the training manual for the 737 Max.

“I would think that there would be a priority of putting explanations of things that could kill you,” Mr. Wissing said.

The Boeing executives, Mr. Sinnett and Mr. Bomben, explained that the company did not believe that pilots needed to know about the software, because they were already trained to deal with scenarios like the one on the doomed Lion Air flight. All pilots are expected to know how to take control of an aircraft when the plane’s tail begins moving in an uncontrolled way because of a malfunction, nudging the aircraft toward the ground.

“The assumption is that the flight crews have been trained,” Mr. Sinnett said in the meeting. He added later: “Rightly or wrongly, that was the design criteria and that’s how the airplane was certified with the system and pilot working together.”

When the pilots pressed Boeing to consider encouraging the F.A.A. to issue an emergency airworthiness directive, Mr. Sinnett made the case against moving too quickly.

“We don’t want to rush and do a crappy job of fixing the right things and we also don’t want to fix the wrong things,” Mr. Sinnett said, later adding, “For flight-critical software, I don’t think you want us to rush, rush it faster.”

Mr. Sinnett acknowledged that the company was looking into potential mistakes in the design of the jet.

“One of the questions will be, is our design assumption wrong?” Mr. Sinnett said. “We’re going through that whole thought process of, were our assumptions really even valid when we did this?”

But he remained steadfast that pilots should know how to handle a malfunction of the new software on the plane, given their existing training.

As the meeting was concluding, Dennis Tajer, spokesman for the union, asked the Boeing executives whether they were still confident in the Max.

“Do you feel comfortable that the situation is under control today, before any software fix is implemented?” he asked.

Mr. Sinnett replied immediately: “Absolutely.”

Phroyd

#boeing #etheopia #crash

[pasthelod]

RBMK, MCAS and control theory

These topics are of course form the proverbial Horn of Plenty itself, with their unending supply of details, complexity, second- and higher order effects/interactions, and so on.

However, what I find most interesting is pinpointing the actual fatal design flaw. Because - and this is why this is fascinating - these situations were not like contacting a deadly disease, no, here there was always a point of return, right before the catastrophe. Basically right until the very last decision to activate the emergency control rod reinsertion procedure (AZ-5, EPS, scram!), or in case of the runaway anti-stall system (MCAS), before going below a certain altitude (which was a few seconds before crashing, so again at the very end).

After all, if the operators insert the control rods one by one and ramp up the water flow, things might break due to the enormous thermal load, but the explosion would have been probably avoided: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q3d3rzFTrLg&t=7m15s

And, in case of the Boeing 737 there's a standard procedure to stop electronics from interfering with the rear stabilizer angle (runaway horizontal stabilizer trim): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xixM_cwSLcQ&t=17m20s

Naturally, we can simply claim that it was human error. Though in case of Chernobyl the information wasn't even known, yet that was the official story. (And of course the chain of events was of course initiated by humans, and again the decision to withold information was again human-made, just as the flawed design, so they got it right, heh fukken tankies.)

And Boeing (even the CEO) blamed humans initially. (Bonus points for the similarity of infomration omission: MCAS was not documented in the 737MAX flight crew manual.)

Okay, so what were the flaws?

In case of the nuclear reactor, it was that the control rods weren't long enough. Basically the transition from ÜBER power to lower power went through a regime of ÜBERHYPER-to-the-11. (Because as the graphite moderator part of the control rods descended it increased reactivity at the bottom, which boiled even more water, etc.)

(Though the IAEA report from 1992 states that the reactor was so unstable that the explosion could have happened even just because of the water pump rundown itself.)

And in case of the Boeing 737MAX, the MCAS relied on systems with lower reliability than the system it influenced. Again, control theory, you cannot have reliable control if some unreliable system sometimes interferes. So claiming that the 737MAX flies the same as the NG because we solved it with some gadgets was rather thick bullshit.

[washingtonprelawland-blog]

The Boeing 737 Max: What Went Wrong?

By Katie Darst, Seattle University Class of 2020

July 16, 2019

Two fatal crashes in only five months, 346 deaths total. What happened? On October 28th, 2018 Lion Air Flight 610 went down just mere minutes after take off in Indonesia while on March 10, 2019 Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 also shared a similar fate, nosediving six minutes after taking off. There are still many questions left unanswered however an automated system created by Boeing may be to blame for these two mysterious crashes.

The Boeing 737 originally had its start in the 1960s while the 737 max first hit the air fairly recently in 2017. This latest generation of Boeing’s 737 resulted from stiff competition, a corporate tit-for-tat with their competitor Airbus. Theories have arisen that because of this tense rivalry, the 737 Max was approved too quickly, flaws overlooked, pilots under trained, and fatal consequences to come.

The primary objective of Boeing’s new 737 was to fly faster, farther, and more efficiently. In order for this to be possible, the size of the engines had to be larger. This resulted in the aerodynamics of the new plane requiring alterations, therefore increasing the dangerous risk of stalling to occur. Stalling transpires when the angle of attack is too great, the nose of the plane becomes lifted too high and the wings become unable to generate enough lift. In order to avoid the risk of stalling, Boeing developed a new automatic system called Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System or MCAS. In the case of a stall, MCAS forces the plane’s nose down in order to stabilize the aircraft. MCAS is controlled by angle of attack sensors placed on the surface of the plane in order to monitor the current positioning of the aircraft while in the air. These sensors determine if MCAS takes action and stabilization of the plane is necessary.

In the case of the Lion Air and Ethiopian flights, the angle of attack sensors sent false readings about the positioning of the aircraft in turn resulting in MCAS “overcorrecting,” the already balanced plane. The outcome was a nosedive the pilots were unable to effectively override in such fleeting time. A multitude of pilots were shockingly unaware that the new automated system even existed implying that the knowledge of overriding MCAS in time would be virtually impossible. It was also later found that the pilots would only have 40 seconds to correct MCAS once the problem was diagnosed.

The Boeing 737 Max planes have been grounded and remain grounded for further investigation. Boeing is currently working to update the software for the automated system responsible for the crashes which the Federal Aviation Administration will have to closely inspect and approve. However, the FAA is also being scrutinized for allowing Boeing to certify their own aircraft as airworthy. It has been argued that the FAA should not have been allowed to delegate the certification process to Boeing employees. The Justice Department, the Department of Transportations and other agencies have opened investigations into the crashes and the questionable relationship between Boeing and the FAA. However, there is no specific date on when the infamous 737 max will be able to meet the skies once again.

________________________________________________________________

1)     Hawkins, Andrew J. “Everything You Need to Know about the Boeing 737 Max Airplane Crashes.” The Verge, The Verge, 22 Mar. 2019, www.theverge.com/2019/3/22/18275736/boeing-737-max-plane-crashes-grounded-problems-info-details-explained-reasons.

2)     Limitone, Julia. “Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 Max Crash Couldn't Be Prevented by Physical Strength, Retired Pilot Says.” Fox Business, Fox Business, 20 June 2019, www.foxbusiness.com/features/ethiopian-airlines-boeing-737-max-crash.

Photo Credit: Bin im Garten

[africanglobe]

AFRICANGLOBE – More than 400 Boeing 737 Max pilots are suing the company over what they allege was an “unprecedented cover-up” of “known design flaws” in the plane, and over the financial losses they face as the plane remains grounded after two fatal crashes. A class-action lawsuit was filed against Boeing on Friday “for financial and other losses arising from the circumstances and grounding of the MAX fleet,” according to the two law firms representing the pilots, based in Chicago and Australia.

https://www.africanglobe.net/business/hundreds-pilots-suing-boeing-cover-up-plane-flaws/

#Boeing #EthiopianAirlines