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xtruss · 1 month

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What Has Happened to Boeing Since the 737 Max Crashes

— By Priyanka Boghani and Kaela Malig | March 13, 2024

A still from "Boeing's Fatal Flaw," a new FRONTLINE Documentary with The New York Times.

Five years ago, 346 people were killed in two crashes involving Boeing 737 Max planes within the span of almost five months: first off the coast of Indonesia in October 2018 and then in Ethiopia in March 2019.

Boeing’s Fatal Flaw, a 2021 FRONTLINE investigation with The New York Times, examined how commercial pressures, flawed design and failed oversight contributed to those devastating tragedies and a catastrophic crisis at one of the world’s most iconic industrial names.

In recent months, Boeing has come under renewed scrutiny after a door-like panel on a Boeing 737 Max 9 operated by Alaska Airlines blew off just a few minutes after takeoff in January 2024. An updated version of our documentary examines the impact of this latest crisis.

“This was supposed to be one of the most highly scrutinized planes in the world. And here you are with another incident that was risking passengers’ lives,” the Times’ Sydney Ember says in the updated documentary.

Here we take a brief look at what has happened to Boeing since the deadly 2018 and 2019 crashes and the recent Alaska Airlines incident.

Change in Leadership

Dennis Muilenburg had been CEO of Boeing since 2015. In the aftermath of the crashes, he testified before U.S. Senate and House Committees in October 2019, acknowledging the fatal accidents happened “on my watch” and saying he and the company were accountable. He told the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, “If we knew back then what we know now, we would have grounded [the 737 Max] right after the first accident.”

Two months after the congressional hearings, on Dec. 23, 2019, Muilenburg was fired by Boeing. The company described the move as “necessary to restore confidence” in Boeing “as it works to repair relationships with regulators, customers, and all other stakeholders.”

David Calhoun stepped into the role of CEO in January 2020 and continues to fill the position.

A $2.5 Billion DOJ Settlement and Challenges

On Jan. 7, 2021, the Department of Justice announced that Boeing would pay a $2.5 billion settlement, resolving a DOJ charge that the company had conspired to defraud the Federal Aviation Administration’s Aircraft Evaluation Group.

The DOJ’s criminal investigation focused on the actions of two employees who Boeing said in court documents “deceived the FAA AEG” about the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) onboard the 737 Max — a system the DOJ said “may have played a role” in both 737 Max crashes. The DOJ said the employees’ “deception” led to information about MCAS being left out of a key document released by the FAA, as well as airplane manuals and pilot-training materials.

As Boeing’s Fatal Flaw recounts, congressional investigators found internal documents showing that, after Boeing realized the impact MCAS would have on pilot training and FAA certification, some Boeing employees suggested removing all references to MCAS from training manuals.

“Boeing’s employees chose the path of profit over candor by concealing material information from the FAA concerning the operation of its 737 Max airplane and engaging in an effort to cover up their deception,” said David P. Burns, the acting assistant attorney general of the DOJ’s criminal division when the settlement was announced.

The company entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ, in which Boeing agreed to pay a nearly $244 million fine, to set up a $500-million fund for the families of people who died in the two crashes, and to pay $1.77 billion to airlines that had been affected by the 20-month grounding of the 737 Max that began in March 2019.

Boeing also agreed to continue cooperating with the DOJ’s Fraud Section on “any ongoing or future investigations and prosecutions” and is required to report any alleged violation of fraud laws by Boeing employees when dealing with foreign or domestic agencies, regulators or airline customers.

Boeing declined FRONTLINE’s request to be interviewed for the documentary. In a statement, the company said safety is its top priority and it has worked closely with regulators, investigators and stakeholders “to implement changes that ensure accidents like these never happen again.”

Former Boeing Pilot Found Not Guilty for Fraud

In October 2021, a federal grand jury criminally indicted Mark Forkner, Boeing’s Former Chief Technical Pilot for the 737 Max Airplane, on fraud charges. Forkner, who became the first and so far only individual to face criminal charges after the two fatal crashes, was accused of providing “materially false, inaccurate and incomplete information” to FAA regulators about flight-control software involved in the 2018 and 2019 crashes. Forkner was later found not guilty of all charges in federal court.

Forkner declined to be interviewed for the documentary, but his lawyer told the Times that his communications with the FAA were honest and that “he would never jeopardize the safety of other pilots or their passengers.”

Lawsuits by Families of Crash Victims

By November 2019, Boeing was facing more than 150 lawsuits filed by families of people who had died in the two crashes — over 50 of the suits stemming from the Indonesian crash and about 100 from the crash in Ethiopia, according to the Associated Press’ review of federal court records.

In July 2020, Boeing told a U.S. federal court that claims related to 171 of the 189 people killed in the Indonesia crash were either partially or fully settled, although the settlements were not publicly disclosed.

As of June 2023, cases related to 68 passengers from the Ethiopian Airlines crash were pending.

The Grounding and Return of the 737 Max 8 and Max 9

In the days after the second 737 Max crashed in March 2019, regulators around the world — from China to the European Union and several other countries — grounded the plane. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration followed suit on March 13, 2019, after initially saying the planes were safe to fly.

When the FAA retested and approved the 737 Max 8 and Max 9, ending the grounding in November 2020, it required airlines to take the following steps before putting the planes back into service: installing new flight-control-computer and display-system software; incorporating revised flight-crew procedures; rerouting wiring; completing a test of the “angle of attack” sensor system, which had contributed to both the 2018 and 2019 crashes; and performing an operational readiness flight.

The FAA, in conjunction with aviation agencies from Canada, Brazil and the European Union, also concluded that pilots operating the 737 Max would need to complete special training. It is not clear who would pay for this additional training, which reversed one of Boeing’s original sales pitches to airlines for the 737 Max: that the plane would require minimal pilot training.

A December 2020 Senate committee report criticized Boeing and the FAA’s handling of the 737 Max recertification testing, saying that, based on whistleblower information and testimony, it appeared Boeing and FAA officials had “established a pre-determined outcome,” and that Boeing officials “inappropriately coached” test pilots in the MCAS simulator. The report alleged, “It appears, in this instance, FAA and Boeing were attempting to cover up important information that may have contributed to the 737 MAX tragedies.”

The FAA responded at the time, saying: “Working closely with other international regulators, the FAA conducted a thorough and deliberate review of the 737 Max.” The agency added it was “confident” the issues that led to the two crashes had been “addressed through the design changes required and independently approved by the FAA and its partners.”

“We have learned many hard lessons” from the crashes, Boeing said in its own statement at the time. The company said it took the committee’s findings seriously and would continue to review the report in full.

Following the Senate report, families of the 2019 Ethiopian crash victims wrote to the FAA and the U.S. Department of Transportation in a letter dated Dec. 22, 2020, and reviewed by Reuters, asking for the 737 Max approval to be rescinded and for an investigation to “determine whether the MAX recertification process was tainted.”

A Brazilian airline was the first to fly a 737 Max after regulators there followed the FAA in ungrounding the plane. On Dec. 29, 2020 — a week after the families’ letter — the 737 Max flew paying passengers in America for the first time after nearly two years of being grounded. A month later, Europe’s aviation authority also gave the 737 Max clearance to fly.

On Aug. 26, 2021, India lifted its ban on the 737 Max after “closely” monitoring the plane’s performance elsewhere and noting “no untoward reporting.” China, which was the first country to ground Max jets after the deadly crashes, resumed commercial flights with the model in January 2023.

The 737 Max 10

On June 18, 2021, Boeing’s new model 737 Max 10 took to the skies for its first flight. The Max 10 is larger than the Max 8, which was involved in the 2018 and 2019 crashes, and the Max 9. According to Boeing’s technical specs, the Max 10 is 14 feet longer than the Max 8 and can seat a maximum of 230 people, compared to the Max 8’s capacity of 210.

At the time of the test flight, Boeing was already working on additional safety features in the Max 10 requested by European regulators, according to Reuters.

“We’re going to take our time on this certification,” Stan Deal, who became president and CEO of Boeing’s Commercial Airplanes division in October 2019, said at the time of the Max 10’s first flight, according to The Seattle Times. “We’re committed to make further safety enhancements.”’

The FAA cleared the Max 10 to begin test flights, a step towards certification, last November.

Alaska Airlines Plane Incident

On January 5, an Alaska Airlines jet made an emergency landing in Portland, Oregon, after a portion of its fuselage blew out and left a door-sized hole in the side of the aircraft while it was around 16,000 feet in the sky. None of the 171 passengers and six crew members were seriously injured. The FAA temporarily grounded more than 170 Max 9 jets so they could be inspected.

In the aftermath, Boeing CEO David Calhoun has said, “Boeing is accountable for what happened.”

A Feb. 6 preliminary report from the National Transportation Safety Board said that the bolts meant to secure the door-like panel appeared to be missing before the flight.

Later the same month, the FAA released a long-awaited report that found that Boeing’s safety culture has been “inadequate” and “confusing.” The FAA gave Boeing 90 days to come up with a plan to address quality control issues.

The FAA conducted a six-week audit after the Alaska Airlines incident, and on March 4 said that it found Boeing had allegedly failed to comply with manufacturing quality control requirements.

Boeing now faces legal trouble in relation to the Jan. 5 event, including lawsuits filed by passengers and shareholders.

On Feb. 21, Boeing told employees that Ed Clark, who led the 737 program since 2021, would be replaced. The memo announcing Clark’s departure and other changes said the company was focused “on ensuring that every airplane we deliver meets or exceeds all quality and safety requirements.”

The Justice Department has also begun a criminal investigation into Boeing in the aftermath of the Alaska Airlines incident, as reported first by The Wall Street Journal.

“Cultural change doesn’t happen overnight, especially at big corporations like this,” David Gelles, one of the Times reporters featured in Boeing’s Fatal Flaw, says. “If Boeing wants to get back to that place of grandeur where it was for so long one of the most important American companies, it’s going to take not four years, but it might take 14.”

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b737m · 1 year

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Part #1: Prologue

Let’s start from the beginning. Boeing is one of the largest airplane manufacturers in the world. They are the largest airplane manufacturer in the US.

In the 1990s and 2000s, there was demand from the airlines to Boeing to make a more fuel-efficient twin-jet aircraft that can compete with the offerings from Airbus (the other major airplane manufacturer in the world). Since it would be too expensive to develop a brand new airplane, Boeing instead took their popular 737 NG narrow-body twin-jet and made modifications to it including, but not limited to, new engines which were larger but used less fuel than the older models. It was the change in engines that brought about the issues we will explore.

These larger engines had to be mounted further up on the wings, and further forward on the aircraft in order to maintain a good weight distribution front to rear. However, there was a concern to engineers at Boeing that the engines could cause the plane to be unstable in the air. They developed a powerful system called the “Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System” (MCAS).

In the United States and around the world, new aircraft must be certified by regulators and governing bodies that they are safe to operate. This is an expensive process to undergo, as well as time-consuming. And that’s just to certify the plane for flight, that’s not taking into account the cost of developing the craft in the first place. The other cost that must be taken into account with a new aircraft is training the pilots to fly the plane itself. This is not generally a cost the manufacturer takes on, but the airline the pilot works for. This can make new planes unattractive for airlines to buy because of the cost and time to train their pilots on the new planes. Ultimately, they may choose to forego the purchase of a new aircraft and instead purchase a model that their pilots have already been trained on. Because Boeing chose to adapt an existing plane with new features, they were able to avoid many of these costs. And because it was the popular 737 adapted, there was no shortage of pilots who — in theory — were trained to fly them. But the MCAS system gets in the way of that. This system was much more powerful and substantial than Boeing published. Boeing’s own tests showed pilots must be trained in order to properly fly the plane.

MCAS was designed to prevent the aircraft from stalling. Stalling in aircraft is not like a car, the engines are not the issue, it is the lift and the airflow around the wings is not sufficient to keep the aircraft in the air and it will fall out of the sky. The MCAS system uses data from a singular Angle of Attack (AoA) sensor to determine if the angle is too high, and can adjust the flaps to gently nose down the aircraft to keep it flying. MCAS runs for 10 seconds, and pushes the aircraft powerfully nose-down during that time. Once MCAS ran, it would take another reading from the AoA sensor and run again if needed. In the time it’s reassessing, it would be off for 5 seconds. This process would continue until the plane was at an acceptable angle. One issue with this system was that it only took measurements from one AoA sensor — and not two. There was no redundancy in this system so if the AoA sensor was malfunctioning or had an inaccurate reading, there was no system in place that would be able to give alternate data to MCAS.

Boeing knew about this limitation, and they also knew that in the event of MCAS malfunctioning, a pilot has only a ten-second window to regain control of the plane. Beyond that timeframe, the aircraft may be traveling at an excessive speed and angle of descent, rendering it unrecoverable. Boeing’s own documents state “With pilot training to recognize the runaway, a reaction time scenario of greater than 10 seconds found the failure to be catastrophic”. Boeing did not disclose this timeframe, nor trained the pilots on MCAS although they knew they had to be trained. This is exactly the situation that lead to the crash of Ethiopian Airlines ET302 and Lion Air JT610. By the time the pilot and captain of ET302 turned off MCAS, the plane was traveling too fast, and they could not pull up because of the extreme force on the tail wing. The pilots of ET302 had been briefed on the system by Boeing, the pilots of JT610 had not.

Boeing opted not to publicize their new system and avoided making a big fuss about it, likely due to concerns over regulatory scrutiny from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). By keeping a low profile, they were able to avoid drawing attention to themselves and potential regulatory implications. Had the FAA gotten involved, they would have required pilots to undergo training and be certified to fly the 737 Max aircraft — a separate certification to the standard 737 NG. As explained earlier, this training is expensive for the airlines who buy and fly the planes. They have to put their pilots on the sidelines while being trained, and have other pilots flying commercially. This is unattractive for airlines, who may choose to purchase a different aircraft which does not require retraining — an aircraft not made by Boeing, principally, Airbus.

Airbus is Boeing’s primary — and in many cases only — competitor. These two manufacturers have an effective duopoly on the marketplace. In the lead up to the 737 Max release, Boeing had been losing market share to Airbus for years. And it did not help that Airbus had just released a version of their popular A320 called the A320neo, which was more efficient than the previous version. The A320 had become the best selling aircraft in its class, and the A320neo extended that lead — the lead ahead of the Boeing 737. At the time the 737 Max was release, it became the fastest selling aircraft Boeing had ever released. It included some of the largest orders both by volume and monetary value that Boeing had ever seen. This was great for Boeing’s profit, and share price.

It was not until the plane was grounded by governments around the world that Boeing was forced to fix the 737 Max. They made adjustments to the MCAS system, listed below:

MCAS now takes input from both of the AoA sensors, instead of just one. And if they do not have the same reading, MCAS will not activate and will instead display a warning to the pilots. MCAS can now only run 1 time, it will not get caught in the repeated “run for 10, off for 5, run for 10, off for 5” cycle that brought down JT610 and ET302. The power of MCAS has been reduced, it can no longer adjust the flaps to a degree which the pilots themselves cannot also match or exceed.

Boeing designed an aircraft with a fatal flaw — one that after the first crash, an FAA investigation projected the 737 Max would wind up being the most deadly modern aircraft. Up to 1 fatal crash every 2 years for the lifetime of the plane, and up to 15 more (after the Lion Air crash) over the life of the Max. This report was not made public at the time of its publication. Boeing chose to put sales and profits ahead of designing a safe aircraft — and designing training that would make pilots aware of the new systems onboard the aircraft. They did not do what would ensure the safety of the hundreds and thousands of passengers who would fly on this plane, and instead concealed the dangers of the aircraft to airlines and regulators alike. As a result, 346 people died in the 2 737 Max crashes.

"Airbus A320neo family." Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, 3 Apr. 2023, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airbus_A320neo_family.

Boeing 737 MAX. (2023, April 3). In Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_MAX

Boeing. “Boeing.” 737 MAX, Boeing, https://www.boeing.com/commercial/737max/#/gallery.

Boeing. “Boeing.” Our Company, Boeing, 2023, https://www.boeing.com/company/.

"Boeing." Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, 31 Mar. 2023, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing.

Boeing. “Boeing.” The 737 MAX MCAS Software Enhancement, Boeing, https://www.boeing.com/commercial/737max/737-max-software-updates.page.

Bailey, Mark, and Keven McAlester. Downfall: The Case Against Boeing, Netflix, 2022, https%3A%2F%2Fwww.netflix.com%2Ftitle%2F81272421&usg=AOvVaw3CSSsbMZpxvie5HD6N85Nq.

Leggett, Theo. “737 MAX Crashes: Boeing Says Not Guilty to Fraud Charge.” BBC News, BBC, 26 Jan. 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-64390546.

Sorokanich, Bob. “Boeing Argues There Was No Pain or Suffering in 737 MAX Crash.” Jalopnik, Jalopnik, 17 Mar. 2023, https://jalopnik.com/boeing-737-max-crash-ethiopia-airlines-pain-suffering-1850236537.

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onetechspot08 · 6 months

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Spectacular Examples of Software Development Failures

Title: Spectacular Examples of Software Development Failures

Introduction

Software development has transformed the world, enabling countless technological advancements and innovations. However, it's not always smooth sailing in the digital realm. For every successful software project, there are spectacular examples of software development failures that serve as cautionary tales. In this article, we'll explore some of the most notable software development failures and the lessons we can learn from them.

The Healthcare.gov Debacle

One of the most infamous software development failures in recent memory is the rollout of Healthcare.gov, the online marketplace created as part of the Affordable Care Act in the United States. When the website launched in 2013, it was plagued by numerous issues, including technical glitches, slow performance, and security vulnerabilities. The project's mismanagement and lack of rigorous testing resulted in a public relations nightmare.

Key Lesson: Proper planning, rigorous testing, and effective project management are essential for the success of complex software projects, especially those with critical public importance.

The Mars Climate Orbiter

The Mars Climate Orbiter, a NASA spacecraft designed to study the Martian climate, ended in disaster in 1999. The spacecraft was lost due to a unit conversion error; one part of the project used metric units while another used imperial units. This oversight led to the spacecraft's fatal trajectory miscalculation.

Key Lesson: Attention to detail and consistent unit standards are paramount, especially in mission-critical projects like space exploration.

Windows Vista

Microsoft's Windows Vista was a highly anticipated operating system that turned into a major disappointment upon release in 2007. The software was criticized for its sluggish performance, compatibility issues with existing software and hardware, and excessive system requirements. Vista tarnished Microsoft's reputation, and many users opted to stick with its predecessor, Windows XP.

Key Lesson: Rushing software development to meet deadlines can lead to a subpar product. Thorough testing and user feedback are essential to ensure a positive user experience.

The Boeing 737 Max

The Boeing 737 Max became infamous for a series of software-related crashes, resulting in the grounding of the entire fleet in 2019. The crashes were attributed to the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), a software system designed to prevent stalls. A lack of proper pilot training, inadequate documentation, and software issues all played a role in these tragedies.

Key Lesson: Safety must always be the top priority in software development, especially in industries like aviation where lives are at stake. Comprehensive testing and transparency are critical.

Knight Capital Group's Trading Software

In 2012, Knight Capital Group lost $440 million in just 45 minutes due to a software glitch. The high-frequency trading algorithm the company used was accidentally activated, causing the firm to buy and sell millions of shares at unfavorable prices. This disastrous event led to the company's near-collapse and its eventual acquisition.

Key Lesson: Rigorous quality assurance and safeguards are crucial in financial software, where errors can have catastrophic financial consequences.

Nokia's MeeGo

Nokia's MeeGo was a promising operating system with the potential to rival Android and iOS. However, poor management decisions, frequent strategy changes, and a lack of developer support doomed the project. Nokia's inability to deliver a competitive software platform ultimately led to its decline in the smartphone market.

Key Lesson: Consistency and a clear development strategy are essential in maintaining the trust and support of developers and users.

Google Wave

Google Wave was an ambitious real-time communication and collaboration platform launched in 2009. Despite significant hype and anticipation, the product failed to gain traction. It was too complex and lacked a clear use case, leaving many users confused and frustrated. Google discontinued the service within a year of its launch.

Key Lesson: Simplicity and clear user value propositions are key to a software product's success. Complexity can deter users and hinder adoption.

The British Airways IT Outage

In May 2017, British Airways suffered a catastrophic IT failure that resulted in the cancellation of thousands of flights. The outage was caused by a power surge and subsequent failure to restore services. It was a stark reminder of the importance of robust disaster recovery plans and the need to test them thoroughly.

Key Lesson: Disaster recovery planning and redundancy are critical in maintaining system uptime and ensuring business continuity.

Conclusion

The world of software development is marked by both triumphs and failures. The spectacular software development failures highlighted in this article serve as reminders of the importance of careful planning, rigorous testing, transparency, and user-centric design. Software development is a complex and ever-evolving field, and learning from past mistakes is essential to ensure future successes. By understanding the root causes of these failures, we can strive to create better, more reliable, and safer software systems.

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thisisbjoeblog · 3 years

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Documentary 101: PBS Frontline – Boeing’s Fatal Flaw 2021

On 14th September 2021, PBS Frontline ran an excellent documentary on Boeing’s series of shocking mishandling & process failure in the manufacturing of the new 737-Max passenger plane. The trigger point was the introduction of the new Airbus A320neo and the delay of Boeing’s next model, the 787 Dreamliner. Image source: PRNewsfoto/Boeing There was tremendous pressure to bring the new plane into…

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#737 Max #A320neo #Airbus #Aircraft #Aviation #Boeing #Death #Design #Flight #Maintenance #Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System #MCAS #Mistakes #Safety #Travelling #Youtube

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newsnomadblog · 5 years

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Six minutes: Ethiopian Air pilots battled the Boeing 737 Max

Ethiopian Federal policemen stand at the scene of the Ethiopian Airlines Flight ET 302 plane crash, near the town of Bishoftu, southeast of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia March 11, 2019.Image Credit: Reuters

05 April 2019 | Staff | Bloomberg via Gulf News

The alarms started sounding just seconds after Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 took off on March 10 from Addis Ababa with 157 people on board.

As…

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#crash #Ethiopian Air #Flight 302 #Lion Air #Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System #MCAS

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privateaviationmarkets · 3 years

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THE 737 MAX RETURNS TO FLY IN EUROPE

(Teleborsa) - The European Union Agency for Aviation Safety (EASA) has issued the authorization for the reuse of the Boeing 737 Max, already certified in mid-November 2020 by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for the return to operations in American skies. The positive opinion was issued following the checks on the modifications introduced on the aircraft after the two serious accidents, in Indonesia and Ethiopia, which had led to the suspension of operations from March 2019. Both accidents, without survivors, were caused from the malfunction of a sensor connected to the MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) software, which had put the 737 Max out of control of the pilots causing it to crash.

Already at the beginning of December, the Brazilian low-cost airline Gol made the first scheduled flight of a 737 MAX, from Sao Paulo to Porto Alegre. EASA Executive Director Patrick Ky said the agency "has determined that Boeing 737 MAXs can return to safe flight" and that "it will continue to closely monitor aircraft operation as they return to service." .

The green light for the resumption of flights for Boeing 737 Max also comes from the British regulatory authority on civil aviation (CAA Civil Aviation Authority). The CAA also approved "changes to the design" of the aircraft, its flight instrumentation, and the training of its piloting personnel as improvements to the safety alarms that had prompted the shutdown of all 737 Max later. to two accidents involving this model aircraft.

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progressivefriends · 5 years

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“Nearly two decades before Boeing’s MCAS system crashed two of the plane-maker’s brand-new 737 MAX jets, Stan Sorscher knew his company’s increasingly toxic mode of operating would create a disaster of some kind. A long and proud “safety culture” was rapidly being replaced, he argued, with “a culture of financial bullshit, a culture of groupthink.” 

Sorscher, a physicist who’d worked at Boeing more than two decades and had led negotiations there for the engineers’ union, had become obsessed with management culture. He said he didn’t previously imagine Boeing’s brave new managerial caste creating a problem as dumb and glaringly obvious as MCAS (or the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, as a handful of software wizards had dubbed it). Mostly he worried about shriveling market share driving sales and head count into the ground, the things that keep post-industrial American labor leaders up at night. On some level, though, he saw it all coming; he even demonstrated how the costs of a grounded plane would dwarf the short-term savings achieved from the latest outsourcing binge in one of his reports that no one read back in 2002.”

#faa #boeing #737max

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washingtonprelawland-blog · 5 years

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The Boeing 737 Max: What Went Wrong?

By Katie Darst, Seattle University Class of 2020

July 16, 2019

Two fatal crashes in only five months, 346 deaths total. What happened? On October 28th, 2018 Lion Air Flight 610 went down just mere minutes after take off in Indonesia while on March 10, 2019 Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 also shared a similar fate, nosediving six minutes after taking off. There are still many questions left unanswered however an automated system created by Boeing may be to blame for these two mysterious crashes.

The Boeing 737 originally had its start in the 1960s while the 737 max first hit the air fairly recently in 2017. This latest generation of Boeing’s 737 resulted from stiff competition, a corporate tit-for-tat with their competitor Airbus. Theories have arisen that because of this tense rivalry, the 737 Max was approved too quickly, flaws overlooked, pilots under trained, and fatal consequences to come.

The primary objective of Boeing’s new 737 was to fly faster, farther, and more efficiently. In order for this to be possible, the size of the engines had to be larger. This resulted in the aerodynamics of the new plane requiring alterations, therefore increasing the dangerous risk of stalling to occur. Stalling transpires when the angle of attack is too great, the nose of the plane becomes lifted too high and the wings become unable to generate enough lift. In order to avoid the risk of stalling, Boeing developed a new automatic system called Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System or MCAS. In the case of a stall, MCAS forces the plane’s nose down in order to stabilize the aircraft. MCAS is controlled by angle of attack sensors placed on the surface of the plane in order to monitor the current positioning of the aircraft while in the air. These sensors determine if MCAS takes action and stabilization of the plane is necessary.

In the case of the Lion Air and Ethiopian flights, the angle of attack sensors sent false readings about the positioning of the aircraft in turn resulting in MCAS “overcorrecting,” the already balanced plane. The outcome was a nosedive the pilots were unable to effectively override in such fleeting time. A multitude of pilots were shockingly unaware that the new automated system even existed implying that the knowledge of overriding MCAS in time would be virtually impossible. It was also later found that the pilots would only have 40 seconds to correct MCAS once the problem was diagnosed.

The Boeing 737 Max planes have been grounded and remain grounded for further investigation. Boeing is currently working to update the software for the automated system responsible for the crashes which the Federal Aviation Administration will have to closely inspect and approve. However, the FAA is also being scrutinized for allowing Boeing to certify their own aircraft as airworthy. It has been argued that the FAA should not have been allowed to delegate the certification process to Boeing employees. The Justice Department, the Department of Transportations and other agencies have opened investigations into the crashes and the questionable relationship between Boeing and the FAA. However, there is no specific date on when the infamous 737 max will be able to meet the skies once again.

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1) Hawkins, Andrew J. “Everything You Need to Know about the Boeing 737 Max Airplane Crashes.” The Verge, The Verge, 22 Mar. 2019, www.theverge.com/2019/3/22/18275736/boeing-737-max-plane-crashes-grounded-problems-info-details-explained-reasons.

2) Limitone, Julia. “Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 Max Crash Couldn't Be Prevented by Physical Strength, Retired Pilot Says.” Fox Business, Fox Business, 20 June 2019, www.foxbusiness.com/features/ethiopian-airlines-boeing-737-max-crash.

Photo Credit: Bin im Garten

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t-annhauser · 5 years

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Disastri ad alta quota: l’affaire 737 Max spiegato bene

Siccome sono un appassionato d’aviazione (rigorosamente a terra), Youtube mi ha consigliato un video interessante che spiega bene cos’è successo al 737 Max: per competere con Airbus che aveva montato sul suo aereo di punta dei motori più grandi ed efficienti in fatto di consumi, la Boeing ha dovuto modificare nel suo 737 l’attacco dei motori portandoli più in alto, questo però ha modificato il comportamento del 737 Max in fase di decollo facendogli alzare il muso più del dovuto, fino a rischiare lo stallo. Ecco che si è reso necessario approntare un software che riportasse in basso il muso del Boeing in fase di decollo, il Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), presunto responsabile dei disastri. Plausibile.

youtube

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yugparibodh-blog · 5 years

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CYBERSECURITY – Why it matters to you...!!

They say that if you have not heard the term “cybersecurity”, then you are living under the rock in today’s time.

I believe it is true, considering the fact how it has touched everyone’s life whosoever is using technology. It can be that phone in your pocket or your computer. Each one of us today is part of the internet hullabaloo.

There were times when technology seemed complicated to everyone. People were skeptical to know it and afraid to adopt it. My point of view is that technology is more complicated now.

I know you would agree to disagree with me. Let me mention a simple example here to prove my point. I had this car which had a master button on the driver’s seat through which I could lock all doors as I pleased. But then there was one of these days that I went to drop some relatives to the airport and we were running late. For some reason, the automatic button in the car stopped working and the doors didn’t unlock. Now, here I was pressing that button desperately like a fool while all of them were staring at me. Deep inside, I cursed my car as much as I could, and then out of nowhere (after 20 minutes), the switch worked, and we could get out, phew!

I know you may feel that this example is not worthy enough of justifying the complexity of technology but trust me we are getting there. The above incident was my way of telling about big problems we are going to be dealing in the future. Most of us are internet users today. And of course, all of us at some point in time have taken printouts of some or the other document. If you take it practically, then there is the world of computers, the world of printers and then the world of internet service providers. All these systems are so complex in their own sense that trying to understand them the way we think we understand things won’t work anymore.

Talk about the Boeing 737 Max Airplane crash that happened last year in 2018. Unfortunately, none of the people onboard survived. If reports are to be believed, a faulty sensor erroneously reported that the airplane was stalling. The false report triggered an automated system known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS. This system tried to point the aircraft’s nose down so that it could gain enough speed to fly safely. MCAS takes readings from two sensors that determine how much the plane’s nose is pointing up or down relative to oncoming airflow. When MCAS detects that the plane is pointing up at a dangerous angle, it can automatically push down the nose of the plane in an effort to prevent the plane from stalling. According to Reuters, the doomed Lion Air cockpit voice recorder revealed how pilots scoured a manual in a losing battle to figure out why they were hurtling down to sea. This tells us how the ease of technology still has made it even more complex for us.

Now, coming back to the phones in your pocket. The multimedia phones today are not phones anymore and have become mobile computers. We access all sorts of personal data on them. Be it the social media apps like Facebook, Gmail etc., or our banking apps, or any shopping websites over the internet. With all this data, comes the vulnerability. Same goes for your laptops.

As more and more people are globally connected with each other (like the sellers connected to their customers), cybersecurity in this new technological age is of greater importance than ever before. The Equifax data breach that happened in 2017 affected almost 145.5 million consumers, clearly tells us that we can be hacked at any point in time and can lose almost everything. In this interconnected age, the risk is higher and of course the stakes are higher too. Theft is not limited to stealing tangible objects anymore. It can be a theft of your Financial identity, Social Security identity theft and what not. The mobiles we are using today are connected to the internet today along with the computers that we use. We have so much dependency on the internet today that it has the greatest power to devastate us.

This is where cybersecurity comes into picture. We need it to mitigate risk and protect us from all the unwanted vulnerabilities. Service providers, mobile app owners like Facebook, Google try their best and have been investing millions of dollars in securing their customers’ data. The bottom line is that cyber security is important. The onus lies not only with the service providers or technology companies, but us as well. We as technology-users should be pro-active in understanding the risks that ease of technology brings with itself. The idea is to be smart and cautious while using any technology. So, before someone takes unauthorized access to your data, it is time to become self-aware. That time is today, that time is now.

#cybersecurity #itsecurity #information security #data breach #computer #internet #threat #technology

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justforbooks · 5 years

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Ξημερώματα 10ης Μαρτίου. Ο κυβερνήτης του Boeing 737 Max 8 της Ethiopian Airlines που εκτελεί πτήση από την Αντίς Αμπέμπα στο Ναϊρόμπι, λίγα λεπτά μόλις μετά την απογείωση ζητά αναγκαστική προσγείωση πίσω στο αεροδρόμιο, εξαιτίας προβλημάτων στο σύστημα ελέγχου πτήσης.

Λίγα λεπτά μετά η είδηση γίνεται γνωστή σ' όλο τον κόσμο. Το αεροσκάφος συντρίβεται στις 8:44, ακριβώς 62 χιλιόμετρα νότια της πρωτεύουσας της Αιθιοπίας, στην περιοχή Bishoftu. Ο απολογισμός, τραγικός. 157 νεκροί, εκ των οποίων 149 επιβάτες και 8 μέλη του πληρώματος. Η πτώση, σύμφωνα με τις πληροφορίες και τις πρώτες εικόνες που μεταδίδονται, είναι σφοδρή, ενώ αυτόπτες μάρτυρες που βλέπουν το αεροπλάνο να πέφτει στο έδαφος αναφέρουν πως έβγαζε καπνούς λίγο πριν τη συντριβή του, καθώς έκανε παράλληλα μια ξαφνική στροφή, λες και προσπαθούσε να πάρει ύψος.

Το αεροσκάφος της μοιραίας πτήσης είναι το Boeing 737 Max 8. Πρόκειται ουσιαστικά για έναν υπερσύγχρονο τύπο αεροπλάνου, ο οποίος βρίσκεται σε λειτουργία εδώ και μόλις δύο χρόνια, ακριβό –το καθένα από αυτά κοστίζει 130 εκατομμύρια δολάρια– και ιδιαίτερα δημοφιλές, καθώς μέχρι πρότινος οι παραγγελίες των αεροπορικών εταιρειών από όλο τον κόσμο που ήθελαν να το συμπεριλάβουν στον στόλο τους έφταναν τις 7.000.

Η είδηση πως το αεροσκάφος που συντρίβεται ανήκει σ' αυτήν τη γενιά προκαλεί ανησυχία, καθώς ένα ακόμη Boeing ακριβώς ίδιο, της Lion Air αυτή τη φορά, συντρίβεται στις 29 Οκτωβρίου του περασμένου χρόνου στην Ινδονησία, με όλους τους 189 επιβάτες του νεκρούς.

Εξαιτίας του δεύτερου αεροπορικού δυστυχήματος των Boeing 737 Max 8 μέσα σε διάστημα μικρότερου των πέντε μηνών, η Boeing τελικά καθηλώνει όλο τον στόλο των συγκεκριμένων τύπων αεροσκαφών παγκοσμίως για να επεξεργαστεί τα αίτια που προκάλεσαν τις μοιραίες πτώσεις. Είχαν προηγηθεί, μάλιστα, διαδοχικές από πολλά κράτη του κόσμου απαγορεύσεις διέλευσης των συγκεκριμένων αεροσκαφών από τον εναέριο χώρο τους, μεταξύ των οποίων και η Ελλάδα – οι αεροπορικές εταιρείες της οποίας, ωστόσο, μέχρι στιγμής, δεν διαθέτουν κάποιο από αυτά.

Τι είναι, όμως, αυτό που οδήγησε στην πτώση των δύο αεροσκαφών και τι έκανε πιλότους και εμπειρογνώμονες ανά τον κόσμο να πιστεύουν πως οι δύο πτήσεις, σε Αιθιοπία και Ινδονησία, παρουσιάζουν πολλά κοινά σημεία;

Η προηγούμενη γενιά Boeing κατασκευάστηκε πριν από 10 χρόνια. Η νέα, ωστόσο, των Max 8 και 9, έχει κάτι διαφορετικό. Πρόκειται, ουσιαστικά, για το περίφημο και «ύποπτο» πια σύστημα MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System), το οποίο ρίχνει αυτομάτως τη μύτη του αεροπλάνου προς τα κάτω, αν τα δεδομένα που υπάρχουν δείχνουν πως βρίσκεται σε κίνδυνο. Ο πιλότος δεν μπορεί να αντιδράσει και εκείνο «παίρνει φόρα» προς τα κάτω.

Συγκρίνοντας τα δύο πρόσφατα περιστατικά παρατηρούμαι ότι και το πρώτο και το δεύτερο αεροσκάφος έπεσαν "με τη μούρη". Αυτό της Ethiopian Airlines δημιούργησε κρατήρα στο έδαφος. Τα αεροσκάφη δεν πέφτουν συνήθως έτσι. Για να συντριβεί μ' αυτό τον τρόπο, πάει να πει πως ο πιλότος δεν μπορούσε να το ελέγξει. Είχε φτάσει στα 8.000 πόδια, άρα θα είχε χρόνο να κάνει κάτι, αν ήξερε πώς να αντιδράσει». Την αδυναμία ελέγχου στην περίπτωση της πρώτης πτώσης του Boeing 737 Max 8 στην Ινδονησία –και πιθανότατα της δεύτερης–, δεν επιτρέπεται να την αγνοήσουμε.

Στο πίσω μέρος των Boeing υπάρχει ένας σένσορας ο οποίος μετρά ουσιαστικά τον αέρα που περνά από εκεί, συλλέγει δεδομένα, τα στέλνει σ' έναν υπολογιστή και αυτός με τη σειρά του στον αυτόματο πιλότο που ελέγχει αν όλα πάνε καλά στο αεροπλάνο. Τι έκανε, όμως η Boeing σ' αυτό τον νέο τύπο αεροσκάφους;

Μίκρυνε τον όγκο των κινητήρων που βρίσκονται στα φτερά του, με αποτέλεσμα ο αέρας που περνάει από το περίβλήμα τους να μην είναι ο ίδιος μ' αυτόν των αεροπλάνων της προηγ��ύμενης γενιάς. Ο αέρας είναι διαφορετικός, άρα ο σένσορας λαμβάνει άλλα δεδομένα. Στον αυτόματο πιλότο, λοιπόν, φτάνουν λανθασμένες πληροφορίες, πληροφορίες πως το αεροπλάνο δεν πετάει καλά, ότι το αεροσκάφος έχει μικρή ταχύτητα. Και τι κάνει ο αυτόματος πιλότος; Ρίχνει τη μούρη του αεροπλάνου προς τα κάτω για να αυξήσει ταχύτητα.

Ο πιλότος όμως βλέπει από τα υπόλοιπα όργανα πως έχει κανονική ταχύτητα. Εγώ, παραδείγματος χάριν, μπορεί να έχω 800 χιλιόμετρα ταχύτητα αλλά ο αυτόματος πιλότος να καταλαβαίνει από τον σένσορα πως έχω 300, άρα πρέπει να του ρίξει την κλίση για να αυξηθεί. Το κάνει, όμως, χωρίς να χρειάζεται, με αποτέλεσμα εγώ εκεί να τρελαίνομαι. Τι κάνει αυτό το πράγμα εδώ πέρα; Αφού όλα πάνε καλά, γιατί το αεροπλάνο πάει προς τα κάτω;

Και οι δύο συντριβές έγιναν λίγα λεπτά μόλις μετά την απογείωση, άρα ο χρόνος που έχει να αντιδράσει ο πιλότος, έχοντας συνάμα να κουμαντάρει ένα αεροπλάνο με μεγάλη ταχύτητα, είναι πέντε με έξι δευτερόλεπτα.

Ο πρώτος πιλότος δεν πρόλαβε να καταλάβει τι να κάνει. Δεν έχεις χρόνο να αντιδράσεις και σου πέφτει το αεροπλάνο. Εδώ ό,τι κάνουμε, είναι όλα γραμμένα, ξέρουμε σε κάθε περίπτωση τι πρέπει να γίνει. Αυτό που μπορεί να σου συμβεί και να 'χει να κάνει με εμπειρία, είναι η κακοκαιρία, οι δυνατοί άνεμοι στην απογείωση και στην προσγείωση. Δεν γίνεται όμως να είσαι μάγος, να λες ξαφνικά "τώρα τι κάνω"; Μόνο ενστικτωδώς μπορείς να βρεις τη λύση, η οποία υπάρχει: να το βγάλεις από τον αυτόματο πιλότο, και να το χειριστείς με τα χέρια σου.

Για ποιο λόγο, όμως, οι πιλότοι και στις δύο περιπτώσεις δεν κατάφεραν να το ελέγξουν;

Η Boeing δεν ενημέρωσε ποτέ τους εκπαιδευτές και τους πιλότους για το νέο αυτό σύστημα και τις ενέργειες που πρέπει να κάνουν σε περίπτωση που συμβεί κάτι απρόοπτο. Έπρεπε να το γνωρίζουμε επίσημα για να γίνουν οι εκπαιδεύσεις στα simulators. Η απορία μας είναι, λοιπόν, γιατί δεν μας το είπε. Δεν το ήξερε, δεν το είχε βρει στις δοκιμές στην αεροσήραγγα ή στον αέρα, δεν περίμενε ότι μπορεί να υπάρξει και αυτή η βλάβη; Δεν μπορώ να καταλάβω.

Οι συντριβές σε Αιθιοπία και Ινδονησία δεν έχουν να κάνουν με τις χώρες προέλευσης των αεροπορικών εταιρειών. Δεν μπορούμε να πούμε πως έπεσε, επειδή η Ethiopian Airlines δεν είναι καλή. Είναι θέμα τύχης. Έτυχε ο αέρας να είναι τόσος ώστε να μεταδοθούν λανθασμένες πληροφορίες στον αυτόματο πιλότο. Εδώ μιλάμε για πολύ λεπτούς υπολογισμούς. Το πιο βασικό ερώτημα που προκύπτει, όμως, είναι το εξής: μπορούσε η Boeing να προλάβει το δεύτερο δυστύχημα; Δεν πρόλαβαν, γιατί έγιναν σε πολύ σύντομο διάστημα. Μπορεί να είδαν τη βλάβη, αλλά έπρεπε να γίνουν ολόκληρες διαδικασίες για τον τρόπο αντίδρασης, αν προκύψει τέτοιο πρόβλημα. Έπρεπε να γίνουν δοκιμές στον αέρα και στο έδαφος, να δουν τι πρέπει να αλλάξουν και πώς. Θα μου πεις είναι καλύτερα τώρα; Έχουμε χάσει 300 άτομα μέχρι στιγμής...

Με τα υπερσύγχρονα αεροπλάνα Boeing 737 Max να είναι πια καθηλωμένα, οι έρευνες για τις αστοχίες στην κατασκευή τους που οδήγησαν στα δύο δυστυχήματα γίνονται με πυρετώδεις ρυθμούς. Το μαύρο κουτί της πτήσης της Ethiopian Airlines έχει εντοπιστεί, με τη διεθνή κοινότητα να περιμένει μέχρι την ερχόμενη Κυριακή για να ακούσει τι τελικά έφταιξε στην μοιραία πτήση.

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