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ellevandersneed · 3 months

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finished reading thru The Hundred Years' War On Palestine: A History of Settler Colonial Conquest and Resistance by Rashid Khalidi and I cannot recommend it enough. A lot of people and, very likely, the average person not completely blinded by Islamophobia and/or USamerican/European/British exceptionalism are probably at least moderately sympathetic to the Palestinian cause but I don't know how many of us actually understand the degrees by which Israel is based in settler colonial ideology, how it has continually attempted to subjugate and ultimately eradicate the Palestinian people, and the degree by which the US and Britain (but mostly the US ever since the Six Day War in 1967) have been complicit in this continual genocide.

This book is an amazing comprehensive guide on understanding the conflict and I genuinely think you should give it a read (or listen) if you want to learn more. It is one thing to feel sympathy and to declare support for a cause, but I think it is important to take a step further and educate yourself more on it. A ploy I have seen frequently by zionists is to tell people to "educate themselves" before commenting on this genocide, hoping to instill doubt and encourage silence. Well, here is your chance to educate yourself! I'm obviously biased in favor of this one as it is the first major text on the Palestinian genocide that I have read, but I fully believe in its quality.

You can find this book online in PDF format or, if you prefer, you can purchase a physical copy from many of the large retail bookstores; Barnes & Noble in the US sells it, and so does Waterstones in the UK. There is also an official audiobook that you can either purchase through many of the major audiobook distributors (though I recommend avoiding Amazon if it can be helped), but you can also obtain it via other means if necessary. It's actually currently up on YouTube in its entirety, though I won't link it here in case it gets taken down. (It's really easy to search for, just type in the books title + 'audiobook' into your preferred search engine or on YouTube itself and you'll find it. It's about 10 hours long which is a reasonable length for an audiobook). I'll include a link in this post to an overview/lecture/dialogue with the author Rashid Khalidi on the contents of the book conducted at Brown University in 2020.

I do ask you read this book. I think a lot of people already are. I checked a couple of online libraries that have a limited number of audiobook copies that had all been checked out and that to me implies that people do want to educate themselves. There's a sizeable stack of these books at the local bookstore I ocassionally shop at, front and center on the table in the history and world affairs section. It's not hard to find. I hope you all have a good day or evening and I know that if we all take the time to educate ourselves further and approach this genocide with a deeper understanding, we may be able to do something about it. Emotional pleas are not enough, they must be informed ones as well.

#palestine #rashid khalidi #end occupation #end israeli occupation #israel #books #the hundred years' war on palestine

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floornahas · 2 years

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Renew license ny when 21

#RENEW LICENSE NY WHEN 21 HOW TO#

#RENEW LICENSE NY WHEN 21 LICENSE#

Note: You need to submit only one Record ID and PIN to link all of your DCA license records. After you register/login, enter your Record ID and PIN to link your account to your DCA Records.Register an account with the City of New York or Login.This information is on your Renewal License Application. How do I submit my renewal application? Online You must renew your license before it expires in order to continue operating your business and avoid fines. View list of industries Consumer Affairs licenses and their expiration dates (in PDF). When do I need to renew my license?Īpproximately three months before your license expires, DCA will mail you a license renewal package.

#RENEW LICENSE NY WHEN 21 HOW TO#

See How to Transfer Your Newsstand License to a Business for more information, including how the law impacts your newsstand business and any active Tobacco Retail Dealer license and/or Electronic Cigarette Retail Dealer license you may have at the same location. Only submit these documents if you have formed a business entity and would like to take advantage of this opportunity. You must submit 1) Request to Hold Newsstand License as a Business Entity and 2) supporting documents. Under Local Law 128 of 2021, business entities, such as corporations, partnerships, and Limited Liability Companies (LLC), can apply for a Newsstand license starting March 21, 2022.Įxisting licensees can request to transfer a Newsstand license in your name to the name of your business. Opportunity to Hold Newsstand License as a Business Entity To renew your Newsstand License, you must submit a completed Renewal License Application, renewal fee, and Newsstand Affirmation. Get DCWP Alerts and Information During COVID-19 Crisis, including DCWP services online and limited in-person assistance, workplace laws, price gouging, and scams and safety tips. If you fail to submit your license renewal application, you will not be able to renew your license. If you have not received your renewed license, you will not be able to operate after August 28, 2021. Although your license has expired, you can still renew your license on or before August 28, 2021. If you were licensed as a Process Server Individual, Process Server Agency, or Scale Dealer Repairer and you did not renew your license prior to February 28, 2020, you were not covered by the EEOs extending license terms.If you fail to submit your renewal license application by this date, you will not be able to renew your license. If you were licensed as a Commercial Lessor, Employment Agency or Scrap Metal Processor, your license period was not extended, but you may still renew your license on or before October 12, 2021.If you fail to submit your renewal license application by October 12, 2021, you will not be able to renew your current license and must apply for a new license. If you do not receive your renewed license by August 14, 2021, you will not be able to operate your business. If your license was set to expire during the period from Mathrough August 14, 2021, your license will expire on August 14, 2021. New York City’s Emergency Executive Orders (EEOs) that extended license expiration dates and renewal application deadlines because of the COVID-19 pandemic has ended. On June 24, 2021, New York’s COVID-19 State of Emergency expired and many New York Forward industry reopening guidance documents are no longer mandatory. Renew your DCA License *Important Updates Due to COVID-19*

#Renew license ny when 21

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gadgetguru360 · 2 years

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PMF IAS Environment Notes 2020 PDF

Environment Full Notes- Click hereEnvironment Short Notes – Click hereEnvironment PYQ 2011-2018 – Click hereLBT Indian Protected Area – Click hereLBT Indian Ramsar Sites – Click hereIndian State of Forest Report 2019 – Click hereEnvironment Current Affairs May 2019-January 2020 – Click here

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yogenderthakur · 3 years

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17 March Current Affairs GK Quiz| Daily Current Affairs

All Exam Solutions प्रतियोगी परीक्षाओं की तयारी कर रहे छात्रो एवं पाठकों के लिए भारत भारत में हाल ही में घटी घटनाओ से संबंधित महत्वपूर्ण Daily Current Affairs प्रश्नोत्तरी प्रस्तुत कर रहा है | आज के इस क्विज में जापान, झारखंड कैबिनेट, विश्व स्वास्थ्य संगठन (डब्ल्यूएचओ) आदि से संबंधित परीक्षापयोगी प्रश्नों का संग्रह शामिल है |

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elenajohansenauthor · 3 years

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COVER REVEAL and RELEASE ANNOUNCEMENT for

FIFTY-FIVE DAYS!

December 16th, 2020!

It was supposed to be a fling.

After events beyond her control upend the course of Amber's career, she decides never to return to the band she helped found, Not My Best Day. She's done with the rock-star life, the highs of performing weighed down by the lows of grueling schedules, endless travel, and the uncomfortable intimacy of living two feet from everyone else on the bus.

But when her replacement has to bail a week before the new tour starts, the band asks her to fill in temporarily. What else can she do? They’re still family.

Rob, as the other new member in their revamped lineup, is doing his best to fit in. His time with Not My Best Day has been defined as much by Amber's absence as his presence. When she returns in their time of need, he sees what the others don’t-–how much it’s costing her to save them from disaster. When his supportiveness becomes attraction, and mutual attraction becomes a fling, Rob faces decisions he never expected. He may doubt their secret affair is good for the band, or even for himself, but he’s certain it’s what's best for her.

But what becomes of them when the tour is over? Can they really go their separate ways like nothing ever happened?

The details:

Digital pre-ordering will be available soon from multiple retailers: the book is currently “in review” everywhere, so I’ll update when it gets through the system.

Paperbacks will be available through Amazon, and there is no pre-order mechanism for that, sadly. In the meantime...

I NEED REVIEWERS! WANT AN ADVANCE REVIEW COPY? KEEP READING!

What you’re committing to: in exchange for a free copy of 55D, you will read it and post an honest review on Amazon (definitely,) Goodreads and/or Storygraph (if you use them,) and your book review blog (if you have one) within a reasonable time frame--since I’m only sending these out a week before release, rather than months ahead as a big publisher can, let’s say the end of January 2021. That’s a month and a half, plenty of time.

How to make that happen: DM me your email address, which I will not share or use for any other purpose, and also your preferred ebook format (mobi, epub, or pdf.) I’ll send you a copy as quick as I can!

#book release #writeblr #booklr #fifty-five days #support independent authors #advanced review copies #free books #please signal boost

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mousaicreations · 4 years

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Production Update #1 - May 22, 2020

Hello everyone! Throughout the production period and until pre-orders are shipped out, we aim to keep you all up to date on the state of affairs so that you know exactly where we stand on our estimated schedule.

All items have been ordered and are currently in production

Proof for the calendar has arrived! The full list of our calendar artists can be found here. The zine proof has shipped and should arrive to our headquarters within the next few days.

Sticker sheets and postcards have shipped and are expected to be here by the beginning of next week.

These are the current production times given to us by our suppliers for these items: Washi tape (15 days), buttons (12 days), charms and transparent cards (5-7 days).

That is all for this week, currently we are still on schedule, but rest assured, should there be any delays we will let you know. Remember, PDF sales are still going on if you want to grab one of those in our shop.

Thank you so much for everyone’s support and enthusiasm! We hope you all are doing well and staying safe.

[ Shop | Contributors | FAQ | Ask | Twitter ]

#announcement #seasons of love zine

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gov-info · 3 years

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The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has authorized for emergency use Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) vaccines sponsored by Pfizer/BioNTech and Moderna. Several other COVID-19 vaccines are currently in clinical trials; additional vaccines may become available within months.

Operation Warp Speed (OWS)—the COVID-19 medical countermeasure initiative led by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of Defense (DOD)—has contracted with manufacturers to purchase hundreds of millions of doses (including Pfizer/BioNTech and Moderna’s vaccines) and related supplies. OWS is also planning and implementing a nationwide vaccine program.

OWS has thus far been financed largely by emergency funding provided in the coronavirus supplemental appropriations acts. In the FY2020 laws, not much was appropriated specifically for COVID-19 vaccine- related efforts; instead, several accounts have funding available for relevant activities. In FY2021, Division M of P.L. 116-260 includes emergency appropriations directed for vaccine-specific activities.

Much of the HHS supplemental funding is available for multiple years or until expended. In addition, HHS transfer authorities in the laws allow for transfers between funds in certain HHS accounts. This Insight provides overviews of supplemental appropriations for selected vaccine-related activities and available information on allocations and obligations. It does not address health care financing issues related to vaccine administration or regular appropriations.

VACCINE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, MANUFACTURING, AND PURCHASE

COVID-19 vaccine research and development (R&D), manufacturing, and purchasing efforts are largely supported by OWS, a collaboration among several federal agencies, including the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), DOD, and others. Some vaccine R&D is supported by NIH, BARDA, and DOD separately from the OWS efforts.

Appropriations

FY2020. In two of the four FY2020 coronavirus supplemental appropriations acts (P.L. 116-123 and P.L. 116-136), funding was made available for vaccine-related efforts to accounts at NIH, DOD, and the Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund (PHSSEF). (PHSSEF, the parent account for BARDA, is an account for the HHS Secretary that funds additional emergency preparedness and response activities and is regularly used for one-time and pass-through funding to address public health emergencies.) In particular, up to roughly $30 billion (accounting for set-asides and transfers) in the PHSSEF account is available for vaccine development, manufacturing, and purchase until September 30, 2024. These funds are also designated for other emergency response activities, such as medical supply procurement for the Strategic National Stockpile, supporting health care surge response, and the development, purchase, and manufacturing of therapeutics and diagnostics.

FY2021. Division M of P.L. 116-260 appropriates $22.945 billion to the PHSSEF account to be available for similar purposes as described above until September 30, 2024. Of the total, $19.695 billion is available to BARDA for “necessary expenses of manufacturing, production, and purchase ... of vaccines, therapeutics, and ancillary supplies.” The law directs the HHS Secretary to “purchase vaccines developed using funds made available ... to respond to an outbreak or pandemic related to coronavirus in quantities determined by the Secretary to be adequate to address the public health need.” Funds may reimburse obligations for vaccines and therapeutics “planning, development, preparation, and purchase” incurred prior to enactment.

Supplemental appropriations to NIH Office of the Director account could also be used, in part, for vaccine-related R&D.

Allocations, Obligations, and Reporting

According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report published on November 30, as of October 31, 2020, HHS had allocated about $13.8 billion in coronavirus supplemental funding for “vaccines”—including $150 million in NIH allocations and the rest in BARDA allocations. Of this allocated amount, about $13.3 billion had been obligated and $1.28 billion had been expended.

The report also states that DOD has allocated about $1.64 billion in funding from the CARES Act (P.L. 116-136) toward a medical countermeasures development portfolio. DOD has five COVID-19 vaccine development projects underway.

According to a separate November GAO report, as of October 15, OWS had announced contract awards to support six vaccines, with obligations totaling at least $10 billion and a total estimated value of at least $18 billion, with awards made by both DOD and BARDA.

P.L. 116-260 adds a reporting requirement on OWS funding that includes total obligations and funding awards exceeding $20 million by department/agency and appropriations act, to be provided not later than 30 days after enactment, and regularly updated thereafter, to the House and Senate Appropriations committees.

VACCINE DEPLOYMENT AND DISTRIBUTION

As a part of OWS, CDC has been working with state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) jurisdictions to plan and implement a nationwide vaccination program.

Appropriations:

FY2020. In two COVID-19 supplemental appropriations acts (P.L. 116-123 and P.L. 116-136), CDC received a total of $6.5 billion (of which $800 million is designated global funding). Much of this funding is available broadly “to prevent, prepare for, and respond to coronavirus, domestically and internationally.”

FY2021. Division M of P.L. 116-260 appropriates $8.75 billion to CDC, for “activities to plan, prepare for, promote, distribute, administer, monitor, and track coronavirus vaccines to ensure broad-based distribution, access, and vaccine coverage,” to be available until September 30, 2024. Of this total, $4.5 billion is for SLTT grants (or cooperative agreements), of which $210 million is to be transferred to the Indian Health Service (IHS) for tribes and tribal organizations and a separate amount of not less than $300 million is for “high-risk and underserved populations, including racial and ethnic minority populations and rural communities.” At least $1 billion in SLTT grants must be made available within 21 days, and funds can reimburse obligations incurred prior to enactment. PHSSEF appropriations described above may also be relevant.

Allocations, Obligations, and Reporting

To date, CRS could not identify an exact amount of related allocations and obligations. Funding announcements include the following:

a contract to a company, McKesson, to manage the nationwide distribution;

a partnership with commercial pharmacies for providing vaccines to long-term care facilities;

SLTT grants under an existing immunization cooperative agreement—announced in September and December—and other smaller demonstration grants; and the first $3 billion in SLTT grants from P.L. 116-260 is to be provided by January 19, 2021.

DOD has assisted with logistics planning. Other agencies manage vaccine distribution efforts among their employees and covered populations (e.g., IHS and the Department of Veterans Affairs [VA]), incollaboration with the nationwide effort.

P.L. 116-260 adds a requirement that CDC “provide an updated and comprehensive coronavirus vaccine distribution strategy and a spend plan, to include funds already allocated for distribution” to specified congressional committees within 30 days.

#crs #COVID19 #vaccines #health #budget #cdc #nih

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taylorafergus · 4 years

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Fashion: The Fast and the Furiously Unsustainable - Week 7

Haute couture has always been a relatively respected and "staid affair" of which consisted of leading fashion houses crafting garments that cost upwards of hundreds and thousands of dollars (Sull and Turconi 2008, pg. 5). These astronomical prices provide buyers and wearers with feelings of exclusivity and contribute to a greater sense of social and cultural acceptance.

Up until the late 1980s, fashion apparel retailers had utilised their knowledge of the industry and its market in a bid to forecast consumer demand and fashion trends in order to remain competitive (cited in Bhardwaj and Fairhurst 2010, pg. 165). Fast-forward 20 years and the fashion industry requires a new lens to view, understand and predict its market. The dynamics of this evolving industry have "forced retailers to desire low cost and flexibility in design, quality, and speed to market [all of which act as] key strategies to maintain a profitable position in the increasingly demanding market" (Bhardwaj and Fairhurst 2010, pg. 165). Retailers have revolutionised the fashion apparel industry by following a strategy known as 'fast fashion' - the democratisation of couture in "bringing trendy, affordable items to the masses" - which consequently bears its own set of harmful and unethical practices (Sull and Turconi 2008, pg. 5). As an antipode to such a strategy, the 'slow fashion' movement was established and continues to gain mainstream attention and traction.

Figure 1. Shopping GIF. Source; Giphy c. 2020.

Firms and fashion houses in the fast fashion apparel industry - such as Zara, Fashion Nova, UNIQLO and H&M - have increasingly embraced the philosophy of 'fast fashion' retailing. The term 'fast fashion' describes a new and accelerated fashion apparel business model. The strategy involves the "increased numbers of new fashion collections every year [ - typically crafted to emulate current, high-cost luxury fashion trends - ], quick turnarounds and often lower prices" (House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee 2019, pg. 6). The aim is to react rapidly, theoretically overnight, in order to develop new products to meet consumer demands and fashion trends before they become yesterday's news. Fast fashion companies thrive off of fast cycles: "rapid prototyping, small batches combined with a large variety, more efficient transportation and delivery, and merchandise that is presented ‘floor-ready’ on hangers with price tags already attached" (cited in Joy et al. 2012, pg. 275). This combined with increasing consumerism has brought forth a dangerous ethos for both consumers and the planet; that is, the adopted mindset of a 'throw-away' culture that encourages over-consumption (Xue 2018, pg.9).

The fast fashion industry is fundamentally unsustainable and unethical. Textile production plays a larger contributing factor to climate change than international aviation and shipping combined. Additionally, the process requires large volumes of fresh drinking water and is a major chemical and plastic pollutant (House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee 2019, pg. 3). To put that into context - It costs 2,700 litres of fresh drinking water to make one cotton T-shirt, which is enough water for one person for a 900 day period (Gbor c. 2020). Australians alone "dispose of 6,000 kilograms of fashion and textile waste every 10 minutes" (Gbor c. 2020). Further, the working conditions of such an industry are no better. "Most garment production is done in developing countries, which do not have strict rules for worker safety, wage regulations or child protection" which is commonly exploited (Gaitho c. 2020).

One medium that plays a contributing factor in the proliferation of the fast fashion industry is Instagram. The trends gaining traction within the fashion industry are highly influenced by, and dependent on, media and celebrities. The rapid adoption of technologies and their increasing accessibility to the internet and social media ultimately contribute to a higher ‘trend’ awareness among consumers (cited in Léa et al. 2018, pg. 8). Fashion inspiration is no longer monopolised by seasonal fashion shows, glossy magazines and photoshoots. Further, the Fashion Retail Academy argues that Instagram has grown into one of the "top sources of fashion inspiration, with nearly a fifth (17%) of people using it to find the latest trends" (cited in Skeldon 2019). Additionally, fast fashion houses have jumped at the opportunity to partner with some of the most influential users of the platform by adopting a strategy called 'influencer marketing' which is commonly employed with individuals of ‘microcelebrity’ status. The term 'influencer marketing' refers to the phenomenon of utilising influential individuals, who are active users online and are willing to share brand messages with their following (cited in Léa et al. 2018, pg. 7).

Figure 2. Big Brother Frankie GIF. Source; Giphy c. 2020.

Consumers are becoming increasingly disenchanted with their mindless consumption and disposal of fashion goods and its impact on society (Joy et al. 2012, pg. 277). Slow fashion, interchangeably referred to as sustainable fashion and ethical fashion was introduced as an antipode to the fast fashion industry (Lai et al. 2017, pg. 82). Sustainable fashion refers to ‘goods and services that respond to basic needs and bring a better quality of life, while minimizing the use of natural resources, toxic materials and emissions of waste and pollutants over the life-cycle, so as not to jeopardize the needs of future generations’ (cited in Lai et al. 2017, pg. 83). Consumers are increasingly seeking ethical and sustainable alternatives to the goods and services they encounter daily such as food, makeup, fashion etc.

Fast fashion is a blatantly unsustainable and unethical industry that depends on the ignorance of consumers in identifying the true costs of staying ‘on-trend’ - the planet and the quality of life of others.

Figure 3. Fashion Upcycling Sticker GIF. Source; Giphy c. 2020.

References.

‘Big Brother Frankie’ [GIF], in Giphy c. 2020, influencer, Giphy, viewed the 4th of May 2020, <https://giphy.com/gifs/globaltv-big-brother-social-media-4T3QViZYrTGfcHEnnC>

Bhardwaj, V, Fairhurst A 2010, 'Fast fashion: response to changes in the fashion industry', The International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research, 01st of February 2010, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 165-173

'Fashion Upcycling Sticker' [GIF], in Giphy c. 2020, fast fashion, Giphy, viewed the 4th of May 2020, <https://giphy.com/stickers/sustainable-ethical-zerrin-YlT2C6hzYI1xXxanjj>

Gaitho, M c. 2020, 'Unethical Fashion: Exploitation of Women and Children', Fabric of the World, viewed the 3rd of May 2020, <http://www.fabricoftheworld.com/unethical-fashion-learn-how-the-textile-industrys-practices-are-hazardous-to-workers/>

Gbor, N c. 2020, 'War on Waste: It’s time to step off the fashion trend-mill', ABC, viewed the 3rd of May 2020, <http://about.abc.net.au/war-on-waste-its-time-to-step-off-the-fashion-trend-mill/>

House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee 2019, 'Fixing fashion: clothing consumption and sustainability', House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, Sixteenth Report of Session 2017–19, 5th of February, viewed the 2nd of May 2020, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmenvaud/1952/1952.pdf>

Joy, A, Sherry, JF, Venkatesh, A, Wang, J, Chan, R 2012, 'Fast Fashion, Sustainability, and the Ethical Appeal of Luxury Brands', Fashion Theory, 1st of September 2012, vol.16, no. 3, pp. 273-295

Lai, Z, Henninger, C, Alevizou, P 2017, ‘An Exploration of Consumers’ Perceptions Towards Sustainable Fashion – A Qualitative Study in the UK’, (eds) Henninger, C, Alevizou, P, Goworek, H, Ryding, D (eds), in Sustainability in Fashion A Cradle to Upcycle Approach, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 81-101

Léa, C, Malek, P, Runnvall, L 2018, 'Influencers impact on decision- making among generation Y and Z Swedish females when purchasing fast fashion.', Jönköping University: Bachelor’s Degree Project in Business Administration, 21st of May, viewed the 3rd of May 2020, <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f5fa/d75c4891a71b6c9f3781f75a13f4666ff846.pdf.>

‘Shopping GIF’ [GIF], in Giphy c. 2020, shopping, Giphy, viewed the 4th of May 2020, <https://giphy.com/gifs/pretty-girls-hair-13SrduL7iVarT2>

Skeldon, P 2019, 'Social influencers have led to the rise in fast fashion, with 30% of shoppers using Instagram for inspiration', Internet Retailing, viewed the 3rd of May 2020, <https://internetretailing.net/mobile-theme/mobile-theme/social-influencers-have-led-to-the-rise-in-fast-fashion-with-30-of-shoppers-using-instagram-for-inspiration-20388>

Sull, D, Turconi, S 2008, 'Fast fashion lessons', Business Strategy Review, June 2008, vol.19, no. 2, pp. 4-11

Xue, S 2018, 'Ethical Fashion in the Age of Fast Fashion', Digital Commons @ Connecticut College, viewed the 2nd of May 2020, <https://digitalcommons.conncoll.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=arthp>

#mda20009 #digitalcommunities #fashion #fastfashion #unsustainable #unethical #slowfashion #influencer #instagram #ethical #ethicalfashion #slowfashionmovement #microcelebrity

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socialscienceresearcher · 4 years

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The Compounded Struggle to Enjoy Customary Land Tenure Rights and Livelihood Security Amid COVID-19 in Shan State, Myanmar

June 29, 2020Help spread the news!

Stephen Nyein Han Tun Land Researcher and Customary Land Tenure Associate Coordinator

Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, is a Southeast Asian country, which is home to 135 diverse culture and language groups (Bianco, 2016) living together under a centralized government. Located along Mekong and Irrawaddy basins, it has also been tagged as “a state shaped largely by civil war” (Stokke, Vakulchuk and Øverland, 2018). This primarily is due to decades-long conflicts between the government and various ethnic/indigenous armed groups (Kramer, 2005). Most indigenous lands are located along the edges of the country, while most Burmese people live mainly in low-land areas (Kramer, 2015). Historically, indigenous peoples’ rights to customary land/tenure in Myanmar have been ignored by both the military and civilian-led government. Moreover, the Constitution does not recognize such rights.

While the world continues to battle with Covid-19, indigenous peoples in Myanmar, particularly in Shan State, have been facing compounded threats brought about by the health crisis and armed conflicts, such as lack of access to medical services, reliefs, health education. Furthermore, their customary lands are being confiscated by the State to give way for mega infrastructure concessions and large-scale land-based investments. In short, they have been denied of rights to access, withdraw, control, claim, profit, use, exclude, lease, and manage their customary land (Allaverdian, Forgerite, Scurrah and Si Thu Htike San, 2017). Food and livelihood insecurities have been aggravated by the inability to freely cultivate crops on their lands. Furthermore, farmers are not given the opportunity to access legal assistance.

On 30 March 2020, when infections were starting to get recorded in the country, the Central State permitted 1,229 mining concession projects in different regions. Around 326 concessions of these types are found in Shan State (Ministry of Resource and Natural Environmental Conservation Department, 2020). Mining capitalists have been keen to take advantage of Namatu Bawdwin mine and other places in Shan State while disregarding the rights of indigenous peoples. On 30 May 2020, Sai Wan Sai (2020) points out that a land dispute broke between the Pa’O indigenous people and Tatmadaw. The Tatmadaw confiscated around 900 acres of land of the indigenous in 2018. When the Pa’O farmers who protested were eventually arrested and sent to jail (Sai Wan Sai, 2020).

The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a part of China’s One Belt One Road Initiative (BRI), has been accelerated by political, social, and economic changes in Myanmar. This acceleration has also been compounded by amendments to land-use policies’ mechanism as a form of State legal land dispossession politics. These policies appear in the 2008 Constitution’s basic national land regulation, 1894 Legal Land Acquisition Act of 2012 (the rights of State in land use and management), the Grants and Leases of Land at the Disposal of Government Policy in 2016 National Land Use Policy, and the 2012/2016 and 2019 Vacant-Fallow-Virgin (VFV) Land laws. Capital accumulation by the CMEC for global energy markets has threatened the customary land (tenure) and the livelihood (including women’s lives) of the Ta’ang indigenous tea farming society (Nyein Han Tun, 2019).

The National Land Use Policy of 2016 mandates the Government “to recognize and protect customary land tenure rights and procedures” (National Land Use Policy, 2016). UNDRIF Article 10 also points out that the “Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their land or territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where possible, with the option return.” However, amid the Covid-19 pandemic, the current civilian government has been adamant to strengthen economic development through land and water-based investments such as seaport, Special Economic Zones, large-scale agribusinesses, highway roads, and different kinds of infrastructure development. These position and perspective prove that it is unable and unwilling to respect and protect the right of its indigenous peoples to live in dignity.

Reference:

Allaverdian, C., Julia Forgerite, Natalia Scurrah and Si Thu Htike San. (2017). Documenting Customary Tenure in Myanmar. A Guidebook. MRLG guidebook #1. Vientiane & Yangon: Mekong Region Land Governance.

Bianco, Joseph Lo. (2016). Building a National Language Policy for Myanmar: An Investment in National Development, Peace, Social Progress and Improved Education. The University of Melbourne Press.

Clements, Alan and Leslie Kean. (1995). Burma’s Revolution of the Spirit: The Struggle for Democratic Freedom and Dignity. Bangkok: White Orchid Press.

Department of Population. (2017). Census Atlas Myanmar: The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census. Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population, May Pyi Taw, Myanmar.

Dittmer, Lowell. (2010). Chapter 1 Burma vs. Myanmar, what’s in a name?”, in Lowell Dittmer (ed.) Burma or Myanmar? The Struggle for National Identity (pp. 1-20). Singapore: World Scientific Publisher.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (2002). Land Tenure and Rural Development. FAO Land Tenure Studies. Rome, FAO.

Ganesan, Narayanan and Kyaw Yin Hliang (eds.). (2007). Myanmar State, Society and Ethnicity. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Publishing.

Kramer, Tom. (2005). Ethnic Conflict and Dilemmas for International Engagement” in Jelsma et al. (eds.). Trouble in the Triangle: Opium and Conflict in Burma. Silkworm Books.

Kramer, Tom. (2015). Ethnic Conflicts and Land Rights in Myanmar. Social Research 82 (2): 355-374.

National Land Use Policy. (2016). The Republic of the Union of Myanmar: National Land Use Policy. Retrieved from http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/mya152783.pdf

Nyein Han Tun. (2019). Ta’ang Tea Farmers and Customary Land Dispossession in the Context of China-Myanmar Economic Corridor in Northeast Myanmar. Master of Arts in Social Science (Development Studies) Thesis. Chiang Mai University, Northern Thailand.

Ministry of Resource and Natural Environmental Conservation Department. (2020). Retrieved from http://www.mining.gov.mm/News_mm/default.asp?page=1

Sai Wansai. (2020). Military Land Confiscation: Major obstacle for ethnic traditional land ownership. Retrieved from https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/military-land-confiscation-major-obstacle-ethnic-traditional-land-ownership

Stokke, Kristian, Roman Vakulchuk and Indra Øverland. (2018). Myanmar: A Political Economy Analysis. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

Original Link:

https://shapesea.com/op-ed/covid-19/the-compounded-struggle-to-enjoy-customary-land-tenure-rights-and-livelihood-security-amid-covid-19-in-shan-state-myanmar/

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iasinterviews-blog · 4 years

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ias interview Q&A

The personality test for the remaining 623 candidates who were successful in UPSC Mains 2019 had resumed from 20th July 2020. UPSC CSE Interview 2019 for these candidates was earlier scheduled from 23 March 2020 onwards but was put on hold amid the COVID-19 outbreak. For the final round of the IAS Exam, the commission came up with a set of arrangements for the conduct of UPSC IAS Interview 2019 with all safety precautions, which you can read about below:

The UPSC Interview 2019 took place between 20th July and 30th July 2020 Considering the partial running of trains, the commission had reimbursed the lowest ‘to and fro airfare’ to the candidates who attended the UPSC PT. e-Summon letters were provided to the candidates using which they were allowed to move in or move out of the restricted zones, to attend the IAS Interview.

Candidates were also provided with lodging and transport facilities by the UPSC The Personality Test panel and the interviewee were given Sealed Kit (face shield, gloves, sanitizer) to ensure safety while conducting the interview. The highest standards of health safety and precautions were taken up by the commission to successfully conduct the UPSC Interview 2019. Following the successful completion of Mains and Interview stages; on 4th August 2020, the commission has declared the UPSC Civil Services Final Results 2019. Candidates can fetch the result in the linked article.

UPSC IAS Interview 2019

The final stage of the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) Civil Services Exam is the IAS interview or the UPSC Personality Test. The IAS personality test for UPSC 2019 had started from February 17, 2020, and was scheduled to run till April 3, 2020. But with the outbreak of Covid-19, the interview round was postponed and later resumed from 23 July onwards. The IAS Interview was finished by 30th July 2020.

Candidates preparing for UPSC Prelims can check the below-mentioned important links to brush up their concepts:

UPSC Previous Year Question Papers

Top 5 Magazines for UPSC UPSC Notes PDF IAS Mock Tests NCERT Notes IAS Topper

The questions in the IAS Interview are more like a discussion between the UPSC board and the aspirant.

Generally, an IAS interview lasts for about 20 minutes and aspirants face interview questions that cover a broad range of topics.

UPSC Mains exam was conducted from September 20, 2019 and the UPSC Personality Test 2019 ended on 30th July 2020. The IAS interviews for the exam year 2018 started on February 9, 2019, and continued till March.

Facing the UPSC IAS interview panel is a daunting task but armed with facts and information, a candidate with confidence and appropriate soft skills can surely ace the interview.

UPSC – IAS Interview Details

Venue: Union Public Service Commission (UPSC), Dholpur House, Shahjahan Road, New Delhi-110069

Timing: Two sessions per day ( Forenoon session 9:00 AM onwards, Afternoon session 1:00 PM onwards). It will be mentioned on the candidate’s call letter.

Dress Code: Basic formals suffice (dark trousers with a light-coloured plain shirt for men and saris or ‘churidar’ for women)

Maximum Marks: 275 (it seems less when compared to Mains but scoring high marks here can be the path to one’s service/cadre of choice).

Vacancies: 896 (as per UPSC 2019 notification)

Aspirants can check the detailed UPSC Notification at the linked article.

UPSC IAS Interview Process

Aspirants can read below the first-hand account of the UPSC IAS Interview experience:

Candidates usually reach the venue with some time in hand, and the security in front of UPSC organizes them in a queue and does the preliminary verification (interview call letter and cross-checking the candidate’s name on their list). It is recommended to carry some government-issued identification. After the security ushers the candidates inside the hallowed gates of the UPSC; they are required to check-in their bags and mobile phones. The candidates are then made to sit in an entrance hall where the actual verification of documents (education documents, caste certificates) takes place. Usually, it is a smooth process and the staff is polite and ready to help. There are also newspapers along with tea/water and biscuits for the candidates. Candidates are also handed out a questionnaire to fill (basic background info for UPSC’s research and analysis purposes).

Once the documents are submitted, the candidates are given the number of the panel and the sequence number of the order in which they will appear before the panel. For e.g. a candidate might be told he/she has to appear before the panel number 5, and for that panel, he/she will be going in as the 3rd individual for that session. They don’t disclose the name of the panel chairperson at that time and it is pointless to ask that.

The somewhat visibly nervous candidates are then escorted to a large circular hall in the centre of the building complex. Here, the candidates are grouped and seated based on their panel number (all the people scheduled to appear before the panel number 5 will sit in a group and so on). Also, this is where a few staff members will hand out forms for travel reimbursement for out-of-town candidates (they refund for train travel in 2nd class).

In one session, a panel takes the interview of 5-6 aspirants. So, initially, the hall is quite full (5-6 panels in all, hence 30-35 odd candidates sitting and waiting). Usually, an interview lasts for about 20 minutes, although there is no time limit as such and people have recounted experiences of being part of even 40-minute interview.

One by one, names are called and candidates make their way to their respective panels (after another security check where one has to leave any remaining documents/papers/pen). Usually, a staff member escorts one from here to the room of the panel chairperson.

So, candidates usually reach the venue around 8:45 AM for the forenoon session. After the formalities, the first candidate to appear before the panel will be called around 10:15 AM. Depending on one’s sequence number, one can estimate the waiting period. Hence, it is essential that you don’t arrive on an empty stomach or sleep-deprived.

Tackling the actual UPSC interview is a completely different challenge. It’s a unique experience for everyone, even for experienced candidates but there are some essential things which candidates need to inculcate before they face the panel.

Broadly speaking, a polite, humble candidate who is calm and confident has the best chance to score high marks irrespective of the panel chairperson, the medium of the interview and the number of questions answered.

Check the linked article for detailed preparation information and study material for IAS 2020.

Read on to know more about IAS toppers and relevant interview questions one can expect.

IAS Interview Questions

The UPSC interview questions test the candidates’ mental acuity, general awareness, social etiquette, and the overall personality. The questions in IAS interview are not meant to solely ascertain the theoretical knowledge so instead of mugging up, candidates should focus on their soft skills.

The IAS interview questions faced by Civil Service aspirants follow a similar pattern. Let’s look at a few of the broad categories of questions in the IAS interview and how candidates can prepare for them.

IAS interview question on Introduction

Tell us briefly about yourself. Tell us about your hometown. What is the meaning of your name (first name/ surname) Tell us about your family To answers questions related to self-introduction in IAS interview, which are open-ended and straight forward, aspirants should prepare 30-40 second coherent responses. These questions are merely setting a baseline i.e. the eminent UPSC board will use the information you give to ask follow-up questions.

IAS interview questions on Education

Which subjects did you study during school/graduation and do you think they are relevant to life in administration

Which subject was your favourite/least favourite?

Why did you choose ‘xyz’ college/school?

What kind of projects did you do during school/graduation/PG?

Would you call yourself an average student? Why?

The basic educational qualification for the UPSC CSE exam is graduation. The questions in the IAS interview may be oriented towards your graduation subject or the latest trends in the same. However, if you don’t know the answer to a particular question then trying to bluff your way out is not advised. It’s better to be humble and truthful.

IAS Interview questions on Current Affairs

What are today’s headlines?

Few important issues in news about India/your state/your hometown in the last few months Reading newspapers and following the daily news is important from the UPSC IAS Interview perspective as well. The IAS interview questions can refer to latest news topics. Try to avoid giving one-dimensional opinion/information unless the question is relatively straight forward. (for e.g., What does the term ‘Petrodollars’ mean?)

To know more about the Current Affairs related information, refer to the linked article.

IAS interview questions on Work profile

What were your roles and responsibilities at your job?

Why do you want to become an IAS/IPS/IFS officer?

Be prepared to answer questions about any gaps in your work history and how your previous experience is going to help in your career as an administrator.

IAS interview questions on Optional Subject

Why did you choose ‘xyz’ optional?

Why didn’t you pick your graduation subject as your optional?

Also, you might face some questions in IAS interview related to topics/theory/contemporary issues based on your optional subject.

IAS interview questions on Hobbies

Here, the nature of questions varies depending on the hobbies you have listed in your DAF. For those who have listed sports as a hobby, the Panel has asked questions on famous sports persons or/and latest results. A few candidates have also been asked to sing during the interview process.

IAS Interview Preparation Strategy

Keep following current affairs

Prepare a list of possible questions that can be asked based on your DAF Practice answering questions in front of a mirror If possible, record yourself as you answer questions during the practice session Brush up your knowledge on your graduation subject The purpose of the questions in the IAS interview is to check a candidate’s suitability to life in administration. It is not at all mandatory that one has to answer all the questions to get good marks in the UPSC Personality Test. Often, it is not about whether you know the precise answer to the question but how you actually come across as an individual when put under some pressure.

Few key points to avoid in an IAS interview

Don’t stress out on the day before the Interview. Better be rested and calm. Don’t try to bluff your way out. The IAS interview is unlike any other interview you have encountered before, so don’t try bluffing strategies. Don’t be concerned about theoretical questions. It is more about how you approach any question which is being asked to you. Don’t argue with the panel members. It is a discussion but candidates should maintain decorum at all times.

Check out For More Info-

https://www.eliteias.in/student-zone/upsc-exam-syllabus/

https://www.eliteias.in/25-best-ias-interview-questions-and-answers/

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ontimeca-blog · 4 years

Link

Weekly Current Affairs PDF Download: 2nd Week May 2020 One Liners

#weekly_Current_Affairs weekly_Current_Affairs_2020

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gadgetguru360 · 2 years

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PMF IAS Geography Notes 2020 PDF

Geomorphology Part 1 – Click hereGeomorphology Part 2 – Click hereClimatology Part 1 – Click hereClimatology Part 2 – Click hereOceanography – Click hereEconomic Geography Part 1 – Click hereEconomic Geography Part 2 – Click hereIndian Geography – Click hereGeography Current Affairs May 2019-January 2020 – Click here

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yogenderthakur · 3 years

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All Exam GK | Competitive Exam GK | General Knowledge GK

Q. उच्‍चतम न्‍यायालय की पहली महिला न्‍यायाधीश कौन थी? उत्‍तर – फातिमा बीबी Q. नील नदी के किनारे कौन सी सभ्यता का विकास हुआ था? उत्तर – मिश्र सभ्यता Q. कौन सा शहर अंगूरों की पैदावार के लिए प्रसिद्ध है? उत्तर – नासिक Q. संविधान सभा के अस्‍थायी अध्‍यक्ष थे? उत्‍तर – डॉ. सच्चिदानन्‍द सिन्‍हा Q4 SAARC का पूर्ण रूप {full form }क्या है? उत्तर – साउथ एशियन एसोसिएशन फॉर रीजनल कोआपरेसन Q. किसके शासनकाल के…

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wolfliving · 4 years

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Chinese Artificial Intelligence vs US Artificial Intelligence

http://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-The-Question-of-Comparative-Advantage-in-Artificial-Intelligence-1.pdf

....Since Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE were added to the Department of Commerce’s Entity List,15 China’s determination to pursue indigenous innovation has only intensified.16

In cases where the United States has stymied Chinese advances with unilateral export controls but substitute options remain available, China has typically managed to find workarounds or substitute components within a short timeframe.17 The challenge will be for China to replicate core innovations in semiconductor technology where no comparable substitute exists.

China’s model of development through state subsidies appears ill-suited for the semiconductor industry, which is fast moving and requires both business acumen and sizable technical expertise.18 Nearly 20 years after PRC science and technology leaders set out to develop a competitor to the x86 processor, Chinese alternatives remain limited and significantly behind U.S. counterparts. State-led pushes in the 1990s to establish a foothold in the chip fabrication market failed to produce commercially viable firms capable of keeping up with foreign leaders. China’s most successful fab, the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), kept PRC’s S&T officials at arm’s length during its early development.19 The current state drive, led by the

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 7

National Integrated Circuit Fund, attempts to learn from prior mistakes and introduces more market mechanisms than in the past. However, many experts are skeptical that this state-led push will be sufficient to wean China off foreign chips.20

Regardless of the Chinese model’s efficiency, the reality is that China is building its manufacturing capacity to compete in semiconductors as the United States loses indigenous capability and outsources semiconductor manufacturing to foundries elsewhere.21 Technological trends may also play out in China’s favor. As Moore’s Law reaches its end, squeezing additional computing power out of chips will require new materials and specialized AI chip architectures.22 The United States enjoys a dominant market share in leading-edge GPU (Graphics Processing Units) and FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array) design, as well as many of the top AI-relevant ASICs (Application Specific Integrated Circuits). For the time being, China’s leading AI chip designs often incorporate U.S. and allied designs. Yet as technological progress slows and evolves, China may have an easier time catching up.

Chinese players are starting to break into the AI chip space on some fronts. China’s AI chip unicorns Cambricon and Horizon Robotics, for example, have attained multi-billion-dollar valuations within just a few years.23 Huawei has launched its own AI chip, Ascend 910, designed to process efficiently the massive amounts of data often required to train algorithms.24 Alibaba has also created a new AI chip, known as the Hanguang 800, which it claims possesses the computing capabilities of 10 GPUs.25 Alibaba’s chip subsidiary Pingtouge (平头哥) open-sourced its microcontroller design platform on GitHub in order to make chip design more accessible.26 So far, however, PRC AI chips have primarily achieved successes in “inference,” the process of running existing neural networks; the process of training continues to rely primarily on GPUs produced by NVIDIA.27 Whether Chinese companies like Huawei can compete with NVIDIA in the AI training space remains to be seen.

Endnotes

1 K. A. Konrad, “Dynamic Contests and the Discouragement Effect,” Revue d'Économie Politique (2012); C. Harris and J. Vickers, “Racing with Uncertainty,” Review of Economic Studies 54, 1 (1987); I. K. Wang, L. Qian, and M. Lehrer, “From Technology Race to Technology Marathon: A Behavioral Explanation of Technology Advancement,” European Management Journal 35, Issue 2 (April 2017): 187-197.

2 This policy brief is not intended to be comprehensive, but rather proposes a framework for assessing relevant data and measures that bear on current debates in AI. We are indebted to the robust research and existing literature in the field. See, e.g., Michael C. Horowitz, Gregory Allen, Elsa Kania, and Paul Scharre, “Strategic Competition in an Era of Artificial Intelligence,” Center for a New American Security, July 2018, 8.

3 Deborah J. Jackson, “What is an innovation ecosystem,” National Science Foundation, 1, 2011. On AI in particular, see “AI is a national security priority — here’s how we cultivate it,” The Hill, February 20, 2019, https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/430765-ai-is-a- national-security-priority-heres-how-we-cultivate-it; For another excellent evaluation of the importance of the overall ecosystem to AI development, see: Lindsey R. Sheppard and Andrew Philip Hunter, “Artificial Intelligence and National Security: The Importance of the AI Ecosystem,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 5, 2018,https://www.csis.org/analysis/artificial-intelligence-and-national-security-importance-ai- ecosystem.

4 Andrew Imbrie, “Mapping the Terrain: AI Governance and the Future of Power,” Survival (blog), December 17, 2019, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/survival- blog/2019/12/mapping-the-terrain-ai-governance.

5 See, e.g., Andrew Imbrie, “Artificial Intelligence Meets Bureaucratic Politics,” War on the Rocks, August 1, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/artificial-intelligence-meets- bureaucratic-politics/; Michael C. Horowitz and Lauren Kahn, “The AI Literacy Gap Hobbling American Officialdom,” War on the Rocks, January 14, 2020,https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/the-ai-literacy-gap-hobbling-american- officialdom/.

6 “Winning the Future: A Blueprint for Sustained U.S. Leadership in Semiconductor Technology,” Semiconductor Industry Association, April 2019,https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/FINAL-SIA-Blueprint- for-web.pdf.

7 We define “AI chips” to include GPUs (Graphics Processing Units), FPGAs (Field Programmable Gate Array), and ASICs (Application Specific Integrated Circuits) specialized for high speed and efficiency for AI algorithms, among others.

8 See, e.g., “Re: ANPRM on Review of Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies (BIS- 2018-0024),” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, January 10, 2019,https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019-01-10-Dept-of-Commerce-GU-

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 36

CSET-ANPRM-on-Export-Controls-for-AI.pdf. For a recent example, see Alexandra Alper, Toby Sterling, and Stephen Nellis, “Trump Administration pressed Dutch hard to cancel China chip-equipment sale: sources,” Reuters, January 6, 2020,https://www.reuters.com/article/asml-holding-usa-china/rpt-insight-trump-administration- pressed-dutch-hard-to-cancel-china-chip-equipment-sale-sources-idUSL1N29802U.

9 “Trade war forces Chinese chipmaker Fujian Jinhua to halt output,” Financial Times, January, 28, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/87b5580c-22bf-11e9-8ce6- 5db4543da632.

10 For one prominent example, see the case of Fujian Jinhua. Paul Mozur, “Inside a Heist of American Chip Designs, as China Bids for Tech Power,” New York Times, June 22, 2018,https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/22/technology/china-micron-chips-theft.html.

11 Some U.S. firms made the move abroad in response to export controls. See “U.S.-based chip-tech group moving to Switzerland over trade curb fears,” Reuters, November 28, 2019,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-semiconductors-insight/u-s-based-chip- tech-group-moving-to-switzerland-over-trade-curb-fears-idUSKBN1XZ16L.

12 Chris Gillis, “US exporters attempt to head off new content restrictions,” American Shipper, December 9, 2019, https://www.freightwaves.com/news/us-exporters-attempt-to-head- off-new-content-restrictions.

13 Timothy P. Morgan, “Huawei Jumps into the Arms Server Chip Fray,” The Next Platform, January 8, 2019. See also Saif Khan, “Maintaining the AI Chip Advantage of the United States and its Allies,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, December 2019,https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-Maintaining-the-AI-Chip- Competitive-Advantage-of-the-United-States-and-its-Allies-20191206.pdf.

14 “Winning the Future: A Blueprint for Sustained U.S. Leadership in Semiconductor Technology,” Semiconductor Industry Association, April 2019,https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/FINAL-SIA-Blueprint- for-web.pdf.

15 ZTE was later removed from this list. “BIS Adds ZTE Corporation and Three Affiliated Entities to the Entity List,” Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce,https://bis.doc.gov/index.php/oee/9-bis/carousel/1011-bis-adds-zte-corporation-and- three-affiliated-entities-to-the-entity-list; “China’s Huawei, 70 affiliates placed on U.S. trade blacklist,” Reuters, May 15, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china- huaweitech/chinas-huawei-70-affiliates-placed-on-us-trade-blacklist-idUSKCN1SL2W4.

16 Lorand Laskai, “Why Blacklisting Huawei Could Backfire,” Foreign Affairs, June 19, 2019,

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-06-19/why-blacklisting-huawei- could-backfire.

17 Jason Matheny and Carrick Flynn, “ANPRM on Review of Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, January 10, 2019,

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 37

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1JDDQaWlU- u90VAl6h9sdQb_c_7EB9ftrYDOEqu12nEk/edit.

19 Doug Fuller, Paper Tigers, Hidden Dragons: Firms and Political Economy of China’s Technological Development (Oxford University Press, 2016), 131.

20 Junko Yoshida, “China Must Go Beyond Big Fund,” EE Times, November 11, 2019,https://www.eetimes.com/china-must-go-beyond-big-fund/#.

21 “The Decline in Semiconductor Manufacturing in the United States,” Center for Public Policy Innovation, June 2010, https://www.cppionline.org/wp- content/uploads/2017/07/The-Decline-of-Semiconductor-Manufacturing.pdf.

22 Will Knight, “China has never had a real chip industry. Making AI chips could change that,” MIT Technology Review, December 14, 2018,https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612569/china-has-never-had-a-real-chip- industry-making-ai-chips-could-change-that/.

23 While valuations are likely inflated due in part to the influence of state-driven investments, these start-ups have achieved notable progress nonetheless. “Chinese AI chip maker Horizon Robotics raises $600 million from SK Hynix, others,” Reuters, February 27, 2019,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-tech-semiconductors/chinese-ai-chip-maker- horizon-robotics-raises-600-million-from-sk-hynix-others-idUSKCN1QG0HW.

24 Dan Strumpf, “Huawei Launches AI Chip in Push to Unseat U.S. Makers,” Wall Street Journal, August 23, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/huawei-launches-ai-chip-in-push- to-unseat-u-s-makers-11566556836.

25 “Alibaba’s New AI Chip Can Process Nearly 80K Images Per Second,” Synced, September 25, 2019, https://syncedreview.com/2019/09/25/alibabas-new-ai-chip- can-process-nearly-80k-images-per-second/. Arjun Kharpal, “Alibaba unveils its first A.I. chip as China pushes for its own semiconductor technology,” CNBC, September 25, 2019,https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/25/alibaba-unveils-its-first-ai-chip-called-the- hanguang-800.html.

26 “Alibaba Open-Sources Its MCU to Boost AI Research,” Synced, October 23, 2019,

https://syncedreview.com/2019/10/23/alibaba-open-sources-its-mcu-to-boost-ai- research/.

27 Lorand Laskai and Helen Toner, “Can China Grow Its Own AI Tech Base?”, DigiChina, November 4, 2019, https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity- initiative/digichina/blog/can-china-grow-its-own-ai-tech-base/.

On the obstacles to indigenizing a semiconductor industry in China, see Douglas B. Fuller,

“Growth, Upgrading, and Limited Catch-up in China’s Semiconductor Industry,” in Loren

Brandt and Thomas G. Rawski, eds., Policy, Regulation and Innovation in China’s Electricity

and Telecom Industries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 38

28 See, e.g., Data.gov, https://www.data.gov/open-gov/; “Project Open Data,” https://project-open-data.cio.gov.

30 Tim Wu, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires (New York: Vintage, 2011), 6.

31 Tim Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age (New York: Random House Audio, 2018).

32 Theresa Hitchens, “U.S. Military Needs Better Data on Itself to Exploit AI,” Breaking Defense, December 12, 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/12/us-military-needs- better-data-on-itself-to-exploit-ai/.

33 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “EXCLUSIVE Pentagon’s AI Problem Is ‘Dirty’ Data: Lt. Gen. Shanahan,” Breaking Defense, November 13, 2019,https://breakingdefense.com/2019/11/exclusive-pentagons-ai-problem-is-dirty-data-lt- gen-shanahan/.

34 “The New Racetrack for Artificial Intelligence: China-U.S. Competition” [人工智能新赛场 -中美对比], CCID, May 2017.

35 For an instructive framework on this issue, see Matt Sheehan, “Much Ado About Data: How America and China Stack Up,” MacroPolo, July 16, 2019,https://macropolo.org/ai-data-us-china/.

36 Celia Chen and Iris Deng, “Tencent seeks to kill silo culture that gave it WeChat as it expands into AI, big data,” South China Morning Post, November 14, 2018,https://www.scmp.com/tech/apps-social/article/2172967/tencent-seeks-kill-silo- culture-gave-it-wechat-it-expands-ai-big.

37 Emily Feng, “In China, A New Call To Protect Data Privacy,” NPR, January 5, 2020,

https://www.npr.org/2020/01/05/793014617/in-china-a-new-call-to-protect-data- privacy.

38 “Navigating China’s Data Maze: How Regulations Affect U.S. Companies,” The American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, May 2019, https://www.amcham- shanghai.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/Viewpoint%20- %20Data%20%28May%202019%29.pdf.

39 “Interpretation of the Work Plan on Promoting the Development of the Artificial Intelligence Industry through the Opening of Public Data” [关于通过公共数据开放促进人工智能产业发展的工作方案》政策解读], November 4, 2019,http://jxj.beijing.gov.cn/zcjd/zcjdlb/201912/t20191212_1088931.html.

Based on analysis of monthly user data of most valuable U.S. and Chinese tech

companies.

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 39

40 For a discussion of the challenges and opportunities that big data presents for defense mobilization, see Li Ching [李庆], “Looking at the National Defense Mobilization Big Data Construction” [冷眼看国防动员大数据建设], China National Defense News [中国国防报], October 24, 2018, http://www.qstheory.cn/defense/2018- 10/24/c_1123606679.htm.

41 “China Tech Talk 76: US vs China—AI asymmetries with Jeffrey Ding,” technode, April 16, 2019, https://technode.com/2019/04/16/china-tech-talk-76-us-vs-china-ai- asymmetries-with-jeffrey-ding/.

42 “Artificial Intelligence Index: 2019 Annual Report,”https://hai.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj10986/f/ai_index_2019_report.pdf.

43 Ibid., 18.44

45 Noam Brown and Tuomas Sandholm, “Superhuman AI for heads-up no-limit poker: Libratus beats top professionals,” Science 359, no. 6374 (2018): 418-424. Alan Blair and Abdallah Saffidine, “AI surpasses humans at six-player poker,” Science 365, no. 6456 (2019): 864-865.

46 Raymond Perrault, Yoav Shoham, Erik Brynjolfsson, Jack Clark, John Etchemendy, Barbara Grosz, Terah Lyons, James Manyika, Saurabh Mishra, and Juan Carlos Niebles, “The AI Index 2019 Annual Report,” AI Index Steering Committee, Human-Centered AI Institute, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, December 2019; Laskai and Toner, “Can China Grow Its Own AI Tech Base.”

47 Field Cady and Oren Etzione, “China May Overtake the US in AI Research,” Medium, March 13, 2019, https://medium.com/ai2-blog/china-to-overtake-us-in-ai-research- 8b6b1fe30595.

48 Karen White, “Publications Output: U.S. Trends and International Comparisons,” Science & Engineering Indicators, December 17, 2019, https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsb20206.

49 “The China New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Strategic Research Academy released two heavyweight reports” [中国新一代人工智能发展战略研究院发布两份重量级报告], Interface news [界面新闻], May 18, 2019,https://xw.qq.com/partner/wcsbzst/20190518A0EB05/20190518A0EB0500?ADTA G=undefined&pgv_ref=undefined.

50 China accounts for 17 of the top 20 academic institutions that have been involved in patenting AI, with particular strength in deep learning, according to a study from the World Intellectual Property Organization. See “WIPO’s First ‘Technology Trends’ Study Probes

David Silver, Thomas Hubert, Julian Schrittwieser, Ioannis Antonoglou, Matthew Lai, Arthur

Guez, Marc Lanctot et al., “A general reinforcement learning algorithm that masters chess,

shogi, and Go through self-play,” Science 362, no. 6419 (2018): 1140-1144.

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 40

Artificial Intelligence: IBM and Microsoft are Leaders Amid Recent Global Upsurge in AI Inventive Activity,” World Intellectual Property Organization,https://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2019/article_0001.html; “WIPO Technology Trends 2019, Artificial Intelligence,” World Intellectual Property Organization,https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_1055.pdf.

51 Sarah O’Meara, “Will China Lead the World in AI by 2030,” Nature, August 21, 2019,https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02360-7.

52 “Robust Vision Challenge,”http://www.robustvision.net/leaderboard.php?benchmark=stereo.

53 Yu Sun, Shuohuan Wang, Yukun Li, Shikun Feng, Xuyi Chen, Han Zhang, Xin Tian, Danxiang Zhu, Hao Tian, and Hua Wu, “ERNIE: Enhanced Representation through Knowledge Integration,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1904.09223 (2019).

54 “Baidu’s Pre-training Model ERNIE Achieves New NLP Benchmark Record,” Synced, December 11, 2019, https://syncedreview.com/2019/12/11/baidus-pre-training- model-ernie-achieves-new-nlp-benchmark-record/.

55 See, e.g., “Global AI Talent Report 2019,” jfgagne, https://jfgagne.ai/talent-2019/.

56 “AAAI-17 Accepted Papers,”http://www.aaai.org/Conferences/AAAI/2017/aaai17accepted-papers.pdf; Sarah Zhang, “China’s Artificial-Intelligence Boom,” The Atlantic, February 16, 2017,https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/02/china-artificial- intelligence/516615/.

57 “Artificial Intelligence Index,” 87,https://hai.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj10986/f/ai_index_2019_report.pdf.

58 Remco Zwetsloot, Roxanne Heston, and Zachary Arnold, “Strengthening the U.S. AI Workforce,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September 2019,https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET_US_AI_Workforce.pdf.

59 Remco Zwetsloot, James Dunham, Zachary Arnold, and Tina Huang, “Keeping Top Talent in the United States: Findings and Policy Options for International Graduate Student Retention,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp- content/uploads/Keeping-Top-AI-Talent-in-the-United-States.pdf.

60 Ibid.

61 Elias G. Carayannis and David FJ Campbell, eds., Knowledge Creation, Diffusion, and Use in Innovation Networks and Knowledge Clusters: A Comparative Systems Approach Across the United States, Europe, and Asia (Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006); “Rapid Rise of China’s STEM Workforce Charted by National Science Board Report,” American Institute of Physics, January 31, 2018.

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62 Wang Cong, “AI race shifts to talent in battle for dominance,” Global Times, March 19, 2019, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1142700.shtml.

63 “The China New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Strategic Research Academy released two heavyweight reports” [中国新一代人工智能发展战略研究院发布两份重量级报告], Interface News [界面新闻], May 18, 2019,https://xw.qq.com/partner/wcsbzst/20190518A0EB05/20190518A0EB0500?ADTA G=undefined&pgv_ref=undefined.

64 Zwetsloot, Dunham, Arnold, and Huang, “Keeping Top Talent in the United States.”

65 China Institute for Science and Technology Policy at Tsinghua University, “China AI Development Report 2018,” Tsinghua University, July 2018,http://www.sppm.tsinghua.edu.cn/eWebEditor/UploadFile/China_AI_development_repo rt_2018.pdf.

66 Ibid.

67 Joy D. Ma, “China’s AI Talent Base Is Growing, and then Leaving,” MacroPolo, July 30, 2019, https://macropolo.org/chinas-ai-talent-base-is-growing-and-then-leaving/. By one initial estimate, of the 12,500 AI graduates from Chinese universities to date, reportedly only 31 percent have stayed in China, whereas 62 percent instead departed to the United States. Wang Cong, “AI race shifts to talent in battle for dominance,” Global Times, March 19, 2019, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1142700.shtml.

68 Ministry of Education, “Artificial Intelligence Innovation Action Plan for Institutions of Higher Learning” [高等学校人工智能创新行动计划], April 4, 2018,http://www.moe.edu.cn/srcsite/A16/s7062/201804/t20180410_332722.html. For commentary on the topic, see Elsa Kania, “China’s AI talent ‘arms race,” The Strategist, April 23, 2018, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-ai-talent-arms-race/.

69 “This year, colleges and universities have added these specialties: artificial intelligence and big data are the hottest” [今年高校新增这些专业:人工智能与大数据最火], June 12, 2019, http://edu.sina.com.cn/gaokao/2019-06-12/doc-ihvhiews8390284.shtml.

70 “Cross National Comparisons of R&D Performance,” National Science Board,

https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2018/nsb20181/report/sections/research-and- development-u-s-trends-and-international-comparisons/cross-national-comparisons-of-r-d- performance.

71 “2016–2019 Progress Report: Advancing Artificial Intelligence R&D,” November 2019,

https://www.nitrd.gov/pubs/AI-Research-and-Development-Progress-Report-2016- 2019.pdf; Melissa Flagg, “America’s Future Lies in Technical Alliances,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology (blog), January 8, 2020,https://cset.georgetown.edu/2020/01/08/americas-future-lies-in-technical-alliances/.

72 “National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence,” Interim Report, November 2019,https://www.nscai.gov/about/reports-to-congress.

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 42

73 Ibid.

74 MIT Committee to Evaluate the Innovation Deficit, “The Future Postponed: Why Declining Investment in Basic Research Threatens a U.S. Innovation Deficit,” April 2015,https://dc.mit.edu/sites/default/files/Future%20Postponed.pdf.

75 Jonathan Gruber and Simon Johnson, Jump-starting America: How Breakthrough Science Can Revive Economic Growth and the American Dream (New York: Public Affairs, 2019).

76 Charlotte Yang, “Chart of the Day: Another Record Year for China R&D Spending, Caixin, October 10, 2018, https://www.caixinglobal.com/2018-10-10/chart-of-the-day- another-record-year-for-china-rd-spending-101333479.html. See also “Is China a global leader in research and development,” China Power, https://chinapower.csis.org/china- research-and-development-rnd/l; Dennis Normile, “China narrows U.S. lead in R&D spending,” Science, October 19, 2018,https://science.sciencemag.org/content/362/6412/276.

77 “China’s R&D expenditure is close to two trillion yuan. Which cities have more research investment?” [中国研发经费接近两万亿，哪些城市科研投入多?], CCTV, September 13, 2019,http://news.cctv.com/2019/09/13/ARTIwBtFsNMhTHQ8DXpFQHJR190913.shtml.

78 Teddy Ng and Jane Cai, “China’s funding for science and research to reach 2.5 per cent of GDP in 2019,” South China Morning Post, March 10, 2019,https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/2189427/chinas-funding-science- and-research-reach-25-cent-gdp-2019.

79 “Atlas of national key R & D plan funding allocation” [国家重点研发计划经费分配图谱浮现], Economic Reference [经济参考报], October 14, 2019,http://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2019-10/14/c_1125100297.htm.

80 Ashwin Acharya and Zachary Arnold, “Chinese Public AI R&D Spending: Provisional Findings,” CSET Issue Brief, December 2019, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp- content/uploads/Chinese-Public-AI-RD-Spending-Provisional-Findings-2.pdf.

81 For instance, i

“Tianjin established a new generation of artificial intelligence industry fund with a scale of 100 billion RMB” [天津设新一代人工智

能产业基金，规模为1000亿人民币], May 16, 2018,https://m.pedaily.cn/news/431332.

82 “The National “863” Plan Computer Subject’s Thirty-Year Anniversary: Leapfrog-Style Development and the Realm of Necessity” [

n May 2018, the city of Tianjin announced the New Generation Artificial

Intelligence Industry Fund, which amounts to 100 billion RMB ($16 billion), based on a

combination of state and venture capital funding.

国家“863”计划计算机主题30年拾遗:跨

越式发展与必然王国], Science Net, February 8, 2017,

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 43

“863 Plan” [

83 Ibid. “863 Plan” [ 84 “Our Nation Launched Four Major Science Research Programs” [我国启动四项重大科

学研究计划], Science and Technology Daily, November 16, 2006.

85 “The national key R&D plan for next year is basically determined! These industries are the most noteworthy” [国家明年重点研发计划基本确定!这几个产业最值得关注], October 28, 2019.

86 “National Medium and Long Term Science and Technology Development Plan Outline” (2006-2020) [国家中长期科学和技术发展规划纲要], Ministry of Science and Technology, February 9, 2006,http://www.most.gov.cn/mostinfo/xinxifenlei/gjkjgh/200811/t20081129_65774_9.ht m.

https://www.itu.int/en/ITU- D/Cybersecurity/Documents/National_Strategies_Repository/China_2006.pdf.

87 See estimates from the Allen Institute.

88 “2021-2035 National Medium- and Long-term Scientific and Technological Development Plan Basic Science Development Strategy Research Project Launched in Beijing” [2021- 2035年国家中长期科技发展规划基础科学发展战略研究专题在京启动], Ministry of Science and Technology Website, May 3, 2019, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019- 05/03/content_5388386.htm.

89 Elsa B. Kania, “Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power,” Center for a New American Security, November 28, 2017,https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/battlefield-singularity-artificial-intelligence- military-revolution-and-chinas-future-military-power.

90 Jeffrey Ding, “Deciphering China’s AI Dream,” Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, March 2018, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp- content/uploads/Deciphering_Chinas_AI-Dream.pdf.

91 “State Council Notice on the Issuance of the New Generation AI Development Plan” [国务院关于印发新一代人工智能发展规划的通知]. “MIIT’s Notice Regarding the Release of the Three Year Action Plan to Promote the Development of New-Generation Artificial Intelligence Industry (2018-2020) [工业和信息化部关于印发《促进新一代人工智能产业发展三年行动计划(2018-2020年)》的通], December 14, 2017,http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/n1652858/n1652930/n3757016/c5960820/co ntent.html.

For an English translation of this plan, see Paul Triolo, Elsa Kania, and Graham Webster (translators), “Translation: Chinese government outlines AI ambitions through 2020,”

http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2017/2/367416.shtm. See also

计划], China Education and Research Network, http://www.edu.cn/html/rd/b/bls.shtml.

See also

http://www.edu.cn/html/rd/b/bls.shtml.

863计划], China Education and Research Network,

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 44

863

DigiChina, https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity- initiative/digichina/blog/translation-chinese-government-outlines-ai-ambitions-through- 2020/.

92 “Ministry of Science and Technology Notice Regarding the Issuance of National Key R&D Plan Transformative Technologies and Crux Scientific Problems Key Topic 2017 Program Application Guidelines” [科技部关于发布国家重点研发计划变革性技术关键科学问题重点专项2017年度项目申报指南的通知], Ministry of Science and Technology, September 27, 2017,http://www.most.gov.cn/mostinfo/xinxifenlei/fgzc/gfxwj/gfxwj2017/201710/t20171 009_135224.htm.

93 There might be some debate about the best translations for the terms “重大工程” and“重大项目,” each of which could be rendered major/mega project/program. See National Development and Reform Commission Office Releases Notice Regarding the Implementation of the 2018 “Internet Plus,” Artificial Intelligence Innovation Development, and Digital Economy Experimental Mega-Project Notice [国家发展改革委办公厅关于组织实施2018年“互联网+”、人工智能创新发展和数字经济试点重大工程的通知], National Development and Reform Commission, October 11, 2017,http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/201710/t20171013_863534.html.

94 “AI Innovation and Development Major Project Application Requirements” [人工智能创新发展重大工程申报要求], NDRC, October 11, 2017,http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/201710/W020171013599553259770.pdf.

95 “56 projects selected as major projects for the ‘Internet Plus,’ Artificial Intelligence Innovation Development and Digital Economy Pilot Megaprojects” [56个项目入选“互联网+”、人工智能创新发展和数字经济试点重大工程], January 22, 2018, Xinhua,http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2018-01/22/content_5259438.htm.

96 “State Council Notice on the Issuance of the New Generation AI Development Plan” [国务院关于印发新一代人工智能发展规划的通知].

97 For examples, see “SDIC’s National Emerging Industry Venture Capital Guidance Fund raised a total of 17.85 billion yuan” [国投创合国家新兴产业创业投资引导基金募集规模达178.5亿元], May 10, 2017,https://www.sdic.com.cn/cn/zxzx/gsyw/2017/06/09/webinfo/phone14959552641 37396.htm.

“Guohua Military-Civil Fusion Industrial Development Fund Established” [国华军民融合产业发展基金创立],National Defense Science and Industry Bureau, September 7, 2016, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-09/07/content_5106111.htm.

98 Paul Triolo, “AI in China: Cutting Through the Hype,” Eurasia Group, December 6, 2017,https://www.eurasiagroup.net/live-post/ai-in-china-cutting-through-the-hype.

99 See the Party’s report from the fourth plenum: “Communiqué of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China” [中国共产党第十九届中

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 45

央委员会第四次全体会议公报], Xinhua, October 31, 2019,http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-10/31/c_1125178024.htm.

100 “The United States of Artificial Intelligence Startups, CBInsights, November 26, 2019,https://www.cbinsights.com/research/artificial-intelligence-startup-us-map/.

101 Ibid.

102 Joanna Glasner, “AI Companies Raise More Money Across Fewer Rounds,” Crunchbase News, September 9, 2019, https://news.crunchbase.com/news/ai-companies-raise-more- money-across-fewer-rounds/.

103 For one historical perspective, see Linda Weiss, America Inc.? Innovation and Enterprise in the National Security State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014).

104 Rachel Olney, “The Rift Between Silicon Valley and the Pentagon is Economic, not Moral,” War on the Rocks, January 28, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/the- rift-between-silicon-valley-and-the-pentagon-is-economic-not-moral/.

105 “The Contest for Innovation: Strengthening America’s National Security Innovation Base in an Era of Strategic Competition,” Ronald Reagan Institute, December 2019,https://www.reaganfoundation.org/media/355312/the_contest_for_innovation_report.p df.

106 Ibid.

107 The levels of funding are high enough that the founder of one Chinese AI start-up characterized this as a negative. As he remarked to one of the authors, there is “too much money chasing too few good ideas.”

108 “China Is Starting To Edge Out The US In AI Investment,” CB Insights, February 12, 2019,

https://www.cbinsights.com/research/china-artificial-intelligence-investment-startups- tech/.

109 Jing Shuiyu, “AI startups see record financing in H1,” China Daily, August 3, 2017,http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/tech/2017-08/03/content_30340585.htm.

110 “The China New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Strategic Research Academy released two heavyweight reports” [中国新一代人工智能发展战略研究院发布两份重量级报告], Interface News [界面新闻], May 18, 2019,https://xw.qq.com/partner/wcsbzst/20190518A0EB05/20190518A0EB0500?ADTA G=undefined&pgv_ref=undefined.

111 “China VC investment hits record high in 2018: Report,” Xinhua, February 1, 2019,http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201902/01/WS5c53e434a3106c65c34e7cb2.html.

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112 See, e.g., “Used cars and AI come out on top as China's startup funding slumps,” Nikkei Asian Review, July 3, 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/China-tech/Used-cars-and- AI-come-out-on-top-as-China-s-startup-funding-slumps.

113 “China recruits Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent to AI ‘national team,’” South China Morning Post, November 21, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/tech/china- tech/article/2120913/china-recruits-baidu-alibaba-and-tencent-ai-national-team.

114 “Artificial Intelligence Open Platform, Have you Joined?” [人工智能开放平台，你加入了吗-中新网”], China News, December 13, 2018,http://www.chinanews.com/it/2018/10-08/8643974.shtml; “AI “national team” Xiong’nn Debut! Will Change Your Life” [人工智能“国家队”雄安登场!将改变你的生活], Xiong’an, November 30, 2017, http://www.xiongan.gov.cn/2017- 11/30/c_129766243.htm.

115 “Rise Of China’s Big Tech In AI: What Baidu, Alibaba, And Tencent Are Working On,” CB Insights, April 26, 2018, https://www.cbinsights.com/research/china-baidu-alibaba- tencent-artificial-intelligence-dominance/.

116 Patrick Foulis, “Across the West powerful firms are becoming even more powerful,” The Economist, November 15, 2018, https://www.economist.com/special- report/2018/11/15/across-the-west-powerful-firms-are-becoming-even-more-powerful; John Mauldin, “America Has a Monopoly Problem,” Forbes, April 11, 2019,https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2019/04/11/america-has-a-monopoly- problem/; Jonathan Tepper, The Myth of Capitalism: Monopolies and the Death of Competition (John Wiley & Sons, 2018).

117 Mark Z. Taylor, The Politics of Innovation: Why Some Countries Are Better Than Others at Science and Technology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

118 Martin Kenney and Urs Von Burg, “Technology, entrepreneurship and path dependence: industrial clustering in Silicon Valley and Route 128.” Industrial and corporate change 8, no. 1 (1999): 67-103; Aaron Chatterji, Edward Glaeser, and William Kerr, “Clusters of entrepreneurship and innovation,” Innovation Policy and the Economy 14, no. 1 (2014): 129-166.

119 Fareed Zakaria, “The Future of American Power,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008,

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2008-05-03/future-american- power.

120

121 MIT Committee to Evaluate the Innovation Deficit, “The Future Postponed: Why Declining Investment in Basic Research Threatens a U.S. Innovation Deficit,” April 2015,https://dc.mit.edu/sites/default/files/Future%20Postponed.pdf.

Mariana Mazzucato, “The entrepreneurial state,” Soundings 49, no. 49 (2011): 131-

142.

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122 Ding, “Deciphering China’s AI Dream.”

123 For a good analysis on the topic, see Yukon Huang and Jeremy Smith, “China’s Record on Intellectual Property Rights Is Getting Better and Better,” Foreign Policy, October 16, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/16/china-intellectual-property-theft- progress/.

124 “State Council’s Guiding Opinions on Accelerating the Construction of Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation Support Platforms” [国务院关于加快构建大众创业万众创新支撑平台的指导意见], September 25, 2016,http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-09/26/content_10183.htm.

125 “The China New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Strategic Research Academy released two heavyweight reports” [中国新一代人工智能发展战略研究院发布两份重量级报告], Interface News [界面新闻], May 18, 2019,https://xw.qq.com/partner/wcsbzst/20190518A0EB05/20190518A0EB0500?ADTA G=undefined&pgv_ref=undefined. Estimates often vary depending on what is defined as an “AI enterprise.”

126 Minghe Hu and Zen Soo, “China’s reliance on US-origin platforms for deep learning raises questions about country’s AI push,” South China Morning Post, November 22, 2019,https://www.scmp.com/tech/start-ups/article/3038772/chinas-reliance-us-origin- platforms-deep-learning-raises-questions.

127 “Artificial Intelligence Open Platform, Have you Joined?” [人工智能开放平台，你加入了吗-中新网”], China News, December 13, 2018,http://www.chinanews.com/it/2018/10-08/8643974.shtml; “Five Major National-Level Open Innovation Platforms Revealed” [五大国家级人工智能开放创新平台将集体亮相 “], January 18, 2019. See also “Ten Major National New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Open Innovation Platforms Released in Shanghai [十大国家新一代人工智能开放创新平台在沪发布], Science Network, August 29, 2019,http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2019/8/429964.shtm.

128 Ministry of Science and Technology Notice on the Publication of the Guidance on National New Generation Artificial Intelligence Open Innovation Platform Construction Work [科技部关于印发《国家新一代人工智能开放创新平台建设工作指引》的通知], September 17, 2019, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Ministry-and- Science-and-Technology-Notice-on-Publication-of-Guidance-1.pdf.

129 Laskai and Toner, “Can China Grow Its Own AI Tech Base.”

130 For updates on its capabilities, see, e.g. “Baidu PaddlePaddle Releases 21 New Capabilities to Accelerate Industry-Grade Model Development,” November 14, 2019,http://research.baidu.com/Blog/index-view?id=126.

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131 Chris Udemans, “Alibaba Cloud opens source code for machine-learning platform Alink,” technode, November 28, 2019, https://technode.com/2019/11/28/alibaba-cloud- machine-learning-platform-open-source/.

132 “CSRankings: Computer Science Rankings,” http://csrankings.org/#/index?all. 133 Josef Joffe, The Myth of America’s Decline: Politics, Economics, and a Half Century of

False Prophecies (New York: Liveright., 2013), 172-188.

134 John Timmer, “US computer science grads outperforming those in other key nations,” ArsTechnica, March 23, 2019, https://arstechnica.com/science/2019/03/us-computer- science-grads-outperforming-those-in-other-key-nations/.

135

Journal of Education and Work

136 Edward Luce, Time to Start Thinking: America in the Age of Descent (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2012).

137 Michael S. Teitelbaum, Falling Behind? Boom, Bust, and the Global Race for Scientific Talent (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Adams B. Nager and Robert D. Atkinson, “Ten Myths of High-Skilled Immigration,” Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, April 2015, http://www.ilw.com/articles/2015,0420-Atkinson.pdf.

138 Michael S. Teitelbaum, Falling Behind? Boom, Bust, and the Global Race for Scientific Talent (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014),https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10208.html.

139 Cary Funk and Kim Parker, “Most Americans evaluate STEM education as middling compared with other developed nations,” Pew Research Center, January 9, 2018,https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/01/09/5-most-americans-evaluate-stem- education-as-middling-compared-with-other-developed-nations/.

140 “Research Reveals Boys’ Interest in STEM Careers Declining; Girls’ Interest Unchanged,” Junior Achievement USA, https://www.juniorachievement.org/web/ja-usa/press- releases/-/asset_publisher/UmcVLQOLGie9/content/research-reveals-boys’-interest-in- stem-careers-declining-girls’-interest-unchanged; “Survey: Teen Girls’ Interest in STEM Careers Declines,” Junior Achievement, https://www.juniorachievement.org/web/ja- usa/press-releases/-/asset_publisher/UmcVLQOLGie9/content/survey-teen-girls’- interest-in-stem-careers-declines.

141 Ibid.

142 Normile, Dennis, “One in Three Chinese Children Faces an Education Apocalypse. An

Ambitious Experiment Hopes to Save Them,” Science 21 (2017).143

Adam Gamoran and Sarah K. Bruch, “Educational inequality in the United States: can we

reverse the tide?”

“Chapter 4: Shanghai and Hong Kong: Two Distinct Examples of Education Reform in

China,” in Strong Performers and Successful Reformers in Education: Lessons from PISA for

30, no. 7 (2017): 777-792.

the United States, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 49

http://www.oecd.org/document/13/0,3343,en_2649_35845621_46538637_1_1_1

_1,00.html.

144 “Chinese university graduates rise exponentially, have diverse career options,” Xinhua, June 24, 2019,https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201906/24/WS5d1080bca3103dbf14329e9f.html.

145 For a good overview, see “Seizing the laurels: Tsinghua University may soon top the world league in science research,” The Economist, November 17, 201,https://www.economist.com/china/2018/11/17/tsinghua-university-may-soon-top-the- world-league-in-science-research.

146 For a comparative perspective, see

147 Ricky Ye, “While US STEM education market declines, China invests heavily,” The Next Web, June 19, 2017, https://thenextweb.com/contributors/2017/06/19/us-stem- education-market-declines-china-invests-heavily/.

148 See initial results reported in a survey from Tsinghua University. China Institute for Science and Technology Policy at Tsinghua University, “China AI Development Report 2018,” Tsinghua University, July 2018,http://www.sppm.tsinghua.edu.cn/eWebEditor/UploadFile/China_AI_development_repo rt_2018.pdf.

149 Yi-Ling Liu, “China’s AI Dreams Aren’t for Everyone,” Foreign Policy, August 13, 2019,

https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/13/china-artificial-intelligence-dreams-arent-for- everyone-data-privacy-economic-inequality/.

150 iFlytek, Deeply Ploughing Education for Fifteen Years” [科大讯飞深耕教育15年] November 21, 2019, Beijing Report [新京报], https://tech.sina.com.cn/it/2019-11- 21/doc-iihnzahi2260676.shtml.

151 Nicholas Eberstadt, “With Great Demographics Comes Great Power,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2019-06-11/great- demographics-comes-great-power.

152 Zwetsloot, Heston, and Arnold, “Strengthening the U.S. AI Workforce.”153 Ibid., 5.

154 “Fewer foreign students coming to the United States for the second year in row, survey finds,” Reuters, November 13, 2018,https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/fewer-foreign-students-coming-united- states-second-year-row-survey-n935701; Zachary Arnold, Roxanne Heston, Remco Zwetsloot, and Tina Huang, “Immigration Policy and the U.S. AI Sector: A Preliminary

Wang, Yan, Jari Lavonen, and Kirsi Tirri, “Aims for

learning 21st century competencies in national primary science curricula in China and

Finland,” Eurasia Journal of Mathematics, Science & Technology Education (2018).

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 50

Assessment,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September 2019, 2-4,https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET_Immigration_Policy_and_AI.pdf.

155 Ibid., Section 3.

156 Alana Semeuls, “Tech Companies Say It’s Too Hard to Hire High-Skilled Immigrants in the U.S. — So They're Growing in Canada Instead,” Time, July 25, 2019,https://time.com/5634351/canada-high-skilled-labor-immigrants/.

157 Zwetsloot, Heston, and Arnold, “Strengthening the U.S. AI Workforce.”

158 At present, China’s fertility rates are below replacement levels, and even the recent changes to the one-child policy won’t compensate for these adverse trends. See also Nicholas Eberstadt, “With Great Demographics Comes Great Power,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2019-06-11/great- demographics-comes-great-power.

159 Ding, “Deciphering China’s AI Dream.”

160 William Hannas and Huey-meei Chang, “China’s Access to Foreign AI Technology: An Assessment,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September 2019,https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp- content/uploads/CSET_China_Access_To_Foreign_Technology.pdf.

161 Meng Jing, “Chinese firms fight to lure top artificial intelligence talent from Silicon Valley,” South China Morning Post, April 2, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/tech/china- tech/article/2084171/chinese-firms-fight-lure-top-artificial-intelligence-talent-silicon.

162 Remco Zwetsloot and Dahlia Peterson, “The US-China Tech Wars: China’s Immigration Disadvantage,” The Diplomat, December 31, 2019,https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/the-us-china-tech-wars-chinas-immigration- disadvantage/.

163 See MIT’s description of these engagements: Adam Conner-Simons, “CSAIL launches new five-year collaboration with iFlyTek,” MIT News, https://news.mit.edu/2018/csail- launches-five-year-collaboration-with-iflytek-0615.

164 Hal Brands and Peter D. Feaver, “What Are America’s Alliances Good For?” Parameters 47, Issue 2 (Summer 2017): 15-30.

165 Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017). See also Niall Ferguson, “The False Prophecy of Hyperconnection,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2017,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-08-15/false-prophecy-hyperconnection; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler, and Alexander H. Montgomery, “Network Analysis for International Relations,” International Organization 63, Issue 3 (July 2009): 559-592,https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/network- analysis-for-international-relations/DE2910979C1B5C44C4CC13F336C5DE97.

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 51

166 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “America’s Edge,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2009-01-01/americas-edge.

167 Ibid.

168 James Carse, Finite and Infinite Games (New York: Free Press, 1986); Robert Wright, Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny (New York: Vintage Books, 2001).

169 “China AI Development Report 2018,” China Institute for Science and Technology Policy at Tsinghua University.

170 See, e.g., Felicia Schwartz and Dov Lieber, “Chinese Investment in Israel Raises Security Fears,” Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese- investment-in-israel-raises-security-fears-11549881000.

171 “Artificial Intelligence and National Security,” Congressional Research Service, January 30, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45178.pdf.

172 For context, see “CFIUS Reform: Foreign Investment National Security Reviews,” Congressional Research Service, October 3, 2019,https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF10952.pdf.

173 Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable A Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation,” January 2018,https://admin.govexec.com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018_(1).pdf.

174 China and the Philippines established a “Data port” in September 2018. China also initiated the Digital Silk Road International Industry Alliance. For more information, see “China's big data companies embark on the “Belt and Road”” [中国大数据企业走上“一带一路”], Xinhua, December 14, 2018, http://news.xinhuanet.com/globe/2018- 12/14/c_137663769.html; “Digital Economy and Digital Silk Road International Conference proposes to jointly build digital silk road,” Zhejiang Daily, September 19, 2018.

175 See, e.g., “BRI helps participating countries with technological innovation,” People’s Daily, April 26, 2019, http://en.people.cn/n3/2019/0426/c90000-9572518.html.

176 Elizabeth C. Economy, “China’s New Revolution,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2018,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-04-17/chinas-new-revolution.

177 “China and France’s top universities build ‘AI Alliance’ to promote artificial intelligence international cooperation,” Xinhua, January 18, 2018.

178 “AI, Another Breakthrough in Sino-UK Innovation Cooperation” [ 人工智能中英创新合作又一风口], People’s Daily, November 3, 2018,http://world.people.com.cn/GB/n1/2018/1103/c1002-30380012.html.

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 52

179 “China and Russia big data base will be built in Harbin at the end of the year” [中俄大数据基地年底将在哈尔滨建成], Harbin Daily, March 11, 2018,https://web.archive.org/save/https://zj.zjol.com.cn/news.html?id=890364.

The project has been successfully supported by the 2017 National Development and Reform Commission Digital Economy Pilot Major Project. a major project of Heilongjiang Province

180 “Lecture Series on “China-Russia Economic and Trade Cooperation Database and Russian-Chinese Intelligent Integrated Service Platform”” [“中俄经贸合作数据库及俄汉语智能化综合服务平台”项目系列讲座中俄经贸合作数据库及俄汉语智能化综合服务平台], November 1, 2018,https://web.archive.org/save/http://yuyanziyuan.blcu.edu.cn/info/1066/1259.htm.

181 Miles Brundage et al., “The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Preventing, and Mitigation,” February 2018, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.07228.pdf.

182 Andrew Imbrie and Elsa B. Kania, “AI Safety, Security, and Stability Among Great Powers: Options, Challenges, and Lessons Learned for Pragmatic Engagement,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, December 2019, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp- content/uploads/AI-Safety-Security-and-Stability-Among-the-Great-Powers.pdf.

183 William J. Burns, “The Demolition of U.S. Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, October 14, 2019; Ronan Farrow, War on Peace: The End of Diplomacy and the Decline of American Influence (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2018).

184 Elsa B. Kania,” The Right to Speak: Discourse and Chinese Power,” Center for Advanced China Research, 27, 2018. See also Joel Wuthnow, “The concept of soft power in China’s strategic discourse,” Issues & Studies 44, no. 2 (2008): 1-28.

185 Kristine Lee and Alexander Sullivan, “People’s Republic of the United Nations: China’s Emerging Revisionism in International Organizations,” Center for a New American Security, May 14, 2019, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/peoples-republic-of-the- united-nations.

186 See, e.g., Elsa B. Kania, “China’s play for global 5G dominance—standards and the ‘Digital Silk Road’,” The Strategist, ASPI, June 27, 2018,https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-play-for-global-5g-dominance-standards-and- the-digital-silk-road/.

187 Graham Webster, Rogier Creemers, Paul Triolo, and Elsa Kania, “China’s Plan to Lead in AI: Purpose, Prospects, and Problems,” New America, August 1, 2017,https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/blog/chinas-plan-lead-ai-purpose- prospects-and-problems/.

188 For authoritative reporting on these issues, see Paul Mozur, “One Month, 500,000 Face Scans: How China Is Using A.I. to Profile a Minority,” New York Times, April 14, 2019,https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/14/technology/china-surveillance-artificial- intelligence-racial-profiling.html.

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 53

189 “Beijing AI Principles,” May 29, https://www.baai.ac.cn/blog/beijing-ai-principles. See also “China Hosts Conference to Promote Ethical AI Standards,” China Daily, June 19, 2019,http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201906/19/WS5d098cdfa3103dbf14329084.html; Will Knight, “Why Does Beijing Suddenly Care About AI Ethics?” MIT Technology Review,https://www.technologyreview.com/s/613610/why-does-china-suddenly-care-about-ai- ethics-and-privacy/.

190 See, e.g., “World Artificial Intelligence Conference,”http://www.worldaic.com.cn/portal/en/index.html; “Global Artificial Intelligence Conference,” https://gaitc.caai.cn/en.

191 See, e.g., “Countering High-Tech Illiberalism,” https://www.cnas.org/press/press- release/countering-high-tech-illiberalism. See also Freedom House, “Freedom on the Net 2018: The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom- net/freedom-net-2018/rise-digital-authoritarianism. For a policy brief on the topic, see Alina Polyakova and Chris Meserole, “Exporting digital authoritarianism,” Brookings Institution, https://www.brookings.edu/wp- content/uploads/2019/08/FP_20190826_digital_authoritarianism_polyakova_meserole .pdf.

192 Samantha Hoffman, “Managing the State: Social Credit, Surveillance and the CCP’s Plan for China,” in Nicholas D. Wright, ed., AI, China, Russia, and the Global Order: Technological, Political, Global, and Creative Perspectives, A Strategic Multiyear Assessment Periodic Publication, 2018, 42, https://nsiteam.com/social/wp- content/uploads/2018/12/AI-China-Russia-Global-WP_FINAL.pdf.

193 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “The Once and Future Superpower,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016.

194 However, the realization of this potential advantage requires the effective use of this data.195 Brooks and Wohlforth, “The Once and Future Superpower.” 196 Ibid.

197 Brooks and Wohlforth, “The Once and Future Superpower”; Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, “Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage,” International Security, 43, Issue 3 (Winter 2018/19): 141-189.

198 “Costs of War,” Watson Institute, Brown University,https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/.

199 See the Defense Innovation Board’s project and report on the topic: “Software is Never Done: Refactoring the Acquisition Code for Competitive Advantage,” May 13, 2019. “Software Acquisition and Practices (SWAP) Study,”https://innovation.defense.gov/software/.

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 54

200 “Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States,” Report to President Donald J. Trump by the Interagency Task Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806, September 2018,https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND- STRENGTHENING-THE-MANUFACTURING-AND%20DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE- AND-SUPPLY-CHAIN-RESILIENCY.PDF.

201 Xi Jinping Discusses Military-Civil Fusion” [习近平谈军民融合], Seeking Truth [求是], October 16, 2018, http://www.qstheory.cn/zhuanqu/rdjj/2018- 10/16/c_1123565364.htm. See also Elsa B. Kania, “In Military-Civil Fusion, China is Learning Lessons from the United States and Starting to Innovate,” The Strategy Bridge, August 27, 2019, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/8/27/in-military-civil- fusion-china-is-learning-lessons-from-the-united-states-and-starting-to-innovate.

202 Ibid.

203 Elsa B. Kania, “Chinese Military Innovation in Artificial Intelligence,” Testimony to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 2019,https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-testimony/chinese-military-innovation- in-artificial-intelligence.

204 CETC Military-Civil Fusion Network Information Systems Appear at Zhuhai Airshow [中国电科军民融合的网络信息体系亮相珠海航展], February 25, 2019,http://www.cetcd.cn/html/2019-02/7435.html.

205 Ibid.206 Ibid.

207 State Council Notice on the Issuance of the New Generation AI Development Plan” [国务院关于印发新一代人工智能发展规划的通知], July 20, 2017,http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-07/20/content_5211996.htm; Graham Webster, Rogier Creemers, Paul Triolo, and Elsa Kania, “Full Translation: China's ‘New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan’ (2017),” New America,https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/full-translation- chinas-new-generation-artificial-intelligence-development-plan-2017/; “Executive Order on Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence,” White House, February 11, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-maintaining- american-leadership-artificial-intelligence/.

208 For an excellent resource on the topic, see the 2019 AI Index Report. This Index provides tools and datasets to evaluate progress in AI, which is available through Stanford’s initiative on Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence. For more information, see “Artificial Intelligence Index: 2019 Annual Report,” https://hai.stanford.edu/ai-index/2019.

209 Vannevar Bush, Science, the Endless Frontier (Ayer Company Publishers, 1995).

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 55

210 Mariana Mazzucato, The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths. Vol. 1 (Anthem Press, 2015).

211 For context, see “DARPA Electronics Resurgence Initiative,”https://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/electronics-resurgence-initiative.

212 Such an initiative could build upon antecedents. See “Public-Private Partnerships for Semiconductor Research,” https://www.nist.gov/industry-impacts/public-private- partnerships-semiconductor-research.

213 See future research forthcoming from CSET by Remco Zwetsloot et al. that will provide a more detailed analysis of this policy issue.

214 Eliezer Geisler and Wagdy Abdallah, The Metrics of Science and Technology (Quorum Books, 2000); OECD Science, Technology, and Industry Outlook, 2014 (OECD Publishing, 2014).

215 For an excellent overview of this issue, see “Campaign for an AI Ready Force,”

https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/2002204191/-1/- 1/0/CAMPAIGN_FOR_AN_AI_READY_FORCE.PDF.

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gouracademy · 4 years

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via Politics – FiveThirtyEight

How voters will pick the Democratic presidential nominee is confusing. Some states hold primaries where voters have all day to vote, while others hold caucuses at a specific time where voters may have to wait around for more than an hour just to participate. In either system, the votes cast don’t directly elect a party’s presidential nominee. Instead, any candidate who wins at least 15 percent of the vote statewide or at the district level1 is allocated national convention delegates, and then those delegates choose the nominee. The ins and outs of this process routinely baffle voters, journalists and even presidential candidates.

And during the 2016 Democratic nomination contest, chaotic caucuses created even more complications. Controversy erupted right from the start when it was discovered that there was no mechanism for holding a recount in the Iowa caucuses, sparking an outcry from Bernie Sanders supporters who said the election was rigged to favor Hillary Clinton. Iowa and other Democratic caucus states also struggled to handle huge crowds of voters looking to make their voices heard. In reaction, the Democratic National Committee changed its rules in an effort to make nomination contests more inclusive, and many 2016 caucus states will hold primaries in the 2020 Democratic nomination contest — a change that could have ramifications for voter turnout as well as for which candidates have an edge in those states.

At least 10 states are planning to switch from a caucus to a primary in 2020. As things stand, just two states — Iowa and Nevada — have firm plans to caucus again. Two other 2016 caucus states — Maine and Wyoming — are still up in the air. Maine lawmakers may establish a government-run primary, in which case the Maine Democratic Party plans to move to a primary. And Wyoming Democrats are still ironing out some details. (The state party committee told FiveThirtyEight they plan to release an updated plan this summer.).

Democrats will hold fewer caucuses in 2020

Number of states planning to use each delegate allocation method for the Democratic presidential nomination contest (as of May 17, 2019)

Method 2016 2020 Change Government-run primary 37 43 +6 Party-run primary 0 4 +4 Party caucus 14 2 -12 To be determined* — 2 2

Includes all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Territorial contests are not included.

* Maine and Wyoming have not finalized the format of their 2020 nomination contests. Both are currently scheduled to be caucuses, but Maine may re-establish a government-run primary, which the state’s Democratic party will use if available. Wyoming Democrats are expected to announce further changes to their process later this year (Wyoming has no government-run presidential primary, but Democrats could hold a party-run primary).

Source: Frontloading HQ, TheGreenPapers, State Delegate Plans

The 10 states switching to primaries fall into two groups: those with government-run primaries and those with party-run ones. In Colorado, Minnesota and Utah, Democrats are moving away from caucuses in favor of newly established state-run presidential primaries, and Democrats in Idaho, Nebraska and Washington have opted to use their states’ existing primaries rather than caucus again. But Democrats in four other states — Alaska, Hawaii, Kansas and North Dakota — will hold party-run primaries because those state governments don’t hold their own. This is an important distinction because government-run and party-run primaries can differ quite a bit. While state governments might open hundreds or thousands of polling places statewide for 12 hours or more, party-run votes might provide less than one voting location per county or keep the polls open for just four hours on primary day. These party-run affairs will likely offer forms of early and absentee voting in 2020, but seeing as they won’t be able to rely on the state-run systems that normally handle these kinds of election administration, it’s unclear how effective the parties will be at managing this on their own.

And some states, like Colorado and Minnesota, actually started shifting toward a primary system long before the DNC officially changed its rules in 2018. Elaine Kamarck, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution who studies the nomination process, said that, in her view, “caucuses are kind of obsolete.” State parties often don’t have the resources needed to keep caucuses running smoothly and ensure everyone can access them, she said. “The participation in these hotly contested [presidential] primaries is so intense that caucus states have had a hard time handling them.”

But party reforms have also led to the increased use of primaries in 2020. Specifically, the DNC delegate-selection rules now say that state parties should try to use government-run primaries if they are available. And if a state party doesn’t have that option, party-run events (including caucuses) are required to allow absentee or early voting and same-day voter registration, plus implement procedures for recounts. For a state such as Washington, which was by far the largest caucus state by population in 2016, it was much easier to meet these rule changes by using Washington’s government-run primary than by adapting its caucuses.

One possible outcome of these changes is that we will likely see higher levels of voter participation because turnout tends to be higher in primaries than in caucuses. Caitlin Jewitt, a political scientist at Virginia Tech who has researched the effects of election rules on turnout in primaries and caucuses, told FiveThirtyEight that she believes moving to a primary system “could help turnout increase 17-18 percent.”2

“The difference between having many hours [to vote] and having to show up on a Tuesday night [to caucus] is huge,” she said, and that increased flexibility helps draw in more voters.

The difference may be especially dramatic in the states switching from caucuses to government-run primaries, which offer lengthy voting hours. On the other hand, voter turnout may not change as much in the party-run primary states, where the party’s limited resources will affect how easy it is to cast a ballot. Still, state parties are also required to follow the DNC rules that encourage broader participation, so turnout could increase nonetheless. Josh Putnam, a lecturer at UNC-Wilmington and author of FrontloadingHQ, a blog following developments in the presidential nomination process, told FiveThirtyEight that he thinks “turnout in these contests will be higher than it would have been for traditional caucuses” but that “we will continue to see a gap between state-run and party-run contests in 2020.”

Of course, increased voter turnout could change which candidates benefit — or suffer — from that voting system. “The conventional wisdom is that caucuses favor more ideological candidates,” said Kamarck. Understandably, then, of the 2020 Democratic presidential field, Sanders is the candidate who’s often named as most likely to take a hit. In 2016, he won all 10 caucus states that are moving to some type of primary in 2020, though the field was far smaller in 2016, when most caucuses were head-to-head matchups between Sanders and Clinton. That said, Sanders probably owes some of his success in the caucuses to the fact that these low-turnout events tend to reward candidates who have strongly ideological and deeply committed supporters, and the move toward more primaries could erode that advantage.

“Caucuses benefit candidates who have strong grassroots campaigns but are also organized to get those grassroots supporters there,” said Jewitt. But since primaries are easier to participate in, candidates who have a bigger base (even if those voters are less engaged) may benefit from the format change. For example, in 2016, Nebraska and Washington held Democratic primaries in addition to their caucuses, though the caucuses determined delegate allocation and the primaries didn’t count. While Sanders handily won the caucus in each state, Clinton won the higher-turnout primaries.

However, not all experts were convinced that these rule changes would hurt Sanders or other “factional” candidates — those who draw passionate engagement but only from a small percentage of the party. As Putnam pointed out, Barack Obama was not a factional contender in 2008, but he won most caucus states. Like most nomination races, much will depend on how the candidate field winnows and how candidates adjust.

“Those with the resources will be the ones who are best able to adapt to the changes,” said Putnam.

Sanders currently holds a strong position in terms of resources, owing in part to his tremendous grassroots fundraising base. Moreover, with 20-plus Democrats running, Sanders’s small but intense base of support might be enough to put him ahead in a fragmented field. Putnam thinks Sanders’s chances depend “to a greater degree on there being at least three (or more) candidates in the race” than whether a state is holding a caucus or a primary.

So to recap, all we can say for sure about the move toward primaries over caucuses is that turnout will likely be higher in 2020 than in 2016 for the states that switch — and that could produce some interesting results.

#IFTTT #Politics – FiveThirtyEight #politics #538 #Geoffrey Skelley

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