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#but indecent is my beloved and she has to be included
hotvintagepoll · 1 month
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Propaganda
Margaret Lindsay (Frisco Kid, The House of the Seven Gables, Scarlet Street)—she was born in Dubuque, Iowa, then moved to England to make her stage debut. She framed herself as a British actress and moved back to America to try Hollywood, then starred with James Cagney in a bunch of movies. She was in the Ellery Queen movie series and The House of the Seven Gables. She never married (I suspect lesbian stuff) but lived with her sisters. She dated Cesar Romero and Liberace (I told you. Lesbian stuff.) Please include the pic of her in the tie [included above]
Mae West (She Done Him Wrong, I'm No Angel)—She is an absolute icon, the OG sex symbol. Every word from her mouth was an innuendo and she was proud of it. I guess one could say she slayed. She got Cary Grant his first acting role, as well. How could you NOT vote for someone who says such iconic stuff as "I do all my writing in bed; everybody knows I do my best work there" or "You only live once, but if you do it right, once is enough." SHE COINED THE PHRASE "IS THAT A GUN IN YOUR POCKET OR ARE YOU JUST HAPPY TO SEE ME?" I LOVE HER!!!
This is round 2 of the tournament. All other polls in this bracket can be found here. Please reblog with further support of your beloved hot sexy vintage woman.
[additional propaganda submitted under the cut.]
Margaret Lindsay:
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Mae West:
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Her voice! Her body! She was thick as hell and SO confident.
Mae West is often called the queen of the sexual pun or innuendo, she was an early sex symbol and a comedy icon. She also has a quote saying "When I am good, I am very good. But when I am bad I am better!" which is possibly the peak of hot girl energy ever. (Including the clip here)
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for an era that didn't have much wiggle room when it came to women that studios wanted in their films, it's refreshing that she was in her late 30s when she skyrocketed to movie fame. she was also curvy and witty and raunchy, an absolute icon!
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Legendary sex symbol. Like 500 vintage iconic quotes and double entendres. "Is that a gun in your pocket, or are you just happy to see me? " "When I'm good, I'm very good. But when I'm bad, I'm better" / "It's not the men in your life that count, it's the life in your men" / "I feel like a million tonight. But one at a time." , "Marriage is a fine institution, but I'm not ready for an institution. " / " How tall are you without your horse? Six foot, seven inches. Never mind the six feet. Let's talk about the seven inches! " Look the pictures don't do her justice just watch a compilation and tell me that voice doesn't do it for you
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She was a SEX GODDESS at a time when that was an extremely scandalous thing to be, and she worked it! She was sardonic, sarcastic, funny...and stacked! Favorite quote (from Night After Night, 1933): Random woman: Goodness! What beautiful diamonds! Mae West: Goodness had nothin' to do with it, dearie.
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i personally love this silly production number from one of her lesser known movies
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She was arrested for indecency and chose to serve 10 days in prison instead of paying the fine for the publicity, and she claimed that she refused to wear the ugly prison outfits so she wore her silk lingerie the entire time. Also one of the first historybound vintage fashion icons (although vintage for her was the Victorian era)
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coochiequeens · 2 years
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A trans comedian is receiving praise from mainstream media, but backlash from women, after a musical performance on UK comedy show Friday Night Live. 
During the live program, trans-identified male comedian Jordan Gray ripped off his clothing to expose his entire naked body, and began to play his keyboard with his penis. This was during Gray’s rendition of his song “Better Than You,” which featured misogynistic lyrics intended to mock females.
“I’m a perfect woman, my tits will never shrink. I’m guaranteed to squirt, and I do anal by default … I am the lizard king, and I can do anything that any other woman can’t … I used to be a man, now I’m better than you,” Gray sang to an audience of delighted onlookers.
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The explicit performance took place during a specialFriday Night Live revival event marking Channel 4’s 40th anniversary. The revival featured former Friday Night Live cast members Ben Elton, Enfield, Brand and Julian Clary as well as a number of new comedians, including Gray.
Mainstream media coverage of Gray’s performance has been overwhelmingly positive. PinkNews, a UK-based outlet, referred to Gray’s song as “rousing” and called the performance “iconic,” and characterized any opposition to the performer’s exposure of his genitals on television as “anti-trans.” The sentiment was shared by some LGBT activists on Twitter.
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Irish Mirror chose to emphasize glowing comments which praised Gray as “amazing” and stated that “seeing a trans woman get naked on TV is exactly what we needed.”
Reporting on Gray’s exhibitionist stunt, The Daily Mail in particular prompted criticism for the use of the term “her penis” to refer to the incident.
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Even some beloved British figures took to social media to heap praise upon Gray. Harry Potter actor Jason Isaacs complimented Gray’s “magnificent boobs and equally magnificent member” and called for Gray to run for Prime Minister.
But while no mainstream British outlet has called into question any safeguarding concerns related to the program, many on social media have stated their shock and outrage at what they consider to be indecent exposure, a sexual offense, being normalized, celebrated, and highly publicized. 
Speaking with Reduxx, UK-based journalist and women’s rights campaigner Jo Bartosch criticized the media outlets who chose to reference Gray’s genitals using feminine pronouns, and highlighted the significance of factually-based language. “Whether it’s calling a man ‘Miss’ or using the oxymoronic phrase ‘her penis,’ these linguistic capitulations to men’s paraphilias are dangerous. It is a public sign of the power men like Gray enjoy. And it is terrifying, yet darkly comic, that respected journalists and broadcasters will now lie in this way, because to do otherwise is to risk breaching media guidelines which have been informed by trans lobby groups,” Bartosch said. 
“The phrase ‘her penis’ is an insult to the profession, to audiences and to the truth,” she added.
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Bartosch explained that she views pornography as an influential force in the concept of a “female penis,” noting that while it may seem bizarre to “the uninitiated,” there exists within the “male domain of pornography a logic to the idea of a ‘female penis.'” 
She then cited as examples genres such as forced feminization, and sissification, which portray men as being transformed into women through processes that involve makeup, lingerie, sexual submissiveness, and humiliation.
“Whether it’s the rebranding of sexual entertainment as ‘children’s education’ or the use of language to reflect men’s fantasies; aggressively male behaviour which festers in online pornography has seeped over into the real world,” Bartosch stated.
“The excitement men feel is because they know that the social bounds that keep their base impulses in check are straining and being broken, and that it is happening in plain sight. Pornographic values have become so mainstream when men brazenly flash their fetishes they are celebrated for their bravery. One wonders which taboos will be the next to be broken?”
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In the days following Channel 4’s broadcast, internet sleuths have brought to light how Gray boasted about being a representative for a charity that promotes gender identity ideology in schools. The charity, Educate and Celebrate, describes its 
programs as offering “the knowledge, skills and confidence to embed gender, gender identity and sexual orientation into the fabric of your organization”. 
Since news of his involvement with the charity has been spread on social media, Educate and Celebrate quietly pulled a page from their site that listed Gray as a patron. “I go into schools to talk about gender as part of a campaign called Educate and Celebrate,” Gray told GuysLikeU. 
“Toddlers kind of get it straightaway. I went into one school recently where there was a 7 year-old transgender girl. And her four year-old classmate, who was a boy, said: ‘Jessie’s a girl and she wants to be a girl. And I am a boy who wants to be a boy.'” “Young minds are very accepting,” Gray added. “It’s teenagers who are harder to get through to. It’s good to educate these kids when they are young.”
A patron of Educate and Celebrate listed alongside Gray, Peter Tatchell, has previously made statements in support of pedophilia and questioning age of consent laws. Tatchell, a former leader of the Gay Liberation Front, authored an obituary in The Independent for Ian Dunn, founder of the former pedophile activist organization the Pedophile Information Exchange (PIE).
Tatchell also published an essay in an anthology released by former vice-chairman of PIE, Warren Middleton, wherein he argued that argued that “children have sexual desires at an early age” and should be “educated” so that they can decide when they want to have sex.
“While it may be impossible to condone pedophilia, it is time society acknowledged the truth that not all sex involving children is unwanted, abusive, and harmful,” Tatchell wrote in a letter to The Guardian in 1997.
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The revelation that Jordan Gray worked alongside Peter Tatchell for a charity promoting the notion of a gender identity to young children mirrors a recent, widely-publicized scandal involving a pro-pedophilia campaigner’s ties to a children’s charity that promotes the medical “transition” of minors.
Earlier this month, Jacob Breslow, an Associate Professor at the London School of Economics, stepped down from his position as a trustee for UK-based trans activist organization Mermaids following revelations that he had ties to pro-pedophilia lobbyists.
Breslow had, on several occasions, made statements and published academic work that favorably portrayed pedophilia, and had once authored a blog that linked directly to child sexual abuse materials.
ByYuliah Amla
A man thinking he’s better than women and then thinking people want to see his penis
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LGBTQIA+ Historical Romance Novels with...Favorite Authors
If you’ve followed the blog any length of time at all, you know I make lists based on themes, the one unifying factor being LGBTQIA+ representation that happens in historical romances. I started reading historicals when I was in middle school, because my grandmother and great-aunt would trade them with one another, and back then they were usually low on heat level. I went on to collect them myself, and still have most of those in storage, but left off for various reasons over time.
By the time I came back to it all, I’d reached well into adulthood, and had gone from thinking of myself as a female with tomboy issues to realizing I was non-binary and graysexual. I didn’t feel represented by any of the main characters in those romances I’d once read so avidly, but I still wanted history with a romantic twist. So, I started exploring.
What fits me, won’t of course fit everyone, but I’d like to recommend some of my favorite LGBTQIA+ historical romance authors that I haven’t seen on similar lists in the past, and authors I’m hoping to see more from soon...Maybe it will add to readers’ TBR lists...
Alex Beecroft - I honestly have no idea why Beecroft doesn’t make more Best Of lists. The broad range of her novel settings (from ancient Crete to 18th century Transylvania to Regency ships), the amount of research, character development, and evocative language, makes her one of my favorites. I don’t think there is anything she couldn’t write about, and do it well. For those interested, she also writes contemporaries, and fantasy. My favorites are The Reluctant Berserker (role reversals from the typical warrior and bard combo), and Labyrinth (non-binary MC and a twist on an old myth).
Erastes - One of the first LGBT historical romance authors I found, this author got started by writing Harry Potter slash fiction. Favorite by this author is Muffled Drum, because it’s a lovers-to-friends-to-lovers plotline.
Ainsley Gray - This author normally publishes under other names, but their recently released Unchained came to my attention, and kept it. If you like your Victorian romances with a darker twist, this one is for you. Hoping to see more from Gray, soon.
Eliot Greyson - I know next to nothing about this author, but their Like a Gentleman (Love in Portstmouth #1) put them on my One-to Watch radar. It’s actually a novella, but packs a lot into those few pages, and makes for an adorable read.
Jude Lucens - Lucens is new on the LGBT historical romance scene, but has already managed to give the genre representation in the forms of gay, bisexual, demisexual, and polyamorous MCs. She’s also a WOC author, and has included a biracial MC in her novella/novel pairing of Gutter Roses & Behind Closed Doors: Indecent Proposals Book One.
Katherine Marlowe - I don’t know what happened to Marlowe, but after several lovely novels, she disappeared. Still, her novels are ideal for those that like low dose homophobia in their historical romances, enjoy novels with working class MCs, and she has at least two novels with POC MCs. Favorites: A Wager of Love & The Blue Ribbon.
Farah Mendlesohn - Normally an author of fantasy and science fiction (they’ve won the coveted Hugo Award), this versatile author transported us to the Regency era with some wonderful historical detail, in the delightful and affordable f/f Spring Flowering. They are also the Managing Editor for Manifold Press, which will be returning this January, with a focus on LGBT historical romances.
KA Merikan - The pen name of a duo, their highwayman novel The Black Sheep and the Rotten Apple is one of my favorite bad boy/cinnamon roll novels ever. This pair typically writes contemporary series with motorcycle gangs, but even then they manage to bring historical ghosts and details, with their series Kings of Hell MC. The Art of Mutual Pleasure is another historical, which will amuse and educate, because it deals with the historically accurate notion of illness being brought on by the loss of male essence, and aggravated by self pollution.
Ruby Moone - If Moone writes it, I read it. Moone’s gents tend to reside in the Regency era, and have been adapting in terms of historical elements and diversity. They were some of the first non-titled MCs I read, and some have disabilities and/or cope with mental illnesses. The plots have increased in tension over time, but a mainstay of Moone’s novels is that despite laws against men being together, her MCs are often supported by those around them. There are also sometimes multiple Favorites: The Wrong Kind of Angel, The Mistletoe Kiss, & Thief of Hearts
Niamh Murphy - Looking for lesbian historicals? Murphy has you covered, with loving details, and also high adventure. Her Escape to Pirate Island is a staple of the LGBT pirate genre, and you can read a free sample on her site.
Victoria Sue - Typically Sue is known for contemporary novels and babies. That said, her Regency novels The Innocent Auction and The Innocent Betrayal are two you should try. They’ve a fair dose of angst, but they also come with some good espionage and character development.
Hayden Thorne - If YA and gothic are something you’re into, Thorne’s novels are a staple. An extremely prolific writer, she has created some of the most unique plot lines of any genre, while managing to have intriguing MCs, and representation. Favorites: Ansel of Pryor House
Leandra Vane - Normally a contemporary author and librian, Vane recently published the great historical Cast From the Earth, which takes place in America’s heartland in the 19th century. Vane is another author that uses her novels to explore with MCs that have disabilities, and this novel also delves into polyamorous love.
NR Walker - Walker is actually known for her contemporary m/m romances, and is one of the rare temp authors that I read a lot, because she includes so much research and detail. Recently, she made the leap into historicals though, with the fantastic Nova Praetorian, which takes place in ancient Rome.
Kelley York - In the past, some of you may have read York’s contemporary YA work, but she’s begun publishing about her beloved Victorian era gothic tastes, too. The Dark is the Night series is co-written with her wife, and I’ve been relishing the two novels that have come out so far. It even comes with its own artwork, and playlist.
Of course, there are the mainstays of the genre, authors that have gone above and beyond on bringing LGBTQIA+ representation to the historical romance reader: Keira Andrews, Joanna Chambers, KJ Charles, Charlie Cochrane, Bonnie Dee, Summer Devon, Jordan L Hawk, Ava March, EE Ottoman, and Cat Sebastian.
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quinnmorgendorffer · 5 years
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I’m thankful for TV!
I don’t care about Thanksgiving, but I love TV! So here is a quick list of some fave Thanksgiving episodes of television to check out, by alphabetical order of the show. I’ve also written down which streaming service you can find it on in the US!
Bob’s Burgers
Every season since season 3 has had a Thanksgiving episode, and they are some of the best ones out there. My top picks are “An Indecent Thanksgiving Proposal”, which was their first Thanksgiving episode, and “Dawn of the Peck”. Both have classic Bob break downs, fun plots for the kids, and lots of great work! (Hulu)
Brooklyn Nine-Nine
Another show with plenty to choose from, but I have to say that my favorite is “Thanksgiving” from the very first season. Super cute and heart warming. (Hulu)
Cheers
"Thanksgiving Orphans” from season five is considered one of the best episodes of television, period. From the improvised food fight to the closet we get to seeing Vera, it definitely deserves to be ranked as a classic episode of one of the most beloved sitcoms. (Netflix and Hulu)
Crazy Ex-Girlfriend
Want something completely different? Check out “My First Thanksgiving With Josh!” in season one. Who doesn’t love musical parodies of Nicki Minaj and Billy Joel? (Netflix)
Frasier
Season four’s “A Lilith Thanksgiving” is one of Lilith’s guest appearances so it’s automatically one of the series’ best. (Netflix and Hulu)
Friends
Say what you want about the show, but only Bob’s Burgers can compete with it in terms of great Thanksgiving episodes. I personally enjoy all of them, but my top picks are “The One With All the Thanksgivings” (s5) or “The One Where Ross Got High” (s6), which includes one of the best 30 second sequences in television history. (Netflix)
How I Met Your Mother
Not only does s3′s “Slapsgiving” give us a great original song from the show’s prime, it also introduced one of the best running jokes - Ted and Robin’s inside joke of saluting at things like “General Idea”, “Major Buzzkill”, etc. (Hulu)
King of the Hill
"Spin the Choice” from s5 is an absolute RIOT. Lots of cute moments with John Redcorn and a development of his relationship with his son, Joseph. Also, Bobby takes things too far and let’s not forget Peggy’s amazing game that makes the title of the episode. Runner up would be “Happy Hanks Giving” from s4, which is quite a treat if you’ve ever experienced being stuck in an airport. (Hulu - FINALLY!!!)
New Girl
"Parents” from season 2 features both Rob Reiner and Jamie Lee Curtis as Jess’ parents whom she is trying to “parent trap”. Super fun, super cute. (Netflix)
Supergirl
"Livewire” is from season one, which is the only season I acknowledge of this show. It introduced one of the coolest villains the show had and is super fun! (Netflix)
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codylabs · 6 years
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Chapter 15: Tale of Two Bots
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-date: 13/20/2094-46’\
Hello.
My name is Ɖg@}Nᶌ.
As one of the survivors of the crash of colonial vessel 46.18’\, I am starting this journal to document our experiences on this planet. In the event that we are rescued, or survive long enough to reestablish contact, this log will serve as a record on our experiences. If you recover this and we’re not here to give it to you… Then I guess we’ve failed.
And this is our story.
Well.
As I said, the colonial vessel has crashed. Near as I can tell, we were traveling near-horizontally at an altitude of several kilometers, when some type of interference or malfunction disabled the vehicles artificial-gravity engines. We hit the ground before control could be regained. The impact was directly into solid rock, at a velocity in excess of 400 meters per second. The ship carved a large chunk out of a mountainside, and half-buried itself in its own artificial valley. The impact was sufficient to free the majority of the nuclear fuel from containment, disable the primary propulsion system, and kill the entire pilot and command crew. To the best of my knowledge, I, and 52 other passengers, are the last survivors of the collision.
We have escaped the confines of the ship, and have used salvaged tarps and materials to erect a small camp on the hill above it.
More of us are injured than not. Many terminally so. Since the vessel’s power supply has largely gone into meltdown, all remaining power has been automatically diverted toward containing the damage. Periphery systems, including the auto-medics, have gone offline. I’m no surgeon, but the others are even less so.
They expect me to repair the wounded.
I’ll see what I can do.
-date: 13/21/2094-46’\
My medical tools were designed for my species specifically. They are poorly suited for the others, who are primarily carbon-based. Their bodies are squishy, ever-shifting, mostly liquid. I don’t know how to handle it. Many of the terminally injured have died following my surgery. I was able to fix a few, but… But the others are angry with me. They think I could have done more for the dying. Survivor count now 41. The names of the living are included here for posterity:
Ɖg@}Nᶌ
Klk76y
Zlfo]n
ƉN::ᶌ
&4r(/_^`;~y
iA**5{y
-@N^^>
C0gsJRY
V;M9OZ
4EtR%ibP
WA~/\hi(B
~u81FF:’
S~5VH/’QepKl
3v49EVv
iZxFpLo
wX~~E2VY
IeR&Usp
xE][fo
I6gyvPh
7ncZ9Itx
bC*$l9DSEmm
J86O/\oBZg
v89Z;vHFiv
4g0ORH
Xp;DWstNBYi
0aF2I(zLxyn7k
SGff\mBOfic8
0Xzn
TSpqQfjFn
famESw
W8{A1EdwQ
j0wX
KlcfG;B0lw0
4hArMXj4
qKhcn0U
SXz4;
PxNeLwi
w4A;mVIV5
tVkqZme
oy.}szN;XJCc
og;hgnC5j8Ca…
I don’t really want to talk about it anymore.
-date: 13/22/2094-46’\
Only one other survivor belongs to my same species. We were bound for the same colony, her and I, but now everybody we knew is gone. I’m glad I have somebody to speak to though, especially after the failed surgeries. Her name is ƉN::ᶌ, and she is kind to me. Seeing as how it looks like we’re here for the long haul, I wonder if perhaps we could begin the colony here, with only us two.
No, I can’t think that. It’s indecent.
She’s looking at me.
I am pretending to type something in.
-date: 13/28/2094-46’\
Klk76y has gotten one of the computers online, and has retrieved data from the crash. Apparently, we are on body 3.0 of this system, on one of the northern continents. It’s hellish here. There’s air, it’s hot, the gravity is high, the surface is soaked in unhealthy chemicals like water, and infested by native (and occasionally hostile) carbon-based life. Even its moon, 3.1, would have been better than this. We can survive, but it isn’t well-suited. Natural terraforming processes won’t work.
I just wish we would have crashed on 4.0. It would have been nearly perfect for our needs.
The only metal ƉN::ᶌ and I have to eat is that from the ship’s hull. Livestock and crops could easily survive on this diet, but they would rip the whole craft apart in the process. Since we’d rather leave it salvageable (by the slim hope that we could repair it someday), we’ll keep the farming systems in stasis for now.
I hope our colonial supplies are still intact. They should be tougher than the other cargo, but I don’t know.
Titanium-steel alloy plating is sure getting bland though. Hard to chew. Hard in general.
I want some fruit.
-date: 13/22/2094-46’\
Everything has calmed down now, as much as it can. The fires from the crash have died out. We’ve buried as many of the dead as we can find. The other survivors are settling into the camp, and they’ve gathered some meager supplies, enough to last the winter. ƉN::ᶌ and I can survive directly off the ship’s power, so we should be fine indefinitely. Klk76y has also taken charge as a sort of leader, and everybody seems as content as they can be.
I suppose that now is a good a time as any to give my own personal story.
It all started long ago, and far away.
It was cold and hard and small, one of many solitary, airless moon of a bloated gas giant, bathed in the light of an old, red star. To look at it, you might mistake it for a larger asteroid, or one of the many unnotable, dusty rocks that inhabit the empty voids of space.
But this rock wasn’t any rock. This was a living place, filled with rugged natural beauty. Spreading seas of liquid sand, mountains of the dust of ancient timbers, and the great, towering forests of mighty trees. Fields abounding in fruits and grains, the woods crawling with wild animals, the void alive with the radio singing of the bugs and the birds, the sun shining brightly on the leaves. And a humble people toiling with bliss beneath the stars, picking and eating their food, building their houses and roads, constructing and raising their children. It was a place where families could be happy. A place of peace.
This was my beloved home.
But I never once enjoyed it.
Why didn’t I? It was a paradise. I could have grown old and happy there. I could have been rich and prosperous. I could have had everything that people strive for… Everything but meaning.
Mind you, I wasn’t alone. There were many of my peers who considered it an utterly boring, menial existence, where our young minds had nowhere to explore, where knowledge and learning was scarce, and where our toil and daily labor did not satisfy our hunger for adventure. We were children then, restlessly longing for something more. I wish now I hadn’t been among them… But I was.
Two cycles ago, when I had just finished being a boy, but didn’t yet know what ‘man’ was, another race came to our world. They arrived in an enormous ship from some other dimension, on a mission (so they said) to explore and archive the wonders of the universe, to seek out new and deviant life, to see, hear, touch and explore that which nobody had ever experienced before, and to set up colonies among the far reaches of space. They visited us for this same reason, collecting samples from our planet, examining and studying us. (The reason for their fascination, I found out later, was our metallic bodies and mechanical makeup. Apparently, it’s something of a novelty to these squishy carbon-based people.)
Regardless, I’m sure you can understand my thoughts when they revealed this mission of theirs. How glamorous! How grand! How adventurous! How meaningful! I dreamed to accompany them, to whatever fate lay beyond the horizons of my own mind. Once, I even had the chance to speak directly withCaptain &:V->GN[], commander of the alien vessel.
“I wish I could accompany you!” I had told him. “I wish I could count myself among the colonists on your ship.”
“It’s certainly a hard life.” He had tempted me, with a twinkle in his eye. “Long years aboard a closed metal ship, and at the end of your journey, an unknown fate… It could be dangerous, it could be strange, it could require things from you that you don’t know you had. Even WE don’t know what we’ll find in that great unknown…”
He was telling me precisely the type of tale I wanted to hear, and naturally I fell for it. “I would be willing!” I told him. “And I have friends as well! We would all love to leave our world, and travel with you to the ends of the universe! We would follow you!”
He stroked his chin, and nodded. “We have set down several colonies already…” He said, as if it were my idea the entire time. “Perhaps there would be room among the organic cargo sectors for your… Particular breed of crops and livestock…”
“I hope so!” I said, and I meant it.
The next day, he announced to our people that they would be taking on passengers and cargo, whatever passengers could fit in sector 22, and whatever farming supplies we could fit in stasis in sector 43. They would allow our people to found a colony on a world of our choosing, or even, if we wished, they would allow us to return with them to their home dimension.
It goes without saying that I, along with many of my friends, signed up eagerly.
My father silently watched me as I entered the shuttle, and he had a sorrowful look on his face which I will never remember, because I never once looked back.
And so did I venture forth, to seek my fortune among the stars.
It was a lie.
No sooner had we left the system, but the crew confined us to quarters, and began to treat us harshly. They told us they were cracking down on troublemakers, and that this was just a necessary caution. But among themselves, they were communicating using their suits’ radios. My people could hear such signals plainly, and I learned to understand them.
I learned that our people were not to be set down on a colony of our choosing. Rather, we were all to be brought back to the aliens’ dimension, to be treated as scientific samples, or even used for their own purposes.
They began to experiment on us.
It was a nightmare.
I would hear the communications as they would take our people, one at a time, from the passenger areas. Always young females. Whenever the rest of us moved to intervene, the crew would summon security drones to threaten us, then say it was for our own protection.
One day we heard their purpose… Well, I feel dirty even describing it.
The females of our species naturally have reproductive systems in their abdomen areas. Normally, these organs serve only to manufacture and assemble the bodies of children. The organs are perfectly designed for the task, and they are able to do so reliably and repeatedly. Since the living bodies of children are inherently complex, the organs must be highly versatile.
The aliens saw this.
So the science team, under the direction of Captain &:V->GN[], were downloading foreign code into the women’s organs, to try and make them manufacture artificial systems: Tools. Weapons. Drones. Storage crates. Spare parts. They were trying to turn our people into living factories. This was just a proof of concept, before they returned to their home dimension and refined the idea into an industrial process.
The experiments were invasive and painful, and the women were not willing.
I began to discuss these matters in hushed tones with the other colonists, of both my own species and others. We all agreed that something needed to be done.
So one night, all at once, we staged a mutiny. We sawed through the doors of our rooms, gathered improvised tools and weapons, rendezvoused with the organic passengers, and aimed ourselves for the bridge.
It didn’t work.
They put us under guard from that point on, reinforced the doors, equipped us with stun collars, and pumped all the air out of our rooms to keep us from audio communication with the other passengers. They also encrypted their radio signals, so we could no longer listen in to them.
A cycle passed quietly and despairingly. An older friend of mine likened it to prison.
But then, days ago, it happened.
For reasons none of us know, Colonial Vessel 46.18’\ crashed.
Now here we are. The greatest adventure of my life, more excitement and strange new weirdness than I ever could have hoped or dreamed: aliens, lies, betrayal, mutiny, heroism, bravery, fierce enemies on all sides and a grave mission to follow… This is the adventure of a lifetime.
And I would trade it all away in an instant. What I wouldn’t give to be back home. My quiet, peaceful, meaningless home…
For there is no meaning to be found out here either. We’ve crossed galaxies by now, gone where none have gone, and we are no closer to something higher than when we started out. There is no height to be climbed to reach enlightenment. There is no lesson or sense or justice to bring to our predicament. Life is cruel and short, and our lives are either empty or painful. Some, like mine, are both.
So that is how I, Ɖg@}Nᶌ, got to where I am now.
ƉN::ᶌ says I’m being pessimistic. She says there is a meaning, and that God has a purpose and plan for our lives, even through our pain and misfortune, even though we do not see it.
I hope she’s right.
I prayed for the first time today.
-date: 13/30/2094-46’\
Why are we on this planet at all? Why did the command crew stop here? Did they have to land to make repairs? Did we have to restock supplies? Was there another mutiny we didn’t hear about?
I, for one, suspected the command crew was goaded into it by the science team. They noticed something interesting on the flyby, and convinced the higher-ups of the need to stop and release probes.
It wouldn’t be the first time it’s happened. We’ve had several unscheduled stops over the course of this trip. Always the science team wanting to collect samples or specimens, or examine some readings. Always something new and interesting to look at.
But why here? What makes this valley so special? What drew their curiosity? And what about this valley caused our crash? We may never know; all the sensors are down, many of the computer logs were damaged, and many of the remaining mission files are simply classified to us passengers.
I suppose I’m just complaining. I shouldn’t complain. What’s done is done, and now all we can do is pick up the pieces and make the most of what we have left.
Perhaps it’s just God’s will.
-date: 15/2/2094-46’\
We sent 5 men deeper into the wreck to see what they could salvage. It’s been 6 days now, and they haven’t come back out. I wonder what has happened. The automated security system is coded for all the colonists’ identities, so even if it reactivated somehow, none of them should have anything to fear… I wonder if perhaps some of the more dangerous scientific specimens have been released from containment.
The rest of the survivors are wanting me and ƉN::ᶌ to venture in after them, since our metal bodies make us tougher than the others.
She is afraid, so I will go in alone. I will be their hero. I will be her hero.
-date: 15/3/2094-46’\
I’m back. I found nothing. No signs of a struggle, no weapon damage.
But no bodies either.
Perhaps they got lost down there. I can see why they would; the crash mutilated the vessel into a veritable labyrinth of twisted metal. We can only wait, and hope that that they survive, and hope still that they can find their way back out.
While I was down there, I did stumble across the scientific sample area. It was torn wide open. Everything in the stasis chambers are dead.
But a few of the chambers are open.
And all the chambers that are open are empty.
Specimens must have escaped. Could one have killed and eaten the men we sent inside? I don’t know what manner of subjects they’d stored in the now-empty chambers, but judging by the looks of some of the others… Let’s just say I’m glad most of them are dead. Out of all the nasty things they’ve collected on their journey, I think that living robots are the most harmless of the bunch.
I’m back on the surface now, and gave my report to the other survivors. It frightened them. They don’t want to explore the wreck any deeper than necessary. I understand that.
ƉN::ᶌ is beating herself up for letting me go alone. She swears that whatever happens next, she will be there for me. I’m glad for the promise.
As it stands, Survivor count now 36.
-date: 15/16/2094-46’\
Survivor count now 28.
We don’t know what’s happening. People go missing. Randomly. Unforeseeably. Without trace. As if they decided to just walk away in those moments when nobody’s watching.
After the last incident, Zlfo]n instructed us to watch closely for anyone behaving strangely. He encouraged us to keep up conversation frequently. I don’t know what he suspects, (does he think we’re going mad one by one? Does he know something we don’t?) but I hope he’s on to something.
I modified a few power tools into melee weapons, so that ƉN::ᶌ and I can defend ourselves if the need arises. When I offered her a cutting drill, she said she would prefer to use her teeth, since they’re sharper and easier to carry around anyway.
It’s nice to have somebody to laugh with, even in times like this.
But seriously though, she’s literally going to use her teeth. This girl is crazy!
I kind of… Never mind.
-date: 15/18/2094-46’\
Somebody struck up conversation today with Klk76y. He mumbled his way through a brief exchange, but in the process, he gave something away: he didn’t possess even the most basic knowledge of Klk76y’s life or job. It quickly became apparent that he wasn’t Klk76y at all, but rather something else, looking exactly like him, bluffing his way through a conversation. Zlfo]n, ƉN::ᶌ, and myself attempted to confront him, but he attacked with an incredible physical strength, and escaped into the forest. Zlfo]n suffered several broken bones during the fight, and will not last long. Meanwhile Klk76y, the only leader we had, is gone like the others.
Also, at some point, ƉN::ᶌ managed to clip the enemy with her teeth. This drew green blood, whereas the real Klk76y would have had yellow-white blood.
Something is out there.
Something that’s changing.
It takes us one by one, probably eats us, and impersonates us to learn more before eating again.
Survivor count now 27. Soon to be 26, as there’s not much I can do for Zlfo]n.
-date: 15/19/2094-46’\
Zlfo]n pulled me close today, and told me about the shapeshifter. He described everything he knew of its abilities, its methods, its mannerisms, and its intelligence. He told me where the science team found it, what it eats, where it lives, what it wants.
(Future reader, I have transcribed his analysis, and saved it as a separate file. This is my journal, after all, and not a tactics guide. Suffice to say that this shifter is quite a character herself, and I don’t like it one bit being on the receiving end of her cunning.)
I asked Zlfo]n how he knew so much about the creature. He sighed and he told me:
Zlfo]n was on the science team.
So I took him outside the camp, and I left him to die. By now he will have perished from his injuries in the silent forest, without burial, without dignity, alone except for the memories of the women he violated. Alone, save for his conscience. I hope he has one, so that he suffered. And I hope the shifter finds him, and that she realizes we are not her enemies.
…Did I do wrong, to let Zlfo]n die like that?
I don’t think I did.
Did he deserve better?
I don’t think he did.
Did ƉN::ᶌ approve?
I think she did.
I never asked her if she’d been a part of the onboard experiments. I pray she didn’t have to suffer it, because I don’t know what I could do for her damage. I’m not that type of doctor. Heck, I’m not any type of doctor! What am I supposed to do for a damaged factory, huh? Look at it? I’m a male. Even that’s not proper.
All I can do for her is to be her friend, and love and respect and care for her regardless of anything else. And I really do love her… I’ve been realizing that more and more.
-date: 15/27/2094-46’\
Survivor count now 23.
The other survivors can’t stand it anymore. They need to get away from the wreck. Whatever the shifter wants, it is hostile. And it is near. And since we haven’t the vaguest inkling of how to face it, we need to flee.
They others all agreed to pick up and head North, as far from the crash site as possible. They are carbon-based, and can therefore subsist on native food. They collected all the weapons and tools they could find, and started off. They should be safe from the enemy… Or at least see it coming… I think they’ll be alright. I hope they’ll be alright.
Either way, ƉN::ᶌ and I need to make other plans. We are not carbon based, and therefore need to grow our own crops if we are to survive. We’ll need a farm. We picked out a pretty good spot for it to the South-East, but this planet doesn’t have a lot of dense deposits near the surface, so our crops won’t grow.
We’ll need to improvise some type of soil.
The hull of the spacecraft, combined with the minerals in the native rock, should supply our farm with all the biological sustenance it needs. It would make excellent soil. But we don’t want to stay in the craft’s immediate vicinity, so we need to somehow cut loose a massive section of the hull and bring it all of 20 kilometers to the farm.
How do we do that?
It was her idea to jury-rig the ship’s last remaining artificial-gravity nacelle. Normally, these nacelles create a gravitational dipole large enough to put the entire ship into free-fall in any direction. One nacelle may not be able to do something so grand on its own, but it still possesses a large amount of power. ƉN::ᶌ thinks it should be a simple matter to shrink this dipole and concentrate it, if only we could get to the engine room. This would allow us to ‘jackhammer’ a section of the hull loose. A slightly larger dipole will then be able to carry the disconnected section 20 kilometers through the air, and set it down at the farm. I just hope the craft has enough power left to run this stunt.
To operate the nacelle, we need to get down to the engine room and do it manually. This means risking whatever tricks and tactics the mimic has in store, but we would prefer to risk it immediately, rather than stay above ground and wait for her… Rather take her on our terms: immediately and directly.
We’re going inside tomorrow.
If we never come back out… Let it be known that ƉN::ᶌ and Ɖg@}Nᶌ were here.
-date: 15/30/2094-46’\
It has been 3 days since my last entry, but we are now back. We successfully completed the mission.
But first, a word on what we found down there.
Let’s just say that at this point, the ship would need half again its weight in glue. Its main propulsion system, (everything except the one intact nacelle), is completely offline. 7 of the 8 main reactors have also gone into meltdown, and the computer automatically locked down the last one for safety. The vessel’s long-range communication systems and tracking beacon were in its lower areas, and were therefore destroyed when it contacted the ground. There is no chance of signaling home, or anywhere.
However, there were a few intact things. The perpetual-motive emergency power generators were left online somehow, and should stay remain so indefinitely, barring mechanical breakdown. These were the only thing running the ship until we got down there.
Also, we found we weren’t the only survivors. There were more, some even among the command crew, who had survived the crash but stayed underground. They were barricaded in the ship’s mid levels, and just stayed down there.
But they aren’t alive anymore.
Apparently, the mimic got to them too. Some of their survivors had taken to drawing graffiti on the walls since the computers were down. Most of it was just innocent nonsense, but then there was some stuff like “GweeV7w isn’t what he seems!” and “That’s not the real u*/~h!” and “Specimen has escaped is changing forms.”
And everybody was dead.
Eaten.
The mimic is smart. Smart enough to kill them all without putting itself in danger. Smart enough to use fear like a weapon, and fill her enemies with it. Smart enough to stay in shadows.
Smart enough to learn to hack computers.
The mimic has reactivated the security system, and made several changes to their programming. Firstly, she wiped the drones’ entries for recognized individuals, so that they now recognize everyone, every last man, woman, child and animal, as unidentified intruders. Secondly, she reprogrammed their tactical assessment system, so that they now evaluate threats based on chemical signs of aggression and fear. If any carbon-based lifeform shows fear in a drone’s vicinity, it is programmed to contain or destroy them.
Since the shifter was terrorizing everyone else while remaining calm herself, it worked perfectly: the drones would leave her alone and go straight for any of the other cowering survivors.
As for us metallic life forms, well… The mimic is smart, as I said. She knew we didn’t have a sense of smell, so she rigged a booby trap that sprayed us with hormones. We didn’t even notice, until every drone in the ship started to attack.
That was a dicey couple hours. Those drones are learning and self-adapting, and can sprout pretty much any weapon in the database. We managed to beat them, barely, by modifying one of the perpetual-motive generators into an electromagnetic pulse emitter. We almost killed ourselves with it too, but it took out most of the drones. Enough so we could slip away.
I don’t know that I’ve ever been more scared in my life than when I was down there… But… I think I might have been having fun too. Crazy how that works. It probably just depends who you have by your side in the thick of things, doesn’t it? And while we were fighting down in those dark depths, I had ƉN::ᶌ. And that made it all right.
Anyway, we made it to the engine room, and ƉN::ᶌ managed to bypass a security lock and reactivate reactor 5. From there, she was able to reprogram the art-grav nacelle, and use the immense gravity field to rip apart the hull.
We tore off half of the ship’s upper hull, along with the entirety of sector 43 (sector 43 being the cargo area where all the samples, livestock and crops from our planet were stored.) The gravity field gathered all this wreckage together, forming an enormous ‘fistfull’ of twisted metal and cargo. ƉN::ᶌ then used the gravity beam to guide this mass through the air to the farmland we designated, and spread it out there. The entire process must have been rather eerie to watch, I imagine.
There was only one problem now: if we could make use of those gravity fields, chances are the mimic could too. If she set the field to a high strength and low size, she could use it to physically crush our entire farm, with us inside.
With that kind of power, the mimic could kill anybody she wanted. And anywhere.
So, we removed the power control coupling from the last reactor, and destroyed all the spares. The coupling is small. Small enough to take with us, and keep hidden forever. So that’s what we’ll do.
We made back above ground without much trouble.
Now, everything seems in order. The livestock and seeds will be waiting for us in sector 43’s wreckage, ready to be unpacked, unfrozen, and organized into a farm. A colony. First thing tomorrow morning, we’re off to begin our new life.
-date: 3/14/2096-46’\
Two local years since my last entry.
Farm is going great. Got some trees planted, and some crops. The ecosystem is starting up, and the drilling worms have started breaking down the spacecraft hull. The cats are working as guards, which should be enough to scare away the mimic if she finds us here. I tampered with the cats’ genetics as well, to make them instinctively react defensively toward any unrecognized large organic. Meaning whatever form the mimic takes, the cats will turn on it. I’m just glad this planet doesn’t have intelligent inhabitants; that could make for a rather messy misunderstanding.
I also found an old runabout shuttle stashed in the wreckage. We turned it right-side-up, half-buried it in the ground, and are now using it as a house. Its glass hull should keep it from decay, and its engines still have enough power to run heat, lighting, and farm equipment.
The place is finally starting to feel like home. The trees are supplying power now, so we don’t have to ration anymore. And they’re beginning to bear the first fruit. We haven’t had actual food in so long, and it’s delicious.
And… Well, there’s one other thing. I don’t really know who else to tell, so I guess I’ll tell this journal.
Anyway…
I finally asked ƉN::ᶌ if she would be my wife. And she said yes. I’m not really sure what I expected her to say, since we’re the only two here… But it was the WAY she said it; it made me believe that she would have chosen me out of a crowd. Like I would have been her first choice out of all the men on all the worlds. She said yes… And I’m a married man now! I’m really happy. I really love her. I’m really glad to be alive.
That probably sounded super corny, huh?
-date: 8/9/2098-46’\
Three local years since my last entry.
We lost contact with the other survivors. I don’t know what happened to them. Maybe it was local wildlife or sickness, maybe it was the mimic again, maybe something else. Anyway, let it be known that this farm contains, to my knowledge, the last 3 survivors of the crash.
3 survivors?
That’s what I said.
Because ƉN::ᶌ is pregnant.
I’m gonna be a dad.
Speaking of dad…
If this recording somehow gets to you, mom and dad… If the fabeled Time Giants ever find this log in the far future, and decide to do a favor for my present, and bring it back to you… If you’re reading this now in the comfort of your own home after I’ve left…
I want you to know that I’ve finally found that life I always dreamed of. There’s a little bit of adventure here and there, sure. (This planet seems to harbor some very improbable life. We’re always finding ourselves in some weird situation or another.) But most of all, I’ve found home. I’ve found love. I’ve found peace. And I think… With the help of God, I’ve found a bit of meaning. Here, in a filthy, watery world at the end of the universe. Here, in the valley carved by the crash of colonial vessel 46.18’/. Here, where nobody else has ever been, is where I’ve decided to stay. And here, I am happy. I wouldn’t trade it for the world.
-date: 16/13/2098-46’\
There was a fault in ƉN::ᶌ’s manufacturing system. The child was damaged during final assembly, and… I’m not sure what happened. There was a problem with the release, and something snapped. There were sparks, and leaking oil.
And she died.
Her and the baby.
I made glass coffins so they wouldn’t decay. And I buried them behind the house.
I guess that’s it then, huh?
So much for our life. So much for our colony, and our future, and our children, and our love… So much for all that. Whoever’s reading this, I’d dreamed that one day we would have healthy, happy descendants who’d be able to hand this to you. And they’d say ‘Take this. This is their legacy…’
But what good are dreams?
Dreams are for young men… And today I feel old.
Anyway… If you’re reading this journal, then… Then I guess I’m long dead. The barn and the tractor and the windmill will have been eaten all away by now… Only the glass shuttle-house thing will remain; that and the coffins… Give it long enough, and the farm will probably grow all over the place… The drilling worms and trees will have digested the last of the hull wreckage we drug out here… That will make for the only soil on all of 3.0 that can support metal life, so the little forest will have reached a maximum size and stopped growing. Due to the atmosphere, the crops can’t spread seeds far enough to fertilize on the main wreck, and even the cats don’t explore very far. So. By now all the livestock will be all feral, all the trees will be huge… It will all be totally natural. Just like God intended.
It’ll be a little tiny drop of home, right in the middle of all this carbon slime. A tiny drop of home…
And that’ll be our legacy.
I’m locking the house up now, and I’m leaving.
I’m going back to the crash site. I go to find our last and greatest enemy, the mimic, and kill her. I go to ensure the safety of anybody who may come to this planet after us. I go in the name of peace. One final battle. One final adventure.
This is Ɖg@}Nᶌ, last survivor of the crash of Colonial Vessel 46.18’\, furthest explorer of a gentle people, last civilized lifeform on this planet, farmer and doctor and husband and father, signing out for the final time. Whoever finds this… I hope God’s plan for you is gentle. Gentler than it was for me.
May the Lord bless you and keep you.
Have a nice life.
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eyeofapocrypha · 6 years
Text
Chapter One: Of His Laudable Youth
Wherein is related, O Happy Audience, the tale of His Majesty's thrice-blessed life, including an account of His Majesty's rise to the Throne of Sentinel, which tale is exemplary, and mention of some of His Majesty's excellences and virtues, which are numberless.
Know, O Beloved Reader, that the lineage of our Auspicious King is both noble and royal, descending patrilinearly from Makala, from Ja-Fr, yea, even from High King Ar-Azal himself. Likewise matrilinearly his forebears are Grandees of Antiphyllos, including the meritorious Zizzeen of most august memory. Indeed, of the Grandee Zizzeen it was said by the Poet Behrouz that he was of such rectitude that, when he in error entered the Ladies' Bath-House, he forthwith put out both his eyes, lest he commit an indecency.
(As to High King Ar-Azal, the Curious Delver has but to seek out the tome "The Worthy Ar-Azal, His Deeds.")
Now when the All-Beneficent King Fahara'jad was but a Prince in Antiphyllos, on a day of days he did hunt birds in the Garden of the Grandees with his Ivory Bow, and by happenstance he saw a great Crow alight in a fig tree. And Prince Fahara'jad vowed, "By Onsi's bright blade, I shall slay me this Crow!" And he did nock an Ivory Arrow to the Ivory Bow and let fly, and lo, the Crow was taken in the eye and did die of the instant.
Then dropped from the sky a hideous Hagraven, with a cursing of curses, and the she-daemon menaced the Young Prince with unclean talons, crying, "You have slain the child of my bosom, and must die the death therefore! In sooth, I shall pluck out your eyes and partake of them like grapes!" And screaming a great scream, she clawed at the Prince's orbs of vision.
Then did a beam of golden light shine down from the heavens, and striding upon it as if upon a bright blade came down the Ever-Glorious Onsi, crying, "Hold, Creature of Evil." And he smote off the Hagraven's claws, which fell upon the ground like hail, and the she-daemon fell likewise and commenced to grovel unto the god and beg for mercy. And Onsi spake, saying, "Pleas shall avail you not, shrill virago, for you have threatened the Fateful Prince, whom it is my special care to foster and protect. For this noble stripling is the Fahara'jad whom prophesy foretells shall lead our people in the Years of Peril, and so you must needs die." And he struck off her head.
And the Prince, sore amazed, did cover both his eyes, and when he dared to look again, both god and she-daemon were gone. Thus the Prince did misdoubt his own eyes, and hurried to the Holy Temple where he related all that had occurred to the Priest of Onsi. And the Priest deemed his seeing a True Seeing. And this was the first of the Prophesies of Monarchy.
- The All-Beneficent King Fahara’jad
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quranreadalong · 6 years
Text
#128, Surah 24
THE QURAN READ-ALONG: DAY 128
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We’re in for a real treat this week fam. An-Nur (The Light) is from Medina, around 627-628 AD--a few months before or after the failed siege of the city. It has less than 70 ayat, but what it lacks in numbers it makes up for in Quality Content. We have a lot to talk about here. Mohammed’s family drama included!
In fact, we get started on that topic right away. To start us off, Mohammed offers the following:
The adulterer and the adulteress, scourge ye each one of them (with) a hundred stripes. And let not pity for the twain withhold you from obedience to Allah, if ye believe in Allah and the Last Day.
Oof! Bad! For a detailed discussion of the many accepted forms of punishment for zina, or sexual indecency, and how they came to be--including house arrest, financial punishment, death, and the corporal punishment indicated above--pls check here for fun stoning times. We have juicier topics to cover today.
No one should marry men or women found guilty of zina except fellow adulterers or idolators.
(For the record, I’m using “adultery” because it’s the nearest English equivalent, but Mohammed used zina to describe all sorts of things, not just PIV intercourse. While zina was a terrible crime that was sometimes punished by death, Mohammed said that as long as you’re a Muslim and not a polytheist, Allah will still let you into heaven even if you're guilty of it, so!)
Now then. Why are we talking about adultery today, exactly? Well, that brings us to an episode of The Prophet Mohammed Presents: All My Wives.
Let me quote from this long hadith narrated by Aisha, who at this time was around 14 years old.
Whenever Allah's Messenger (ﷺ) intended to go on a journey, he used to draw lots among his wives and would take with him the one on whom the lot had fallen. Once he drew lots when he wanted to carry out a Ghazwa [military expedition], and the lot came upon me. ... We carried on our journey, and when Allah's Apostle had finished his Ghazwa and returned and we approached Medina, Allah's Messenger (ﷺ) ordered to proceed at night. When the army was ordered to resume the homeward journey, I got up and walked on till I left the army (camp) behind. When I had answered the call of nature ... A necklace of mine made of Jaz Azfar (a kind of black bead) was broken and I looked for it and my search for it detained me. 
Aisha was the wife Mohammed chose to accompany him on some exciting adventure of terrorizing Bedouin clans. She was carried around in a covered seat called a howdah (or hawdaj) on the back of a camel, which looks like this.
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This is because Mohammed had ordered his wives to totally seclude themselves from men by this point, which we’ll get to later.
When their task was accomplished, the group returned home. On the way back, Aisha got up to go to the bathroom one night and lost part of her necklace. The men in charge of her camel didn’t look inside to make sure she was in the howdah (because they were not supposed to look at her), so they took off without her.
those people did not feel the lightness of the howdah while raising it up, and I was still a young lady. They drove away the camel and proceeded. Then I found my necklace after the army had gone. I came to their camp but found nobody therein so I went to the place where I used to stay, thinking that they would miss me and come back in my search.
Aisha lingered nearby, assuming that the men would realize their mistake and come back for her soon.
While I was sitting at my place, I felt sleepy and slept. Safwan ... was behind the army. He had started in the last part of the night and reached my stationing place in the morning and saw the figure of a sleeping person. He came to me and recognized me on seeing me for he used to see me before veiling. ... he made his shecamel kneel down whereupon he trod on its forelegs and I mounted it.
One of Mohammed’s soldiers, Safwan, had been separated from the rest of the troops and came upon her while she was sleeping at the campsite. He gave her a ride.
Then Safwan set out, leading the she-camel that was carrying me, till we met the army while they were resting during the hot midday. Then whoever was meant for destruction, fell in destruction, and the leader of the Ifk (false statement) was `Abdullah bin Ubai bin Salul. After this we arrived at Medina and I became ill for one month while the people were spreading the forged statements of the people of the Ifk, and I was not aware of anything thereof. But ... I was no longer receiving from Allah's Messenger (ﷺ) the same kindness as I used to receive when I fell sick. Allah's Messenger (ﷺ) would enter upon me, say a greeting and add, "How is that (lady)?" and then depart. That aroused my suspicion
She returned to Medina and fell ill, but while she was sick, schemes were afoot. The “ifk”, also known as the slander, is the topic of this part of the surah. Unbeknownst to her, some of Mohammed’s men had accused her of sleeping with Safwan the night that she was separated from the army. Aisha noticed that Mohammed was not treating his beloved child bride in his usual way, and was acting distant. She finally learned of what was going on when another woman told her, then she told her mother about it. Her mother suggested that one of Mohammed’s other wives, or one of their family members, was behind it.
My mother said, "O my daughter! Take it easy, for by Allah, there is no charming lady who is loved by her husband who has other wives as well, but that those wives would find fault with her." ... That night I kept on weeping the whole night till the morning. My tears never stopped, nor did I sleep
Mohammed’s pride was badly wounded by all this, so he consulted with some of his bros concerning the topic--how to determine Aisha’s guilt (Allah was in the shower at the time and couldn’t answer the phone) and what to do with her if she was in fact guilty. Ali said that it would be no big deal if Mo just tossed her aside regardless of the truth (Aisha would never forget this), but suggested asking one of Aisha’s slaves if she’d seen anything.
while I was still weeping, Allah's Messenger (ﷺ) called `Ali bin Abi Talib and Usama bin Zaid when the Divine Inspiration delayed, in order to consult them as to the idea of divorcing his wife. Usama ... said, "O Allah's Messenger (ﷺ)! She is your wife, and we do not know anything about her except good." But `Ali bin Abi Talib said, "... Allah does not impose restrictions on you; and there are plenty of women other than her. If you however, ask (her) slave girl, she will tell you the truth." `Aisha added: So Allah's Messenger (ﷺ) called for Barira and said, "O Barira! Did you ever see anything which might have aroused your suspicion? (as regards Aisha)”. Barira said, “... I have never seen anything regarding Aisha which I would blame her for except that she is a girl of immature age who sometimes sleeps and leaves the dough of her family unprotected so that the domestic goats come and eat it.”
The slave called Aisha immature but said she has never seen her with any men. Mohammed was now very irritated at Abdallah ibn Ubayy--who you may remember as one of the “munafiqun” who helped the Jews and didn’t want to go to Tabouk. He was the chief of one of the tribes of Medina, the Banu Khazraj.
So Allah's Messenger (ﷺ) got up (and addressed) the people an asked for somebody who would take revenge on `Abdullah bin Ubai bin Salul then.
This set off an argument between the Khazraj and the other main (formerly) polytheistic tribe of Medina, the Banu Aws. Mohammed just sighed and presumably began banging his head against a wall.
So the two tribes of Al-Aus and Al-Khazraj got excited till they were on the point of fighting with each other while Allah's Messenger (ﷺ) was standing on the pulpit.
Aisha, meanwhile, was miserable and still locked in her house, spending all her time crying and fearful. Mohammed came to Aisha and told her to confess to Allah if she had done something wrong, but she refused, because she wasn’t guilty of anything. At that exact moment, Allah finally got out of the damn shower and informed Mohammed that Aisha was innocent. The story’s epilogue states that Mohammed never did “deal with” Abdallah, who never admitted his “guilt” and could never be proven as the source of the rumors. Because he was the leader of one of Medina’s important tribes, killing him without evidence would have been an issue. Some others did admit to spreading the gossip, though, including the sister of one of Mohammed’s wives, as Aisha’s mother suspected; a poet named Hassan ibn Thabit, who was a messy bitch who lived for drama; and, curiously, a man from Aisha’s own extended family. They were admonished but Mohammed told everyone to just forget about all of it and never speak of it again.
As for the truth of what happened that night, look, idk. This hadith is from Aisha herself, and she would obviously want to present herself as innocently as possible. There are other ahadith where she seems to stretch the truth a tad in order to protect her reputation, like this one, which we’ll see much later on. Maybe Safwan was really hot and Aisha was sick of being married to an old guy, I wouldn’t blame her. But it’s more likely that she really was innocent--I mean the girl had been indoctrinated and brainwashed since childhood, the concept of infidelity probably never even occurred to her. And Safwan would’ve had to possess balls of steel to screw around with Mohammed’s youngest and favorite wife. So I tend to believe the allegations were false rumors. Whether Abdallah was truly involved or whether he was just the Token Guy To Blame as always, I can’t tell you.
Let’s get back to the Quran now. In 24:4, Mohammed says that people who accuse “honorable women” of adultery without evidence/witnesses/proof should be lashed 80 times, unless they say they’re sorry and repent. Uh... I guess that’s neutral, altogether? Corporal punishment is bad, but falsely accusing women of being adulterers is also bad, right? It evens out.
If you are accusing your own wife of zina, though, then your own testimony is all that’s needed. A man has to invoke a curse upon himself, called lian, saying that Allah can punish him if he’s lying. But if the wife says she’s innocent and also invokes the curse of Allah upon herself, telling Allah to send his wrath upon her if she’s lying, then what?! It’s a curse-off... one’s gotta be lying, but Allah’s punishment isn’t coming down upon either, so who is the truthful one?! Lo! It is like one of those games with the two-headed dragons, with one head that tells the truth and the other that only lies. Ibn Kathir collects some ahadith on this matter here if you want to see how Mohammed “resolved” this issue, though that one was only “resolved” because the woman was pregnant and her kid was obviously not her husband’s. Without that evidence, you’re just left sitting around waiting for Allah’s curse to materialize upon the liar. Tbh because it’s all so circular I feel like it’s ultimately neutral?
Now then... let’s talk about “the slander”. In 24:10, Mohammed thanks Allah for revealing the truth to him. Those who spread the lies, he says, are a “gang” and the one ultimately responsible for starting the rumor will be met with The Doom. He scolds the Muslims in general for not immediately shutting down the rumors, given that the accusers couldn’t identify any witnesses to the alleged affair. It’s a good thing that Allah is in a good mood today, he tells them, or else they’d all be doomed for their gossip, which was a grievous sin. They shouldn’t have even dared speculate about it, and they must never do this again.
Like... this is a bit much, but in context it’s at least understandable and neutral. You don’t accuse a cult leader’s child bride of being a ho and expect him to take it well.
This has been a long section because of that hadith, so I’ll leave it there for now.
NEXT TIME: We finish up the Slander Debacle and move onto forced modesty rules!!!
The Quran Read-Along: Day 128
Ayat: 17
Good: 0
Neutral: 15 (24:1, 24:4-17)
Bad: 2 (24:2-3)
Kuffar hell counter: 0
⇚ previous day | next day ⇛  
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princexelias · 6 years
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- ̗̀✰ •【 TARON EGERTON / CISMALE / 26 】announcing the arrival of his/her/their royal highness, ( ELIAS JOSEPH EDWARDS ), the ( CROWN PRINCE ) of ( GERMANY ). I’ve heard that she/he/they is/are ( MANIPULATIVE ) & ( SARCASTIC ) but can also be ( INTELLECTUAL ) & ( RESOURCEFUL ). ( ELIAS ) is arranged to marry ( VICTORIA WINDSOR ). Rumor has it (THEY SUFFER FROM EPILEPTIC SEIZURES ). We hope you enjoy your stay at London!【 OOC: rose, 21,est,she/her 】
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Hi friends! Rose again with my sickly prince.  I couldn’t resist taking up a second character, and really wanted to take a fun twist on an interesting troupe. Below are bullet points on who he is as a person, backstory and the usual couple of idea for wanted connections.
Elias and his mother Queen Elena were in a car accident when Elias was five years old, a year before the birth of his younger brother.  The prince and his mother were on the way to meet with their father, when their driver lost control of the car.  The limo rolled five times, and with later inspection it was discovered the vehicle was tampered with shortly before their departure.
His mother survived with minor injuries but the Prince had been thrown from their limo and was rushed to medical care almost immediately.  Under the care of the best doctors in Germany, he was officially labeled unresponsive and in a coma. 
His accident became international news, at the time the only son of the King of Germany holding on by a thread.   It was covered by every news outlet, and several other royal families weighed in on the tragic turn of events.  
He was in a coma for three months before his Father desire a second child in case Elias perished.
His mother was five months pregnant when he came out the Coma.  The Sleeping Prince had woken up 10 months after his accident and began his climb back to physical and mental health.  
He began physical therapy and was kept under observation during his early stages of recovery which was a blessing given the boy collapsed barely a month after his awakening in a seizure.  Doctors examined him and determined the accident and being thrown from the car caused mild neurological damage that resulted in the Prince being diagnosed with Epilepsy.
His Father and Mother quickly covered up the diagnosis, paying off Doctors or sabotaging the credibility of others who refused to be paid off.  
They didn’t want the country to lose faith in their future king by viewing him as damaged.  
He takes medicine to help prevent seizures but has suffered many in his life and has been swapped between several different medications hoping to find his magic pill.
He suffers minor symptoms of his neurological damage such as random shaking in his hands, randomly his muscles can lock up making it hard for him to move said body part for a short duration or he’ll lose his train of thought and stammer.   These symptoms come about if he isn’t keeping up with his medicines or several days following a seizure.
 He spent most of his early life in therapy, teaching him ways to control stress in his body and how to avoid situations that might trigger seizures.  
Due to this he is a bit of a health nut, he has a strict dinning schedule and goes to bed a relatively decent hour in hopes of eliminating triggers in his life.  
He doesn’t see his epilepsy as much of a threat to his claim to the crown as his parents do but follows their lead but he does worry that one day, a seizure might damage him worse and he’ll be unable to rule.
Growing up after his Accident, he became spoiled by his parents and this caused him to develop a partial bit of self entitlement.  
He is envious of his younger brother.
He was still governed in the sense of needing to be the perfect example of a German Gentleman.  He dresses right, and learned how to break the rules without getting caught.  
His scandals have included Romantic Scandals, Drug Addiction * neither confirmed or denied by the royal family* (Mistaking his medical pill taking), Public Indecency.
His mother after almost losing her son indulged most if not all of his whims and this caused him to grow to see other people outside of his family as chess pieces.
To Elias the world is this big game and he is a play maker.  He has been responsible for outing several of his father’s mistresses, and outing spies within their staff who were simply trying to manipulate the royal family.  
He views his engagement as another play by his family, He will be playing a part in unifying the English and German people by bringing one of the English Royal Family daughters as the Next Queen of Germany.   
Given Germany’s Checkered past, his engagement is seen as a stepping stone to ensure his country has a more positive impact on the global world not just the local.
He can cordial and kind and is a beloved figure in the public eyes but the Red Queen has been commenting on the fact he has his own personal doctor, and his frequent visits to hospitals.  Painting that the health nut of a prince, might not be as healthy as he would like the world to believe.  
Wanted Connections
Ex-Girlfriends : Elias has had his fair share of romantic relationships over the years, be it with Princess or nobles or even part of his palace staff.  They broke up for one reason or another but now they are face to face again because of this summit.
Not Over You: Elias truly loved this person but due to his medical issues he broke up with them after they witnessed one of his blackouts without any explanation.  
A Fellow Player: This is a Royal who connected with Elias in their love for playing the game.  They often make up competitions between each other and keep a personal tally of who is winning and losing.
You Get Me: This is a Royal who can put Elias in his place and ngl he loves it.  They shrink his big head and keep him balanced, when they are around the prince is almost a different person.
Gym Rats - They met be it out for an early morning run while one or the other was visiting the others country but the two found someone they can stand to work out with and their friendship rotates around small talk and jokes
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hotvintagepoll · 2 months
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Propaganda
Mae West (She Done Him Wrong, I'm No Angel)— Legendary sex symbol. Like 500 vintage iconic quotes and double entendres. "Is that a gun in your pocket, or are you just happy to see me? " "When I'm good, I'm very good. But when I'm bad, I'm better" / "It's not the men in your life that count, it's the life in your men" / "I feel like a million tonight. But one at a time." , "Marriage is a fine institution, but I'm not ready for an institution. " / " How tall are you without your horse? Six foot, seven inches. Never mind the six feet. Let's talk about the seven inches! " Look the pictures don't do her justice just watch a compilation and tell me that voice doesn't do it for you
Flora Robson (Fire over England, Sarabande for Dead Lovers)— It's a testament to her power that despite an extensive film career, that a single role has cemented itself firmly in my mind as one of the best. That of Elizabeth I in Five over England
This is round 1 of the tournament. All other polls in this bracket can be found here. Please reblog with further support of your beloved hot sexy vintage woman.
[additional propaganda submitted under the cut]
Mae West:
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Her voice! Her body! She was thick as hell and SO confident.
Mae West is often called the queen of the sexual pun or innuendo, she was an early sex symbol and a comedy icon. She also has a quote saying "When I am good, I am very good. But when I am bad I am better!" which is possibly the peak of hot girl energy ever. (Including the clip here)
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for an era that didn't have much wiggle room when it came to women that studios wanted in their films, it's refreshing that she was in her late 30s when she skyrocketed to movie fame. she was also curvy and witty and raunchy, an absolute icon!
She is an absolute icon, the OG sex symbol. Every word from her mouth was an innuendo and she was proud of it. I guess one could say she slayed. She got Cary Grant his first acting role, as well. How could you NOT vote for someone who says such iconic stuff as "I do all my writing in bed; everybody knows I do my best work there" or "You only live once, but if you do it right, once is enough." SHE COINED THE PHRASE "IS THAT A GUN IN YOUR POCKET OR ARE YOU JUST HAPPY TO SEE ME?" I LOVE HER!!!
“I created myself and I never put up with sloppy work”-mae west
great short compilation of mae west mae westing:
youtube
She was a SEX GODDESS at a time when that was an extremely scandalous thing to be, and she worked it! She was sardonic, sarcastic, funny...and stacked! Favorite quote (from Night After Night, 1933): Random woman: Goodness! What beautiful diamonds! Mae West: Goodness had nothin' to do with it, dearie.
i personally love this silly production number from one of her lesser known movies
She was arrested for indecency and chose to serve 10 days in prison instead of paying the fine for the publicity, and she claimed that she refused to wear the ugly prison outfits so she wore her silk lingerie the entire time. Also one of the first historybound vintage fashion icons (although vintage for her was the Victorian era)
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Flora Robson:
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C:R ~VE~ Chapter 4
 I wish I dreamed more often. I read somewhere that our dreams let us know our heart’s deepest desires. It allows them a safe place to manifest, one where nobody else can see.
But my dreams are always black. Peaceful, but quiet. It’s like my mind refuses to let me have a conversation with myself.
At least without dreams it’s easier for me to wake up. If my mind pulled me into fantasies of endless depths, of untamed fathoms just waiting for me…
I sit up in bed, only mildly surprised to see a hot pot of tea resting nearby.
“Oh, you’re up already!” Conseil gives me a bright smile as he hurries over with a plate of delicate pastries. “I had Mr. Barbicane prepare these for you, since I wasn’t sure how long you would be asleep.”
A dish of scones and clotted cream rests daintily next to a sprig of lavender. Nearby is… what I can only assume is a cannoli.
“Conseil, is this…?”
“Yes,” he replies. “Mr. Barbicane insisted that he make you a ‘Super Leviathan Cannoli de Barbicane’.”
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Indeed, it is a cannoli shaped like a squid, with cream tentacles pouring out of one side and spelling out ‘GOOD LUCK’ across the plate.
“He was already working on it this morning,” Conseil continues. “He wanted to have it prepared for when you board…”
His smile looks a little sad.
“He was very happy when I informed him of your changed circumstances.”
I motion for Conseil to come closer to me. He obeys, and I pass him the plate of scones. “Here. There’s no way I can eat these all by myself. Why don’t you join me for breakfast?”
Conseil smiles and takes the plate from me. He sets it on the bedside table before leaning down and hugging me tight to him.
I’m so surprised by this that I gasp.
“Forgive me,” says Conseil. “But I have to prepare for my journey, and the thought of leaving you again—the thought of being left behind again—forgive me for this act of indecency.”
He rests his chin on my shoulder, and I gently reach up to rub his back.
“And I’m sorry, I’m so sorry for my behavior,” he continues. “I know I need to trust you, Professor. I just want to ask one thing of you, just one more thing and then I will leave you be!”
I feel a wetness on my shoulder, and I realize that it’s from a tear rolling down his cheek.
“Please be safe!” is his request.
Finally, I return his hug.
“I’ll never leave you behind,” I reply. “And I promise I will be safe.”
Conseil straightens himself up and takes a step back.
“Thank you, Professor,” he says. “I must return to Paris, now. Pray for a swift journey, and that I am able to fulfill my duty.”
“Conseil, I’m fairly certain you could even find a way to move the sun if I asked for it!”
Conseil assists me in readying my wardrobe before we walk downstairs so I can see him off. He doesn’t even have any luggage of his own, such was his panic to reach me.
“Hey, hey!” Barbicane claps Conseil on the back. “I’ll give you a ride, okay? It wouldn’t be right for you to come all the way to Steel London without sampling a bit of Impey Tech~!”
Conseil suddenly looks very uncomfortable, but when he sees my laughter, he gives a nod.
“Your kindness is much appreciated, Mr. Barbicane,” he says.
“Woah, woah! What’s this ‘Mr. Barbicane’ business?! I swear, between you and Polly-chan… it’s Impey, just Impey! IM-PEY.”
I wave as Barbicane leads Conseil away to his automobile.
--- Soon, the automobile is bouncing down the road at a healthy speed. Impey is smiling brightly, chatting about something or another. Conseil is only half-listening, instead choosing to watch the mansion as it grows smaller in the side mirror.
It’s only when the mansion completely vanishes from sight that he turns to regard his driver. He looks so carefree, so happy. Conseil feels a pang of envy in his chest.
“Mr. Barbicane,” he starts.
“Huh? Again with the ‘mister’ thing?!”
“Please humor me,” Conseil continues. “Since I am on this mission for the Professor, I will not be around to protect her.”
Impey raises an eyebrow.
Conseil looks straight ahead, as though he doesn’t want to acknowledge the question he’s asking: “What sort of man is Nemo?”
“What… sort of man…? What kind of question is that?”
“Can you not alleviate my worries?”
“Yeesh, you’re so intense…”
“I want to be reassured that the Professor will be safe with him.”
Impey sighs. “Look, to be completely honest with you, I don’t think I could say anything that will make you feel better. But…”
Conseil finally looks at the driver.
“Nemo loves science more than anything. He told me once… that it’s the reason he’s alive. Now, Polly-chan, she loves science too, right? That’s why she went on all those expeditions when she was younger? Nemo is kind of a messed-up guy, but since they both love science, I think they’ll be really happy on their journey. Besides, Nemo needs some stability in his life, and Polly-chan? Well, you might think she’s all right, but I think she could use a little more passion and zest—”
“Stop the car.”
Impey slams on the breaks. “Woah! What’s wrong?!”
Conseil quickly opens the door and steps out, giving Impey a polite smile.
“Thank you for the ride, Mr. Barbicane… and thank you for the reassurance.”
Impey shivers when he sees Conseil’s smile. There is no positivity behind it- it is a mere mask. But as unnerved as he is, he has to say: “Hey, we aren’t there yet. I can take you the rest of the way if you want.”
“That won’t be necessary,” says Conseil. “I would hate to keep you from your companions any longer. Please, give them my well-wishes.”
He bows to Impey before walking down the road on his own.
---
When I walk into the dining room, I see that there are quite a few more people than there were the night before. Frankenstein has returned, and with him came Sisi, who’s eagerly bounding around the slim ankles of an ethereal woman. Roses are in her lips, and her eyes are as deep as the ocean I long to see. When she smiles at me, all I can recall are Barbicane’s fond names for her: angel, princess, darling.
As dry as my mouth is, I’m able to offer a greeting, “You must be Cardia.”
“And you are Professor Aronnax,” she replies. Her voice is soft, like sunlight filtering through the windows of the mansion.
“Yes!” I straighten. “Ah, I hope Conseil hasn’t bothered you…”
Cardia laughs lightly. “Impey’s told me a lot about you, actually. I’m glad that someone like you is here.”
“What she means to say is that she’s glad there’s another woman here to attract the attention of these clods.”
A boy seated next to Cardia thumps down the newspaper he was holding. His angelic face is diluted by his sour expression, but he’s beautiful all the same.
“Finis, you know that isn’t true,” says Cardia.
“I’m afraid that Barbicane has spoken of little but Cardia,” I say with a shrug of my shoulders.
“Criminy…” the boy scoffs.
“This is my little brother, Finis,” Cardia continues. “I hope you’ll excuse his behavior.”
“Sister!” Finis’ eyes snap open and he glares at Cardia. She just laughs.
I join her at the table, sitting next to Frankenstein.
“It’s good to have so many people at the mansion again,” the Count addresses us from the head of the table. “It’s beginning to feel like old times.”
“Will Lupin be able to join us?” asks Cardia. “And Van, and Dela-chan?”
The Count looks apologetic.
“I’m sorry, Cardia. Lupin is tied up in Paris—”
Finis snorts.
“—and Dela-chan sent word that he and Van have been making great progress. They were all disappointed that they couldn’t see you this time.”
Cardia looks down at her tea cup, a frown pulling at the edges of that beautiful mouth.
I’m ripped from looking at her by a nagging feeling that I’ve heard one of those names before.
“Lupin…” I muse. “You aren’t talking about the Gentleman Thief, are you?”
Cardia immediately brightens. Impey’s clearly got his work cut out for him.
“Wow, you truly do surround yourself with characters,” I say. “He’s rather beloved in Paris, despite his criminal record.”
“He’s a good person,” says Cardia, that beautiful smile returning to her face.
I absolutely believe her. I think I’d believe anything she told me.
“I’ve returned, Cardia-chaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaan!” Barbicane practically floats into the room, but a glare from Finis shoots him down with all the might of a bolt of lightning.
“So…” I look around at the group. Frankenstein, Barbicane, Cardia, Finis, the Count… and Sisi. “Are all of you here for Nemo’s release?”
Frankenstein shifts uncomfortably.
“They’re all here for my sister,” Finis says matter-of-factly. “She’s the only one who has that lecherous buffoon in mind. Well…” Finis opens one eye. “Maybe his buffoon partner, also.”
“Hey!” Barbicane snaps. “’Partner’ is a title reserved for Lupin!”
“So yes, they’re all really here for her,” Finis says with a resigned sigh.
“You shouldn’t say things like that,” says Cardia. “Nemo’s work on the Nautilus saved our lives, you know.”
Finis shrugs, but he doesn’t say anything to defend his words.
I look around, waiting for an explanation, but it looks like no one wants to talk about what had happened. I pick up a spare tea cup and reach for the sugar bowl, only to find it empty.
Finis is staring at me, daring me to comment.
I quickly whisper an apology.
---
A few hours later, I find myself at the vanity in my room. I’m usually not one for primping, but I’m feeling restless. There are so many people in the mansion now, and despite their best attempts to include me, I can’t help but feel a little lost. They all must have experienced a lot together.
As I’m braiding my hair, I hear a knock at the door.
“Enter,” my voice is even.
I see Cardia’s reflection as she opens the door and walks inside. I turn and look back at her with a smile.
“Do you need something?” I ask.
She shakes her head, a smile on her face. “Are you getting ready to go to Buckingham Palace?”
I feel my cheeks redden.
“I was just… I felt like looking after myself a bit. I’m not usually one to…” my voice trails off when I see her laughing lightly.
“Barbicane has been talking to you, hasn’t he?” My tone sounds a little more accusing than I’d like for it to.
Cardia’s smile looks rather mischievous. “About what?”
I sigh. “He seems to have some theories… well, I suppose they’re harmless enough, baseless as they are.”
“I’d like to go with you,” says Cardia. “It’s been a long time since I’ve seen Nemo, but… I’m afraid it would feel strange if I went with Finis.”
I nod. “Sure, I’d be happy for the company.”
I’m only partially lying. It’s true that there’s a part of me that wants his genius all to myself, but Cardia feels just as special as he does, though it’s in a different way.
“Here, let me,” she says as she sits down on the edge of the bed. She undoes my braid with her long fingers and begins to brush it out. I sit wordlessly, my cheeks reddening even more.
“I don’t get to do this very often, Finis is so particular about his hair,” she says. “He says he doesn’t need his big sister messing it up.”
I find myself mimicking her smile.
She quickly begins to pull my hair back and braid it tightly.
“The Queen wears her hair up like this,” she tells me. “I think it will look nice on you, too.”
“You’re very kind, Cardia,” I say. “Barbicane was right about you.”
“I think…” Cardia trails off, pausing as she begins to pin my hair up in a braided bun. “I think I just want everyone to have an opportunity to be happy. Whether it’s shooting for the moon or sailing through the sea.”
She finishes, and I turn around to look at her.
“We all deserve joy,” she says. “After all, the feeling of joy is what makes us really human.”
---
As Cardia and I walk outside, Barbicane runs up to us joyfully.
“My ladies, your carriage awaits!”
“Impey, you’re going to Buckingham Palace as well?” asks Cardia.
Barbicane nods gleefully at her. “I’m going on business, though. Have to meet Victoria-chan!”
“V… Victoria-chan?”
Surely he couldn’t mean…
“Oh, you need to report your progress to Her Majesty?” says Cardia.
He… he does mean her.
“Mm-hmm!” Barbicane gives a thumbs up. “But what kind of man would I be if I didn’t offer such sweet ladies a lift, huh?”
“Thank you, Impey!” Cardia smiles, and the world becomes just a little bit brighter.
As Barbicane holds the door open for Cardia to climb in, he glances at me. “Eh? Did your hair special, huh?”
“A-Actually—” my voice breaks. “Cardia offered…”
“Ohhhhh~ no wonder it looks so nice!” Barbicane sniffs. “You’re so lucky, to have her thread her fingers through your hair like that! Ahh, Cardia-chaaaaaan!”
“I can do your hair too, if you’d like, Impey,” says Cardia.
The three of us continue our banter as we ride down the street. I’ve only known Impey Barbicane for a few weeks, and Cardia for less than a day, but I feel so comfortable speaking with them it’s like we’ve been lifelong friends.
“So, this Conseil guy…” Barbicane starts. “How did you meet such an intense guy?”
“He didn’t bother you, did he?” I ask.
“Well, he just asked some weird questions. I mean, I’m pretty used to ‘weird’ since I’ve spoken with Nemo so much, but he’s still a little…” he winces. “A little intense, I guess.”
“He’s very focused,” I say. “He always has been. We met each other back when I was in school. I hired him to be my assistant during my first expedition. He’s come on every single one since then.  We worked so well together that eventually he stopped leaving after the expeditions ended. He’s my permanent assistant now, and my dearest friend. I wish I could do something to put him at ease.”
“I doubt you could do much,” says Impey. “I think he sees Nemo as a rival.”
“Oh, no…” Cardia sighs. “Not another rivalry.”
Impey laughs and shakes his head. “For once, I think Nemo’s the one in the dark about it!”
“A rival? Whatever for?” I blink a few times.
Impey just sighs.
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writemarcus · 3 years
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Jun. 23: Jason Robert Brown, Savion Glover, Priscilla López, Susan Stroman, Marisha Wallace, and Christopher Wheeldon Join I’M STILL HERE: A Virtual Benefit for the Billy Rose Theatre Division Honoring George C. Wolfe and the Late Harold Prince and Celebrating 90 Years of the New York Public Library for the Performing Arts; Tickets for the In-Person Viewing Party are Available Now
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Jason Robert Brown, Savion Glover, Priscilla López, Susan Stroman, Marisha Wallace, and Christopher Wheeldon join the cavalcade of stars participating in The New York Public Library for the Performing Arts’ I’m Still Here: A Virtual Benefit for the Billy Rose Theatre Division, airing June 23, 2021 on Broadway On Demand at 8pm EST and 8pm PST. The fundraiser will help raise critical funds for the Library for the Performing Arts’ beloved Theatre Division as it celebrates its 90th anniversary this year.
Tickets to the online fundraiser will be donate-what-you-can, with a recommendation of at least $19.31 in honor of the year the division was founded. To purchase tickets to the one-time-only virtual event, visit StillHereAt90.com.
An in-person viewing party at the Library for the Performing Arts in Lincoln Center for donors has also just been announced, including a pre-screening reception and performance featuring Pulitzer Prize winner Michael R. Jackson (A Strange Loop), and GRAMMY and two-time Tony Award winner Duncan Sheik (Spring Awakening). For details and ticket prices for this limited capacity in- person event, please contact [email protected].
An incredibly special aspect of I’m Still Here is that it will feature clips of Broadway productions from the Theatre Division’s Theatre on Film and Tape Archive (TOFT), shown especially for this occasion with special permission from The Coalition of Broadway Unions and Guilds and the respective talent, creative teams and rights holders of each production. These archival recordings are typically only available to view onsite at the Library for the Performing Arts. The recordings shown will include the original Broadway cast of In the Heights; Angela Bassett and Samuel L. Jackson in The Mountaintop; Brian Stokes Mitchell in Ragtime; Glenn Close in Sunset Boulevard; Kelli O’Hara and Paulo Szot in South Pacific; Craig Bierko and Rebecca Luker in The Music Man; Meryl Streep, Marcia Gay Harden and Larry Pine in The Seagull; Savion Glover, Jimmy Tate, Choclattjared and Raymond King in Bring in ‘da Noise, Bring in ‘da Funk; Bette Midler in I’ll Eat You Last; Christian Borle and Tim Curry in Spamalot; and more.
I’m Still Here will also include interviews with Broadway legends and emerging creatives; and reconceived performances of musical theatre songs, including Stephanie J. Block performing “A Trip to the Library,” André De Shields performing “I’m Still Here,” original Company cast members from 1970-to-present performing “Another Hundred People,” “Wheels of a Dream,” “Love Will Find a Way,” and more. The evening’s honorees are Harold Prince and George C. Wolfe.
Featuring new performances and appearances by Troy Anthony (The River Is Me), Annaleigh Ashford (Sunday in the Park with George), Major Attaway (Aladdin), Alexander Bello (Caroline, or Change), Laura Benanti (She Loves Me), Malik Bilbrew, Susan Birkenhead (Jelly’s Last Jam), Shay Bland, Stephanie J. Block (The Cher Show), Alex Brightman (Beetlejuice), Matthew Broderick (Plaza Suite), Jason Robert Brown (The Last 5 Years), Krystal Joy Brown (Hamilton), David Burtka (“A Series of Unfortunate Events”), Sammi Cannold (Endlings), Ayodele Casel (Chasing Magic), Kirsten Childs (Bella), Antonio Cipriano (Mean Girls), Victoria Clark (The Light in the Piazza), Max Clayton (Moulin Rouge!), Calvin L. Cooper (Mrs. Doubtfire), Trip Cullman (Choir Boy), Taeler Elyse Cyrus (Hello, Dolly!), Quentin Earl Darrington (Once on This Island), André De Shields (Hadestown), Frank DiLella (NY1), Derek Ege, Amina Faye, Harvey Fierstein (La Cage aux Folles), Leslie Donna Flesner (Tootsie), Chelsea P. Freeman, Savion Glover (Bring in ‘da Noise, Bring in ‘da Funk), Joel Grey (Cabaret), Ryan J. Haddad (“The Politician”),James Harkness (Ain’t Too Proud), Sheldon Harnick (Fiddler on the Roof), Marcy Harriell (Company), Mark Harris (“Mike Nichols: A Life”), Neil Patrick Harris (Hedwig and the Angry Inch), David Henry Hwang (M. Butterfly), Arica Jackson (Caroline, or Change), Michael R. Jackson (A Strange Loop), Cassondra James (Once on This Island), Marcus Paul James (Rent), Taylor Iman Jones (Hamilton), Maya Kazzaz, Tom Kirdahy (The Inheritance), Leslie Kritzer (Beetlejuice), Michael John LaChiusa (The Wild Party), Norman Lear (Good Times), Baayork Lee (A Chorus Line), L. Morgan Lee (A Strange Loop), Robert Lee (Takeaway), Sondra Lee (Hello, Dolly!), Telly Leung (Aladdin), Priscilla Lopez (A Chorus Line),Ashley Loren (Moulin Rouge!), Allen René Louis (“Jimmy Kimmel Live!”), Brittney Mack (Six), Morgan Marcell (Hamilton), Aaron Marcellus (“American Idol”), Joan Marcus, Michael Mayer (Spring Awakening), Annie McGreevey (Company), Sarah Meahl (Kiss Me, Kate), Joanna Merlin (Fiddler on the Roof), Ruthie Ann Miles (Sunday in the Park with George), Bonnie Milligan (Head Over Heels), Rita Moreno (West Side Story), Madeline Myers (Double Helix), Pamela Myers (Company),Leilani Patao (Garden Girl), Nova Payton (Dreamgirls), Joel Perez (Kiss My Aztec), Bernadette Peters (Into the Woods), Tonya Pinkins (Jelly’s Last Jam), Jacoby Pruitt, Sam Quinn, Phylicia Rashad (A Raisin in the Sun), Jelani Remy (Ain’t Too Proud), George Salazar (Be More Chill), Marilyn Saunders (Company), Marcus Scott (Fidelio), Rashidra Scott (Company), Rona Siddiqui (Tales of a Halfghan), Ahmad Simmons (West Side Story), Susan Stroman (The Producers), Rebecca Taichman (Indecent), Jeanine Tesori (Fun Home), Bobby Conte Thornton (Company), Sergio Trujillo (On Your Feet), Kei Tsuruharatani (Jagged Little Pill), Ben Vereen (Pippin), Jack Viertel, Christopher Vo (The Cher Show), Nik Walker (Ain’t Too Proud), Marisha Wallace (Dreamgirls), Shannon Fiona Weir, Christopher Wheeldon (MJ: The Musical),Helen Marla White (Ain’t Misbehavin’), Natasha Yvette Williams (“Orange is the New Black”), and Kumiko Yoshii (Prince of Broadway).
Click here to watch New York Public Library’s Doug Reside on Backstage LIVE with Richard Ridge.
The virtual benefit is produced and conceived by co-founder of the upcoming Museum of Broadway and four-time Tony nominee Julie Boardman (Company) and Co-Executive Producer of Broadway For Biden Nolan Doran (Head Over Heels), featuring direction by Steve Broadnax (Thoughts Of A Colored Man), Sammi Cannold (Endlings), Nick Corley (Plaza Suite), GRAMMY Award Winner Ty Defoe (Straight White Men), Drama Desk winner Lorin Latarro (Waitress), Mia Walker (Jagged Little Pill) and Tony Award winnerJason Michael Webb (Choir Boy), choreography by Ayodele Casel (Chasing Magic),Lorin Latarro and Ray Mercer (The Lion King), with new music arranged by ASCAP Award winner Rachel Dean (Medusa) and Annastasia Victory (A Wonderful World), with arrangements and orchestrations by Brian Usifer (Frozen). Casting is by Peter Van Dam at Tara Rubin Casting.
Tony Marx is the president of The New York Public Library, William Kelly is the Andrew W. Mellon Director of the Research Libraries,Jennifer Schantz is the Barbara G. and Lawrence A. Fleischman Executive Director of the Library for the Performing Arts, and Doug Reside is the Lewis and Dorothy Cullman Curator of the Billy Rose Theatre Division. Patrick Hoffman is the curator of the Theatre on Film and Tape Archive. Henry Tisch serves as Associate Producer and Travis Waldschmidt is Associate Choreographer. Animation and Motion Graphics by Kate Freer, Graphic Design by Caitlin Whittington, Sean MacLaughlin is Director of Photography and Ian Johnston is B Camera Operator. Dylan Tashjian is Onsite Coordinator with COVID compliance by Lauren Class Schneider.
HOST COMMITTEE: Ted & Mary Jo Shen, Barbara Fleischman, Agnes Gund, Fiona & Eric Rudin, Lizzie & Jon Tisch, Kate Cannova, Joan Marcus, Daisy Prince, Gayfryd Steinberg, Van Horn Group
LIBRARY FOR THE PERFORMING ARTS THEATRE COMMITTEE: Emily Altman, Margot Astrachan, Ken Billington, Julie Boardman, Ted Chapin, Bonnie Comley, Van Dean, Kurt Deutsch, Scott Farthing, Barbara Fleischman, Freddie Gershon, Louise Hirschfeld, Joan Marcus, Elliott Masie, Arthur Pober, Ed Schloss, Morwin Schmookler, Jenna Segal, Ted Shen, Kara Unterberg, Abbie Van Nostrand, Kumiko Yoshii
THE NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY FOR THE PERFORMING ARTS DOROTHY AND LEWIS B. CULLMAN CENTER houses one of the world’s most extensive combinations of circulating, reference, and rare archival collections in the field of dance, theatre, music and recorded sound. These materials are available free of charge, along with a wide range of special programs, including exhibitions, seminars, and performances. An essential resource for everyone with an interest in the arts — whether professional or amateur — the Library is known particularly for its prodigious collections of non-book materials such as historic recordings, videotapes, autograph manuscripts, correspondence, sheet music, stage designs, press clippings, programs, posters and photographs. The Library is part of The New York Public Library system, which has locations in the Bronx, Manhattan and Staten Island, and is a lead provider of free education for all.
BROADWAY ON DEMAND is the industry-leading livestream platform housing performance & theatre education programming, & the preferred choice of top Broadway artists, producers, educators & professionals. Broadway On Demand has streamed 2,500 events & live productions—from Broadway shows to concert series, performance venues to individual artists, & original content—in 82 countries to over 300,000 viewers. Thanks to a unique licensing interface, ShowShare, approved middle school, high school, college, community & professional theatre productions utilize the platform to stream to their audiences. Broadway on Demand is available on the web, mobile, Apple and Android app store, AppleTV, Roku, Chromecast, and Amazon Fire TV. For access to the complete and ever-expanding Broadway on Demand library, subscribe at BroadwayOnDemand.com.
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unda-dittaboot · 4 years
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More Than A Number: The Continuing Pattern of Misgendering/Misnaming in the Media and It’s Dangers
 This is a continuation of the list made on the first blog post of black trans women who have been killed due to violence against the trans community and how the media fails to justly represent them. 
Brayla Stone
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Brayla Stone was 17 years old. She is remembered by Tori Cooper, HRC director of community engagement for the Transgender Justice Initiative as “a child just beginning to live her life.” Her favorite colors were red and purple. "Brayla was someone who always held space for others to be themselves and express their identities," the Center for Artistic Revolution wrote in a post on Facebook. She had a youtube channel and was expressive with creating music. Not much other information is found about her life.
Shaki Peters
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Shaki Peters was 32 years old. She was beloved by her family. Nathalie Nia Faulk who was a friend of Shaki Peters' says that Shaki was “consistently laughing, consistently joking, the first person to get up and dance.” She was active in community development and organizing in and around the New Orleans area. According to People, she was a very caring person and would constantly check up on her friends. Faulk says that “She definitely was an inspiration in how she navigated life.”
Tiffany Harris
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Tiffany Harris as known as Dior H Ova. Age unknown. She is remembered as a “beautiful soul full of life and love.” According to the National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, Dior loved shopping and had an obsession with Louis Vuitton. She had a love for fashion as she adored luxury brand names and worked as a personal shopper. She loved watching Desperate Housewives, Nip/Tuck, and Sex and the City.
Queasha D Hardy
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Queasha D Hardy was 22 years old. She is remembered as “extremely loved by her community” and as “truly one of a kind.” According to the Human Rights Campaign, Queasha was a hairstylist and was remembered as always doing someone’s hair. Friends described her as loyal, loving, “always smiling,” “the life of all parties” and “truly one of a kind.” She was bright and fun personality as she can be seen spontaneously dancing with friends in a Facebook post made by a close friend of hers.
Kee Sam
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Kee Sam. Age unknown. She is remembered by her friends in a loving way. According to the Human Rights Campaign, friends have been remembering Kee Sam on her Instagram page, commenting with heartfelt messages including “this can’t be real,” “I will miss you… you know you in my heart forever” and “rest in love.” So little information about Kee’s life has been released due to the fact that police officials and early media sources have misgendered and misnamed her.
Every single one of these women were misgendered and misnamed in the media. According to HRC research, an estimated 78% of all tracked deaths included misgendering in media or by law enforcement. Misgendering and misnaming trans women in the media has been a constant and terrible issue faced by the trans community. The media has specifically failed all of these women by taking part of this reckless reporting and has the tendency to be carless no matter many efforts have been made to combat this discrimination. Not only is it indecent but there is a deeper emotional and psychological effect that occurs whenever misgendering and misnaming continuously happen. Trans women, and especially black trans women, feel as if their identity doesn’t matter. They feel invalidated and stressed for their mental being. There is also a dangerous effect that our society learns from this lack of ethical reporting. People in our society view the media as such an influential and important factor of our lives that misgendering and misnaming can subject this community to facing harassment and discrimination. It allows people to see that if the media can do it then they can as well. 
Misgendering and misnaming may not seem like it has a large effect but it does. There are enormous consequences that occur from an action like this taken by the media and law enforcement. This leads to very few policies being passed to help protect the trans community specifically these trans women. Already there are very few explicit federal legal protections for transgender or gender-expansive people. One small step like correctly naming and correctly using the gender a person prefers leads to huge actions being taken to combat these discriminations found in our society. The HRC reports that there are ethical guidelines made specifically for media sources so that they correctly report about the trans community ethically. Even though that is true too many sources have failed to have the common curtesy of figuring out a persons preferred pronouns and name. Nathalie Nia Faulk states “the saddest part of this is that we have a protocol for when our people die.” She continues on by emphasizing the fact that, “most people can mourn the dead once they’ve lost someone, but we actually have to fight for our humanity.” How long must it take for us as a society to do better and to actively take measures in combating discrimination along with violence against the trans community. 
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gospelmusic · 4 years
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Seeds Of Destiny: April 27 2020
Today SOD - 2020-04-27 TOPIC: OUTWARD APPEARANCE AND INWARD PERSONALITY
SCRIPTURE: Even so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit; but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit. A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit,"neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. 
Matthew 7":17-18
THOUGHT FOR THE DAY: It is what you are inside that shows on the outside.
Some time ago,"my wife and I went for a meeting at Sheraton Hotels, Abuja, Nigeria. We met a girl who also came to the hotel area for a different purpose, a prostitutious assignment, she was a prostitute. My wife and I decided to preach to her. She was so indecently dressed that her dressing was showing her contours and cleavages. When we called her to preach to her, her sight was so terrible that my wife had to use something to block her widely open chest first before we continued preaching. She gave her life to Christ and we invited her to church on Sunday. But then she said something that touched me deeply, she said": “I don’t have church clothes; I can’t wear the kind of clothes I am wearing now to church.” Now,"this is someone who was a prostitute but knew the ideal dress code for church services. She knew that there are clothes a person should not wear and appear before God. Meanwhile, some Christians who claim to be in church for donkey years feel that they can wear any type of suggestive clothes to church claiming that a person’s outward appearance doesn’t matter to God. That is a lie from the pit of hell. They claim that God looks at the heart and the outward appearance does not matter. The truth is, whatever is in the heart reflects on the outside. For instance, when you look at a ripened mango; how do you know that it is really ripe when you have not tasted it? You know it is ripe because you saw the external appearance of the mango which is a product of the condition of the mango inside. In the same way, how do you know that someone has the spirit of seduction in her? It is the way she appears on the outside. It is what you are inside that shows on the outside.
Beloved, the people of the world know what belongs to the world; but the people of God are claiming not to know. Remember, God cannot be mocked.
Remember this": It is what you are inside that shows on the outside.
ASSIGNMENTS:
1. Make up your mind to be a genuine Christian.
2. Let your appearance glorify God.
PRAYER: Lord,"I ask for the grace to be an authentic Christian. Let everything I do glorify You, Lord, in Jesus’ Name.
FOR FURTHER UNDERSTANDING, GET THIS MESSAGE": ENEMIES OF DISTINCTION (PART 6).
QUOTE: Today,"many members of the Body of Christ are competing with the world in seductive dressing, wrongly appropriating office funds and foul languages. Now people cannot tell who is who. But God is saying to us, “If you want me to stand by you in this generation; if you want me to advertise you to your generation, then you must answer the question": “Who are you?”” Culled from “WHO ARE YOU?” by Dr Paul Enenche.
AMAZING FACT: Jews and Christians have a higher education than any other religious group in the world. On average,"the number of years of formal education for Jews and Christians is 13.4 and 9.3 years respectively.
DAILY READING": Job 7-9
PROPHETIC WORD: Receive the grace for authenticity in Jesus Name.
  Read more Seeds of Destiny Devotionals at dunamis.org  (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); Follow us on social media: Facebook: @hottestnaija.com Twitter: @wherehot Instagram: @hottest9jablog (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({});
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You may also like our gospel worship songs page which contains, the best, coolest and hottest Nigerian Gospel Songs, and Foreign Gospel Songs. Whatsoever is the mood, we've got you covered. Do you feel like dancing, rejoicing, shouting, screaming, or you're filled with jubilation because of the Mighty things the Lord has done? Then look no further, cos our gospel praise songs page, containing the hottest Nigerian and foreign praise songs collection, was prepared specifically for you. Peradventure you need the lyrics of the songs you are downloading now, just downloaded, or have downloaded before, our lyrics page is the best place to look. What more could be more helpful and entertaining than seeing the lyrics of your most favourite  song before you, as the music unfolds unto the climax. Hey we've been there before, and still encounter it from time to time when the vocals get lost in the cloud of heavy orchestration.
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Are You a Classical Music lover, our classical music page, contains the best of classical songs, composed and written by composers like G. F Handel, Bach, Joseph Haydn, etc. As you listen to your best gospel song, you may also want to get some more insight and knowledge about the word of God, from eBooks written by God's servants, or you may want to learn something new or build yourself up in some way. Then our eBook Page is the right place to look. (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); You may be in need of entertainment, and probably want to watch a video too. We understand that as well. You can get entertaining video downloads from our video downloads page.
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michaeljames1221 · 4 years
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Divorce Lawyer South Salt Lake Utah
There can be no divorce without marriage. Both are interconnected since the beginning of civilization.
Marriage is called a “covenant” throughout the Pentateuch and the rest of the Old Testament.1 Proverbs 2:17 speaks about the adulterous wife who “ignored the covenant made before God,” and Malachi says that one of the witnesses of any “marriage covenant” is God himself (2:14). Ezekiel employs a vivid picture of God marrying the nation of Judah, in which he frequently referred to their marriage covenant (Ezek. 16:8, 59-62). He describes in intimate and overtly sexual language how God entered into marriage, including the ceremony at which he said: “I spread the edge of my cloak over you, and covered your nakedness: I pledged myself to you and entered into a covenant with you” (Ezek. 16:8).
A marriage covenant is also referred to in many of the passages that speak about a covenant with God. The word “covenant” may mean a “marriage covenant” or a “treaty covenant,” and often in these passages it means both. The marriage covenant of God with his people is, at times, almost synonymous with his treaty covenant with them. For example, the comment “I will remember my covenant with you in the days of your youth, and I will establish with you an everlasting covenant,” which occurs in the description of God’s marriage to Israel (Ezek. 16:60), sounds very similar to Ezekiel 37:26, which speaks about the treaty covenant of God with his people. A similar mixture of these two ideas occurs in Jeremiah 31:31-32, where the new everlasting covenant is compared with “my covenant which they broke, though I was their husband.” These two concepts are sometimes mixed deliberately in order to draw out comparisons. For example, Jeremiah 11:10 appears to refer to a treaty covenant (“they have broken the covenant that I made with their ancestors”) but later verses contain references to Israel as a wayward wife (Jer. 11:15, “What right has my beloved in my house, when she has done vile deeds?”).
The phrase “marriage covenant” was the constant and normative phrase used to describe the legal framework of marriage in the Old Testament and in its surrounding cultures. Marriage covenants in the rest of the ancient Near East help us to understand the meaning of this phrase in the Old Testament. The term “covenant” has a wide range of meaning in the ancient Near East, from a business agreement concerning a loan through to a national treaty with a foreign power or with a god. The primary meaning of “covenant” was an agreement between two parties that was mutually binding. Covenants could be made, kept, and broken. Covenants were implemented by document or by a ceremony. They had stipulation agreed to by both parties, and sanctions that came into force when a stipulation was broken.
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The legal basis of marriage was called a “covenant” because, like all other types of covenant, it was an agreement between two parties that contained stipulations and sanctions. A marriage covenant, like any other covenant, included details of payment, the agreement to stipulations by two parties, a set of penalties for the party who did not keep these stipulations, and a legally binding witnessed ceremony or document that recorded all these matters.
A marriage covenant in the Old Testament was like all other ancient Near Eastern covenants. The Old Testament refers to the payments involved, the stipulations of the agreement, and the penalties that ensued if these stipulations were not kept. The Old Testament also uses the same legal language for all these aspects of a marriage covenant as found in other ancient Near Eastern marriage covenants.
Payment varied in different cultures and at different times throughout the time period covered by the Old Testament. The Old Babylonian culture had various payments. The terhatu or “bride-price,” which sealed the betrothal, was paid by the groom to the bride’s father. This averaged 10 shekels, or about 10 months wages. The sheriqtu or “dowry” was paid by the bride’s father to the bride. The Jewish equivalent of the terhatu was called the mohar. The husband also gave the bride gifts (Gen. 24:22). The Jewish equivalent of the sheriqtu was known as the nedunyah. scheme in the city states of Old Babylon and in other ancient Near Eastern cultures. Even the gods were not immune from making such payments. When Ugaritic gods took wives, they paid a very high bride-price in keeping with their exalted status. Yahweh also paid an especially high bride-price when he married Israel. However, Yahweh was pictured as paying the bride-price in a currency that was much more valuable than gold: he paid with “righteousness and justice.”
The purpose of these payments was to give security to the marriage, as well as being the legal seal on the marriage covenant. In some senses the covenant appears to be a sale, in which the groom buys his bride from her father. However, it was understood that the father would give a dowry well in excess of the bride-price, so that the net payment was made by the bride’s father to the groom. The dowry could be regarded as equivalent to the daughter’s share of the family estate, held in trust for her by her husband. In effect, therefore, the payment by the bride’s father helped the couple to establish their home.
The dowry also gave personal security to the bride. The dowry continued to belong to the bride, so if her husband died or divorced her, she had money to live on. She might also get a portion of the estate in addition to her dowry. The only exception to this was when the wife caused the divorce. In some arrangements the wife would get only half the dowry in this case, though usually she lost all rights to the dowry.
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These payments also added security to the marriage itself. The bride price, which was paid by the groom to the bride’s father, represented many months wages. This helped to ensure that marriage was not entered into lightly. The whole system of payments was weighted against divorce, because whoever caused the divorce was penalized financially. If the husband divorced his wife without cause, he usually returned the dowry, and if the wife divorced her husband without cause, she lost her right to some or all of her dowry. However, if the divorce was caused by one partner breaking a stipulation in the marriage contract, the guilty partner was deemed to have caused the divorce and the innocent partner kept the dowry. For example, the seventeenth century B.C.E. Babylonian high priest Enlil tried to escape the repayment of this dowry by accusing his wife of disloyalty, but his charges were found to be false.
Deuteronomy 24:1-4 is an example of these payments and penalties in action. This passage is an item of case law28 about a man who wanted to remarry a wife whom he had divorced, and who had been married again in the meantime. The ruling states that she would now be unclean for him. The reason for this ruling can be traced to the financial payments and penalties involved in marriage and divorce. The main difference between these two marriages was the financial consequence for the woman. The first marriage ended when the man cited a valid ground for divorce, namely “a matter of indecency.” The fact that he had a valid ground for the divorce meant that she lost her right to her dowry. The second marriage ended without any valid grounds for divorce, either because the man “hated/disliked” her (which was a technical term for a groundless divorce), or because he died. In either case the woman would have kept her dowry. If she had not brought a dowry into this second marriage, she would nevertheless have been awarded an equivalent amount. Westbrook thus noted that this would give the first husband a financial motive for remarrying his wife, because he would then have both her new dowry and her old one. This law therefore forbids the first husband from getting financial benefit in this way.
Marriage covenants in the ancient Near East were written and enacted exactly like any other business or diplomatic covenant. Like any other agreement, they were based on both trust and penalties. The penalties as well as the benefits of keeping the stipulations of the marriage covenant were clearly outlined. There was a recognized system of financial penalties for the partner who initiated divorce without good cause, or for the partner who broke the stipulations of the covenant. The terminology of marriage documents is also similar in all respects to other business transactions. This is all reflected in the Old Testament language and law. Although the phrase “marriage covenant” is correct, it is misleading. Marriage “covenant” has come to mean something separate from legal restraints. The phrase “marriage contract” is therefore much better than “marriage covenant” for conveying the correct meaning in modern English. This is the normal phrase used by Jewish scholars when referring to legal marriage documents, and also by ancient historians when referring to ancient Near Eastern marriage law.
Like any other contract, the ancient Near Eastern marriage contract was an agreement between two parties that also defined the penalties incurred by the party who failed to keep the agreement.
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There is a general understanding throughout the ancient Near East that a wife can be divorced at will by a husband and have her dowry returned, but, if she has done wrong, she does not receive her dowry. There is also some evidence that wives were able to divorce their husbands in some situations.
South Salt Lake Utah Divorce
With the hindsight of the New Testament, Genesis 2:24 might also be interpreted as a condemnation of divorce. The rest of the Pentateuch, however, fails to speak against divorce. Abraham divorced his wife Hagar, the slave, and it is recorded as if God approved (Gen. 21:12). Specific guidelines were given about the practice of divorce. In Exodus 21:10-11 there is the requirement in the divorce of a wife who is a slave that she must be released without any payment. Presumably this means that she did not have to buy her freedom, though it may also mean that the man did not have to pay her the equivalent of a dowry. Any other wife would be released with the repayment of her dowry, but a slave brought no dowry. Other guidelines are given about divorces in general in Deuteronomy 24:1-4: a divorced wife must be given a divorce certificate, and she must leave the marital home. Grounds for which divorce was accepted are also given in these passages. Indecency (whatever that meant) is named in Deuteronomy 24:1, and the neglect of basic provisions is implied in Exodus 21:10-11.10 The fact that the husband in Deuteronomy 22:13-18 tried to find false grounds for divorce suggests that a groundless divorce was either not permitted or resulted in severe financial penalty.
There is much more about divorce that is not stated. There is nothing about whether these were the only grounds for divorce, or whether or when the wife should have her dowry returned. There is nothing about the rights of children to their father’s estate. There is nothing about the rights of the woman after she is divorced, whether she is allowed to remarry, or where she should live after her divorce. There is no indication of the procedures for divorce, such as witnesses or other legal necessities.
Divorce Today
Divorce is not synonymous with marriage breakdown. It is, on the contrary, merely the legal recognition of the fact that the marriage relation ended at some time in the past. A divorce cannot be secured unless and until this fact has been established. Many married persons have terminated their marital relations in fact but have felt content to live apart without obtaining a divorce. Everyone knows of married couples not living together and with no present intention of being divorced. They may have shunned the divorce court because of the trouble or expense involved, because of moral scruples, or for fear of incurring social disapproval. People often are timid about advertising their domestic troubles to their friends and acquaintances for social or business reasons and hence avoid the publicity, not to say scandal, sometimes involved in divorce procedure. The public submission of the type of evidence necessary to secure divorce often serves as a deterrent with persons of sensitive nature. If you are considering divorce, speak to an experienced South Salt Lake Utah divorce lawyer. A prospective divorce client appears in a divorce lawyer’s office for an initial consultation. She has a sad story of domestic violence and a clear need for legal assistance, but only a limited capacity to pay for that service. Does the lawyer agree to represent this client, knowing that she may have to reduce or even waive her usual fees?
A divorce client frequently tries to use his meetings with his divorce lawyer to unburden himself about his unhappiness over his divorce and the direction his life is taking. Does the divorce lawyer listen to the client and offer him emotional support, or does he insist that the consultations focus on the client’s legal case?
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A divorce client refuses to consider a negotiated agreement and demands that her lawyer fight her case in court as a way of punishing her husband. Does the divorce lawyer pursue the client’s demands in court, or does she try to persuade the client to rethink her goals and expectations for the divorce in order to reach a settlement?
A divorce lawyer is preparing for settlement talks with an opposing attorney with whom he has never negotiated before. Does the lawyer significantly inflate his opening demands, or does he make a more modest proposal that he considers fair and reasonable?
A divorce lawyer has a client who wishes to talk directly with her spouse about the terms of their settlement. Does the lawyer permit her client to take part in fashioning an agreement, or does she insist that all negotiations be strictly between herself and the opposing counsel? Decisions such as these lie at the heart of lawyers’ day-to-day work. Whether they are made reflectively or reflexively, such choices underline the substantial discretion that results from the indeterminacy of attorneys’ professional roles. Ultimately, legal practice is constituted out of these many small judgments. How do lawyers think about and actually make these decisions? What guidelines and standards do lawyers use in deciding how to relate to clients and to opposing attorneys; about when, how, and with whom to negotiate; and about how at the end of the day to evaluate their own work? Do the answers to these questions flow more or less automatically from the lawyer’s formal training and expertise? To what degree do they reflect the lawyer’s own self-interest, the particular interests of the client, or the broader public interest? Such questions lie at the heart of discussions among scholars and bar leaders about the meaning of professionalism.
Simply put, the debate over legal professionalism revolves around the degree to which general professional identities, formal training, and rules of conduct guide the choices of individual lawyers in practice.
Professional bar rhetoric suggests that the most powerful influences on lawyers’ decisions come from law school socialization and formal codes of professional responsibility, which promote and enforce shared expertise, norms, and obligations. An alternative perspective points to economic incentives as the crucial determinants of lawyers’ conduct. That is, through their conditions of work, lawyers’ choices, like those of many professionals, are shaped by their own material interests or those of their employers or clients, even though they may be rationalized by reference to professional norms. Yet a third perspective emphasizes the role of personal identities and values in lawyers’ decision making. In this view, lawyers’ individual values or personal characteristics such as gender, race, religion, or class influence their professional conduct.
Each of these viewpoints yields a different explanation for the choices lawyers make in their daily work lives. Consider, for example, the attorney who is trying to decide whether or not to represent a poor client. If the lawyer agrees to accept the case, the professionalism account might suggest that she has internalized the legal profession’s norm of public service and feels obliged to help those who cannot afford a lawyer. However, the workplace version might see a struggling sole practitioner who cannot afford to pass up even the possibility of a modest fee. Alternatively, the personal identity perspective might attribute the lawyer’s decision to take the case to the fact that as a woman, the lawyer empathizes with the abused wife and seeks to use her legal skills to help women in difficult situations.
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Similarly, if the lawyer decides against representing the client, it might be because, having already achieved the American Bar Association’s target pro bono work for the year, she feels that she has done her professional duty. Or perhaps the attorney rejects the case because as a junior law firm associate, she is under considerable workplace pressure from firm partners to meet her annual quota of billable hours. Or it may be that she is tired of doing divorce work and does not want to be stereotyped as the advocate for all women.
What about the situation in which a divorce client badly wants and needs help in sorting out his personal life? How should the lawyer respond? Perhaps he declines to provide such assistance because he believes his legal training did not prepare him to be a therapist, and that it would be unethical for him to pretend to do so. Or maybe it is because in his low-cost, high-volume practice, the lawyer simply cannot spare the time to talk to clients about their personal problems. Possibly, the lawyer discourages his client from venting his feelings because he finds such issues painful and difficult to talk about. If, however, the lawyer decides to engage in counseling the client, is it the result of a family law course in law school that opened his eyes to the psychological effects of divorce? Is it because his experience as a divorce specialist has taught him that affluent clients expect to be provided with emotional as well as legal counseling—and are able and willing to pay for it? Or is it perhaps because this lawyer is naturally sensitive and empathetic and would not dream of silencing a person in distress?
Divorce lawyers vary in their understandings of professionalism in divorce practice. Some of these differences are shaped by the nature of their practices. Some derive from individual variations in character and values, while others are rooted in gender roles, age, and experience, and still others in the organization of their law firms. Specialists often understand their roles in divorce cases differently than do general practice lawyers. Unlike sole practitioners who do divorce work, lawyers employed by law firms face demands to be attentive to the interests of partners and to firm policies. Attorneys whose clients have few resources find themselves pressed to structure and limit their time in ways that lawyers with well-to-do clients do not.
The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (AAML) addressed the professional dilemma over representation in 1991 by adopting standards of conduct for divorce lawyers entitled Bounds of Advocacy (American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 1991). In this report, the Academy criticized existing bar codes for not providing adequate guidance to divorce lawyers and for ignoring the uniqueness of family law. The AAML standards rejected overzealous representation of partisan advocacy and articulated instead “the much greater level of professionalism” to which matrimonial lawyers should aspire (American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 1991: 4). The norms for professional conduct set out in the Bounds of Advocacy are indeed the informal norms of the “reasonable” divorce lawyer that we encountered in our interviews with divorce attorneys: prescriptions to encourage settlement; to avoid hardball legal tactics; to treat opposing counsel with candor, courtesy, and cooperation.
The common norm of the reasonable divorce lawyer defined both typical and expected behavior for handling most divorce cases. Through this norm, attorneys found guidance from their peers in how to make the difficult judgments that are central to the professional role. Reasonable lawyers advocated for their clients by knowing the law of divorce and making independent judgments about how to apply that law rather than by identifying too strongly with clients. They sought negotiated settlements where appropriate and avoided unnecessary litigation. In short, the norm of reasonableness in divorce appeared to respond to and incorporate some of the critiques of adversary advocacy. Reasonable lawyers were said to reduce costs (financial and emotional) for clients, more accurately apply substantive law (rather than being caught up in strategic manoeuvres), and produce qualitatively better and more equitable case outcomes. Divorce lawyers are not ordinarily portrayed as behaving in this way. The press and popular culture depict the “Rambo” lawyer, who files every conceivable motion, seeks everything and more from the opposing side, refuses to cooperate in settlement, and argues vigorously and bitterly in a long, drawn-out trial.
Divorce Legal Framework
The law provides the basic structure for defining advocacy. As the comment on Model Rule 3.1 states, “The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed” (American Bar Association 1995). The grounds for divorce in Utah allow both traditional fault criteria and no-fault, with equitable distribution of property and presumptions of shared legal custody of children. Knowledge of the law and experience with judicial decision making in divorce have led lawyers to construct informal norms about how to advocate for their clients. The communities of divorce lawyers have developed standards and shared reference points that define professionalism in practice. Not only does divorce bargaining occur “within the shadow of the law” but so too have attorneys’ ideas about the meaning of advocacy developed and changed within that legal shadow. Arguing zealously that a divorce client is blameless and deserves the bulk of the marital assets simply makes no sense to lawyers operating within a legal framework that ignores fault and presumes a 50–50 division of property. In other words, for most divorce cases, lawyers saw themselves engaged in something more closely resembling problem solving than adversarial negotiation.
In addition to the shift to no-fault, the introduction of child support guidelines significantly changed the law of divorce. Congress passed a law in 1984 to encourage child support enforcement, and states seeking federal funds were required to institute numerical formulas to guide judges in setting child support awards. The federal Family Support Act of 1988 further strengthened the 1984 law by making mandatory these mathematical formulas to set support amounts and strictly limiting deviations from them. Many states including Utah rewrote their child support laws to comply with these federal mandates.
“Winning” in divorce was not only unlikely as a matter of law, but it was also a costly goal to seek. That is, the costs of pursuing every possible avenue for a client within the bounds of the law often outweighed benefits to be gained. Divorce lawyers thus tried to convince clients to settle divorces by touting the comparative advantage of settlement over trials, rather than talking about fairness in settlement. A custody fight imposes costs on the “winning” party in terms of damaged long-term relationships that lawyers believed usually outweigh any gain. Divorce lawyers did not see divorce conflicts as zero-sum games.
The transaction costs of fighting for a greater share of property or more generous visitation were high, lawyers felt, and those costs rarely made economic sense for their clients. Thus, lawyers were attentive to the costs of alternative strategies in negotiation. Professional practice requires understanding what a job entails so that it can be done efficiently. Seeking a fair settlement rather than the most for a client, and opening divorce negotiations with a reasonable offer rather than an extreme one, provided lawyers with an efficient solution to the problem of negotiating an agreement.
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When lawyers tender offers in negotiation, they communicate important information about their own judgment and operating style, information that is easily and quickly shared within a small legal community. At the same time, lawyers’ offers communicate something to the other lawyer about how she is viewed—as another professional to be treated with respect and courtesy or as an adversary to be fought.
Legal rules, concepts, and procedures in family law all influenced the nature of advocacy in divorce. The substantive legal rules of no-fault divorce rejected one-sided case outcomes and presumed instead an equal division of property and some sharing of legal responsibility for children. Strict child support guidelines further removed issues from legal dispute. The resulting legal framework thus provided few incentives for divorce lawyers in most cases to try to “win big” for their clients.
The ideology of legal professionalism includes a commitment to altruism. The realities of practice, however, place limits on selflessness. Scholars of the professions see as a core problem of professional practice “the tension between the provision of affordable and conscientious service to others, and the economic interest of those who provide it”. The American Bar Association’s Commission on Professionalism placed the tension between service and self-interest at the center of its inquiry, questioning whether the profession has lived up to its public service commitment. The formal rules of professional responsibility highlight this conflict without resolving context for many day-to-day decisions by divorce lawyers, decisions through which lawyers both construct and enact the variable meanings of professionalism in practice.
In a contested divorce, witness testimony and evidence can play an important role in the outcome of the trial. An experienced South Salt Lake Utah divorce lawyer can be your best friend if you are in the midst of a contested divorce.
Just as a lawyer may not himself make false statements or offer false evidence, he has certain kinds of obligations to the other side’s evidence as well. An attorney may not “unlawfully obstruct another person’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value.” He or she must make a “diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party.” The prohibitions on a lawyer’s making a false statement, however undetectable, or presenting false evidence, however effective, are examples of the way in which the constitutive rules of the trial incorporate the lawyer’s “natural” or full knowledge of events. They are, in a sense, limitations on the trial’s artifice. By contrast, other constitutive rules require that a lawyer put aside his own full knowledge and judgment and defer to the trial’s artifice. By prohibiting a lawyer from alluding during trial to “any matter the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence,” the rules enjoin, as a matter of ethical obligation, deference to all of the policies embedded in the law of evidence. An attorney may neither assert a personal knowledge of the facts, except under those very rare occasions on which a trial attorney may testify, nor state her personal opinion as to “the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant, or the guilt or innocence of an accused.” It is only what can be proven subject to the public rules of the trial that affects the outcome.
Though the privileges, including the lawyer-client privilege, are part of the law of evidence, the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality goes beyond the attorney-client privilege, which applies only to confidential communications from the client and prevents compelled disclosures at trial. The duty of confidentiality prohibits the lawyer from revealing anything, whatever its source, “relating to the representation.” This affects the trial as well. It allows a lawyer to rely on what can be dozens of often slight misunderstandings by witnesses and opposing counsel that are helpful to his case. He does not have to tell the court that they “don’t quite have it right.” This is unlike the singular instance of “false testimony” offered by a witness whom she herself calls, where she has a duty to take “remedial measures” based on her own knowledge, whatever its source. Here, again, it is the artifice of the trial, embedded in the ethical and evidentiary rules operating together, that reigns.
Hence the law of professional responsibility pushes the trial in two very different directions. It imposes on a lawyer an ethical obligation to bend all his imagination and effort to present a case, tell a story, that serves his client’s own perceived interests. Facts are purposes. Yet against this general obligation stand specific and limited prohibitions: the client deserves counsel on the wisdom of his perceived interests in light of how the legal order will view those interests; access to evidence should not be obstructed; false statements should not be made nor false evidence presented; and the lawyer should respect the principles and policies embedded in the evidentiary rules. Purposefulness must respect those things which we cannot, or should not, change at will. The tension is between energy and respect. In any case, the rules of professional responsibility, both in reinforcing and limiting the trial’s artifice, make it what it is. Evidence law is, after all, a vast body of doctrine that has developed over centuries, and, despite recent simplification and rationalization, it still bears many vestigial organs from that evolution. The law of evidence provides the “grammar” of the trial. Only those truths that can be said “grammatically” can become part of the legal world. In the language of the trial courts, it is no longer “based on personal knowledge.” It becomes potentially objectionable as opinion testimony, as improper characterization, as reputation testimony, as unauthentic, as violating the best evidence rule, as hearsay. In each case the proponent of the evidence must look to some specific rule, with additional requirements, exceptions, and limitations, to admit the problematic testimony. The requirement of testimony in the language of perception, embodied in the requirement that testimony be based on “personal knowledge” and that it stay within the nonopinion rule, is one of the two fundamental principles of the law of evidence.
The nonopinion rule is, in the trial courtroom, supported by a range of objections “to the form of the question.” Most prominently, these objections prevent the lawyer’s “leading” most witnesses on direct examination, calling for conclusions, or assuming facts not yet in evidence. These rules prohibit some of the most common devices of ordinary conversation and have entangled thousands of young lawyers in their nets, reducing them to an embarrassed silence. These rules were not constructed in order to enforce the legal profession��s priestly prerogatives, to allow only the initiated to engage in the activities that invoke the power of the legal system. Rather, they enforce a certain vision of the form that direct examination, and so witness testimony, ought to have. They are rules that serve as “mere abridgement of the activity itself; they do not exist in advance of the activity.” The envisioned activity is lay witness testimony about any episode as a rhythm of physical description and then chronological narrative of events and actions.
The first can be accomplished without leading questions and questions that call for conclusions or the assumption of facts not yet in evidence only because the witness testimony has an implicit structure— that of spatial relationships. In fact, one of the most common rhetorical devices for description of the scene is the “walk around.” (“Now, as you entered the house and looked to your left, what did you see?” “And as your gaze came around to the area right in front of you, what did you see there?”) The second step has its implicit structure as well—that of temporal relationships. The most common question in direct examination is simply, “What happened next?” Now this simplicity is deceiving: as we have seen, a fair amount of craft can go into the structuring of a direct examination. My point here is only that unless the examination is conducted as a rhythm of physical description, and chronological narrative, it will inevitably violate the strictures against leading, calling for conclusions, and assuming facts not (yet) in evidence. Basic elements of narrative structure are embedded in the evidentiary rules that constitute direct examination. The other basic principle is the requirement that the evidence be relevant. Materiality requires that the proposition which the evidence is offered to prove be a proposition that is “of consequence.” The substantive law, of course, determines whether the proposition is of consequence.
Materiality is the notion that, more than any other, serves to limit the range of the inquiry at the trial, that keeps “every witness box from becoming a confessional.” Most broadly, it seeks to limit the trial to serving corrective or commutative justice, restoring a party to his legally legitimate expectations (or “rights”), without regard to broader inquiries concerning what we now call distributive or social justice, the fairness of the overall distribution of benefits and burdens between the parties. In a liberal society, it serves specifically to suppress inquiry into the moral character, or desert, of the parties.
Materiality thus requires that every unit of evidence offered be related to an element of the crime, claim, or defense—the propositions that the party with the burden of proof must establish in order to prevail. It has a dark side. The dark side is the threat it poses to “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.” Materiality serves to assure that the truth which emerges at trial is a “legal truth,” determined solely by those aspects of the case that the law deems “of consequence.” Insofar as the legal perspective on the case deviates from a compelling moral perspective, for example, the trier of fact will be unaware of morally relevant aspects of the situation. Sometimes the gap between morally relevant and legally relevant may be justified, but ultimately it must be morally justified. And even if justified, it risks absolutizing the legal artifice by detaching it from its moral foundations, and so forgetting “that man is only the master, not the creator of the world.”
The other element of relevance is logical relevance: the unit of evidence must actually be probative of (or disprove) a legally determined element of the claim or defense.
To be logically relevant, a proposed piece of evidence need only make a proposition of consequence to the determination of the litigation (a “material” proposition) more or less likely than it would be without the evidence. It must ever so slightly alter the balance of probabilities. Once it achieves that level of probative force, it can be excluded only for what are basically pragmatic reasons, and only if those reasons “substantially” outweigh its probative force. Thus evidence is relevant if it makes any material proposition ever so slightly more or less likely than it would be without the evidence, unless certain pragmatic considerations substantially outweigh its probative value. That is a strong tilt toward admissibility, a tilt which approaches the vertical if understood practically.
The human mind seeks to determine historical truth (“what happened”) by constructing plausible narratives that are both consistent with the “web of belief” and supported by reliable evidence. The notions “consistent,” “supported,” and “reliable” are subject to varying interpretations and raise deep questions. A trial judge will not usually make his or her relevancy determinations by considering the direct logical relationship of the evidence offered to a material proposition. Rather, he or she will situate the evidence offered within the proponent’s factual theory of the case. But an advocate will almost always have choices to make among theories of the case and always will have choices among details of the factual theory, “subplots” if you will.
There are deep reasons why most evidence has “multiple relevances,” some legitimate and some illegitimate. The illegitimate inferences may invoke substantive moral or political norms outside the instructions for the ultimate decision of the case, or may involve lines of reasoning—from a party’s “character” for example, or from a hearsay statement—that the law of evidence determines insufficiently reliable on which to base a purely factual determination that must be made if the trier of fact is following the norms in the instructions. Recall that evidence may be excluded only if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice, such as that from an “illegitimate inference,” and one can understand the inevitability of evidence whose significance can overwhelm the substantive legal norms by invoking alternative values. Thus the lawyer’s control over both the legal and factual theory of the case, the low standard for logical relevance, the high standard (“substantially outweighed”) for exclusion of logically relevant evidence, and the pervasiveness of the nonopinion rule all suggest that the rules of evidence function more to structure than to exclude evidence. This is true, even within the “rationalist” tradition in the law of evidence, which generally understands the warrants that render a piece of evidence logically relevant to be purely empirical, and so value-free, empirical generalizations embedded in the judge’s common sense about what happens “generally and for the most part.” But there is more to relevance.
Most obviously, what constitutes “unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,” possibly calling for the exclusion of logically relevant evidence, requires a normative judgment on which purely legal considerations offer little guidance, and to which appellate courts are especially deferential. In many different ways, normative considerations affect “pure” relevancy determinations, both by rule and by judicial practice. This occurs in a self-conscious and focused way and, more important, in a tacit and pervasive way.
Some of these “relevancy” rules embody deeply held views about the importance of limited government. For example, evidence law prohibits a lawyer’s presenting proof of a witness’s religious beliefs in order to show that he is more or less credible.
The nonopinion rule and the relevance rule are the two most important and most “generative” of the rules of evidence. They are “generative” in the sense that most of the other evidence rules can be derived from them. There are basically four other categories of evidentiary rules, which have limited theoretical interest because of their derivative nature, but I deem them worth mentioning to round out the picture. The so-called best evidence rule requires only that the originals of documents be offered if available. Therefore, evidence as diverse as documents, physical evidence, telephone calls, and scientific processes all must be authenticated, unless it belongs to a class of evidence where there is no serious reason to doubt that evidence “is what it purports to be.” Authentication is usually fairly undemanding, the available methods virtually without limit, and the standard for admissibility relatively low. Though it is possible that some potential evidence can be excluded because the requisite “foundation” as to authenticity is unavailable, such exclusions are relatively rare. Evidence must also be “competent”—broadly speaking, “eligible to be received as evidence.” For example, a judge is incompetent to testify in a trial over which she presides; a juror is incompetent to testify as to his own intentions during deliberation in order to “impeach” or overturn his verdict; it is still said that a witness who has not perceived anything of consequence, or cannot remember what he perceived, or is incapable of communicating what he perceives and remembers, or is psychologically or morally incapable of differentiating fact from fantasy, is “incompetent” to testify.
Competence is a residual category. It now excludes certain kinds of evidence because they are likely to be unreliable, such as the testimony of very young children and persons in psychotic states. The broad tendency of the law of evidence has been to eliminate total incompetencies to testify and permit, instead, forms of impeachment that allow the juror to weigh the troubling aspect of the witness’s testimony like any other “impeaching” fact. Competency rules also exclude certain kinds of evidence for “structural” reasons: the judge’s potential testimony in the case over which he presides and usually the trial lawyer’s testimony in the case he tries. Finally, there is the rule against hearsay, which excludes out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted. There is a wonderful scholasticism surrounding the definition of hearsay that has its interests but is not germane to my purposes here. The most fundamental purpose of the hearsay rule is to protect cross-examination, “the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.” The notion is that only if the person whose perceptions are being reported is the same person who is reporting the perceptions can the cross-examiner properly explore (1) important weaknesses in perception, memory, and clarity of expression that may infect the testimony even of sincere witnesses, and (2) biases, interests, prejudice, and character failings that cast doubt on the witness’s credibility.
The broad drift of the law of evidence has been to admit more and more hearsay evidence, and for the constitutional jurisprudence surrounding the analogous Confrontation Clause to follow the lead of evidence law. There have always been dozens of defined exceptions to the hearsay rule. Many jurisdictions also now have “catch-all” exceptions for hearsay that simply seems “reliable.” Recall too that out-of-court statements are inadmissible only if offered for the truth of the matter asserted. This raises what we now know to be issues of multiple relevancies. Out of-court statements can be offered for purposes other than the truth of what was asserted, and, once admitted, are usually considered for all purposes. The deferential principles of relevancy law that allow those other purposes to be logically quite weak and the ability of advocates to tailor actual theories in order to render desirable evidence logically relevant together reduce the actual bite of the hearsay rule.
The best evidence rule, the requirement of authentication, most of the law of competence, and the hearsay rule all serve to ensure that evidence upon which a juror may decide a case is reliable. At a level below the rhetoric of judicial opinions, reliability is really a form of relevance. Evidence that is utterly unreliable is really irrelevant: it really does not render a fact that is of consequence to the litigation any more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Lawyers play the dominant role in the courtroom because they serve professionally as essential, expert advocates for those they represent. A word used since at least the thirteenth century, “advocate” refers to a “lawyer who pleads a case in a court of law on behalf of another”. In divorce trials, each of the litigants—plaintiff and defendant—are represented by one or more advocates. Preparing and pleading a case in the modern legal world is a time-consuming, complicated process requiring extensive knowledge of the law and the rules of the legal system. Parties generally have no hope of competently managing a case on their own (proceeding “pro se”). Trial cases are the bailiwick of lawyer-advocates. What is litigation? It is a legal proceeding between two or more parties in an attempt to “right” an alleged wrong. The “right” usually takes the form of a demand for payment to the party alleging injury. The path to a legal solution is often filled with unanticipated twists, unexpected delays, and potentially high stress for even the most seasoned litigants. Litigation is more often about losing less than it is about winning more; a litigant “is a person about to give up his skin in the hope of retaining his bone.” An anonymous author once wrote that “America is a country where, thanks to Congress, there are 40 million laws to enforce 10 Commandments.” As a result, litigation can easily take long periods of time and a great deal of expense. As courts become more congested with the seemingly endless number of cases being filed, the process can bog down from sheer volume alone. To be fair, many of the cases filed have merit. The American legal system is built on the principle of protecting the rights of the individual, and litigation is one way to protect those rights. Merit or not, however, the number of lawsuits continues to grow with little sign of slowing. Lawyers are the vanguards of the justice system. The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide attorneys with a framework for carrying out their responsibilities to their clients, the courts, and society in a professional manner. These rules are particularly important when pursuing a client’s claims, given the adversarial nature of litigation as well as the conflicts that may arise when lawyer and client have differing interests in the outcome (for example, settling a case versus taking it to trial).
The Model Rules require lawyers to provide “competent representation” to their clients in the areas of legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation. Legal knowledge includes knowledge of federal and state rules of evidence and civil procedure, as well as precedents set by case law, in order “to advance and protect the integrity of the fact-finding process.” Mastering these laws not only helps lawyers and their clients but also reduces the possibility for embarrassment and legal complications such as mistrials, inadmissible evidence, lost appeals, or reversed verdicts.
Custody and Parental Involvement
Custody itself is probably the biggest factor determining the level of parental involvement among parents who do not live together, because of its long-run effects on the level of emotional effort, care, and connection. In some families, noncustodial parents visit frequently and consistently. This is especially true immediately after children are born to unmarried parents who are romantically involved. However, these relationships tend to either turn into cohabitation or marriage or break up within a year or two. When parents are divorced or were never married and are no longer romantically involved, fathers’ involvement with children is often minimal and sporadic. Among a significant minority of such families, paternal visitation tapers off to nothing or nearly nothing within a few years.
Noncustodial parents tend to disengage emotionally for several reasons, whether as a result of relationship atrophy (“out of sight out of mind”), emotional avoidance (“it’s just too painful to see my kids under these conditions”), or overreliance on the custodial parent (“she’ll take good care of the kids no matter what I do”). Custodial parents may want to avoid contact with their previous partners at all costs. Emotional disengagement may contribute to financial disengagement, or vice versa. In any case, the effects are cumulative: The more emotionally disengaged the noncustodial parent becomes, the less implicit bargaining power the custodial parent has to increase either payment or time inputs. If the noncustodial parent feels little connection to—and wants no contact with—the child, the custodial parent is less able to successfully use an appeal to the needs of the child or a threat to make visitation or contact more difficult as a bargaining strategy. Furthermore, the less emotionally engaged the noncustodial parent becomes, the less the custodial parent and child have to gain from personal contact with him (or her). Thus, disengagement of one type breeds further disengagement.
Most parents want to increase their children’s well-being. But the ways they want to do so are shaped not merely by their perceptions of children’s needs but also by their own preferences—how they weigh their children’s and fellow parent’s well-being relative to their own. A father may feel less need to be involved in direct parenting if a mother is already providing substantial effort, and vice versa. Both levels and forms of parental involvement are subject to negotiation and bargaining. For instance, one parent might want the other parent to spend more time or money or simply give more personal attention to a child. That parent might offer something in return, as in, “If you’ll put the children to bed, I’ll do the dishes. ” Parents don’t negotiate over every detail of their lives. Many aspects of the division of labor in parenting are determined by social norms or prior agreement. Traditionally, we expect fathers to provide more income and mothers to provide more direct care for children. But in periods of time when both social norms and individual economic opportunities are rapidly changing, the scope for individual bargaining probably increases. For instance, a mother who has high earnings potential or who is committed to her career is likely to bargain with the father to increase his direct involvement in child care.
Such negotiations are necessarily complex. Parental involvement is a not a simple “product” but a process that requires emotional effort as well as time and money. It imposes costs, but it also confers benefits. Therefore, we cannot assume that parents always want to minimize it or to maximize it—rather they probably seek some level of involvement that is determined both by their perceptions of what children need, their own preferences, and what they believe the other parent should and could provide. It is important to remember, however, that some circularity comes into play; for example, a parent’s bargaining power may affect how much the other parent is involved with the child, but that involvement may in turn affect the parents’ relative bargaining power.
Rules about custody and support interact in ways that illustrate the interplay of nonpecuniary and economic benefits. Child custody is psychologically important to parents, especially to primary caregivers whose involvement is time and care intensive. They may feel that custody is necessary in order to provide greater continuity for themselves or the child; furthermore, as primary caregivers, they may be more emotionally attached to the child. As we discussed, this means that most mothers cannot make a credible threat to stop taking care of the child within the marriage or in the event of divorce (to leave the child with the father); thus, their ability to use the fact that they are providing child care as a bargaining chip with the father is limited, and it is limited even more if the father’s empathy for the child is low because he has been less emotionally involved.
The intensification of child support enforcement efforts over the past few years has provoked tremendous controversy. Although success has been uneven, more divorced fathers are paying children support. This, together with the growing cultural stigmatization of “deadbeat dads” has almost certainly increased the bargaining power of mothers relative to fathers within marriage as well as among noncohabiting parents. Mothers’ external threat points are higher as a result. Men can withdraw some of their earnings by divorce, but the amount of withdrawal is reduced by the amount of child support mandated by the state. Not surprisingly, some men have responded to this trend by demanding greater consideration as potential custodians in the event of divorce. In most states today the presumption of legal custody is no longer gender specific, but rests instead on what the court deems best for the child. Relatively few fathers try to convince judges that they are the better custodial parent, and even fewer succeed. But the number of men who seek and get custody or joint physical custody is rising.
Thus, the legal environment has produced two changes in recent decades. Mothers’ confidence that they will get child support if they divorce has increased, but they can be less sure than before that they will get custody. What is the net effect of this change on bargaining power likely to be? One could argue that two changes cancel each other out in their effect on maternal bargaining power—that is, mothers gain a higher probability of effective child support enforcement at the cost of a higher risk of losing sole custody and so there is no effect on their bargaining power. It is hard to say.
Divorced noncustodial parents are required to pay child support (provided there is a court order for it), and custodial parents are required to allow visitation by the other father. Furthermore, states limit the ability of unmarried parents to bargain by setting separate and independent rules regarding custody, visitation, and support. Failure to pay child support, for instance, cannot generally be used as a reason to deny a noncustodial parent contact with a child. Nor can failure to enjoy visitation easily be used as a reason not to pay child support.
Cohabitation and Alimony
No laws in Utah require unmarried cohabitants to support each other. And no state including Utah awards alimony or other support payments when an unmarried couple separates. If, however, the cohabitants have entered a contract under which one agrees to support the other, the contract may be enforced (depending on the state in which the cohabitants live or the contract was established). Lawsuits brought to enforce these contracts have been popularly called palimony cases. But, since cohabitants seeking recovery under such an agreement are doing so on the basis of an express or implied contract and not on an alimony statute, the word palimony is actually inaccurate.
Traditionally, unless a couple has an express written agreement to the contrary, the law has left matters regarding the property owned by cohabitants if they end their relationship as they are. Thus, when a couple separates, the property goes to whoever has legal title to it. Usually, this has meant that the man gets the property, because in relationships in which the man is the wage earner and the woman the homemaker, the wage earner “owns” the property acquired through his wages. In addition, until recently, most state courts refused to enforce even express agreements between cohabitants as to support or ownership of property. These courts have followed two main lines of reasoning. First, they have based their refusal on the grounds that such agreements are invalid. because they are based on “illicit sexual services.” For any contract to be valid, it must be based on something of value, or what the law calls consideration. Consideration cannot be illegal. The typical consideration in business contracts is money, services, property, or goods. Traditionally, courts have ignored the fact that most contracts between cohabitants are based on similar types of consideration. They have assumed either that the only services exchanged are sexual services or that, because sexual services form even part of the agreement, they invalidate the entire agreement. The second line of reasoning courts have used in refusing to enforce contracts between cohabitants is that homemaking services have no dollar value, so are not sufficient consideration to support an agreement to share property or to provide support.
Divorce and Alimony
In some divorces, courts award alimony, also called spousal support or maintenance, to one party. Alimony is especially likely after a long marriage or if one spouse gave up career plans to support the other spouse or to care for the children.
Alimony is designed to help a lower-earning spouse make it through the divorce and the transition into a new single life. Depending on the length of the marriage and the degree to which one spouse was financially dependent on the other, support can be either temporary or last for many years. However, the nationwide trend is for courts to award spousal support in fewer and fewer situations, and for shorter times when they do award it, because it has become common for both spouses to work or at least be able to return to work. The court’s decision on whether one spouse is entitled to support from the other after the divorce is completed, begins with the question of need. There’s no hard and fast rule, but in general the longer the marriage, the stronger the presumption that support is appropriate. The court will consider many factors while determining alimony including the length of the marriage, the division of marital property, the income and earning capacity of the spouses, the amount of time one spouse has not worked since the marriage and any other factor that the court may consider as relevant.
Alimony falls into two broad categories: short-term support and long-term or permanent support. “Reimbursement” support is a kind of long-term support. A spouse may also get temporary support before the divorce is final. It’s possible that a former spouse might receive more than one kind of support at the same time. If a spouse is getting more than one kind of support, say rehabilitative and short-term, then when the spouse is employed again, the rehabilitative support would end. The short-term support would continue until its termination date.
Short-term support is ordered when the marriage itself was short. Short-term support lasts only a few years, and its precise ending date is set in the court order. Rehabilitative support, sometimes also called “bridge the gap” support, is a specific kind of short-term support, designed to help a dependent spouse get retrained and back into the workforce. It usually lasts until the recipient is back to work. Generally, that date isn’t set in advance—the agreement is that the support payments will stop when the recipient completes a retraining program and becomes employed. The recipient is responsible for diligently pursuing their training and then searching for work. The other spouse is responsible for paying the support until that point—and a payer who suspects the recipient isn’t really trying to complete an education or get work can ask the court to reduce the support amount or set a termination date. The person asking for the modification would have to prove that the other ex-spouse was not working hard enough.
Permanent support may be granted after long marriages, generally more than ten years, if the judge concludes that the dependent spouse isn’t likely to go back into the workforce and will need support indefinitely. Some states don’t allow permanent support. Permanent support does eventually end when either the recipient or the payor dies. It also may end when the recipient remarries. In about half the states, it ends if the recipient begins living with another person in a marriage-like relationship where the couple provides mutual support and shares financial responsibilities. Reimbursement support is the only type of spousal support that’s not completely based on financial need. Instead, it’s a way to compensate a spouse who sacrificed education, training, or career advancement during the marriage by taking any old job that would support the family while the other spouse trained for a lucrative professional career. Generally both spouses expected that once the professional spouse was established and earning the anticipated higher salary, the sacrificing spouse would benefit from the higher standard of living and be free to pursue a desirable career. If the marriage ends before that spouse gets any of those expected benefits, reimbursement support rebalances the scales by making the professional spouse return some of what was given during the marriage. Because it’s not tied to need, reimbursement support ends whenever the agreement or court order says it does. Its termination generally isn’t tied to an event like the supported spouse getting work or remarrying. If you are seeking alimony payments from your spouse, or your spouse is seeking alimony payments from you, the services of an experienced South Salt Lake Utah divorce lawyer can greatly increase your chances since the lawyer has been trained in how to present evidence that supports your position to the judge.
Hire the services of Ascent Law – Hire an experienced South Salt Lake Utah divorce lawyer.
Unless you and your spouse have mutually agreed on the terms of your divorce, your divorce battle can be a long drawn case. You will have to back up your claims with evidence and be prepared to testify in support of your case. If there are children from the divorce, the custody of the children will be decided by the courts unless you and your spouse have mutually agreed on the custody. The mother does not automatically get custody of the children. The court will consider many factors when deciding on who should get custody of the children in a contested divorce. Utah divorce law is complex. Attempting to navigate the complex maze of Utah divorce laws can be disastrous. Seek the assistance of an experienced South Salt Lake Utah divorce lawyer.
South Salt Lake Utah Divorce Lawyer Free Consultation
When you need legal help with a divorce in South Salt Lake Utah, please call Ascent Law LLC (801) 676-5506 for your Free Consultation. We can help you with Divorce. Child Support. Child Custody. Alimony. Modification of Child Support. Modification of Divorce Decree. And Much More. We want to help you.
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Divorce Lawyer South Salt Lake Utah
There can be no divorce without marriage. Both are interconnected since the beginning of civilization.
Marriage is called a “covenant” throughout the Pentateuch and the rest of the Old Testament.1 Proverbs 2:17 speaks about the adulterous wife who “ignored the covenant made before God,” and Malachi says that one of the witnesses of any “marriage covenant” is God himself (2:14). Ezekiel employs a vivid picture of God marrying the nation of Judah, in which he frequently referred to their marriage covenant (Ezek. 16:8, 59-62). He describes in intimate and overtly sexual language how God entered into marriage, including the ceremony at which he said: “I spread the edge of my cloak over you, and covered your nakedness: I pledged myself to you and entered into a covenant with you” (Ezek. 16:8).
A marriage covenant is also referred to in many of the passages that speak about a covenant with God. The word “covenant” may mean a “marriage covenant” or a “treaty covenant,” and often in these passages it means both. The marriage covenant of God with his people is, at times, almost synonymous with his treaty covenant with them. For example, the comment “I will remember my covenant with you in the days of your youth, and I will establish with you an everlasting covenant,” which occurs in the description of God’s marriage to Israel (Ezek. 16:60), sounds very similar to Ezekiel 37:26, which speaks about the treaty covenant of God with his people. A similar mixture of these two ideas occurs in Jeremiah 31:31-32, where the new everlasting covenant is compared with “my covenant which they broke, though I was their husband.” These two concepts are sometimes mixed deliberately in order to draw out comparisons. For example, Jeremiah 11:10 appears to refer to a treaty covenant (“they have broken the covenant that I made with their ancestors”) but later verses contain references to Israel as a wayward wife (Jer. 11:15, “What right has my beloved in my house, when she has done vile deeds?”).
The phrase “marriage covenant” was the constant and normative phrase used to describe the legal framework of marriage in the Old Testament and in its surrounding cultures. Marriage covenants in the rest of the ancient Near East help us to understand the meaning of this phrase in the Old Testament. The term “covenant” has a wide range of meaning in the ancient Near East, from a business agreement concerning a loan through to a national treaty with a foreign power or with a god. The primary meaning of “covenant” was an agreement between two parties that was mutually binding. Covenants could be made, kept, and broken. Covenants were implemented by document or by a ceremony. They had stipulation agreed to by both parties, and sanctions that came into force when a stipulation was broken.
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The legal basis of marriage was called a “covenant” because, like all other types of covenant, it was an agreement between two parties that contained stipulations and sanctions. A marriage covenant, like any other covenant, included details of payment, the agreement to stipulations by two parties, a set of penalties for the party who did not keep these stipulations, and a legally binding witnessed ceremony or document that recorded all these matters.
A marriage covenant in the Old Testament was like all other ancient Near Eastern covenants. The Old Testament refers to the payments involved, the stipulations of the agreement, and the penalties that ensued if these stipulations were not kept. The Old Testament also uses the same legal language for all these aspects of a marriage covenant as found in other ancient Near Eastern marriage covenants.
Payment varied in different cultures and at different times throughout the time period covered by the Old Testament. The Old Babylonian culture had various payments. The terhatu or “bride-price,” which sealed the betrothal, was paid by the groom to the bride’s father. This averaged 10 shekels, or about 10 months wages. The sheriqtu or “dowry” was paid by the bride’s father to the bride. The Jewish equivalent of the terhatu was called the mohar. The husband also gave the bride gifts (Gen. 24:22). The Jewish equivalent of the sheriqtu was known as the nedunyah. scheme in the city states of Old Babylon and in other ancient Near Eastern cultures. Even the gods were not immune from making such payments. When Ugaritic gods took wives, they paid a very high bride-price in keeping with their exalted status. Yahweh also paid an especially high bride-price when he married Israel. However, Yahweh was pictured as paying the bride-price in a currency that was much more valuable than gold: he paid with “righteousness and justice.”
The purpose of these payments was to give security to the marriage, as well as being the legal seal on the marriage covenant. In some senses the covenant appears to be a sale, in which the groom buys his bride from her father. However, it was understood that the father would give a dowry well in excess of the bride-price, so that the net payment was made by the bride’s father to the groom. The dowry could be regarded as equivalent to the daughter’s share of the family estate, held in trust for her by her husband. In effect, therefore, the payment by the bride’s father helped the couple to establish their home.
The dowry also gave personal security to the bride. The dowry continued to belong to the bride, so if her husband died or divorced her, she had money to live on. She might also get a portion of the estate in addition to her dowry. The only exception to this was when the wife caused the divorce. In some arrangements the wife would get only half the dowry in this case, though usually she lost all rights to the dowry.
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These payments also added security to the marriage itself. The bride price, which was paid by the groom to the bride’s father, represented many months wages. This helped to ensure that marriage was not entered into lightly. The whole system of payments was weighted against divorce, because whoever caused the divorce was penalized financially. If the husband divorced his wife without cause, he usually returned the dowry, and if the wife divorced her husband without cause, she lost her right to some or all of her dowry. However, if the divorce was caused by one partner breaking a stipulation in the marriage contract, the guilty partner was deemed to have caused the divorce and the innocent partner kept the dowry. For example, the seventeenth century B.C.E. Babylonian high priest Enlil tried to escape the repayment of this dowry by accusing his wife of disloyalty, but his charges were found to be false.
Deuteronomy 24:1-4 is an example of these payments and penalties in action. This passage is an item of case law28 about a man who wanted to remarry a wife whom he had divorced, and who had been married again in the meantime. The ruling states that she would now be unclean for him. The reason for this ruling can be traced to the financial payments and penalties involved in marriage and divorce. The main difference between these two marriages was the financial consequence for the woman. The first marriage ended when the man cited a valid ground for divorce, namely “a matter of indecency.” The fact that he had a valid ground for the divorce meant that she lost her right to her dowry. The second marriage ended without any valid grounds for divorce, either because the man “hated/disliked” her (which was a technical term for a groundless divorce), or because he died. In either case the woman would have kept her dowry. If she had not brought a dowry into this second marriage, she would nevertheless have been awarded an equivalent amount. Westbrook thus noted that this would give the first husband a financial motive for remarrying his wife, because he would then have both her new dowry and her old one. This law therefore forbids the first husband from getting financial benefit in this way.
Marriage covenants in the ancient Near East were written and enacted exactly like any other business or diplomatic covenant. Like any other agreement, they were based on both trust and penalties. The penalties as well as the benefits of keeping the stipulations of the marriage covenant were clearly outlined. There was a recognized system of financial penalties for the partner who initiated divorce without good cause, or for the partner who broke the stipulations of the covenant. The terminology of marriage documents is also similar in all respects to other business transactions. This is all reflected in the Old Testament language and law. Although the phrase “marriage covenant” is correct, it is misleading. Marriage “covenant” has come to mean something separate from legal restraints. The phrase “marriage contract” is therefore much better than “marriage covenant” for conveying the correct meaning in modern English. This is the normal phrase used by Jewish scholars when referring to legal marriage documents, and also by ancient historians when referring to ancient Near Eastern marriage law.
Like any other contract, the ancient Near Eastern marriage contract was an agreement between two parties that also defined the penalties incurred by the party who failed to keep the agreement.
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There is a general understanding throughout the ancient Near East that a wife can be divorced at will by a husband and have her dowry returned, but, if she has done wrong, she does not receive her dowry. There is also some evidence that wives were able to divorce their husbands in some situations.
South Salt Lake Utah Divorce
With the hindsight of the New Testament, Genesis 2:24 might also be interpreted as a condemnation of divorce. The rest of the Pentateuch, however, fails to speak against divorce. Abraham divorced his wife Hagar, the slave, and it is recorded as if God approved (Gen. 21:12). Specific guidelines were given about the practice of divorce. In Exodus 21:10-11 there is the requirement in the divorce of a wife who is a slave that she must be released without any payment. Presumably this means that she did not have to buy her freedom, though it may also mean that the man did not have to pay her the equivalent of a dowry. Any other wife would be released with the repayment of her dowry, but a slave brought no dowry. Other guidelines are given about divorces in general in Deuteronomy 24:1-4: a divorced wife must be given a divorce certificate, and she must leave the marital home. Grounds for which divorce was accepted are also given in these passages. Indecency (whatever that meant) is named in Deuteronomy 24:1, and the neglect of basic provisions is implied in Exodus 21:10-11.10 The fact that the husband in Deuteronomy 22:13-18 tried to find false grounds for divorce suggests that a groundless divorce was either not permitted or resulted in severe financial penalty.
There is much more about divorce that is not stated. There is nothing about whether these were the only grounds for divorce, or whether or when the wife should have her dowry returned. There is nothing about the rights of children to their father’s estate. There is nothing about the rights of the woman after she is divorced, whether she is allowed to remarry, or where she should live after her divorce. There is no indication of the procedures for divorce, such as witnesses or other legal necessities.
Divorce Today
Divorce is not synonymous with marriage breakdown. It is, on the contrary, merely the legal recognition of the fact that the marriage relation ended at some time in the past. A divorce cannot be secured unless and until this fact has been established. Many married persons have terminated their marital relations in fact but have felt content to live apart without obtaining a divorce. Everyone knows of married couples not living together and with no present intention of being divorced. They may have shunned the divorce court because of the trouble or expense involved, because of moral scruples, or for fear of incurring social disapproval. People often are timid about advertising their domestic troubles to their friends and acquaintances for social or business reasons and hence avoid the publicity, not to say scandal, sometimes involved in divorce procedure. The public submission of the type of evidence necessary to secure divorce often serves as a deterrent with persons of sensitive nature. If you are considering divorce, speak to an experienced South Salt Lake Utah divorce lawyer. A prospective divorce client appears in a divorce lawyer’s office for an initial consultation. She has a sad story of domestic violence and a clear need for legal assistance, but only a limited capacity to pay for that service. Does the lawyer agree to represent this client, knowing that she may have to reduce or even waive her usual fees?
A divorce client frequently tries to use his meetings with his divorce lawyer to unburden himself about his unhappiness over his divorce and the direction his life is taking. Does the divorce lawyer listen to the client and offer him emotional support, or does he insist that the consultations focus on the client’s legal case?
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A divorce client refuses to consider a negotiated agreement and demands that her lawyer fight her case in court as a way of punishing her husband. Does the divorce lawyer pursue the client’s demands in court, or does she try to persuade the client to rethink her goals and expectations for the divorce in order to reach a settlement?
A divorce lawyer is preparing for settlement talks with an opposing attorney with whom he has never negotiated before. Does the lawyer significantly inflate his opening demands, or does he make a more modest proposal that he considers fair and reasonable?
A divorce lawyer has a client who wishes to talk directly with her spouse about the terms of their settlement. Does the lawyer permit her client to take part in fashioning an agreement, or does she insist that all negotiations be strictly between herself and the opposing counsel? Decisions such as these lie at the heart of lawyers’ day-to-day work. Whether they are made reflectively or reflexively, such choices underline the substantial discretion that results from the indeterminacy of attorneys’ professional roles. Ultimately, legal practice is constituted out of these many small judgments. How do lawyers think about and actually make these decisions? What guidelines and standards do lawyers use in deciding how to relate to clients and to opposing attorneys; about when, how, and with whom to negotiate; and about how at the end of the day to evaluate their own work? Do the answers to these questions flow more or less automatically from the lawyer’s formal training and expertise? To what degree do they reflect the lawyer’s own self-interest, the particular interests of the client, or the broader public interest? Such questions lie at the heart of discussions among scholars and bar leaders about the meaning of professionalism.
Simply put, the debate over legal professionalism revolves around the degree to which general professional identities, formal training, and rules of conduct guide the choices of individual lawyers in practice.
Professional bar rhetoric suggests that the most powerful influences on lawyers’ decisions come from law school socialization and formal codes of professional responsibility, which promote and enforce shared expertise, norms, and obligations. An alternative perspective points to economic incentives as the crucial determinants of lawyers’ conduct. That is, through their conditions of work, lawyers’ choices, like those of many professionals, are shaped by their own material interests or those of their employers or clients, even though they may be rationalized by reference to professional norms. Yet a third perspective emphasizes the role of personal identities and values in lawyers’ decision making. In this view, lawyers’ individual values or personal characteristics such as gender, race, religion, or class influence their professional conduct.
Each of these viewpoints yields a different explanation for the choices lawyers make in their daily work lives. Consider, for example, the attorney who is trying to decide whether or not to represent a poor client. If the lawyer agrees to accept the case, the professionalism account might suggest that she has internalized the legal profession’s norm of public service and feels obliged to help those who cannot afford a lawyer. However, the workplace version might see a struggling sole practitioner who cannot afford to pass up even the possibility of a modest fee. Alternatively, the personal identity perspective might attribute the lawyer’s decision to take the case to the fact that as a woman, the lawyer empathizes with the abused wife and seeks to use her legal skills to help women in difficult situations.
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Similarly, if the lawyer decides against representing the client, it might be because, having already achieved the American Bar Association’s target pro bono work for the year, she feels that she has done her professional duty. Or perhaps the attorney rejects the case because as a junior law firm associate, she is under considerable workplace pressure from firm partners to meet her annual quota of billable hours. Or it may be that she is tired of doing divorce work and does not want to be stereotyped as the advocate for all women.
What about the situation in which a divorce client badly wants and needs help in sorting out his personal life? How should the lawyer respond? Perhaps he declines to provide such assistance because he believes his legal training did not prepare him to be a therapist, and that it would be unethical for him to pretend to do so. Or maybe it is because in his low-cost, high-volume practice, the lawyer simply cannot spare the time to talk to clients about their personal problems. Possibly, the lawyer discourages his client from venting his feelings because he finds such issues painful and difficult to talk about. If, however, the lawyer decides to engage in counseling the client, is it the result of a family law course in law school that opened his eyes to the psychological effects of divorce? Is it because his experience as a divorce specialist has taught him that affluent clients expect to be provided with emotional as well as legal counseling—and are able and willing to pay for it? Or is it perhaps because this lawyer is naturally sensitive and empathetic and would not dream of silencing a person in distress?
Divorce lawyers vary in their understandings of professionalism in divorce practice. Some of these differences are shaped by the nature of their practices. Some derive from individual variations in character and values, while others are rooted in gender roles, age, and experience, and still others in the organization of their law firms. Specialists often understand their roles in divorce cases differently than do general practice lawyers. Unlike sole practitioners who do divorce work, lawyers employed by law firms face demands to be attentive to the interests of partners and to firm policies. Attorneys whose clients have few resources find themselves pressed to structure and limit their time in ways that lawyers with well-to-do clients do not.
The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (AAML) addressed the professional dilemma over representation in 1991 by adopting standards of conduct for divorce lawyers entitled Bounds of Advocacy (American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 1991). In this report, the Academy criticized existing bar codes for not providing adequate guidance to divorce lawyers and for ignoring the uniqueness of family law. The AAML standards rejected overzealous representation of partisan advocacy and articulated instead “the much greater level of professionalism” to which matrimonial lawyers should aspire (American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 1991: 4). The norms for professional conduct set out in the Bounds of Advocacy are indeed the informal norms of the “reasonable” divorce lawyer that we encountered in our interviews with divorce attorneys: prescriptions to encourage settlement; to avoid hardball legal tactics; to treat opposing counsel with candor, courtesy, and cooperation.
The common norm of the reasonable divorce lawyer defined both typical and expected behavior for handling most divorce cases. Through this norm, attorneys found guidance from their peers in how to make the difficult judgments that are central to the professional role. Reasonable lawyers advocated for their clients by knowing the law of divorce and making independent judgments about how to apply that law rather than by identifying too strongly with clients. They sought negotiated settlements where appropriate and avoided unnecessary litigation. In short, the norm of reasonableness in divorce appeared to respond to and incorporate some of the critiques of adversary advocacy. Reasonable lawyers were said to reduce costs (financial and emotional) for clients, more accurately apply substantive law (rather than being caught up in strategic manoeuvres), and produce qualitatively better and more equitable case outcomes. Divorce lawyers are not ordinarily portrayed as behaving in this way. The press and popular culture depict the “Rambo” lawyer, who files every conceivable motion, seeks everything and more from the opposing side, refuses to cooperate in settlement, and argues vigorously and bitterly in a long, drawn-out trial.
Divorce Legal Framework
The law provides the basic structure for defining advocacy. As the comment on Model Rule 3.1 states, “The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed” (American Bar Association 1995). The grounds for divorce in Utah allow both traditional fault criteria and no-fault, with equitable distribution of property and presumptions of shared legal custody of children. Knowledge of the law and experience with judicial decision making in divorce have led lawyers to construct informal norms about how to advocate for their clients. The communities of divorce lawyers have developed standards and shared reference points that define professionalism in practice. Not only does divorce bargaining occur “within the shadow of the law” but so too have attorneys’ ideas about the meaning of advocacy developed and changed within that legal shadow. Arguing zealously that a divorce client is blameless and deserves the bulk of the marital assets simply makes no sense to lawyers operating within a legal framework that ignores fault and presumes a 50–50 division of property. In other words, for most divorce cases, lawyers saw themselves engaged in something more closely resembling problem solving than adversarial negotiation.
In addition to the shift to no-fault, the introduction of child support guidelines significantly changed the law of divorce. Congress passed a law in 1984 to encourage child support enforcement, and states seeking federal funds were required to institute numerical formulas to guide judges in setting child support awards. The federal Family Support Act of 1988 further strengthened the 1984 law by making mandatory these mathematical formulas to set support amounts and strictly limiting deviations from them. Many states including Utah rewrote their child support laws to comply with these federal mandates.
“Winning” in divorce was not only unlikely as a matter of law, but it was also a costly goal to seek. That is, the costs of pursuing every possible avenue for a client within the bounds of the law often outweighed benefits to be gained. Divorce lawyers thus tried to convince clients to settle divorces by touting the comparative advantage of settlement over trials, rather than talking about fairness in settlement. A custody fight imposes costs on the “winning” party in terms of damaged long-term relationships that lawyers believed usually outweigh any gain. Divorce lawyers did not see divorce conflicts as zero-sum games.
The transaction costs of fighting for a greater share of property or more generous visitation were high, lawyers felt, and those costs rarely made economic sense for their clients. Thus, lawyers were attentive to the costs of alternative strategies in negotiation. Professional practice requires understanding what a job entails so that it can be done efficiently. Seeking a fair settlement rather than the most for a client, and opening divorce negotiations with a reasonable offer rather than an extreme one, provided lawyers with an efficient solution to the problem of negotiating an agreement.
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When lawyers tender offers in negotiation, they communicate important information about their own judgment and operating style, information that is easily and quickly shared within a small legal community. At the same time, lawyers’ offers communicate something to the other lawyer about how she is viewed—as another professional to be treated with respect and courtesy or as an adversary to be fought.
Legal rules, concepts, and procedures in family law all influenced the nature of advocacy in divorce. The substantive legal rules of no-fault divorce rejected one-sided case outcomes and presumed instead an equal division of property and some sharing of legal responsibility for children. Strict child support guidelines further removed issues from legal dispute. The resulting legal framework thus provided few incentives for divorce lawyers in most cases to try to “win big” for their clients.
The ideology of legal professionalism includes a commitment to altruism. The realities of practice, however, place limits on selflessness. Scholars of the professions see as a core problem of professional practice “the tension between the provision of affordable and conscientious service to others, and the economic interest of those who provide it”. The American Bar Association’s Commission on Professionalism placed the tension between service and self-interest at the center of its inquiry, questioning whether the profession has lived up to its public service commitment. The formal rules of professional responsibility highlight this conflict without resolving context for many day-to-day decisions by divorce lawyers, decisions through which lawyers both construct and enact the variable meanings of professionalism in practice.
In a contested divorce, witness testimony and evidence can play an important role in the outcome of the trial. An experienced South Salt Lake Utah divorce lawyer can be your best friend if you are in the midst of a contested divorce.
Just as a lawyer may not himself make false statements or offer false evidence, he has certain kinds of obligations to the other side’s evidence as well. An attorney may not “unlawfully obstruct another person’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value.” He or she must make a “diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party.” The prohibitions on a lawyer’s making a false statement, however undetectable, or presenting false evidence, however effective, are examples of the way in which the constitutive rules of the trial incorporate the lawyer’s “natural” or full knowledge of events. They are, in a sense, limitations on the trial’s artifice. By contrast, other constitutive rules require that a lawyer put aside his own full knowledge and judgment and defer to the trial’s artifice. By prohibiting a lawyer from alluding during trial to “any matter the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence,” the rules enjoin, as a matter of ethical obligation, deference to all of the policies embedded in the law of evidence. An attorney may neither assert a personal knowledge of the facts, except under those very rare occasions on which a trial attorney may testify, nor state her personal opinion as to “the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant, or the guilt or innocence of an accused.” It is only what can be proven subject to the public rules of the trial that affects the outcome.
Though the privileges, including the lawyer-client privilege, are part of the law of evidence, the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality goes beyond the attorney-client privilege, which applies only to confidential communications from the client and prevents compelled disclosures at trial. The duty of confidentiality prohibits the lawyer from revealing anything, whatever its source, “relating to the representation.” This affects the trial as well. It allows a lawyer to rely on what can be dozens of often slight misunderstandings by witnesses and opposing counsel that are helpful to his case. He does not have to tell the court that they “don’t quite have it right.” This is unlike the singular instance of “false testimony” offered by a witness whom she herself calls, where she has a duty to take “remedial measures” based on her own knowledge, whatever its source. Here, again, it is the artifice of the trial, embedded in the ethical and evidentiary rules operating together, that reigns.
Hence the law of professional responsibility pushes the trial in two very different directions. It imposes on a lawyer an ethical obligation to bend all his imagination and effort to present a case, tell a story, that serves his client’s own perceived interests. Facts are purposes. Yet against this general obligation stand specific and limited prohibitions: the client deserves counsel on the wisdom of his perceived interests in light of how the legal order will view those interests; access to evidence should not be obstructed; false statements should not be made nor false evidence presented; and the lawyer should respect the principles and policies embedded in the evidentiary rules. Purposefulness must respect those things which we cannot, or should not, change at will. The tension is between energy and respect. In any case, the rules of professional responsibility, both in reinforcing and limiting the trial’s artifice, make it what it is. Evidence law is, after all, a vast body of doctrine that has developed over centuries, and, despite recent simplification and rationalization, it still bears many vestigial organs from that evolution. The law of evidence provides the “grammar” of the trial. Only those truths that can be said “grammatically” can become part of the legal world. In the language of the trial courts, it is no longer “based on personal knowledge.” It becomes potentially objectionable as opinion testimony, as improper characterization, as reputation testimony, as unauthentic, as violating the best evidence rule, as hearsay. In each case the proponent of the evidence must look to some specific rule, with additional requirements, exceptions, and limitations, to admit the problematic testimony. The requirement of testimony in the language of perception, embodied in the requirement that testimony be based on “personal knowledge” and that it stay within the nonopinion rule, is one of the two fundamental principles of the law of evidence.
The nonopinion rule is, in the trial courtroom, supported by a range of objections “to the form of the question.” Most prominently, these objections prevent the lawyer’s “leading” most witnesses on direct examination, calling for conclusions, or assuming facts not yet in evidence. These rules prohibit some of the most common devices of ordinary conversation and have entangled thousands of young lawyers in their nets, reducing them to an embarrassed silence. These rules were not constructed in order to enforce the legal profession’s priestly prerogatives, to allow only the initiated to engage in the activities that invoke the power of the legal system. Rather, they enforce a certain vision of the form that direct examination, and so witness testimony, ought to have. They are rules that serve as “mere abridgement of the activity itself; they do not exist in advance of the activity.” The envisioned activity is lay witness testimony about any episode as a rhythm of physical description and then chronological narrative of events and actions.
The first can be accomplished without leading questions and questions that call for conclusions or the assumption of facts not yet in evidence only because the witness testimony has an implicit structure— that of spatial relationships. In fact, one of the most common rhetorical devices for description of the scene is the “walk around.” (“Now, as you entered the house and looked to your left, what did you see?” “And as your gaze came around to the area right in front of you, what did you see there?”) The second step has its implicit structure as well—that of temporal relationships. The most common question in direct examination is simply, “What happened next?” Now this simplicity is deceiving: as we have seen, a fair amount of craft can go into the structuring of a direct examination. My point here is only that unless the examination is conducted as a rhythm of physical description, and chronological narrative, it will inevitably violate the strictures against leading, calling for conclusions, and assuming facts not (yet) in evidence. Basic elements of narrative structure are embedded in the evidentiary rules that constitute direct examination. The other basic principle is the requirement that the evidence be relevant. Materiality requires that the proposition which the evidence is offered to prove be a proposition that is “of consequence.” The substantive law, of course, determines whether the proposition is of consequence.
Materiality is the notion that, more than any other, serves to limit the range of the inquiry at the trial, that keeps “every witness box from becoming a confessional.” Most broadly, it seeks to limit the trial to serving corrective or commutative justice, restoring a party to his legally legitimate expectations (or “rights”), without regard to broader inquiries concerning what we now call distributive or social justice, the fairness of the overall distribution of benefits and burdens between the parties. In a liberal society, it serves specifically to suppress inquiry into the moral character, or desert, of the parties.
Materiality thus requires that every unit of evidence offered be related to an element of the crime, claim, or defense—the propositions that the party with the burden of proof must establish in order to prevail. It has a dark side. The dark side is the threat it poses to “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.” Materiality serves to assure that the truth which emerges at trial is a “legal truth,” determined solely by those aspects of the case that the law deems “of consequence.” Insofar as the legal perspective on the case deviates from a compelling moral perspective, for example, the trier of fact will be unaware of morally relevant aspects of the situation. Sometimes the gap between morally relevant and legally relevant may be justified, but ultimately it must be morally justified. And even if justified, it risks absolutizing the legal artifice by detaching it from its moral foundations, and so forgetting “that man is only the master, not the creator of the world.”
The other element of relevance is logical relevance: the unit of evidence must actually be probative of (or disprove) a legally determined element of the claim or defense.
To be logically relevant, a proposed piece of evidence need only make a proposition of consequence to the determination of the litigation (a “material” proposition) more or less likely than it would be without the evidence. It must ever so slightly alter the balance of probabilities. Once it achieves that level of probative force, it can be excluded only for what are basically pragmatic reasons, and only if those reasons “substantially” outweigh its probative force. Thus evidence is relevant if it makes any material proposition ever so slightly more or less likely than it would be without the evidence, unless certain pragmatic considerations substantially outweigh its probative value. That is a strong tilt toward admissibility, a tilt which approaches the vertical if understood practically.
The human mind seeks to determine historical truth (“what happened”) by constructing plausible narratives that are both consistent with the “web of belief” and supported by reliable evidence. The notions “consistent,” “supported,” and “reliable” are subject to varying interpretations and raise deep questions. A trial judge will not usually make his or her relevancy determinations by considering the direct logical relationship of the evidence offered to a material proposition. Rather, he or she will situate the evidence offered within the proponent’s factual theory of the case. But an advocate will almost always have choices to make among theories of the case and always will have choices among details of the factual theory, “subplots” if you will.
There are deep reasons why most evidence has “multiple relevances,” some legitimate and some illegitimate. The illegitimate inferences may invoke substantive moral or political norms outside the instructions for the ultimate decision of the case, or may involve lines of reasoning—from a party’s “character” for example, or from a hearsay statement—that the law of evidence determines insufficiently reliable on which to base a purely factual determination that must be made if the trier of fact is following the norms in the instructions. Recall that evidence may be excluded only if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice, such as that from an “illegitimate inference,” and one can understand the inevitability of evidence whose significance can overwhelm the substantive legal norms by invoking alternative values. Thus the lawyer’s control over both the legal and factual theory of the case, the low standard for logical relevance, the high standard (“substantially outweighed”) for exclusion of logically relevant evidence, and the pervasiveness of the nonopinion rule all suggest that the rules of evidence function more to structure than to exclude evidence. This is true, even within the “rationalist” tradition in the law of evidence, which generally understands the warrants that render a piece of evidence logically relevant to be purely empirical, and so value-free, empirical generalizations embedded in the judge’s common sense about what happens “generally and for the most part.” But there is more to relevance.
Most obviously, what constitutes “unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,” possibly calling for the exclusion of logically relevant evidence, requires a normative judgment on which purely legal considerations offer little guidance, and to which appellate courts are especially deferential. In many different ways, normative considerations affect “pure” relevancy determinations, both by rule and by judicial practice. This occurs in a self-conscious and focused way and, more important, in a tacit and pervasive way.
Some of these “relevancy” rules embody deeply held views about the importance of limited government. For example, evidence law prohibits a lawyer’s presenting proof of a witness’s religious beliefs in order to show that he is more or less credible.
The nonopinion rule and the relevance rule are the two most important and most “generative” of the rules of evidence. They are “generative” in the sense that most of the other evidence rules can be derived from them. There are basically four other categories of evidentiary rules, which have limited theoretical interest because of their derivative nature, but I deem them worth mentioning to round out the picture. The so-called best evidence rule requires only that the originals of documents be offered if available. Therefore, evidence as diverse as documents, physical evidence, telephone calls, and scientific processes all must be authenticated, unless it belongs to a class of evidence where there is no serious reason to doubt that evidence “is what it purports to be.” Authentication is usually fairly undemanding, the available methods virtually without limit, and the standard for admissibility relatively low. Though it is possible that some potential evidence can be excluded because the requisite “foundation” as to authenticity is unavailable, such exclusions are relatively rare. Evidence must also be “competent”—broadly speaking, “eligible to be received as evidence.” For example, a judge is incompetent to testify in a trial over which she presides; a juror is incompetent to testify as to his own intentions during deliberation in order to “impeach” or overturn his verdict; it is still said that a witness who has not perceived anything of consequence, or cannot remember what he perceived, or is incapable of communicating what he perceives and remembers, or is psychologically or morally incapable of differentiating fact from fantasy, is “incompetent” to testify.
Competence is a residual category. It now excludes certain kinds of evidence because they are likely to be unreliable, such as the testimony of very young children and persons in psychotic states. The broad tendency of the law of evidence has been to eliminate total incompetencies to testify and permit, instead, forms of impeachment that allow the juror to weigh the troubling aspect of the witness’s testimony like any other “impeaching” fact. Competency rules also exclude certain kinds of evidence for “structural” reasons: the judge’s potential testimony in the case over which he presides and usually the trial lawyer’s testimony in the case he tries. Finally, there is the rule against hearsay, which excludes out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted. There is a wonderful scholasticism surrounding the definition of hearsay that has its interests but is not germane to my purposes here. The most fundamental purpose of the hearsay rule is to protect cross-examination, “the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.” The notion is that only if the person whose perceptions are being reported is the same person who is reporting the perceptions can the cross-examiner properly explore (1) important weaknesses in perception, memory, and clarity of expression that may infect the testimony even of sincere witnesses, and (2) biases, interests, prejudice, and character failings that cast doubt on the witness’s credibility.
The broad drift of the law of evidence has been to admit more and more hearsay evidence, and for the constitutional jurisprudence surrounding the analogous Confrontation Clause to follow the lead of evidence law. There have always been dozens of defined exceptions to the hearsay rule. Many jurisdictions also now have “catch-all” exceptions for hearsay that simply seems “reliable.” Recall too that out-of-court statements are inadmissible only if offered for the truth of the matter asserted. This raises what we now know to be issues of multiple relevancies. Out of-court statements can be offered for purposes other than the truth of what was asserted, and, once admitted, are usually considered for all purposes. The deferential principles of relevancy law that allow those other purposes to be logically quite weak and the ability of advocates to tailor actual theories in order to render desirable evidence logically relevant together reduce the actual bite of the hearsay rule.
The best evidence rule, the requirement of authentication, most of the law of competence, and the hearsay rule all serve to ensure that evidence upon which a juror may decide a case is reliable. At a level below the rhetoric of judicial opinions, reliability is really a form of relevance. Evidence that is utterly unreliable is really irrelevant: it really does not render a fact that is of consequence to the litigation any more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Lawyers play the dominant role in the courtroom because they serve professionally as essential, expert advocates for those they represent. A word used since at least the thirteenth century, “advocate” refers to a “lawyer who pleads a case in a court of law on behalf of another”. In divorce trials, each of the litigants—plaintiff and defendant—are represented by one or more advocates. Preparing and pleading a case in the modern legal world is a time-consuming, complicated process requiring extensive knowledge of the law and the rules of the legal system. Parties generally have no hope of competently managing a case on their own (proceeding “pro se”). Trial cases are the bailiwick of lawyer-advocates. What is litigation? It is a legal proceeding between two or more parties in an attempt to “right” an alleged wrong. The “right” usually takes the form of a demand for payment to the party alleging injury. The path to a legal solution is often filled with unanticipated twists, unexpected delays, and potentially high stress for even the most seasoned litigants. Litigation is more often about losing less than it is about winning more; a litigant “is a person about to give up his skin in the hope of retaining his bone.” An anonymous author once wrote that “America is a country where, thanks to Congress, there are 40 million laws to enforce 10 Commandments.” As a result, litigation can easily take long periods of time and a great deal of expense. As courts become more congested with the seemingly endless number of cases being filed, the process can bog down from sheer volume alone. To be fair, many of the cases filed have merit. The American legal system is built on the principle of protecting the rights of the individual, and litigation is one way to protect those rights. Merit or not, however, the number of lawsuits continues to grow with little sign of slowing. Lawyers are the vanguards of the justice system. The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide attorneys with a framework for carrying out their responsibilities to their clients, the courts, and society in a professional manner. These rules are particularly important when pursuing a client’s claims, given the adversarial nature of litigation as well as the conflicts that may arise when lawyer and client have differing interests in the outcome (for example, settling a case versus taking it to trial).
The Model Rules require lawyers to provide “competent representation” to their clients in the areas of legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation. Legal knowledge includes knowledge of federal and state rules of evidence and civil procedure, as well as precedents set by case law, in order “to advance and protect the integrity of the fact-finding process.” Mastering these laws not only helps lawyers and their clients but also reduces the possibility for embarrassment and legal complications such as mistrials, inadmissible evidence, lost appeals, or reversed verdicts.
Custody and Parental Involvement
Custody itself is probably the biggest factor determining the level of parental involvement among parents who do not live together, because of its long-run effects on the level of emotional effort, care, and connection. In some families, noncustodial parents visit frequently and consistently. This is especially true immediately after children are born to unmarried parents who are romantically involved. However, these relationships tend to either turn into cohabitation or marriage or break up within a year or two. When parents are divorced or were never married and are no longer romantically involved, fathers’ involvement with children is often minimal and sporadic. Among a significant minority of such families, paternal visitation tapers off to nothing or nearly nothing within a few years.
Noncustodial parents tend to disengage emotionally for several reasons, whether as a result of relationship atrophy (“out of sight out of mind”), emotional avoidance (“it’s just too painful to see my kids under these conditions”), or overreliance on the custodial parent (“she’ll take good care of the kids no matter what I do”). Custodial parents may want to avoid contact with their previous partners at all costs. Emotional disengagement may contribute to financial disengagement, or vice versa. In any case, the effects are cumulative: The more emotionally disengaged the noncustodial parent becomes, the less implicit bargaining power the custodial parent has to increase either payment or time inputs. If the noncustodial parent feels little connection to—and wants no contact with—the child, the custodial parent is less able to successfully use an appeal to the needs of the child or a threat to make visitation or contact more difficult as a bargaining strategy. Furthermore, the less emotionally engaged the noncustodial parent becomes, the less the custodial parent and child have to gain from personal contact with him (or her). Thus, disengagement of one type breeds further disengagement.
Most parents want to increase their children’s well-being. But the ways they want to do so are shaped not merely by their perceptions of children’s needs but also by their own preferences—how they weigh their children’s and fellow parent’s well-being relative to their own. A father may feel less need to be involved in direct parenting if a mother is already providing substantial effort, and vice versa. Both levels and forms of parental involvement are subject to negotiation and bargaining. For instance, one parent might want the other parent to spend more time or money or simply give more personal attention to a child. That parent might offer something in return, as in, “If you’ll put the children to bed, I’ll do the dishes. ” Parents don’t negotiate over every detail of their lives. Many aspects of the division of labor in parenting are determined by social norms or prior agreement. Traditionally, we expect fathers to provide more income and mothers to provide more direct care for children. But in periods of time when both social norms and individual economic opportunities are rapidly changing, the scope for individual bargaining probably increases. For instance, a mother who has high earnings potential or who is committed to her career is likely to bargain with the father to increase his direct involvement in child care.
Such negotiations are necessarily complex. Parental involvement is a not a simple “product” but a process that requires emotional effort as well as time and money. It imposes costs, but it also confers benefits. Therefore, we cannot assume that parents always want to minimize it or to maximize it—rather they probably seek some level of involvement that is determined both by their perceptions of what children need, their own preferences, and what they believe the other parent should and could provide. It is important to remember, however, that some circularity comes into play; for example, a parent’s bargaining power may affect how much the other parent is involved with the child, but that involvement may in turn affect the parents’ relative bargaining power.
Rules about custody and support interact in ways that illustrate the interplay of nonpecuniary and economic benefits. Child custody is psychologically important to parents, especially to primary caregivers whose involvement is time and care intensive. They may feel that custody is necessary in order to provide greater continuity for themselves or the child; furthermore, as primary caregivers, they may be more emotionally attached to the child. As we discussed, this means that most mothers cannot make a credible threat to stop taking care of the child within the marriage or in the event of divorce (to leave the child with the father); thus, their ability to use the fact that they are providing child care as a bargaining chip with the father is limited, and it is limited even more if the father’s empathy for the child is low because he has been less emotionally involved.
The intensification of child support enforcement efforts over the past few years has provoked tremendous controversy. Although success has been uneven, more divorced fathers are paying children support. This, together with the growing cultural stigmatization of “deadbeat dads” has almost certainly increased the bargaining power of mothers relative to fathers within marriage as well as among noncohabiting parents. Mothers’ external threat points are higher as a result. Men can withdraw some of their earnings by divorce, but the amount of withdrawal is reduced by the amount of child support mandated by the state. Not surprisingly, some men have responded to this trend by demanding greater consideration as potential custodians in the event of divorce. In most states today the presumption of legal custody is no longer gender specific, but rests instead on what the court deems best for the child. Relatively few fathers try to convince judges that they are the better custodial parent, and even fewer succeed. But the number of men who seek and get custody or joint physical custody is rising.
Thus, the legal environment has produced two changes in recent decades. Mothers’ confidence that they will get child support if they divorce has increased, but they can be less sure than before that they will get custody. What is the net effect of this change on bargaining power likely to be? One could argue that two changes cancel each other out in their effect on maternal bargaining power—that is, mothers gain a higher probability of effective child support enforcement at the cost of a higher risk of losing sole custody and so there is no effect on their bargaining power. It is hard to say.
Divorced noncustodial parents are required to pay child support (provided there is a court order for it), and custodial parents are required to allow visitation by the other father. Furthermore, states limit the ability of unmarried parents to bargain by setting separate and independent rules regarding custody, visitation, and support. Failure to pay child support, for instance, cannot generally be used as a reason to deny a noncustodial parent contact with a child. Nor can failure to enjoy visitation easily be used as a reason not to pay child support.
Cohabitation and Alimony
No laws in Utah require unmarried cohabitants to support each other. And no state including Utah awards alimony or other support payments when an unmarried couple separates. If, however, the cohabitants have entered a contract under which one agrees to support the other, the contract may be enforced (depending on the state in which the cohabitants live or the contract was established). Lawsuits brought to enforce these contracts have been popularly called palimony cases. But, since cohabitants seeking recovery under such an agreement are doing so on the basis of an express or implied contract and not on an alimony statute, the word palimony is actually inaccurate.
Traditionally, unless a couple has an express written agreement to the contrary, the law has left matters regarding the property owned by cohabitants if they end their relationship as they are. Thus, when a couple separates, the property goes to whoever has legal title to it. Usually, this has meant that the man gets the property, because in relationships in which the man is the wage earner and the woman the homemaker, the wage earner “owns” the property acquired through his wages. In addition, until recently, most state courts refused to enforce even express agreements between cohabitants as to support or ownership of property. These courts have followed two main lines of reasoning. First, they have based their refusal on the grounds that such agreements are invalid. because they are based on “illicit sexual services.” For any contract to be valid, it must be based on something of value, or what the law calls consideration. Consideration cannot be illegal. The typical consideration in business contracts is money, services, property, or goods. Traditionally, courts have ignored the fact that most contracts between cohabitants are based on similar types of consideration. They have assumed either that the only services exchanged are sexual services or that, because sexual services form even part of the agreement, they invalidate the entire agreement. The second line of reasoning courts have used in refusing to enforce contracts between cohabitants is that homemaking services have no dollar value, so are not sufficient consideration to support an agreement to share property or to provide support.
Divorce and Alimony
In some divorces, courts award alimony, also called spousal support or maintenance, to one party. Alimony is especially likely after a long marriage or if one spouse gave up career plans to support the other spouse or to care for the children.
Alimony is designed to help a lower-earning spouse make it through the divorce and the transition into a new single life. Depending on the length of the marriage and the degree to which one spouse was financially dependent on the other, support can be either temporary or last for many years. However, the nationwide trend is for courts to award spousal support in fewer and fewer situations, and for shorter times when they do award it, because it has become common for both spouses to work or at least be able to return to work. The court’s decision on whether one spouse is entitled to support from the other after the divorce is completed, begins with the question of need. There’s no hard and fast rule, but in general the longer the marriage, the stronger the presumption that support is appropriate. The court will consider many factors while determining alimony including the length of the marriage, the division of marital property, the income and earning capacity of the spouses, the amount of time one spouse has not worked since the marriage and any other factor that the court may consider as relevant.
Alimony falls into two broad categories: short-term support and long-term or permanent support. “Reimbursement” support is a kind of long-term support. A spouse may also get temporary support before the divorce is final. It’s possible that a former spouse might receive more than one kind of support at the same time. If a spouse is getting more than one kind of support, say rehabilitative and short-term, then when the spouse is employed again, the rehabilitative support would end. The short-term support would continue until its termination date.
Short-term support is ordered when the marriage itself was short. Short-term support lasts only a few years, and its precise ending date is set in the court order. Rehabilitative support, sometimes also called “bridge the gap” support, is a specific kind of short-term support, designed to help a dependent spouse get retrained and back into the workforce. It usually lasts until the recipient is back to work. Generally, that date isn’t set in advance—the agreement is that the support payments will stop when the recipient completes a retraining program and becomes employed. The recipient is responsible for diligently pursuing their training and then searching for work. The other spouse is responsible for paying the support until that point—and a payer who suspects the recipient isn’t really trying to complete an education or get work can ask the court to reduce the support amount or set a termination date. The person asking for the modification would have to prove that the other ex-spouse was not working hard enough.
Permanent support may be granted after long marriages, generally more than ten years, if the judge concludes that the dependent spouse isn’t likely to go back into the workforce and will need support indefinitely. Some states don’t allow permanent support. Permanent support does eventually end when either the recipient or the payor dies. It also may end when the recipient remarries. In about half the states, it ends if the recipient begins living with another person in a marriage-like relationship where the couple provides mutual support and shares financial responsibilities. Reimbursement support is the only type of spousal support that’s not completely based on financial need. Instead, it’s a way to compensate a spouse who sacrificed education, training, or career advancement during the marriage by taking any old job that would support the family while the other spouse trained for a lucrative professional career. Generally both spouses expected that once the professional spouse was established and earning the anticipated higher salary, the sacrificing spouse would benefit from the higher standard of living and be free to pursue a desirable career. If the marriage ends before that spouse gets any of those expected benefits, reimbursement support rebalances the scales by making the professional spouse return some of what was given during the marriage. Because it’s not tied to need, reimbursement support ends whenever the agreement or court order says it does. Its termination generally isn’t tied to an event like the supported spouse getting work or remarrying. If you are seeking alimony payments from your spouse, or your spouse is seeking alimony payments from you, the services of an experienced South Salt Lake Utah divorce lawyer can greatly increase your chances since the lawyer has been trained in how to present evidence that supports your position to the judge.
Hire the services of Ascent Law – Hire an experienced South Salt Lake Utah divorce lawyer.
Unless you and your spouse have mutually agreed on the terms of your divorce, your divorce battle can be a long drawn case. You will have to back up your claims with evidence and be prepared to testify in support of your case. If there are children from the divorce, the custody of the children will be decided by the courts unless you and your spouse have mutually agreed on the custody. The mother does not automatically get custody of the children. The court will consider many factors when deciding on who should get custody of the children in a contested divorce. Utah divorce law is complex. Attempting to navigate the complex maze of Utah divorce laws can be disastrous. Seek the assistance of an experienced South Salt Lake Utah divorce lawyer.
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melissawalker01 · 4 years
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Divorce Lawyer South Salt Lake Utah
There can be no divorce without marriage. Both are interconnected since the beginning of civilization.
Marriage is called a “covenant” throughout the Pentateuch and the rest of the Old Testament.1 Proverbs 2:17 speaks about the adulterous wife who “ignored the covenant made before God,” and Malachi says that one of the witnesses of any “marriage covenant” is God himself (2:14). Ezekiel employs a vivid picture of God marrying the nation of Judah, in which he frequently referred to their marriage covenant (Ezek. 16:8, 59-62). He describes in intimate and overtly sexual language how God entered into marriage, including the ceremony at which he said: “I spread the edge of my cloak over you, and covered your nakedness: I pledged myself to you and entered into a covenant with you” (Ezek. 16:8).
A marriage covenant is also referred to in many of the passages that speak about a covenant with God. The word “covenant” may mean a “marriage covenant” or a “treaty covenant,” and often in these passages it means both. The marriage covenant of God with his people is, at times, almost synonymous with his treaty covenant with them. For example, the comment “I will remember my covenant with you in the days of your youth, and I will establish with you an everlasting covenant,” which occurs in the description of God’s marriage to Israel (Ezek. 16:60), sounds very similar to Ezekiel 37:26, which speaks about the treaty covenant of God with his people. A similar mixture of these two ideas occurs in Jeremiah 31:31-32, where the new everlasting covenant is compared with “my covenant which they broke, though I was their husband.” These two concepts are sometimes mixed deliberately in order to draw out comparisons. For example, Jeremiah 11:10 appears to refer to a treaty covenant (“they have broken the covenant that I made with their ancestors”) but later verses contain references to Israel as a wayward wife (Jer. 11:15, “What right has my beloved in my house, when she has done vile deeds?”).
The phrase “marriage covenant” was the constant and normative phrase used to describe the legal framework of marriage in the Old Testament and in its surrounding cultures. Marriage covenants in the rest of the ancient Near East help us to understand the meaning of this phrase in the Old Testament. The term “covenant” has a wide range of meaning in the ancient Near East, from a business agreement concerning a loan through to a national treaty with a foreign power or with a god. The primary meaning of “covenant” was an agreement between two parties that was mutually binding. Covenants could be made, kept, and broken. Covenants were implemented by document or by a ceremony. They had stipulation agreed to by both parties, and sanctions that came into force when a stipulation was broken.
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The legal basis of marriage was called a “covenant” because, like all other types of covenant, it was an agreement between two parties that contained stipulations and sanctions. A marriage covenant, like any other covenant, included details of payment, the agreement to stipulations by two parties, a set of penalties for the party who did not keep these stipulations, and a legally binding witnessed ceremony or document that recorded all these matters.
A marriage covenant in the Old Testament was like all other ancient Near Eastern covenants. The Old Testament refers to the payments involved, the stipulations of the agreement, and the penalties that ensued if these stipulations were not kept. The Old Testament also uses the same legal language for all these aspects of a marriage covenant as found in other ancient Near Eastern marriage covenants.
Payment varied in different cultures and at different times throughout the time period covered by the Old Testament. The Old Babylonian culture had various payments. The terhatu or “bride-price,” which sealed the betrothal, was paid by the groom to the bride’s father. This averaged 10 shekels, or about 10 months wages. The sheriqtu or “dowry” was paid by the bride’s father to the bride. The Jewish equivalent of the terhatu was called the mohar. The husband also gave the bride gifts (Gen. 24:22). The Jewish equivalent of the sheriqtu was known as the nedunyah. scheme in the city states of Old Babylon and in other ancient Near Eastern cultures. Even the gods were not immune from making such payments. When Ugaritic gods took wives, they paid a very high bride-price in keeping with their exalted status. Yahweh also paid an especially high bride-price when he married Israel. However, Yahweh was pictured as paying the bride-price in a currency that was much more valuable than gold: he paid with “righteousness and justice.”
The purpose of these payments was to give security to the marriage, as well as being the legal seal on the marriage covenant. In some senses the covenant appears to be a sale, in which the groom buys his bride from her father. However, it was understood that the father would give a dowry well in excess of the bride-price, so that the net payment was made by the bride’s father to the groom. The dowry could be regarded as equivalent to the daughter’s share of the family estate, held in trust for her by her husband. In effect, therefore, the payment by the bride’s father helped the couple to establish their home.
The dowry also gave personal security to the bride. The dowry continued to belong to the bride, so if her husband died or divorced her, she had money to live on. She might also get a portion of the estate in addition to her dowry. The only exception to this was when the wife caused the divorce. In some arrangements the wife would get only half the dowry in this case, though usually she lost all rights to the dowry.
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These payments also added security to the marriage itself. The bride price, which was paid by the groom to the bride’s father, represented many months wages. This helped to ensure that marriage was not entered into lightly. The whole system of payments was weighted against divorce, because whoever caused the divorce was penalized financially. If the husband divorced his wife without cause, he usually returned the dowry, and if the wife divorced her husband without cause, she lost her right to some or all of her dowry. However, if the divorce was caused by one partner breaking a stipulation in the marriage contract, the guilty partner was deemed to have caused the divorce and the innocent partner kept the dowry. For example, the seventeenth century B.C.E. Babylonian high priest Enlil tried to escape the repayment of this dowry by accusing his wife of disloyalty, but his charges were found to be false.
Deuteronomy 24:1-4 is an example of these payments and penalties in action. This passage is an item of case law28 about a man who wanted to remarry a wife whom he had divorced, and who had been married again in the meantime. The ruling states that she would now be unclean for him. The reason for this ruling can be traced to the financial payments and penalties involved in marriage and divorce. The main difference between these two marriages was the financial consequence for the woman. The first marriage ended when the man cited a valid ground for divorce, namely “a matter of indecency.” The fact that he had a valid ground for the divorce meant that she lost her right to her dowry. The second marriage ended without any valid grounds for divorce, either because the man “hated/disliked” her (which was a technical term for a groundless divorce), or because he died. In either case the woman would have kept her dowry. If she had not brought a dowry into this second marriage, she would nevertheless have been awarded an equivalent amount. Westbrook thus noted that this would give the first husband a financial motive for remarrying his wife, because he would then have both her new dowry and her old one. This law therefore forbids the first husband from getting financial benefit in this way.
Marriage covenants in the ancient Near East were written and enacted exactly like any other business or diplomatic covenant. Like any other agreement, they were based on both trust and penalties. The penalties as well as the benefits of keeping the stipulations of the marriage covenant were clearly outlined. There was a recognized system of financial penalties for the partner who initiated divorce without good cause, or for the partner who broke the stipulations of the covenant. The terminology of marriage documents is also similar in all respects to other business transactions. This is all reflected in the Old Testament language and law. Although the phrase “marriage covenant” is correct, it is misleading. Marriage “covenant” has come to mean something separate from legal restraints. The phrase “marriage contract” is therefore much better than “marriage covenant” for conveying the correct meaning in modern English. This is the normal phrase used by Jewish scholars when referring to legal marriage documents, and also by ancient historians when referring to ancient Near Eastern marriage law.
Like any other contract, the ancient Near Eastern marriage contract was an agreement between two parties that also defined the penalties incurred by the party who failed to keep the agreement.
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There is a general understanding throughout the ancient Near East that a wife can be divorced at will by a husband and have her dowry returned, but, if she has done wrong, she does not receive her dowry. There is also some evidence that wives were able to divorce their husbands in some situations.
South Salt Lake Utah Divorce
With the hindsight of the New Testament, Genesis 2:24 might also be interpreted as a condemnation of divorce. The rest of the Pentateuch, however, fails to speak against divorce. Abraham divorced his wife Hagar, the slave, and it is recorded as if God approved (Gen. 21:12). Specific guidelines were given about the practice of divorce. In Exodus 21:10-11 there is the requirement in the divorce of a wife who is a slave that she must be released without any payment. Presumably this means that she did not have to buy her freedom, though it may also mean that the man did not have to pay her the equivalent of a dowry. Any other wife would be released with the repayment of her dowry, but a slave brought no dowry. Other guidelines are given about divorces in general in Deuteronomy 24:1-4: a divorced wife must be given a divorce certificate, and she must leave the marital home. Grounds for which divorce was accepted are also given in these passages. Indecency (whatever that meant) is named in Deuteronomy 24:1, and the neglect of basic provisions is implied in Exodus 21:10-11.10 The fact that the husband in Deuteronomy 22:13-18 tried to find false grounds for divorce suggests that a groundless divorce was either not permitted or resulted in severe financial penalty.
There is much more about divorce that is not stated. There is nothing about whether these were the only grounds for divorce, or whether or when the wife should have her dowry returned. There is nothing about the rights of children to their father’s estate. There is nothing about the rights of the woman after she is divorced, whether she is allowed to remarry, or where she should live after her divorce. There is no indication of the procedures for divorce, such as witnesses or other legal necessities.
Divorce Today
Divorce is not synonymous with marriage breakdown. It is, on the contrary, merely the legal recognition of the fact that the marriage relation ended at some time in the past. A divorce cannot be secured unless and until this fact has been established. Many married persons have terminated their marital relations in fact but have felt content to live apart without obtaining a divorce. Everyone knows of married couples not living together and with no present intention of being divorced. They may have shunned the divorce court because of the trouble or expense involved, because of moral scruples, or for fear of incurring social disapproval. People often are timid about advertising their domestic troubles to their friends and acquaintances for social or business reasons and hence avoid the publicity, not to say scandal, sometimes involved in divorce procedure. The public submission of the type of evidence necessary to secure divorce often serves as a deterrent with persons of sensitive nature. If you are considering divorce, speak to an experienced South Salt Lake Utah divorce lawyer. A prospective divorce client appears in a divorce lawyer’s office for an initial consultation. She has a sad story of domestic violence and a clear need for legal assistance, but only a limited capacity to pay for that service. Does the lawyer agree to represent this client, knowing that she may have to reduce or even waive her usual fees?
A divorce client frequently tries to use his meetings with his divorce lawyer to unburden himself about his unhappiness over his divorce and the direction his life is taking. Does the divorce lawyer listen to the client and offer him emotional support, or does he insist that the consultations focus on the client’s legal case?
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A divorce client refuses to consider a negotiated agreement and demands that her lawyer fight her case in court as a way of punishing her husband. Does the divorce lawyer pursue the client’s demands in court, or does she try to persuade the client to rethink her goals and expectations for the divorce in order to reach a settlement?
A divorce lawyer is preparing for settlement talks with an opposing attorney with whom he has never negotiated before. Does the lawyer significantly inflate his opening demands, or does he make a more modest proposal that he considers fair and reasonable?
A divorce lawyer has a client who wishes to talk directly with her spouse about the terms of their settlement. Does the lawyer permit her client to take part in fashioning an agreement, or does she insist that all negotiations be strictly between herself and the opposing counsel? Decisions such as these lie at the heart of lawyers’ day-to-day work. Whether they are made reflectively or reflexively, such choices underline the substantial discretion that results from the indeterminacy of attorneys’ professional roles. Ultimately, legal practice is constituted out of these many small judgments. How do lawyers think about and actually make these decisions? What guidelines and standards do lawyers use in deciding how to relate to clients and to opposing attorneys; about when, how, and with whom to negotiate; and about how at the end of the day to evaluate their own work? Do the answers to these questions flow more or less automatically from the lawyer’s formal training and expertise? To what degree do they reflect the lawyer’s own self-interest, the particular interests of the client, or the broader public interest? Such questions lie at the heart of discussions among scholars and bar leaders about the meaning of professionalism.
Simply put, the debate over legal professionalism revolves around the degree to which general professional identities, formal training, and rules of conduct guide the choices of individual lawyers in practice.
Professional bar rhetoric suggests that the most powerful influences on lawyers’ decisions come from law school socialization and formal codes of professional responsibility, which promote and enforce shared expertise, norms, and obligations. An alternative perspective points to economic incentives as the crucial determinants of lawyers’ conduct. That is, through their conditions of work, lawyers’ choices, like those of many professionals, are shaped by their own material interests or those of their employers or clients, even though they may be rationalized by reference to professional norms. Yet a third perspective emphasizes the role of personal identities and values in lawyers’ decision making. In this view, lawyers’ individual values or personal characteristics such as gender, race, religion, or class influence their professional conduct.
Each of these viewpoints yields a different explanation for the choices lawyers make in their daily work lives. Consider, for example, the attorney who is trying to decide whether or not to represent a poor client. If the lawyer agrees to accept the case, the professionalism account might suggest that she has internalized the legal profession’s norm of public service and feels obliged to help those who cannot afford a lawyer. However, the workplace version might see a struggling sole practitioner who cannot afford to pass up even the possibility of a modest fee. Alternatively, the personal identity perspective might attribute the lawyer’s decision to take the case to the fact that as a woman, the lawyer empathizes with the abused wife and seeks to use her legal skills to help women in difficult situations.
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Similarly, if the lawyer decides against representing the client, it might be because, having already achieved the American Bar Association’s target pro bono work for the year, she feels that she has done her professional duty. Or perhaps the attorney rejects the case because as a junior law firm associate, she is under considerable workplace pressure from firm partners to meet her annual quota of billable hours. Or it may be that she is tired of doing divorce work and does not want to be stereotyped as the advocate for all women.
What about the situation in which a divorce client badly wants and needs help in sorting out his personal life? How should the lawyer respond? Perhaps he declines to provide such assistance because he believes his legal training did not prepare him to be a therapist, and that it would be unethical for him to pretend to do so. Or maybe it is because in his low-cost, high-volume practice, the lawyer simply cannot spare the time to talk to clients about their personal problems. Possibly, the lawyer discourages his client from venting his feelings because he finds such issues painful and difficult to talk about. If, however, the lawyer decides to engage in counseling the client, is it the result of a family law course in law school that opened his eyes to the psychological effects of divorce? Is it because his experience as a divorce specialist has taught him that affluent clients expect to be provided with emotional as well as legal counseling—and are able and willing to pay for it? Or is it perhaps because this lawyer is naturally sensitive and empathetic and would not dream of silencing a person in distress?
Divorce lawyers vary in their understandings of professionalism in divorce practice. Some of these differences are shaped by the nature of their practices. Some derive from individual variations in character and values, while others are rooted in gender roles, age, and experience, and still others in the organization of their law firms. Specialists often understand their roles in divorce cases differently than do general practice lawyers. Unlike sole practitioners who do divorce work, lawyers employed by law firms face demands to be attentive to the interests of partners and to firm policies. Attorneys whose clients have few resources find themselves pressed to structure and limit their time in ways that lawyers with well-to-do clients do not.
The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (AAML) addressed the professional dilemma over representation in 1991 by adopting standards of conduct for divorce lawyers entitled Bounds of Advocacy (American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 1991). In this report, the Academy criticized existing bar codes for not providing adequate guidance to divorce lawyers and for ignoring the uniqueness of family law. The AAML standards rejected overzealous representation of partisan advocacy and articulated instead “the much greater level of professionalism” to which matrimonial lawyers should aspire (American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 1991: 4). The norms for professional conduct set out in the Bounds of Advocacy are indeed the informal norms of the “reasonable” divorce lawyer that we encountered in our interviews with divorce attorneys: prescriptions to encourage settlement; to avoid hardball legal tactics; to treat opposing counsel with candor, courtesy, and cooperation.
The common norm of the reasonable divorce lawyer defined both typical and expected behavior for handling most divorce cases. Through this norm, attorneys found guidance from their peers in how to make the difficult judgments that are central to the professional role. Reasonable lawyers advocated for their clients by knowing the law of divorce and making independent judgments about how to apply that law rather than by identifying too strongly with clients. They sought negotiated settlements where appropriate and avoided unnecessary litigation. In short, the norm of reasonableness in divorce appeared to respond to and incorporate some of the critiques of adversary advocacy. Reasonable lawyers were said to reduce costs (financial and emotional) for clients, more accurately apply substantive law (rather than being caught up in strategic manoeuvres), and produce qualitatively better and more equitable case outcomes. Divorce lawyers are not ordinarily portrayed as behaving in this way. The press and popular culture depict the “Rambo” lawyer, who files every conceivable motion, seeks everything and more from the opposing side, refuses to cooperate in settlement, and argues vigorously and bitterly in a long, drawn-out trial.
Divorce Legal Framework
The law provides the basic structure for defining advocacy. As the comment on Model Rule 3.1 states, “The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed” (American Bar Association 1995). The grounds for divorce in Utah allow both traditional fault criteria and no-fault, with equitable distribution of property and presumptions of shared legal custody of children. Knowledge of the law and experience with judicial decision making in divorce have led lawyers to construct informal norms about how to advocate for their clients. The communities of divorce lawyers have developed standards and shared reference points that define professionalism in practice. Not only does divorce bargaining occur “within the shadow of the law” but so too have attorneys’ ideas about the meaning of advocacy developed and changed within that legal shadow. Arguing zealously that a divorce client is blameless and deserves the bulk of the marital assets simply makes no sense to lawyers operating within a legal framework that ignores fault and presumes a 50–50 division of property. In other words, for most divorce cases, lawyers saw themselves engaged in something more closely resembling problem solving than adversarial negotiation.
In addition to the shift to no-fault, the introduction of child support guidelines significantly changed the law of divorce. Congress passed a law in 1984 to encourage child support enforcement, and states seeking federal funds were required to institute numerical formulas to guide judges in setting child support awards. The federal Family Support Act of 1988 further strengthened the 1984 law by making mandatory these mathematical formulas to set support amounts and strictly limiting deviations from them. Many states including Utah rewrote their child support laws to comply with these federal mandates.
“Winning” in divorce was not only unlikely as a matter of law, but it was also a costly goal to seek. That is, the costs of pursuing every possible avenue for a client within the bounds of the law often outweighed benefits to be gained. Divorce lawyers thus tried to convince clients to settle divorces by touting the comparative advantage of settlement over trials, rather than talking about fairness in settlement. A custody fight imposes costs on the “winning” party in terms of damaged long-term relationships that lawyers believed usually outweigh any gain. Divorce lawyers did not see divorce conflicts as zero-sum games.
The transaction costs of fighting for a greater share of property or more generous visitation were high, lawyers felt, and those costs rarely made economic sense for their clients. Thus, lawyers were attentive to the costs of alternative strategies in negotiation. Professional practice requires understanding what a job entails so that it can be done efficiently. Seeking a fair settlement rather than the most for a client, and opening divorce negotiations with a reasonable offer rather than an extreme one, provided lawyers with an efficient solution to the problem of negotiating an agreement.
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When lawyers tender offers in negotiation, they communicate important information about their own judgment and operating style, information that is easily and quickly shared within a small legal community. At the same time, lawyers’ offers communicate something to the other lawyer about how she is viewed—as another professional to be treated with respect and courtesy or as an adversary to be fought.
Legal rules, concepts, and procedures in family law all influenced the nature of advocacy in divorce. The substantive legal rules of no-fault divorce rejected one-sided case outcomes and presumed instead an equal division of property and some sharing of legal responsibility for children. Strict child support guidelines further removed issues from legal dispute. The resulting legal framework thus provided few incentives for divorce lawyers in most cases to try to “win big” for their clients.
The ideology of legal professionalism includes a commitment to altruism. The realities of practice, however, place limits on selflessness. Scholars of the professions see as a core problem of professional practice “the tension between the provision of affordable and conscientious service to others, and the economic interest of those who provide it”. The American Bar Association’s Commission on Professionalism placed the tension between service and self-interest at the center of its inquiry, questioning whether the profession has lived up to its public service commitment. The formal rules of professional responsibility highlight this conflict without resolving context for many day-to-day decisions by divorce lawyers, decisions through which lawyers both construct and enact the variable meanings of professionalism in practice.
In a contested divorce, witness testimony and evidence can play an important role in the outcome of the trial. An experienced South Salt Lake Utah divorce lawyer can be your best friend if you are in the midst of a contested divorce.
Just as a lawyer may not himself make false statements or offer false evidence, he has certain kinds of obligations to the other side’s evidence as well. An attorney may not “unlawfully obstruct another person’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value.” He or she must make a “diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party.” The prohibitions on a lawyer’s making a false statement, however undetectable, or presenting false evidence, however effective, are examples of the way in which the constitutive rules of the trial incorporate the lawyer’s “natural” or full knowledge of events. They are, in a sense, limitations on the trial’s artifice. By contrast, other constitutive rules require that a lawyer put aside his own full knowledge and judgment and defer to the trial’s artifice. By prohibiting a lawyer from alluding during trial to “any matter the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence,” the rules enjoin, as a matter of ethical obligation, deference to all of the policies embedded in the law of evidence. An attorney may neither assert a personal knowledge of the facts, except under those very rare occasions on which a trial attorney may testify, nor state her personal opinion as to “the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant, or the guilt or innocence of an accused.” It is only what can be proven subject to the public rules of the trial that affects the outcome.
Though the privileges, including the lawyer-client privilege, are part of the law of evidence, the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality goes beyond the attorney-client privilege, which applies only to confidential communications from the client and prevents compelled disclosures at trial. The duty of confidentiality prohibits the lawyer from revealing anything, whatever its source, “relating to the representation.” This affects the trial as well. It allows a lawyer to rely on what can be dozens of often slight misunderstandings by witnesses and opposing counsel that are helpful to his case. He does not have to tell the court that they “don’t quite have it right.” This is unlike the singular instance of “false testimony” offered by a witness whom she herself calls, where she has a duty to take “remedial measures” based on her own knowledge, whatever its source. Here, again, it is the artifice of the trial, embedded in the ethical and evidentiary rules operating together, that reigns.
Hence the law of professional responsibility pushes the trial in two very different directions. It imposes on a lawyer an ethical obligation to bend all his imagination and effort to present a case, tell a story, that serves his client’s own perceived interests. Facts are purposes. Yet against this general obligation stand specific and limited prohibitions: the client deserves counsel on the wisdom of his perceived interests in light of how the legal order will view those interests; access to evidence should not be obstructed; false statements should not be made nor false evidence presented; and the lawyer should respect the principles and policies embedded in the evidentiary rules. Purposefulness must respect those things which we cannot, or should not, change at will. The tension is between energy and respect. In any case, the rules of professional responsibility, both in reinforcing and limiting the trial’s artifice, make it what it is. Evidence law is, after all, a vast body of doctrine that has developed over centuries, and, despite recent simplification and rationalization, it still bears many vestigial organs from that evolution. The law of evidence provides the “grammar” of the trial. Only those truths that can be said “grammatically” can become part of the legal world. In the language of the trial courts, it is no longer “based on personal knowledge.” It becomes potentially objectionable as opinion testimony, as improper characterization, as reputation testimony, as unauthentic, as violating the best evidence rule, as hearsay. In each case the proponent of the evidence must look to some specific rule, with additional requirements, exceptions, and limitations, to admit the problematic testimony. The requirement of testimony in the language of perception, embodied in the requirement that testimony be based on “personal knowledge” and that it stay within the nonopinion rule, is one of the two fundamental principles of the law of evidence.
The nonopinion rule is, in the trial courtroom, supported by a range of objections “to the form of the question.” Most prominently, these objections prevent the lawyer’s “leading” most witnesses on direct examination, calling for conclusions, or assuming facts not yet in evidence. These rules prohibit some of the most common devices of ordinary conversation and have entangled thousands of young lawyers in their nets, reducing them to an embarrassed silence. These rules were not constructed in order to enforce the legal profession’s priestly prerogatives, to allow only the initiated to engage in the activities that invoke the power of the legal system. Rather, they enforce a certain vision of the form that direct examination, and so witness testimony, ought to have. They are rules that serve as “mere abridgement of the activity itself; they do not exist in advance of the activity.” The envisioned activity is lay witness testimony about any episode as a rhythm of physical description and then chronological narrative of events and actions.
The first can be accomplished without leading questions and questions that call for conclusions or the assumption of facts not yet in evidence only because the witness testimony has an implicit structure— that of spatial relationships. In fact, one of the most common rhetorical devices for description of the scene is the “walk around.” (“Now, as you entered the house and looked to your left, what did you see?” “And as your gaze came around to the area right in front of you, what did you see there?”) The second step has its implicit structure as well—that of temporal relationships. The most common question in direct examination is simply, “What happened next?” Now this simplicity is deceiving: as we have seen, a fair amount of craft can go into the structuring of a direct examination. My point here is only that unless the examination is conducted as a rhythm of physical description, and chronological narrative, it will inevitably violate the strictures against leading, calling for conclusions, and assuming facts not (yet) in evidence. Basic elements of narrative structure are embedded in the evidentiary rules that constitute direct examination. The other basic principle is the requirement that the evidence be relevant. Materiality requires that the proposition which the evidence is offered to prove be a proposition that is “of consequence.” The substantive law, of course, determines whether the proposition is of consequence.
Materiality is the notion that, more than any other, serves to limit the range of the inquiry at the trial, that keeps “every witness box from becoming a confessional.” Most broadly, it seeks to limit the trial to serving corrective or commutative justice, restoring a party to his legally legitimate expectations (or “rights”), without regard to broader inquiries concerning what we now call distributive or social justice, the fairness of the overall distribution of benefits and burdens between the parties. In a liberal society, it serves specifically to suppress inquiry into the moral character, or desert, of the parties.
Materiality thus requires that every unit of evidence offered be related to an element of the crime, claim, or defense—the propositions that the party with the burden of proof must establish in order to prevail. It has a dark side. The dark side is the threat it poses to “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.” Materiality serves to assure that the truth which emerges at trial is a “legal truth,” determined solely by those aspects of the case that the law deems “of consequence.” Insofar as the legal perspective on the case deviates from a compelling moral perspective, for example, the trier of fact will be unaware of morally relevant aspects of the situation. Sometimes the gap between morally relevant and legally relevant may be justified, but ultimately it must be morally justified. And even if justified, it risks absolutizing the legal artifice by detaching it from its moral foundations, and so forgetting “that man is only the master, not the creator of the world.”
The other element of relevance is logical relevance: the unit of evidence must actually be probative of (or disprove) a legally determined element of the claim or defense.
To be logically relevant, a proposed piece of evidence need only make a proposition of consequence to the determination of the litigation (a “material” proposition) more or less likely than it would be without the evidence. It must ever so slightly alter the balance of probabilities. Once it achieves that level of probative force, it can be excluded only for what are basically pragmatic reasons, and only if those reasons “substantially” outweigh its probative force. Thus evidence is relevant if it makes any material proposition ever so slightly more or less likely than it would be without the evidence, unless certain pragmatic considerations substantially outweigh its probative value. That is a strong tilt toward admissibility, a tilt which approaches the vertical if understood practically.
The human mind seeks to determine historical truth (“what happened”) by constructing plausible narratives that are both consistent with the “web of belief” and supported by reliable evidence. The notions “consistent,” “supported,” and “reliable” are subject to varying interpretations and raise deep questions. A trial judge will not usually make his or her relevancy determinations by considering the direct logical relationship of the evidence offered to a material proposition. Rather, he or she will situate the evidence offered within the proponent’s factual theory of the case. But an advocate will almost always have choices to make among theories of the case and always will have choices among details of the factual theory, “subplots” if you will.
There are deep reasons why most evidence has “multiple relevances,” some legitimate and some illegitimate. The illegitimate inferences may invoke substantive moral or political norms outside the instructions for the ultimate decision of the case, or may involve lines of reasoning—from a party’s “character” for example, or from a hearsay statement—that the law of evidence determines insufficiently reliable on which to base a purely factual determination that must be made if the trier of fact is following the norms in the instructions. Recall that evidence may be excluded only if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice, such as that from an “illegitimate inference,” and one can understand the inevitability of evidence whose significance can overwhelm the substantive legal norms by invoking alternative values. Thus the lawyer’s control over both the legal and factual theory of the case, the low standard for logical relevance, the high standard (“substantially outweighed”) for exclusion of logically relevant evidence, and the pervasiveness of the nonopinion rule all suggest that the rules of evidence function more to structure than to exclude evidence. This is true, even within the “rationalist” tradition in the law of evidence, which generally understands the warrants that render a piece of evidence logically relevant to be purely empirical, and so value-free, empirical generalizations embedded in the judge’s common sense about what happens “generally and for the most part.” But there is more to relevance.
Most obviously, what constitutes “unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,” possibly calling for the exclusion of logically relevant evidence, requires a normative judgment on which purely legal considerations offer little guidance, and to which appellate courts are especially deferential. In many different ways, normative considerations affect “pure” relevancy determinations, both by rule and by judicial practice. This occurs in a self-conscious and focused way and, more important, in a tacit and pervasive way.
Some of these “relevancy” rules embody deeply held views about the importance of limited government. For example, evidence law prohibits a lawyer’s presenting proof of a witness’s religious beliefs in order to show that he is more or less credible.
The nonopinion rule and the relevance rule are the two most important and most “generative” of the rules of evidence. They are “generative” in the sense that most of the other evidence rules can be derived from them. There are basically four other categories of evidentiary rules, which have limited theoretical interest because of their derivative nature, but I deem them worth mentioning to round out the picture. The so-called best evidence rule requires only that the originals of documents be offered if available. Therefore, evidence as diverse as documents, physical evidence, telephone calls, and scientific processes all must be authenticated, unless it belongs to a class of evidence where there is no serious reason to doubt that evidence “is what it purports to be.” Authentication is usually fairly undemanding, the available methods virtually without limit, and the standard for admissibility relatively low. Though it is possible that some potential evidence can be excluded because the requisite “foundation” as to authenticity is unavailable, such exclusions are relatively rare. Evidence must also be “competent”—broadly speaking, “eligible to be received as evidence.” For example, a judge is incompetent to testify in a trial over which she presides; a juror is incompetent to testify as to his own intentions during deliberation in order to “impeach” or overturn his verdict; it is still said that a witness who has not perceived anything of consequence, or cannot remember what he perceived, or is incapable of communicating what he perceives and remembers, or is psychologically or morally incapable of differentiating fact from fantasy, is “incompetent” to testify.
Competence is a residual category. It now excludes certain kinds of evidence because they are likely to be unreliable, such as the testimony of very young children and persons in psychotic states. The broad tendency of the law of evidence has been to eliminate total incompetencies to testify and permit, instead, forms of impeachment that allow the juror to weigh the troubling aspect of the witness’s testimony like any other “impeaching” fact. Competency rules also exclude certain kinds of evidence for “structural” reasons: the judge’s potential testimony in the case over which he presides and usually the trial lawyer’s testimony in the case he tries. Finally, there is the rule against hearsay, which excludes out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted. There is a wonderful scholasticism surrounding the definition of hearsay that has its interests but is not germane to my purposes here. The most fundamental purpose of the hearsay rule is to protect cross-examination, “the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.” The notion is that only if the person whose perceptions are being reported is the same person who is reporting the perceptions can the cross-examiner properly explore (1) important weaknesses in perception, memory, and clarity of expression that may infect the testimony even of sincere witnesses, and (2) biases, interests, prejudice, and character failings that cast doubt on the witness’s credibility.
The broad drift of the law of evidence has been to admit more and more hearsay evidence, and for the constitutional jurisprudence surrounding the analogous Confrontation Clause to follow the lead of evidence law. There have always been dozens of defined exceptions to the hearsay rule. Many jurisdictions also now have “catch-all” exceptions for hearsay that simply seems “reliable.” Recall too that out-of-court statements are inadmissible only if offered for the truth of the matter asserted. This raises what we now know to be issues of multiple relevancies. Out of-court statements can be offered for purposes other than the truth of what was asserted, and, once admitted, are usually considered for all purposes. The deferential principles of relevancy law that allow those other purposes to be logically quite weak and the ability of advocates to tailor actual theories in order to render desirable evidence logically relevant together reduce the actual bite of the hearsay rule.
The best evidence rule, the requirement of authentication, most of the law of competence, and the hearsay rule all serve to ensure that evidence upon which a juror may decide a case is reliable. At a level below the rhetoric of judicial opinions, reliability is really a form of relevance. Evidence that is utterly unreliable is really irrelevant: it really does not render a fact that is of consequence to the litigation any more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Lawyers play the dominant role in the courtroom because they serve professionally as essential, expert advocates for those they represent. A word used since at least the thirteenth century, “advocate” refers to a “lawyer who pleads a case in a court of law on behalf of another”. In divorce trials, each of the litigants—plaintiff and defendant—are represented by one or more advocates. Preparing and pleading a case in the modern legal world is a time-consuming, complicated process requiring extensive knowledge of the law and the rules of the legal system. Parties generally have no hope of competently managing a case on their own (proceeding “pro se”). Trial cases are the bailiwick of lawyer-advocates. What is litigation? It is a legal proceeding between two or more parties in an attempt to “right” an alleged wrong. The “right” usually takes the form of a demand for payment to the party alleging injury. The path to a legal solution is often filled with unanticipated twists, unexpected delays, and potentially high stress for even the most seasoned litigants. Litigation is more often about losing less than it is about winning more; a litigant “is a person about to give up his skin in the hope of retaining his bone.” An anonymous author once wrote that “America is a country where, thanks to Congress, there are 40 million laws to enforce 10 Commandments.” As a result, litigation can easily take long periods of time and a great deal of expense. As courts become more congested with the seemingly endless number of cases being filed, the process can bog down from sheer volume alone. To be fair, many of the cases filed have merit. The American legal system is built on the principle of protecting the rights of the individual, and litigation is one way to protect those rights. Merit or not, however, the number of lawsuits continues to grow with little sign of slowing. Lawyers are the vanguards of the justice system. The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide attorneys with a framework for carrying out their responsibilities to their clients, the courts, and society in a professional manner. These rules are particularly important when pursuing a client’s claims, given the adversarial nature of litigation as well as the conflicts that may arise when lawyer and client have differing interests in the outcome (for example, settling a case versus taking it to trial).
The Model Rules require lawyers to provide “competent representation” to their clients in the areas of legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation. Legal knowledge includes knowledge of federal and state rules of evidence and civil procedure, as well as precedents set by case law, in order “to advance and protect the integrity of the fact-finding process.” Mastering these laws not only helps lawyers and their clients but also reduces the possibility for embarrassment and legal complications such as mistrials, inadmissible evidence, lost appeals, or reversed verdicts.
Custody and Parental Involvement
Custody itself is probably the biggest factor determining the level of parental involvement among parents who do not live together, because of its long-run effects on the level of emotional effort, care, and connection. In some families, noncustodial parents visit frequently and consistently. This is especially true immediately after children are born to unmarried parents who are romantically involved. However, these relationships tend to either turn into cohabitation or marriage or break up within a year or two. When parents are divorced or were never married and are no longer romantically involved, fathers’ involvement with children is often minimal and sporadic. Among a significant minority of such families, paternal visitation tapers off to nothing or nearly nothing within a few years.
Noncustodial parents tend to disengage emotionally for several reasons, whether as a result of relationship atrophy (“out of sight out of mind”), emotional avoidance (“it’s just too painful to see my kids under these conditions”), or overreliance on the custodial parent (“she’ll take good care of the kids no matter what I do”). Custodial parents may want to avoid contact with their previous partners at all costs. Emotional disengagement may contribute to financial disengagement, or vice versa. In any case, the effects are cumulative: The more emotionally disengaged the noncustodial parent becomes, the less implicit bargaining power the custodial parent has to increase either payment or time inputs. If the noncustodial parent feels little connection to—and wants no contact with—the child, the custodial parent is less able to successfully use an appeal to the needs of the child or a threat to make visitation or contact more difficult as a bargaining strategy. Furthermore, the less emotionally engaged the noncustodial parent becomes, the less the custodial parent and child have to gain from personal contact with him (or her). Thus, disengagement of one type breeds further disengagement.
Most parents want to increase their children’s well-being. But the ways they want to do so are shaped not merely by their perceptions of children’s needs but also by their own preferences—how they weigh their children’s and fellow parent’s well-being relative to their own. A father may feel less need to be involved in direct parenting if a mother is already providing substantial effort, and vice versa. Both levels and forms of parental involvement are subject to negotiation and bargaining. For instance, one parent might want the other parent to spend more time or money or simply give more personal attention to a child. That parent might offer something in return, as in, “If you’ll put the children to bed, I’ll do the dishes. ” Parents don’t negotiate over every detail of their lives. Many aspects of the division of labor in parenting are determined by social norms or prior agreement. Traditionally, we expect fathers to provide more income and mothers to provide more direct care for children. But in periods of time when both social norms and individual economic opportunities are rapidly changing, the scope for individual bargaining probably increases. For instance, a mother who has high earnings potential or who is committed to her career is likely to bargain with the father to increase his direct involvement in child care.
Such negotiations are necessarily complex. Parental involvement is a not a simple “product” but a process that requires emotional effort as well as time and money. It imposes costs, but it also confers benefits. Therefore, we cannot assume that parents always want to minimize it or to maximize it—rather they probably seek some level of involvement that is determined both by their perceptions of what children need, their own preferences, and what they believe the other parent should and could provide. It is important to remember, however, that some circularity comes into play; for example, a parent’s bargaining power may affect how much the other parent is involved with the child, but that involvement may in turn affect the parents’ relative bargaining power.
Rules about custody and support interact in ways that illustrate the interplay of nonpecuniary and economic benefits. Child custody is psychologically important to parents, especially to primary caregivers whose involvement is time and care intensive. They may feel that custody is necessary in order to provide greater continuity for themselves or the child; furthermore, as primary caregivers, they may be more emotionally attached to the child. As we discussed, this means that most mothers cannot make a credible threat to stop taking care of the child within the marriage or in the event of divorce (to leave the child with the father); thus, their ability to use the fact that they are providing child care as a bargaining chip with the father is limited, and it is limited even more if the father’s empathy for the child is low because he has been less emotionally involved.
The intensification of child support enforcement efforts over the past few years has provoked tremendous controversy. Although success has been uneven, more divorced fathers are paying children support. This, together with the growing cultural stigmatization of “deadbeat dads” has almost certainly increased the bargaining power of mothers relative to fathers within marriage as well as among noncohabiting parents. Mothers’ external threat points are higher as a result. Men can withdraw some of their earnings by divorce, but the amount of withdrawal is reduced by the amount of child support mandated by the state. Not surprisingly, some men have responded to this trend by demanding greater consideration as potential custodians in the event of divorce. In most states today the presumption of legal custody is no longer gender specific, but rests instead on what the court deems best for the child. Relatively few fathers try to convince judges that they are the better custodial parent, and even fewer succeed. But the number of men who seek and get custody or joint physical custody is rising.
Thus, the legal environment has produced two changes in recent decades. Mothers’ confidence that they will get child support if they divorce has increased, but they can be less sure than before that they will get custody. What is the net effect of this change on bargaining power likely to be? One could argue that two changes cancel each other out in their effect on maternal bargaining power—that is, mothers gain a higher probability of effective child support enforcement at the cost of a higher risk of losing sole custody and so there is no effect on their bargaining power. It is hard to say.
Divorced noncustodial parents are required to pay child support (provided there is a court order for it), and custodial parents are required to allow visitation by the other father. Furthermore, states limit the ability of unmarried parents to bargain by setting separate and independent rules regarding custody, visitation, and support. Failure to pay child support, for instance, cannot generally be used as a reason to deny a noncustodial parent contact with a child. Nor can failure to enjoy visitation easily be used as a reason not to pay child support.
Cohabitation and Alimony
No laws in Utah require unmarried cohabitants to support each other. And no state including Utah awards alimony or other support payments when an unmarried couple separates. If, however, the cohabitants have entered a contract under which one agrees to support the other, the contract may be enforced (depending on the state in which the cohabitants live or the contract was established). Lawsuits brought to enforce these contracts have been popularly called palimony cases. But, since cohabitants seeking recovery under such an agreement are doing so on the basis of an express or implied contract and not on an alimony statute, the word palimony is actually inaccurate.
Traditionally, unless a couple has an express written agreement to the contrary, the law has left matters regarding the property owned by cohabitants if they end their relationship as they are. Thus, when a couple separates, the property goes to whoever has legal title to it. Usually, this has meant that the man gets the property, because in relationships in which the man is the wage earner and the woman the homemaker, the wage earner “owns” the property acquired through his wages. In addition, until recently, most state courts refused to enforce even express agreements between cohabitants as to support or ownership of property. These courts have followed two main lines of reasoning. First, they have based their refusal on the grounds that such agreements are invalid. because they are based on “illicit sexual services.” For any contract to be valid, it must be based on something of value, or what the law calls consideration. Consideration cannot be illegal. The typical consideration in business contracts is money, services, property, or goods. Traditionally, courts have ignored the fact that most contracts between cohabitants are based on similar types of consideration. They have assumed either that the only services exchanged are sexual services or that, because sexual services form even part of the agreement, they invalidate the entire agreement. The second line of reasoning courts have used in refusing to enforce contracts between cohabitants is that homemaking services have no dollar value, so are not sufficient consideration to support an agreement to share property or to provide support.
Divorce and Alimony
In some divorces, courts award alimony, also called spousal support or maintenance, to one party. Alimony is especially likely after a long marriage or if one spouse gave up career plans to support the other spouse or to care for the children.
Alimony is designed to help a lower-earning spouse make it through the divorce and the transition into a new single life. Depending on the length of the marriage and the degree to which one spouse was financially dependent on the other, support can be either temporary or last for many years. However, the nationwide trend is for courts to award spousal support in fewer and fewer situations, and for shorter times when they do award it, because it has become common for both spouses to work or at least be able to return to work. The court’s decision on whether one spouse is entitled to support from the other after the divorce is completed, begins with the question of need. There’s no hard and fast rule, but in general the longer the marriage, the stronger the presumption that support is appropriate. The court will consider many factors while determining alimony including the length of the marriage, the division of marital property, the income and earning capacity of the spouses, the amount of time one spouse has not worked since the marriage and any other factor that the court may consider as relevant.
Alimony falls into two broad categories: short-term support and long-term or permanent support. “Reimbursement” support is a kind of long-term support. A spouse may also get temporary support before the divorce is final. It’s possible that a former spouse might receive more than one kind of support at the same time. If a spouse is getting more than one kind of support, say rehabilitative and short-term, then when the spouse is employed again, the rehabilitative support would end. The short-term support would continue until its termination date.
Short-term support is ordered when the marriage itself was short. Short-term support lasts only a few years, and its precise ending date is set in the court order. Rehabilitative support, sometimes also called “bridge the gap” support, is a specific kind of short-term support, designed to help a dependent spouse get retrained and back into the workforce. It usually lasts until the recipient is back to work. Generally, that date isn’t set in advance—the agreement is that the support payments will stop when the recipient completes a retraining program and becomes employed. The recipient is responsible for diligently pursuing their training and then searching for work. The other spouse is responsible for paying the support until that point—and a payer who suspects the recipient isn’t really trying to complete an education or get work can ask the court to reduce the support amount or set a termination date. The person asking for the modification would have to prove that the other ex-spouse was not working hard enough.
Permanent support may be granted after long marriages, generally more than ten years, if the judge concludes that the dependent spouse isn’t likely to go back into the workforce and will need support indefinitely. Some states don’t allow permanent support. Permanent support does eventually end when either the recipient or the payor dies. It also may end when the recipient remarries. In about half the states, it ends if the recipient begins living with another person in a marriage-like relationship where the couple provides mutual support and shares financial responsibilities. Reimbursement support is the only type of spousal support that’s not completely based on financial need. Instead, it’s a way to compensate a spouse who sacrificed education, training, or career advancement during the marriage by taking any old job that would support the family while the other spouse trained for a lucrative professional career. Generally both spouses expected that once the professional spouse was established and earning the anticipated higher salary, the sacrificing spouse would benefit from the higher standard of living and be free to pursue a desirable career. If the marriage ends before that spouse gets any of those expected benefits, reimbursement support rebalances the scales by making the professional spouse return some of what was given during the marriage. Because it’s not tied to need, reimbursement support ends whenever the agreement or court order says it does. Its termination generally isn’t tied to an event like the supported spouse getting work or remarrying. If you are seeking alimony payments from your spouse, or your spouse is seeking alimony payments from you, the services of an experienced South Salt Lake Utah divorce lawyer can greatly increase your chances since the lawyer has been trained in how to present evidence that supports your position to the judge.
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Unless you and your spouse have mutually agreed on the terms of your divorce, your divorce battle can be a long drawn case. You will have to back up your claims with evidence and be prepared to testify in support of your case. If there are children from the divorce, the custody of the children will be decided by the courts unless you and your spouse have mutually agreed on the custody. The mother does not automatically get custody of the children. The court will consider many factors when deciding on who should get custody of the children in a contested divorce. Utah divorce law is complex. Attempting to navigate the complex maze of Utah divorce laws can be disastrous. Seek the assistance of an experienced South Salt Lake Utah divorce lawyer.
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from Michael Anderson https://www.ascentlawfirm.com/divorce-lawyer-south-salt-lake-utah/ from Divorce Lawyer Nelson Farms Utah https://divorcelawyernelsonfarmsutah.tumblr.com/post/190318149425
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