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aimeedaisies · 7 months

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The Princess Royal’s Official Engagements in October 2023

02/10 As President of the Riding for the Disabled Association visited Avon Riding Centre, to mark its 40th Anniversary. 🐴🥳

03/10 Held two Investiture ceremonies at Windsor Castle. 🎖️

With Sir Tim As Patron of the Minchinhampton Centre for the Elderly, visited Horsfall House, Minchinhampton. 👵🏻👴🏻

04/10 In Cornwall Princess Anne visited;

Origin Coffee in Porthleven. ☕️

Camborne School of Mines at the Penryn Campus of University of Exeter, in Penryn. 🔨

St Ewe Free Range Eggs Packing Centre in Truro. 🥚

05/10 As Colonel of The Blues and Royals (Royal Horse Guards and 1st Dragoons), attended a Household Cavalry Medal Parade at Powle Lines, Picton Barracks in Wiltshire. 🫡

07/10 With Sir Tim Attended the Scotland vs Ireland Rugby World Cup match at the Stade de France in Paris. 🏴󠁧󠁢󠁳󠁣󠁴󠁿🇮🇪🇫🇷🏉

09/10 As Patron of Livability, visited Livability Millie College in Poole. 🏫

As Patron of UK Youth, visited Avon Tyrrell Outdoor Activity Centre in Bransgore. 🧗‍♀️

10/10 Attended a Future of UK Food Systems Seminar held by Crops for the Future at the National Institute of Agricultural Botany in Cambridge. 🚜

As Commandant-in-Chief (Youth) of St. John Ambulance, opened the new Ambulance Hub in Castle Donington. 🚑

11/10 Held two investiture ceremonies at Windsor Castle. 🎖️

Unofficial, Sir Tim attended the opening of the New Zealand Liberation Museum, Te Arawhata, in Le Quesnoy, France. 🇫🇷🇳🇿

As Patron of Scots in London Group attended a Reception at St Columba’s Church of Scotland. 🏴󠁧󠁢󠁳󠁣󠁴󠁿

Attended a Blue Seal Club Dinner at the Cavalry and Guards Club in Piccadilly, London. 🤵‍♂️

12/10 As Patron of the Campaign for Gordonstoun, chaired a Cabinet Meeting at the Lansdowne Club, London. 🏫

As Patron of English Rural Housing Association, attended a Parish Council Rural Housing Conference at Eversholt Hall, Bedfordshire. 🏡

Visited the Aircraft Research Association in Bedford. ✈️

As Grand Master of the Royal Victorian Order, attended Evensong and a Reception at The King’s Chapel of the Savoy, London. 🎶

14/10 Sir Tim represented Princess Anne, Patron of the Wiltshire Horn Society, at a dinner on the occasion of their centenary. 🐑

15/10 As Member of the International Olympic Committee, and Chairman of the International Olympic Committee Members Election Commission, attended the first day of the 141st International Olympic Committee Session in Mumbai, India. 🇮🇳

16/10 As Member of the International Olympic Committee, and Chairman of the International Olympic Committee Members Election Commission, attended the second day of the 141st International Olympic Committee Session in Mumbai, India. 🇮🇳

Attended an IOC Reception at Jio World Centre. 🌏

17/10 As Member of the International Olympic Committee, and Chairman of the International Olympic Committee Members Election Commission, attended the third day of the 141st International Olympic Committee Session in Mumbai, India. 🇮🇳

Visited the Commonwealth War Graves Commission Bombay 1914-1918 Memorial at the Indian Sailors’ Home, in Mumbai. 🪖

Attended a reception at the residence of His Majesty’s Trade Commissioner for South Asia and Deputy High Commissioner for Western India in Mumbai. 🌏

Unofficial Sir Tim attended a memorial service for Lord Lawson (former Chancellor of the Exchequer) at St. Margaret’s church in Westminster ⛪️

19/10 Hosted a Reception with the King, Queen and the Duchess of Edinburgh at Buckingham Palace to thank those who contributed to and were involved with the State Funeral of The late Queen Elizabeth II and with the Coronation of Their Majesties. 🥂

With Sir Tim, As Colonel-in-Chief of the Royal Army Veterinary Corps attended the launch of the Corps History Book at the National Army Museum in London. 📚

With Sir Tim, As Patron of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines Charity, attended the Trafalgar Night Dinner at the Old Royal Naval College in Greenwich, London. 🤵‍♀️🤵‍♂️

20/10 Opened Cutbush and Corrall Charity almshouse accommodation in Maidstone.

Opened the Royal British Legion Industries Centenary Village, Greenwich House, in Aylesford, Kent.

As Patron of the Butler Trust, visited HM Prison Elmley.

24/10 Held an Investiture at Windsor Castle. 🎖️

As President of the English-Speaking Union of the Commonwealth, delivered the Evelyn Wrench Lecture at Dartmouth House in London. 🏴󠁧󠁢󠁥󠁮󠁧󠁿

25/10 In Scotland Princess Anne visited;

The International Society for Optics and Photonics Photonex Exhibition at Scottish Event Campus in Glasgow. 🔍

As President of Victim Support Scotland, visited the National Office-West in Glasgow. 🫂

Peter Equi and Sons Limited Ice Cream Manufacturer. 🍦

26/10 Opened the National Honey Show at Sandown Park Racecourse in Esher, Surrey. 🍯 🐝

As Royal Patron of the Security Institute, this afternoon attended the Annual Conference at the Royal Society of Medicine in London. ⛓️

With Sir Tim As President of the Royal Yachting Association, attended a 50th Anniversary of the Yachtmaster Scheme Dinner at Trinity House, London. 🛥️🍽️

27/10 Held an Investiture at Buckingham Palace. 🎖️

31/10 In Scotland;

As Patron of the Moredun Foundation, attended a Conference at Moredun Research Institute, Pentlands Science Park, in Penicuik. 🧬

As Royal Patron of the Leuchie Forever Fund, attended a Reception to launch Leuchie House’s new strategy in Edinburgh. 🏡

As Chancellor of the University of Edinburgh, held a Chancellor’s Dinner at the Palace of Holyroodhouse. 👩‍🎓

Total official engagements for Anne in October: 47

2023 total so far: 400

Total official engagements accompanied by Tim in October: 6

2023 total so far: 81

#a busy bee #princess anne #princess royal #tim laurence #timothy laurence #unofficial engagement count 2023 #october 2023

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usafphantom2 · 7 days

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Marine Air’s Dark Day at Midway

Marine Aircraft Group 22’s experience at the Battle of Midway serves as a hard lesson in trying to do too much with too little.

The 4th of June 1942 was a very bad day for Marine Corps aviation. At the Battle of Midway, Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 22 suffered terrible losses and contributed little to the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s spectacular victory that day. The group’s fighting squadron, VMF-221, lost far more aircraft than its pilots shot down. Its dive-bomber squadron, VMSB-241, suffered staggering losses without hitting a single Japanese ship.

Midway historians have thoroughly chronicled the actions of these two squadrons and touched on some reasons for their performance. The most cited causes are the obsolescence of Marine aircraft and the inexperience of Marine aviators.1 A closer examination of archival material reveals additional factors that impaired the group’s performance at Midway and new insights into why MAG-22 sent such green pilots into battle.

The heart of MAG-22’s troubles lay in its two competing missions: While forward deployed to defend an advanced base, the group also served as a de facto training command for new aviators. This alone would have undermined its combat readiness. But additional factors worked against MAG-22. In the weeks before the battle, the flight hours the group devoted to training were limited by its responsibilities to defend Midway Atoll and by logistical shortfalls. During the battle, Naval Air Station Midway and MAG-22 were unable to coordinate aircraft from three services based at the atoll. Finally, imprecise direction from Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester W. Nimitz led to misunderstandings of how MAG-22 would employ its fighting squadron.

Present-day naval commanders are acutely familiar with the challenge of balancing combat readiness and forward presence. As naval leaders look for ways to maintain Navy and Marine Corps forces in the western Pacific and prepare for possible conflict there, the experience of MAG-22 at Midway provides a sobering reminder of the risks of attempting to do too much with too little.

At Midway, First Lieutenant Daniel Iverson stands on a wing of his shot-up SBD-2 Dauntless, one of MAG-22’s 46 aircraft losses in the Battle of Midway. Later repaired in the United States, the restored SBD is now an exhibit at the National Naval Aviation Museum in Pensacola, Florida.

MAG-22’s Very Bad Day

At 0555 on 4 June 1942, Midway’s radar detected a large formation of aircraft 93 miles northwest of the atoll. MAG-22’s siren wailed. In accordance with orders issued the previous evening by Lieutenant Colonel Ira L. Kimes, the commander of MAG-22, VMF-221 launched its aircraft immediately. A detachment of six Navy TBF Avengers took off next, followed by four Army Air Forces B-26 Marauders armed with torpedoes. The TBFs and B-26s proceeded independently to attack the Japanese carriers. The 16 SBD-2 Dauntlesses and 12 SB2U-3 Vindicators of VMSB-241 took off last and rendezvoused about 20 miles east of Midway’s Eastern Island.2

VMF-221’s commanding officer, Major Floyd B. Parks, had organized his 21 F2A-3 Buffalos and seven F4F-3 Wildcats into four divisions of Buffalos and one of Wildcats. All but one F2A-3 and one F4F-3 were mission ready and got airborne, though the divisions became slightly disorganized during the hasty scramble. The Japanese strike consisted of 108 aircraft—36 Aichi D3A “Val” dive bombers, 36 Nakajima B5N2 “Kate” carrier attack aircraft, and 36 Mitsubishi A6M2 “Zeke,” or Zero, fighters. In accordance with Kimes’ plan, MAG-22’s fighter direction center funneled all five of VMF-221’s divisions to intercept the incoming strike. The Marines had the altitude advantage, and the separate divisions launched a series of overhead gunnery passes against the Japanese bomber formations. As the slower Marine aircraft recovered for additional passes, the nimbler Zeros overtook them and sent one after another tumbling downward.3

There is little doubt VMF-221 got the worst of the fight. The Japanese shot down 15 Marine fighters and severely damaged another nine, leaving just one F2A-3 and one F4F-3 ready to fly. Though Kimes afterward estimated Japanese losses at 43 aircraft, his surviving pilots definitively claimed just nine victories. Kimes’ estimate included “probable victories by missing fighter pilots” as well as claims by rear-seat gunners of VMSB-241.4 The actual total was far lower. VMF-221 probably shot down just three aircraft outright. Another 16 Japanese aircraft survived the raid but either ditched or were so irreparably damaged they could not fly again.5

A PBY Catalina flying boat had spotted the Japanese carriers, and MAG-22 passed their location to VMSB-241.6 Major Lofton R. Henderson, the squadron commander, led the SBDs. Major Benjamin W. Norris, the executive officer, led the SB2Us. While Henderson took his unit to 9,000 feet, Norris climbed to 13,000 feet.7 On paper, the SB2U-3s were nearly as fast as the SBD-2s, but the two flights proceeded independently.8

Because the Marine dive bombers were slower than the TBFs and B-26s, had taken off last, and had flown east before heading northwest, VMSB-241 did not attack until a half hour after the TBF and B-26 attacks had ended. The Japanese combat air patrol had shot down five of the six Avengers and two of the four Marauders; none had scored a hit. When Henderson and his SBDs spotted the carrier Hiryū at about 0755, the Japanese combat air patrol still had 13 fighters aloft.9

Henderson conducted a glide-bombing attack. A dive-bombing attack would have facilitated bombing accuracy and complicated fighter gunnery and antiaircraft solutions. But more than half of Henderson’s pilots were too inexperienced to attempt the technique, and the cloud cover would have made dive bombing particularly difficult.10

The combat air patrol’s Zeros attacked Henderson first. On their second pass, they sent him down in flames. The remaining SBDs continued the gliding attack. One by one, the Marines released their bombs—and missed. Some came petrifyingly close for the Hiryū’s crew, and many Marines mistakenly believed they had scored hits.11

Norris and his Vindicators arrived at about 0820, less than ten minutes after the surviving SBD-2s had departed and amid an attack by Army Air Forces B-17 Flying Fortresses. The combat air patrol had doubled to 26 fighters. Norris descended through the clouds toward the carrier Akagi. The Zeros could not find the dive bombers as long as they were in the safety of the cloud bank, but neither could the Marines see the ships below. When they emerged at 2,000 feet, they saw only the battleship Haruna. Norris also attempted a gliding attack. The Haruna maneuvered evasively, neatly avoiding every one of the Marines’ bombs. The SB2Us hugged the surface and flew back to Midway.12 Only 8 of VMSB-241’s 16 SBD-2s and 8 of its 12 SB2U-3s returned.13

VMSB-241 conducted two more strikes during the battle. That evening Norris led five SB2U-3s and six SBD-2s in a vain search for burning carriers. They found nothing, and Norris did not return, lost in the inky, moonless squalls. On 5 June, VMSB-241 attacked the cruisers Mogami and Mikuma. The squadron lost another Vindicator to antiaircraft fire and again scored no hits.14

What Was Done Well

MAG-22 did some things remarkably well in its first action. Due to superb intelligence and early warning, no airworthy planes were caught on the ground. The fighter direction center placed the fighters in an optimum intercept position. The dive bombers located the Japanese carriers. Most impressively, every fighter and dive-bomber pilot attacked without hesitation into the teeth of a formidable defense.

MAG-22’s efforts indirectly contributed to the destruction of the Akagi and two other carriers, the Kaga and Sōryū, later that morning. As historians Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully demonstrated, the cumulative effect of the series of failed attacks by bombers from Midway and U.S. carriers created conditions that delayed Admiral Chūichi Nagumo’s counterattack and placed his carriers at greater vulnerability to the dive bombers from the USS Enterprise (CV-6) and Yorktown (CV-5). Dodging the attacks required the carriers to maneuver violently. Defending against them required the carriers to launch and recover fighters. Perhaps just as important, Nagumo faced a series of menacing dilemmas, complicating his decision-making. When the dive bombers from the Enterprise and Yorktown appeared overhead at 1020, Kates and Vals were still below on the hangar decks, where their fuel and ordnance amplified the destructive power of the American bombs.15

VMF-221 also helped reduce the strength of Nagumo’s counterpunch when it did come. The only carrier that survived the Enterprise and Yorktown dive-bomber attacks was the Hiryū. It was her air group that VMF-221 had attacked. Though the Marine fighters shot down just two Kates outright, another seven Kates were shot down by Marine antiaircraft guns, ditched, or were too damaged to participate in the strikes against the U.S. carriers.16 In other words, the Marines did not bring down many aircraft, but the ones they did bring down were the right ones—aircraft from the Hiryū’s air group.

Nonetheless, 4 June had been an awful day for MAG-22. It had lost many aircraft, shot down only a handful of the enemy, and hit no ships. Forty-two MAG-22 Marines had died; 36 pilots and gunners were missing; and six Marines had been killed in the bombing of Eastern Island.17

‘Not a Combat Airplane’

On 17 April, Major (soon to be Lieutenant Colonel) Ira L. Kimes (below) landed at Midway Atoll to replace Lieutenant Colonel William Wallace as MAG-22 commander. Accompanying Kimes were six second lieutenants, green aviators who replaced six captains, seasoned fliers, who left the atoll with Wallace three days later. Public Domain

Every surviving Marine fighter pilot from VMF-221 attested to the superiority of the Zero over the Marine fighters. Captain

The F2A-3 is not a combat airplane. It is inferior to the planes we were fighting in every respect.

It is my belief that any commander that orders pilots out for combat in a F2A-3 should consider the pilot as lost before leaving the ground.18

Kimes agreed. In his endorsement to his aviator’s statements, Kimes recommended that the fleet relegate the F2A-3 Buffalo, the F4F-3 Wildcat, and the SB2U-3 Vindicator to training commands.19

The Vindicator was indeed past its usefulness. However, there is evidence that neither fighter was to blame for VMF-221’s poor performance. With improved tactics, Marine and Navy pilots would achieve far better results with the F4F in the Solomons. Captain Marion Carl, the only Marine to shoot down a Zero over Midway, believed the F2A-3 was as maneuverable and fast as the F4F-3, and its only drawbacks were that it could not absorb punishment and was less stable as a gunnery platform than the Wildcat.20

Some British and Dutch Buffalo aces, whose squadrons suffered grievously against Imperial Japanese Navy Zeros, attributed their lopsided outcome to Japanese proficiency and numbers rather than the Buffalo’s inferiority. Finnish Buffalo pilots enjoyed great success flying the planes against the Soviets.21 The Buffalo’s mixed performance in other theaters suggests that other factors contributed to VMF-221’s poor performance.

‘Half-Baked Flyers’

When VMF-221 and VMSB-241 had landed on Eastern Island in December 1941, both squadrons were top heavy with experience. VMF-221’s most junior pilot had been flying for at least a year since flight school.22 But the 57 aviators who flew on 4 June included 35 second lieutenants, none of whom had been with their squadron more than four months, and 17 of whom had arrived on 27 May directly from flight school.23

SB2U-3 Vindicator dive bombers take off from Midway’s Eastern Island in early June, possibly to attack Japanese carriers the morning of 4 June. While inferior aircraft—including Vindicators—were factors in MAG-22’s poor performance at Midway, tactics and training played key roles.

In the first half of 1942, Marine aviation had two conflicting missions: defending the fleet’s advanced bases and training new aviators. Newly winged aviators reported to the fleet with just 200 hours of flight time, and none in the aircraft they would fly in combat.24 The new aviators needed operational training, but the aircraft they needed to train in were defending advanced bases in the Pacific.

On 8 January 1942, Brigadier General Ross E. Rowell, the commander of 2d Marine Air Wing, described the dilemma in a letter to Vice Admiral William F. Halsey Jr., the commander of Aircraft, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet: “I have now accumulated 35 second lieutenants in various stages of advanced training. . . . If ComAirBatFor approves and you want some half-baked flyers, send me a dispatch to that effect.” Halsey approved; he directed Rowell to order the green fliers to squadrons like VMF-221 and VMSB-241.25 This decision set in motion a sequence of personnel transfers that diluted the combat readiness of forward-deployed squadrons. As inexperienced aviators joined squadrons at advanced bases, experienced aviators left to form new squadrons in Hawaii and California.

Marine aviation was still following its prewar training pipeline. Once students were designated naval aviators, they reported to squadrons in the Fleet Marine Force for about a year of operational flight training in combat aircraft.26

Not only did MAG-22 not have a year to train its new aviators, but the group’s commitment to the defense of Midway also required it to devote most of its operational flights to patrols and radar calibration vice gunnery and tactics. Less than 30 percent of VMF-221’s missions from December 1941 to May 1942 were dedicated to improving the lethality of its fighter pilots.27

Logistics shortfalls further impinged on the group’s training. A shortage of .50-caliber machine-gun ammunition often limited gunnery practice to dummy runs.28 In the final week before combat, PBY Catalinas and B-17 Flying Fortresses drew thirstily from Midway’s fuel stocks, which were already limited due to an incredible blunder. On 22 May, demolition charges placed at an underground fuel storage facility detonated when one of the defense battalion batteries fired its 11-inch guns. The station lost 375,000 gallons of precious aviation fuel and its pipeline to Eastern Island.29 The resulting shortage prevented the group from providing the 17 Marines fresh out of flight school with anything more than familiarization flights. VMSB-241 could not even check out its new pilots in their SBDs.30

Without question, MAG-22 fought the Battle of Midway with inferior aircraft and many “half-baked” pilots. Though the odds were stacked against the group’s aviators, command decisions may have stacked the odds higher than they needed to be.

‘No Organized Plan Whatsoever’

In a 1966 interview, MAG-22’s former executive officer stated there had been “no organized plan whatsoever” to coordinate Midway’s Army Air Forces, Navy, and Marine aircraft.31 Though not strictly true, his characterization betrays how Naval Air Station Midway and MAG-22 struggled to coordinate air operations.

In anticipation of the coming fight, Nimitz had abundantly reinforced Midway. In addition to MAG-22, Midway’s air force included 31 PBYs, 17 B-17s, the 4 B-26s, and the 6 TBFs. Nimitz assigned tactical control of all these to the naval air station commander, Navy Captain Cyril T. Simard, and sent an experienced aviator and a naval base air defense detachment to coordinate air operations.32

While the naval air station directed scouting operations superbly, integrating the bombers in a coordinated strike proved beyond its reach. Each aircraft type attacked without regard to the next, permitting the Japanese the opportunity to fend off each in turn. As Kimes observed in perfect hindsight, “It would have been better had they arrived simultaneously.”33

Coordination was exacerbated by the physical separation of the naval air station and MAG-22 command posts. Simard and his air operations officer were on Sand Island; Kimes and his command post were on Eastern Island. According to Kimes’ executive officer, the “Marines ran their own show” but did not command the other services’ bombers on Eastern Island, including the six Navy TBFs.34

Kimes’ air group struggled to coordinate its own aircraft. VMSB-241 does not seem to have attempted to integrate its SBD and SB2U attacks. Most puzzlingly, MAG-22 allocated no fighter protection to VMSB-241 for its strike against the Japanese carriers.

‘Go All Out for the Carriers’

Kimes employed his fighting squadron in what Marine Corps doctrine termed “general support.” As then–Major William J. Wallace lectured Marine officers at Quantico in 1941, general support was an offensive mission that allowed fighters the freedom to be “on the prowl.” In contrast, missions that tied fighters to protection missions, such as escorting bombers, were termed “special support.” As a fighter pilot, Wallace clearly favored the freedom to go find trouble and emphasized, “The rule, then, for the employment of fighter units should be-—general support wherever and whenever possible.”35

In January 1942, now–Lieutenant Colonel Wallace took command of Marine aviation on Midway, which he retained until relieved by Kimes in April. It was Wallace who had developed the fighter direction system MAG-22 employed for defense of the atoll. As Wallace’s views on fighter employment reflected Marine Corps doctrine, and Wallace commanded MAG-22 until two months before the battle, this bias likely influenced Kimes’ decision to place all of VMF-221 in general support on 4 June.

MAG-22’s fighter employment stands in stark contrast to how Japanese and U.S. carrier task forces operated on 4 June. Carriers were far more vulnerable to air attack than an island base. Nonetheless, every Japanese and American task force commander allocated fighter escorts to increase their bombers’ chances of getting through the enemy’s fighters.

Hitting the Japanese fleet was exactly what Nimitz had in mind when he reinforced Midway with so many aircraft. On 20 May, Nimitz provided the Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet, Admiral Ernest J. King, with some views on the role of land-based aircraft he had drawn from the recent Battle of the Coral Sea:

The shore commander should assign attack missions designed to render the greatest possible assistance to the Fleet Task Force when it is engaged and should particularly be ready to provide fighter protection when it is practicable.36

Nimitz incorporated these views in his planning guidance for Midway. In a 23 May memorandum to his chief of staff, Captain Milo F. Draemel, Nimitz explicitly directed that “Midway planes must thus make the CV’s [aircraft carriers] their objective, rather than attempting any local defense of the atoll.”37 In an undated memorandum likely written about the same time, Nimitz reiterated his intent to Captain Arthur C. Davis, his air officer:

Balsa’s [Midway’s] air force must be employed to inflict prompt and early damage to Jap carrier flight decks if recurring attacks are to be stopped. Our objectives will be first—their flight decks rather than attempting to fight off the initial attacks on Balsa. . . . If this is correct, Balsa air force . . . should go all out for the carriers . . . leaving to Balsa’s guns the first defense of the field.38

But in his operations order for Midway, Nimitz was less clear in the tasks he assigned to Simard at Midway:

(1) Hold MIDWAY.

(2) Aircraft obtain and report early information of enemy advance by searches to maximum practicable radius from MIDWAY covering daily the greatest arc possible with the number of planes available between true bearings from MIDWAY clockwise two hundred degrees dash twenty degrees. Inflict maximum damage on enemy, particularly carriers, battleships, and transports.

(3) Take every precaution against being destroyed on the ground or water. Long range aircraft retire to OAHU when necessary to avoid such destruction. Patrol planes fuel from AVD [seaplane tender] at French Frigate Shoals if necessary.

(4) Patrol craft patrol approaches; exploit favorable opportunities to attack carriers, battleships, transports, and auxiliaries. Observe KURE and PEARL and HERMES REEF. Give prompt warning of approaching enemy forces.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier fully informed of air searches and other air operations; also the weather encountered by search planes.39

The very explicit language Nimitz used in his planning guidance—that Midway’s aircraft “should go all out for the carriers”—is not reflected in his order. Absent such direction, Simard left it to Kimes to command the Marine squadrons as he saw fit. In accordance with Marine Corps doctrine, Kimes placed his fighting squadron in general support over Midway—and sent his dive bombers against the Japanese fleet without fighter escorts. Had he allocated one or two divisions from VMF-221 to escort VMSB-241, more Marine dive bombers may have survived to drop bombs on the Hiryū, and their accuracy may have improved had they attacked with less interference from the Japanese combat air patrol.

Trying to Do More with Less

MAG-22 had not gone all out for the carriers but had massed its fighters in defense of Midway. Naval Air Station Midway had struck the Japanese carriers with every bomber available but had been unable to coordinate their attacks to increase their chances for success and survival. Most tragically, many of the Marines lost in the battle were just not ready to fight the Imperial Japanese Navy, despite their willingness and eagerness to try.

MAG-22’s very bad day is a cautionary tale. Trying to do more with less—in MAG-22’s case, trying to defend Midway while training novice aviators—carries risks that may be hidden until they are exposed through combat. In his report of the battle, Kimes included a page and a half of candid comments and recommendations.40 After Midway, Marine aviators applied the lessons MAG-22 had learned at enormous cost and achieved spectacular results against the same foe in the Solomons, often under the leadership of aviators who had survived Midway.

Those same lessons are noteworthy today. Naval experts have cautioned the naval services against maintaining too much forward presence with too little fleet.41 An enduring lesson of MAG-22 may be that very bad days result from very bad choices, and that choosing to do more with less is often a very bad choice.

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dreaminginthedeepsouth · 8 months

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LETTERS FROM AN AMERICAN

October 15, 2023

HEATHER COX RICHARDSON

“We came here with four key objectives,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken told reporters in Egypt: “to make clear that the United States stands with Israel; to prevent the conflict from spreading to other places; to work on securing the release of hostages, including American citizens; and to address the humanitarian crisis that exists in Gaza.”

Blinken has been traveling country to country in the Middle East since shortly after the October 7 attack on Israel by Hamas fighters, who crossed into Israel and killed at least 1,300 people, of whom more than 1,000 were civilians, 30 were Americans, 12 were Thais, and 2 were French nationals. They also took 126 hostages, including not only Israelis, apparently, but also 8 Germans, 5 U.S. nationals, and 2 Mexican nationals.

Retaliatory strikes by Israeli forces on Gaza since then have killed at least 2,670 people and displaced almost a million. Israel has stopped food, water, fuel, and electricity from getting to Gaza and has told the more than a million residents in northern Gaza to move south to clear the way for a military incursion. Israeli energy minister Israel Katz said the siege would continue until Hamas frees the hostages. About 500 U.S. citizens are in Gaza.

The Biden administration has been pushing diplomacy to stop the crisis from spreading. On October 11, Blinken traveled to Israel, where he met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and then to Jordan, where he met with the head of the Palestinian Authority that exercises limited government in the West Bank, Mahmoud Abbas.

Then he went on to Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Virtually everywhere, he said, he found “a shared view that we have to do everything possible to make sure this doesn’t spread to other places; a shared view to safeguard innocent lives; a shared view to get assistance to Palestinians in Gaza who need it, and we’re working very much on that.”

Blinken emphasized that the U.S. will stand with Israel “today, tomorrow, and every day…in word and also in deed.” He noted that the U.S. has moved a second carrier strike group (CSG) to the Eastern Mediterranean. A CSG is a powerful, flexible group of about 7,500 sailors and Marines on a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, a replenishment ship (which carries oil and supplies), a cruiser, destroyers, and a submarine, as well as various aircraft.

The U.S. maintains 11 CSGs. Two of them are now in the Eastern Mediterranean not as provocation, Blinken said, but “as a deterrent. It’s meant to make clear that no one should do anything that could add fuel to the fire in any other place.” Sending two CSGs to the region is a strong statement, almost certainly designed to address threats by Iran that it will “respond” if Israel proceeds with a ground invasion of Gaza.

Iran backs Hamas—although there is not yet evidence that Iranian officials directly helped plan the October 7 attack—and also backs Hezbollah, the militant group that controls southern Lebanon. Today, clashes broke out on the border between Israel and Lebanon as Hezbollah fired missiles into Israel and Israeli forces fired artillery back.

Israel has “the right—indeed it has the obligation—to defend itself against these attacks from Hamas, and to try to do what it can to make sure that this never happens again,” Blinken said. But, he added, “[i]t needs to do it in a way that affirms the shared values that we have for human life and human dignity, taking every possible precaution to avoid harming civilians.”

United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres implored Hamas to release the hostages immediately and Israel to grant “rapid and unimpeded access…for humanitarian supplies and workers for the sake of the civilians in Gaza,” which “is running out of water, electricity and other essential supplies.” These two issues must not become bargaining chips, he said. “[W]e are on the verge of the abyss in the Middle East.” Opening a gate between Gaza and Egypt would allow supplies to be brought in and would help to move refugees south, away from the northern areas Israel is expected to attack.

Relief for Gaza’s people has been bottled up on the Egyptian side of the border as Israeli officials refuse to guarantee their forces will not bomb relief trucks out of concern they are carrying weapons. The U.S. has put strong pressure on Israel to reopen the water supply to Gaza, especially in the southern region since the influx of refugees was already stressing supplies, and today Israel did so, but observers say that without electricity and fuel, the pumping stations and the plants that take salt out of the water don’t work.

The U.S. is also clearly working to get the U.S. hostages released, but officials will not talk about the details of that operation.

Today President Biden appointed Ambassador David Satterfield as the U.S. Special Envoy for Middle East Humanitarian Issues, charging him with bringing “urgently needed humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people, particularly in Gaza, in coordination with the U.N., Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and other regional stakeholders.”

A diplomat since 1980, Satterfield has worked in countries all over the region for both Republican and Democratic administrations. He has served as the U.S. ambassador to Lebanon, U.S. deputy chief of mission in Iraq, assistant secretary for the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and director general of the body overseeing peace between Israel and Egypt.

“There are two very different visions for the future and what the Middle East can and should be,” Blinken said today. The U.S. stands behind a vision “that has countries in the region normalizing their relations, integrating, working together in common purpose, and upholding and bringing forth the rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people.”

The other vision is the one Hamas embraces: “a vision of death, of destruction, of nihilism, of terrorism. That’s a vision that does nothing to advance aspirations for Palestinians, that does nothing to help create better futures for people in the region, and does everything to bring total darkness to everyone that it’s able to affect.”

The visions are clear, Blinken said. He said he had no doubt that the overwhelming majority of people in the region would choose the first if given the chance. So it is the responsibility of “all of us who believe in that first path…to make it real, to bring it to light, to make it a clear, affirmative choice. And that’s what we’re determined to do…. If we do that, everyone in this region will be in a much better place and so will the rest of the world.”

And yet that vision must be reinforced at home. The murder of a six-year-old child and the attempted murder of the child’s mother yesterday in Illinois by their 71-year-old landlord prompted the president to warn against Islamophobia. The family was Palestinian and had immigrated to the U.S. “seeking what we all seek—a refuge to live, learn, and pray in peace,” Biden said. The child was born in the U.S.

“This horrific act of hate has no place in America, and stands against our fundamental values: freedom from fear for how we pray, what we believe, and who we are,” Biden said.

“We join everyone here at the White House in sending our condolences and prayers to the family, including for the mother’s recovery, and to the broader Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim American communities.”

—

LETTERS FROM AN AMERICAN

HEATHER COX RICHARDSON

#Letters from an American #Heather Cox Richardson #Israel Hamas war #Israel #Gaza #foreign policy #world on fire #Blinken #Middle East

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todaysdocument · 10 months

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Marines from Marine Air Logistics Squadron 11 (MALS-11) painted a mural on a road barricade at Ahmed Al Jaber Air Base, Kuwait, August 12, 2003.

Record Group 330: Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

Series: Combined Military Service Digital Photographic Files

Image description: A concrete road barrier, painted. The background is half American flag and half red with the Marine Corps logo. Superimposed are: Two aircraft, an angry-looking octopus, and “MALS-11”. On the base of the barrier is “Devil fish,” another octopus, and names and nicknames of members of the unit.

#archivesgov #August 12 #2003 #2000s #military #art #U.S. Marines #USMC #octopus #devil fish #Operation Iraqi Freedom #OIF #Operation Enduring Freedom #OEF

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impokedcomputergentlemen · 1 year

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Authorizes funding for eight F-18E/F aircraft.  Authorizes funding for 16 F-35C aircraft.  Authorizes funding for 15 F-35B aircraft.  Authorizes funding for 12 CH-53K helicopters.  Authorizes funding for two V-22 aircraft.  Authorizes funding for seven E-2D Hawkeye aircraft.  Authorizes funding for five KC-130J tanker aircraft.  Authorizes funding for three MQ-4 Triton unmanned aerial systems.  Authorizes funding for four MQ-25 Stingray unmanned aerial systems.  Authorizes funding for five Marine Group 5 unmanned aerial systems

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nebris · 2 years

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USS Helena (CL-50) was a Brooklyn-class light cruiser built for the United States Navy in the late 1930s, the ninth and final member of the class. The Brooklyns were the first modern light cruisers built by the US Navy under the limitations of the London Naval Treaty, and they were intended to counter the Japanese Mogami class; as such, they carried a battery of fifteen 6-inch (150 mm) guns, the same gun armament carried by the Mogamis. Helena and her sister St. Louis were built to a slightly modified design with a unit system of machinery and an improved anti-aircraft battery. Completed in late 1939, Helena spent the first two years of her career in peacetime training that accelerated as tensions between the United States and Japan increased through 1941. She was torpedoed at the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and was repaired and modernized in early 1942.

After returning to service, Helena was assigned to the forces participating in the Guadalcanal campaign in the south Pacific. There, she took part in two major night battles with Japanese vessels in October and November 1942. The first, the Battle of Cape Esperance on the night of 11–12 October, resulted in a Japanese defeat, with Helena's rapid-fire 6-inch battery helping to sink a heavy cruiser and a destroyer. The second, the first night of the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in the early hours of 13 November, saw a similar defeat imposed on the Japanese; again, Helena's fast shooting helped to overwhelm a Japanese task force that included two fast battleships, one of which was disabled by heavy American fire and sunk the next day. Helena sank a destroyer and damaged several others in the action while emerging relatively unscathed. During her tour in the south Pacific, she also escorted convoys carrying supplies and reinforcements to the Marines fighting on Guadalcanal and bombarded Japanese positions on the island and elsewhere in the Solomons.

Following the American victory on Guadalcanal in early 1943, Allied forces began preparations to advance along the Solomon chain, first targeting New Georgia. Helena took part in a series of preparatory attacks on the island through mid-1943, culminating in an amphibious assault in the Kula Gulf on 5 July. The next night, while attempting to intercept a Japanese reinforcement squadron, Helena was torpedoed and sunk in the Battle of Kula Gulf. Most of her crew were picked up by a pair of destroyers and one group landed on New Georgia where they were evacuated the next day, but more than a hundred remained at sea for two days, ultimately making land on Japanese-occupied Vella Lavella. There, they were hidden from Japanese patrols by Solomon Islanders and a coastwatcher detachment before being evacuated on the night of 15–16 July. Helena's wreck was located in 2018 by Paul Allen.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Helena_(CL-50)

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pacificeagles · 1 month

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https://pacificeagles.net/the-guadalcanal-landings/

The Guadalcanal Landings

As the largest invasion fleet assembled so far in the war approached Guadalcanal to begin the landing operations, the first order of business for VAdm Frank J. Fletcher’s Task Force 61 was to clear the immediate area of air opposition, and then to assist with the softening up of the beaches. At 0530 the first wave of 93 aircraft took off to attack the landing areas, including no less than 44 fighters for strafing and air cover. Taking off in the pre-dawn darkness many of the pilots got lost and failed to join up with their formations, so it was a rather disjointed force that made its way to Guadalcanal and Tulagi.

Fighters from Wasp’s VF-71, eleven in all, swept in low towards the seaplane base at Tulagi. A unit of H6K flying boats from the Yokohama Kokutai was caught on the water preparing to take off for dawn searches, and a unit of A6M2-N floatplane Zeros was also unprepared. All the aircraft were quickly flamed by the Americans, seven H6Ks and six Zeros in all. Several supporting boats and shore installations were also burned, removing any chance that the Tulagi unit could interfere with the landings. SBDs from Wasp followed up these attacks by dropping bombs on various shore installations, all without encountering any serious anti-aircraft fire.

At Guadalcanal the Saratoga Air Group took the lead. The Lunga Point airfield was approaching completion, but 12 VF-5 fighters strafed every likely target, including the “pagoda” and several hangars. There was no return fire from anti-aircraft guns, even though several guns were in position around the airfield. There were even two Type 11 radar sets, but these were apparently not operating that morning having failed to provide any warning. 26 SBDs followed up the strafing attack by bombing structures around the airfield. The attack caused Japanese troops and construction crews around the field to flee for the hills, and the airfield was captured without incident two days after the marines came ashore. All bombing missions were halted after midday as the operation was proceeding well – the Guadalcanal landings were unopposed, and the marines on Tulagi had the situation well in hand despite heavy fighting.

Tanambogo after being bombed by Wasp aircraft

Afternoon Air Attacks

At Vunakanau airfield near Rabaul, the 4th Kokutai was preparing for a mission of its own when news of the American landings arrived. The 4th was slated to attack a newly discovered Allied airfield at Rabi, on the eastern tip of New Guinea and 27 G4Ms were bombed up and ready to depart when the new threat became evident. RAdm Sadayoshi Yamada, commander of the 5th Base Air Force, elected to send these bombers to Guadalcanal instead, judging that the new landings were a more significant threat. Keen to strike early, Yamada ordered the 4th to attack with bombs instead of re-arming them with potentially more deadly torpedoes. The Tainan Kokutai was to supply 18 Zeros as escort, even though Guadalcanal was at the extreme limit of the Zero’s range – well over 500 miles from Rabaul. At about 10am, just 90 minutes after news of the American invasion had arrived, the 4th and Tainan Kokutai were on their way to Guadalcanal.

Even though no land-based radar was yet operational at Lunga, the Allied intelligence network provided early warning of the incoming strike. Coastwatcher Paul Mason, stationed near Buin in southern Bougainville, radioed “24 bombers headed yours” to Turner and Fletcher at around midday when he spotted the 4th Ku bombers at high altitude. The message arrived in plenty of time but there were nevertheless difficulties in preparing a defensive effort.

News of the incoming Japanese air attack was no real surprise, but the tactical situation meant that the Americans had to plan the defence carefully. Fletcher’s fighters had to defend two locations, about 60 miles apart – his own carriers and Turner’s landing force. Wildcats had to be kept on station to protect both locations, which were not mutually supporting. This placed an enormous burden on the three fighter squadrons and the Fighter Direction Officers responsible for their deployment. As the FDOs struggled to make sense of the likely attack direction, fighters were dispatched as either “CV CAP” for the carriers or “Screen CAP” (SCAP) for Lunga, with the carriers taking priority. Matters were not helped by the F4F’s short endurance, which meant that the CAPs had to be replaced regularly with fresh, fully fuelled fighters. Consequently, when the Japanese finally arrived over Guadalcanal there were just 8 SCAP F4Fs from Saratoga’s VF-5 on station.

Four of the Wildcats were led by Lt James Southerland. The FDO aboard the cruiser Chicago vectored his flight towards the incoming Japanese who were at the time inside a large cloud bank and out of sight. When the G4Ms burst out of the cloud bank Southerland’s fighters were just a few hundred yards away and he immediately led them into the attack, but the escorting Zeroes were equally alert and two F4Fs were shot down immediately, leaving Southerland to attack alone. He shot down one of the bombers and damaged another, before return fire damaged his fighter requiring him to break off. The second flight of Wildcats also made attacks on the bombers but without apparent success.

The remaining bombers arrived over Turner’s fleet and commenced bombing. Their aim was poor, and the bombs landed between transports and cruisers, but hit nothing – nevertheless the bombardiers claimed a destroyer sunk and transport damaged. Immediately afterwards the American fighters returned and damaged more of the G4Ms forcing a response from the escorts which resulted in two more F4Fs being shot down. The remaining Wildcats, some of them damaged, turned for home. Southerland was ambushed by more Zeros, culminating in a famous dogfight with the renowned Japanese ace PO1c Saburo Sakai who poured fire into Wildcat. Southerland was finally forced to bail out of his battered fighter and make his way towards the American lines. In all 5 of the 8 VF-5 Wildcats were shot down.

Sakai meanwhile followed up by attacking a nearby formation of SBDs. Making a poorly executed stern attack, Sakai was severely injured by the defensive guns of the dive-bombers – a bullet hit his skull and blinded him on one eye. Despite this severe wound, Sakai was able to maintain control of his Zero and set course for home. Battling blood loss and partial blindness, Sakai managed to fly the 550 miles home to Rabaul and land safely. He was evacuated back to Japan to recuperate but would fly again despite the loss of his eye.

Whilst the VF-5 Wildcats were fighting for their lives, 10 more F4Fs from VF-6 and eight from VF-71 attempted to intervene. Four VF-6 fighters under Lt Vincent de Poix were first to arrive as the bombers were beginning their withdrawal towards Santa Isabel Island. They made one firing pass on the formation of G4Ms before the escort was able to react, but soon the Zeros shot down one of the F4Fs and forced the others to scatter. The remaining six VF-6 fighters under Lt(jg) Gordon Firebaugh caught up with the bombers almost at the extreme range of their F4Fs. The Tainan fighters, now about 16 in number, again put up an excellent defence of the bombers, quickly shooting one Wildcat down. Firebaugh claimed two of the Zeroes whilst his charges finished off two more bombers, but Firebaugh was himself forced to bail out of his badly damaged fighter. The VF-71 fighters did not arrive in time to fight the Japanese.

In the defence of the invasion fleet half of the American fighters that were engaged were lost, 9 Wildcats in total. They managed to shoot down four bombers and two Zeroes, with two more G4Ms written off due to battle damage.

The Japanese launched one more attack on the 7th by nine D3A dive bombers. These aircraft lacked the fuel to fly from Rabaul to Guadalcanal and return, so it was planned that they would ditch near Shortland harbour on the return leg. These dive bombers only carried small 60kg bombs so it was doubtful they could do much damage to enemy warships. They arrived near Lunga almost an hour after the G4Ms left and attacked without escort. They scored a hit on the destroyer Mugford that killed 21 men. Five of the D3As were shot down by fighters and American AA fire, and the remaining four ditched at Shortland as planned.

To cap off a busy day of air operations, the US Fifth Air Force got into the action when it launched a raid by heavy bombers on Vunakanau airfield. 13 B-17s from the 19th Bomb Group took off from Port Moresby as the 4th Kokutai was busy attacking Guadalcanal, and they reported bombing the airfield despite strong fighter opposition from the 2nd Kokutai’s Zero 32s which caused the loss of one Fortress. No Japanese aircraft were destroyed on the ground by Gen George C. Kenney, commander of the Fifth, claimed based on faulty intelligence that his bombers had destroyed 75 planes “parked wingtip to wingtip” at Vunakunau.

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D Plus One

The following day RAdm Yamada was determined to find the enemy carriers and attack them. Five reconnaissance aircraft were launched followed an hour later by 26 torpedo-armed bombers from the 4th and Misawa Kokutai and 15 Zeros. When the search planes failed to report any American carriers in the vicinity, the strike group set course for Tulagi and the transport fleet. Due to communications foul-ups and fuel worries, there were only three F4Fs on station over Savo Sound although 14 more were hurrying north to join them. Task Force 62 would have to rely primarily on its own anti-aircraft guns to repel the attack.

Japanese bombers skimming at low level as they attack Allied shipping off Guadalcanal

The Japanese bombers had flown at low altitude north of the Solomons to shield themselves from American radar. As a result, they were first sighted visually just before midday by lookouts. AA guns quickly swung into action and opened up as the G4Ms descended to low level to begin their torpedo attack, whilst TF62 turned away. Almost immediately bombers began to crash in flames as the American gunners found their targets, some of the wrecks barely missing ships as they splashed. One G4M smashed into the transport George F. Elliot and started a large fire. She was later beached and, beyond saving, was allowed to burn out. Very few torpedoes appear to have been launched and the only ship that was hit by a ‘fish’ was the destroyer Jarvis. She was struck forward near her bow and immediately started to take on water.

The three F4Fs on patrol responded to radio calls for help and dived from high altitude down to the deck. There they came across several bombers making their escape at low level, and quickly shot down four of them as well as one of the escorting Zeros, which was itself distracted by a cruiser based SOC in the area.

The attack was disastrous for the 4th and Misawa Kokutai. Seventeen Type 1 bombers were destroyed in the attack, and another crashed after having aborted early. In return they had managed to damage a transport and a destroyer but had otherwise nothing to show for their efforts despite hysterical claims of dozens of cruisers and transports sunk or damaged. It was the worst single day loss of Japanese bombers during the entire Guadalcanal campaign and highlighted the extreme vulnerability of the G4M to American firepower.

George F. Elliot burns after being hit by a crashing Japanese bomber. Two other plumes are destroyed aircraft burning on the water.

Following the successful defence of TF62, Fletcher reviewed his aircraft situation. During two days of operations his carriers had lost 21 fighters to enemy action and operational accidents, more than 20% of his total strength. Aware that Rabaul-based aircraft posed a serious threat to his carriers and that Japanese submarines were likely hunting for TF61, Fletcher determined that it was too dangerous to remain in the area and requested permission from Ghormley to withdraw early. At the time of making his request he believed that TF62 would shortly make its own withdrawal, but the Japanese attacks had disrupted unloading operations and Turner had elected to keep his ships in the area longer to give the marines more time to unload their supplies and equipment. Overnight Fletcher had TF61 sail southeast, away from Guadalcanal, but still within range to support Turner should the need arise. The Japanese had other plans. Their 8th Fleet, a powerful force of heavy cruisers under the command of VAdm Gunichi Mikawa, was rapidly concentrated at Rabaul and made ready to sail for Guadalcanal. The stage was set for the US Navy’s worst ever disaster.

#guadalcanal #invasion #History #South Pacific

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militaryleak · 2 months

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Reveal Technology, Inc. Receives $3.2Million Award with US Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL)

Reveal Technology, Inc. (Reveal), is proud to share that they have been granted a $3.2M research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) contract award with the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL). The contract is a 12-month effort that will allow Reveal to enhance their Farsight platform to produce actionable intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance (ISR) to Marine Corps operators through near real-time 3D modeling and artificial intelligence analytics. The Reveal team will work alongside Government stakeholders, including MCWL, Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division [AR1], and research and technology partners Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory and AeroVironment's (AV) Tomahawk GCS group to optimize Farsight for use on the Marine Corps' Group 1 and 2 Family of unmanned aircraft systems, develop analytical enhancements to support Marine Corps specific use cases and perform operational testing, evaluation, and training with Marine Corps users. #military #defense #defence #militaryleak #usmc

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defensenow · 11 months

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youtube

Defending the Skies: Marine Aircraft Group 12 gears up for Northern Edge...

#youtube

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honeysfashion · 1 year

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US Marine Corps Grumman A 6E Intruder G 128 Of VMFAAW 533 Hawaiian Shirt

The Grumman A6E Intruder was first flown in 1951 and entered service with the United States Navy in 1954. The Intruder is a single-seat, twin-engine turboprop aircraft that is used for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and reconnaissance. The Marine Corps currently flies the Grumman A6E Intruder as part of the Anti-Submarine Warfare Wing of Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12).The Grumman A6E Intruder features a wide variety of sensors that allow it to perform a variety of missions. These sensors include an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, sonobuoys, and depth charges. The Grumman A6E Intruder can carry up to sixteen torpedoes and two depth charges.The Grumman A6E Intruder has a long history with the United States Marine Corps. The Marine Corps first flew the Grumman A6E Intruder in 1952 as part of Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12). Today, the Grumman A6E Intruder remains an important aircraft in the Marine Corps' arsenal and is used for a variety of missions, including ASW and reconnaissance.

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handcalfieetherington · 1 year

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The Vietnam war is a relatively famous event in history even over here of US invading Vietnam thinking it would be an easy fight given the numbers and power difference, unfortunately for them there enemy’s were avid enjoyers of Sun Tzu ‘s classic book ‘the art of war’ and using the tactics of Guerrilla warfare were able to divide and conquer through attacking in small groups and sowing chaos and uncertainty into there enemies, this isn’t a history blog though so let’s just talk about how the US used helicopters.

the Millitary used them for a different variety of things depending on the model, some were massive and meant to transport in troops, some were made for offence while smaller ones were made to act as drones and some were multi purpose, here’s a description of all the 24 types of helicopters listed on the site.

Attack Helicopters

Bell AH-1 HueyCobra / Cobra

The Cobra is a single-engine attack helicopter produced by Bell Helicopter as a primary attack helicopter in the Vietnam War for aerial assaults or as air cavalry. The AH-1 is sometimes affectionately referred to as the “Huey Cobra” or “The Snake”.

Bell AH-1J SeaCobra

The SeaCobra was a twin-engine attack helicopter that was developed from the single-engine AH-1 Cobra helicopter. The AH-1J SeaCobra was used later in the later stages of the Vietnam war.

The Marine Corp used it for the sea-based interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in 1972. The Bell AH-1J was also used for various subsequent assaults and military operations conducted by the US Marine Corps.

Observation Helicopters

Hughes OH-6 Cayuse (Loach)

The Hughes OH-6 Cayuse is a light helicopter with a single engine and a four-bladed main rotor. It was used for transporting personnel, escorting other aircraft and naval vessels, attacking enemy units, and acting as an observation post.

The US military primarily used the OH-6 for observational and reconnaissance purposes.

Bell OH-58 Kiowa

The Bell OH-58 Kiowa was an entire line of military helicopters with a single engine and a single rotor. These helicopters were mostly used for observation, reconnaissance, utility, and for providing combat support.

This chopper is mostly known for having been used to spot enemy artillery.

Light Utility Helicopters

Bell H-13 Sioux

The Bell H-13 Sioux was developed as a light-weight single-engine and single-rotor helicopter.

The Bell H-13 Sioux were used for multiple roles, ranging from transporting troops, conducting medical evacuations, and performing reconnaissance and observational activities.

Bell Model 206

The Bell Model 206 is a line of both single and twin-engined helicopters with two primary rotor blades.

The Model 206 was mostly employed as a general utility helicopter, but at times it was also used for transporting troops and high command, in addition to serving observational and reconnaissance roles during the Vietnam war.

Hiller OH-23 Raven (Model UH-12)

The Raven was used as a scouting helicopter during the early phases of the war, before it was eventually replaced by the Cayuse in early 1986.

On a few occasions, the OH-23 was also used for medical evacuation purposes, but this was rarely the case.

Kaman HH-43 Huskie

The Huskie was used by the US Air Force, US Navy, and US Marine Corps. During the Vietnam War, it was mostly deployed for aerial combat and for conducting rescue operations in areas close to US Air bases. Late in the war, the HH-43 was also deployed for short overland search and rescue missions.

During the Vietnam war, the HH-43 Huskie was used for more rescue missions than all other aircraft combined. It was used prolifically because of its unique hovering abilities.

Gunship Helicopters

Bell UH-1B/C Huey Cobra / Frog

The Bell UH-1B/C was modified from the UH-1A Cobra to include a set of machine guns for attacking ground targets. The UH-1B/C was used sparingly during the Vietnam War.

ASW Helicopters (Anti-Submarine Warfare)

Kaman SH-2 Seasprite / Super Seasprite

The Seasprite was an anti-submarine and anti-surface helicopter that had over-the-horizon targeting facilities. The Kaman SH-2 could extend and increase both shipboard sensor and weapon abilities against different types of enemy units, including submarines, ships, and patrol craft with anti-ship missiles.

Despite its strong offensive abilities, the SH-2 Seasprite was mostly used for rescuing downed friendly aircrews instead of direct combat.

Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopters

Gyrodyne QH-50 DASH

The Gyrodyne company built the Gyrodyne QH-50 DASH (Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter) to combat submarines from a distance. The Gyrodyne QH-50 was mostly designed to be used on ships that weren’t large enough to carry a full-sized helicopter.

Despite having been designed for anti-submarine combat, the Gyrodyne QH-50 was mostly used for conducting reconnaissance of enemy vessels in the Vietnam war, instead of actual combat.

Search and Rescue Helicopters

Sikorsky HH-3E Jolly Green Giant

The Sikorsky S-61R is a twin-engine transport and search helicopter. It was nicknamed the “Jolly Green Giant” during the war. These choppers were modified for combat rescue missions and had self-sealing fuel tanks, rescue hoist, and in-flight refueling abilities.

Heavy-Lift Transport Helicopters

Sikorsky CH-37 Mojave

The Mojave is a large heavy-lift helicopter that was deployed in the Vietnam War in 1965 to assist in recovery of downed US aircraft, but it proved ineffective.

Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallion

The Sea Stallion is a line of heavy-lift transport helicopters. The Sea Stallion is a variant of the Jolly Green Giant, but it’s used only for sea transport. In the Vietnam War, these choppers were used to recover downed aircraft.

Sikorsky CH-54 Tarhe

The CH-53 Tarhe was another heavy-lift helicopter designed to transport and recover downed aircraft. Unlike previous aircraft, the Tarhe was extremely successful during the Vietnam War.

Transport Helicopters

Boeing CH-47 Chinook

The Boeing CH-47 Chinook is a tandem rotor chopper that was developed by Vetrol and built by Boeing Vertol. It was mostly used to transport troops and cargo during the Vietnam war.

Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight

The Sea Knight is a medium left-tandem rotor helicopter used for transport. Primarily, it was used by the Marine Corp to transport personnel and cargo.

Piasecki H-21 Workhorse

The Piasecki H-21 Workhorse was the fourth line of tandem rotor helicopters developed by Piasecki Helicopters. The-21C was extensively used by the US Army to transport troops and supplies.

CH-34 Choctaw

The CH-34 Choctaw was developed by Sikorsky Aircraft for transport purposes to carry personnel and deliver supplies. Some units were modified during the war with machine guns to act as gunships.

Multipurpose Helicopters

Bell UH-1 Iroquois

The UH, nicknamed “Huey” is a utility military chopper that was used for troop and cargo transport, medical evacuation, and sometimes for military purposes.

Sikorsky H-19 Chickasaw

The Chickasaw was a multi-purpose helicopter designed for both the US Army and Air Force. It was barely used in the Vietnam War because it was replaced by the more advanced Sikorsky H-34 Choctaw.

Helicopters Used By the Vietnamese

Mil Mi-1 (Hare)

The Mil Mi-1 was a Soviet-made light utility chopper with three or four seats. During the Vietnam War, it was exclusively used by North Vietnam for reconnaissance and VIP transport.

Mil Mi-4 (Hound)

The Mil Mi-4 was a Soviet transport chopper used both for civilian and military purposes. It was mostly used as a transport chopper, but it could also deliver supplies to troops.

Mil Mi-8 (Hip)

The Mil Mi-8 is a Soviet medium twin-turbine helicopter. The Mil Mi-8 was developed in the later stage of the Vietnam War to counter the Bell Huey UH1

.Ramos, A. (2023) 24 helicopters used in Vietnam (and their purpose), EXECUTIVE FLYERS. Available at: https://executiveflyers.com/helicopters-used-in-vietnam/ (Accessed: February 16, 2023).

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opedguy · 1 year

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Biden Pushes China to the Brink

LOS ANGELES (OnlineColumnist.com), Feb. 12, 2023.--After shooting down what China calls a weather balloon last week, tensions have never been higher with the Peoples Republic of China, prompting calls by the Foreign Ministry that the U.S. used “indiscriminate aggression.” Instead of ratcheting down tensions, Biden sent the USS Nimitz nuclear-powered aircraft carrier strike group and the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit to conduct “integrated expeditionary strike force operations” into the South China Sea. U.S. has had a beef with China for building out military installations on sandbars in the Spratly Islands’ shallow shoals for the past 10 years. U.S. took China to the International Court of Arbitration at the Hague where China lost a ruling July 12, 2016, over freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. China rejected the Hague’s ruling because Beijing doesn’t subscribe to the International Court of Arbitration.

U.S. officials, and its Indo-Pacific allies claim that China seized illegally sovereign control of areas in open waters, not part of any sovereign country. Yet building military installation on sandbars, China asserted its right to seize control of the South China Sea, considering the waterway part of Communist China. U.S. officials are committed to open navigation in the South China Sea where some $5 trillion in goods pass through on ships every year. Sending a U.S. carrier strike force to the South China Sea directly challenges China’s navy, no match to the U.S. Pacific Fleet but still capable to launching attacks on U.S. ships. Relations with China took a hit last summer when 82-yearold former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) visited Taiwan Aug. 4, 2022, telling the Taipei government that the U.S. has its back. Biden followed up Sept. 23, 2022, saying he would defend Taiwan with U.S. troops.

Biden knows the U.S. is bound by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, signed into law by former President Jimmy Carter, agreeing to recognize diplomatically only one China, the one in Beijing. Signing the Taiwan Relations Act, Carter agreed to end the 1954 Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty that obligates the U.S. to defend Taiwan in the event of a Beijing takeover. So, with Biden ordering the shoot down of a Chinese Spy Balloon Feb. 4, China was already up in arms. Sending the Nimitz strike force into the South China only makes a bad situation worse. Biden has a proxy war in Ukraine going against the Russian Federation. Now he’s on the verge of going to war against Communist China, all because he doesn’t like China’s human rights record, something not typically used to interfere with relations between nuclear-armed superpowers. Biden’s been the most belligerent U.S. president on record.

When the U.S. discovered the Chinese spy balloon drifting for six days across the continental states, Biden finally order the shoot down Feb. 4, prompting Beijing to react harshly to U.S. actions. No one knows now how China will react to today’s provocation in the South China Sea. While freedom of navigation still applies in the South China Sea, given the high state of tension between Washington and Beijing, you’d think Biden would call off any provocative military drills. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, 60, already cancelled his recently scheduled trip to Beijing after the Feb. 4 balloon shoot down. Blinken finds it’s going to be difficult under the circumstances to reschedule his diplomatic mission to Beijing, knowing the current state of tensions. Beijing could act at anytime to attack U.S. assets in the region. Blinken called the spy balloon incident a clear violation of U.S. sovereignty.

Whatever the reason, Biden has no business provoking the Chinese while he’s fighting a bloody proxy war against the Russian Federation. U.S. national security requires the White House to get along with its adversaries, regardless of the propensity to take more aggressive action. Biden knows the U.S. should end its proxy war against the Russian Federation. Whatever Ukraine’s beef with the Kremlin, it’s not up to the U.S. to settle the score. When it comes to China, there’s no reason for Biden to make bilateral relations more tense when provocation could send world peace in flames. Pentagon officials have known about China’s network of spy balloons for years. Why now the White House takes an aggressive stand is anyone’s guess. Biden can’t afford to open up a new war front with China when the outcome in Ukraine remains in doubt with U.S. national security requiring careful calculation.

Sending the U.S. Nimitz carrier strike force into the South China Sea was bad timing, not required for national security. “As a ready response force, we underpin a broad spectrum of missions including landing Marines ashore, humanitarian disaster relief, and deterring potential adversaries through visible combat power,” read a Pentagon news release. Biden must pick-and-chose his battles wisely to protect U.S. national security. Going to war with the Russian Federation harmed U.S. national security, something unnecessary to protect democracy in Europe. Ukraine’s 44-year-old President Volodymyr Zelensky told a joint session of Congress Dec. 21, 2022 and more recently in Brussels that Ukraine is not a charity case but an investment in preserving Europe democracy. Elected officials on both sides of the Atlantic have been sold a bill of goods by Zelensky, when NATO protects Europe’s security.

About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He’s editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

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usafphantom2 · 5 months

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Japan starts sea tests of its second modified helipter carrier for F-35B jets

Fernando Valduga By Fernando Valduga 12/28/2023 - 22:22 in Military

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) began sea testing for its JS Kaga (DDH 184) helipter carrier after undergoing significant modifications to accommodate F-35B fighters, as announced by JMSDF on December 25.

New images shared on the social media platform X (formerly Twitter), by the service's Escort Flotilla Four depict JS Kaga leaving his pier at the Japan Marine United (JMU) shipyard in the city of Kure, Hiroshima province, to undergo tests at sea.

The Escort Flotilla Four post expressed enthusiasm, stating: "Today's post is about JS Kaga during the sea tests. There is only a little time left until the special modification of JS Kaga is completed! We can't wait!"

The port of origin of JS Kaga is the JMSDF Naval Base of Kure, where the Fleet Four Escort Division is stationed. Although the official date of the sea tests was not disclosed by the JMSDF, an officer confirmed to Naval News that the initial sea tests took place on November 13.

JS Kaga left the JMU shipyard pier in Kure on April 20, marking its first departure in more than a year, after undergoing modifications that transformed its appearance into that of a light aircraft carrier. Notable changes ?? included the modification of the bow section of its cockpit from a trapezoid to a square shape, similar to those of the Wasp class and America-class amphibious assault ships of the U.S. Navy.

JMSDF plans to complete the modification of its two Izumo-class helipter carriers, JS Izumo and JS Kaga, into aircraft carriers capable of supporting the operations of Lockheed Martin F-35B fighters until fiscal year 2027.

For JS Kaga, the renovation work at JMU's Kure shipyard began in March 2022, involving initial modifications, such as cockpit reinforcement, installation of additional guidance lights, marking of yellow lines in the control cabin for F-35B launches and landings, and incorporating heat-resistant systems at points on the deck for vertical landings. Fiscal year 2023 will see the acquisition of Raytheon's Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS) and additional modifications to the satellite communication system.

Subsequent and final modifications during the next revision of the Kaga, scheduled to begin at the end of fiscal year 2026, will include changes to the ship's interior compartments.

F-35B during testing on JS Izumo.

Meanwhile, Izumo is expected to undergo modifications to the bow section of its cockpit, transforming it from trapezoid to square during the next fiscal year of 2024, starting in April. The JMSDF allocated $287.3 million for the modifications of the bow section of Izumo in fiscal year 2024 and an additional $4.2 million for the installation of a landing navigation system, which is expected to be Raytheon's JPALS. The Izumo class ships, measuring 248 meters in length and moving 26,000 tons at full load, are the largest Japanese military ships built since World War II, with the capacity to carry up to 14 helicopters.

Tags: Military AviationJMSDF - Japan Maritime Self Defence Force/Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force - Japanese Navyaircraft carrier

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Fernando Valduga

Aviation photographer and pilot since 1992, he has participated in several events and air operations, such as Cruzex, AirVenture, Dayton Airshow and FIDAE. He has works published in specialized aviation magazines in Brazil and abroad. He uses Canon equipment during his photographic work in the world of aviation.