#alenka zupančič

[ammonitetestpatterns]

alenka zupančič

#alenka zupančič #antigone #to be in love with impossibility #the uranian sentence

[chaosloon]

God is dead. And, as a matter of fact, I don’t feel too well either.

Alenka Zupančič, quoted by Graham Harman in Architecture and Objects: Art After Nature (2022)

#philosophy #existentialism #nietzsche #god is dead #alenka zupančič #graham harman #ooo #speculative realism

[onetwofeb]

Alenka Zupančič

[borderepisteme]

“The point of Lacan's identification of the Real with the impossible is not that the Real is some Thing that cannot possibly happen—the whole point of the Lacanian concept of the Real is that the impossible happens.”

Alenka Zupančič, The Odd One In: On Comedy

[memoriae-lectoris]

Slovenian philosopher Alenka Zupančič has dubbed this biomorality – people must take care of their bodies because not doing so means they are stupid or irresponsible. It is a moral judgment – healthy people concerned about their bodies are good people, and unhealthy people are bad people.

Such a mentality explains why people view those who are obese as lazy or not trying hard enough, if at all, to improve their health. In doing so, obese people are evading their moral and social responsibilities. Similarly, smoking has become another way to judge a person’s social morality. Smokers are thought of as more “stupid” and “selfish” than people who don’t smoke.

The crucial point is that biomorality has led us to focus all our attention on the physical body, socially shaming people into following a wellness lifestyle and in doing so, keeping them occupied with diets and fads as to not question the moral assumptions of such obsessions.

#book: the wellness syndrome #psychology #fatphobia #biomorality #Alenka Zupancic #health

[iguanalysis]

A Laplanchian “Engine”?

Alenka Zupančič, in Why Psychoanalysis?, lists “three elements” (pg. 40) in dealing with the thought of Jean Laplanche and the “cause” of the unconscious:

[For Hegel, the syllogistic “Individual”:] A specific, subjective figure related to the formations of the unconscious. “…in inner intuition, even the thinking subject is an appearance to himself.” –Immanuel Kant, Preface to Critique of Practical Reason. (real lack)

Plus, two “kinds of causes”:

[For Hegel, the syllogistic “Universal”:] Elements, words, gestures, gazes, etc. that constitute what Jean Laplanche called “enigmatic messages” circulating in the Other. (symbolic lack)

[For Hegel, the syllogistic “Particular”:] The objective or object-like surplus/leftover of the interpretation of these messages. (imaginary lack)

Furthermore: Jacques Lacan states in his seminar, Desire and Its Interpretation: “Thus, desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first, from the second, the phenomenon of their splitting (Spaltung).”

(A quote I found here: https://nosubject.com/Desire)

Therefore:

Demand for love – appetite for satisfaction = desire

Privation, linked perceptually to frustration, is the production of symbolic lack. But prior to this linkage, the semblance of real lack must be apprehended in a form of imaginary object that is structured like a knowledge. The predicate of this knowledge is presumably the symbolic order, but it is ascertained in the form of an “enigma”, which coincides with Kantian speculative reason, or, that idea of skepticism as it pertains to the thing-in-itself. The overall effect of this knowledge is fundamentally repressive, as it locks in place for appearance the semblance of a noun. But the accession to Kantian pure practical reason is capitulated simultaneously, and the valence of cognition towards appearance, through both its noun-semblance and through pure practical reason is what determines for the subject how the (syllogistic) Universal will tend to be treated in the form of knowledge.

In unison with the desire of the Other, then, there emerges (in the subject) the feminine construct of the idea of gender, along with the ambiguous construct of the moral law.

Or at least, so long as the (syllogistic) Individual is anchored in place by real lack in the specific, subjective figure of the formations of the unconscious, we have an analogy to Hegel’s qualitative syllogism, from which such interactions with the desire of the Other may proceed. If there is any such thing as a psychoanalytic “end of history”, then this figuration is the psychical groundwork of the object a itself.

Altogether, this forms a figurative “engine” of the historical progression and development of human knowledge. This inculcates science, history, and thought itself, all in conversation with the collective anchoring points of the pursuit of truth in discourse that make up a formal unconscious which corresponds to the Other as something universally shared.

Yet, Laplanche (according to Zupančič) seems to introduce (what I would consider as) a kind of (perhaps Marxian) materialism to the Lacanian unconscious and its relation to knowledge. This is because the Other of the child is also necessarily the same Other of the child’s parents, which only ever culminated for those parents in an incomplete knowledge which is characterized by its relationship to “enigmatic messages”, without any clear solutions to their meaning, nor any closure towards the historical progress the parents' generation bore to its successors.

However, this factor of materialism is in actuality just the (repressive) constant which determines the basic character of “primal repression” itself. Laplanche in this account, without Alenka Zupančič necessarily saying so, apparently criticizes Lacan for making the agents of the moments of the Oedipus complex (real father, symbolic mother, imaginary father) into perceptually metaphysical and overly-abstract figures (by means of the Lacanian interpretation of Freud’s concept of child “seduction”), which are thereby impotent to explain the knowledge-Other of reality, which is to say, the incongruousness of the whole multiplicity of billions of other Others, presumably now serving for every single different person who is currently alive.

But, as Alenka Zupančič writes:

(Pg. 41).

Also:

Perhaps then the question in any self-analysis is not to wonder “when did my parents or caregivers first touch me in an erotic way that I had to repress in order to understand who they truly were?”, but rather, “when did the physical world (or entire universe) first touch me in an erotic way that I had to repress in order to understand what it truly was (in relation to myself)?”

In reality, however, it is crucial to ask both questions anyway, and I think Alenka Zupančič might agree and have a lot more to say about it.

This dualism of the two questions is also how the hypothetical Laplanchian “engine” I would like to propose is analytically constructed. Is the Other really necessarily always the Other of one’s parents or culture, or is it more like the Other of the physical/material universe itself? In any case, it functions mostly like an engine of history, or of scientific discovery, just to simplify the ideas of knowledge concerned here.

— (10/15/2022)

#jean laplanche #alenka zupancic #lacanian psychoanalysis #psychoanalytic theory #why psychoanalysis?

[chrisengel]

"Regarding the relation between surplus satisfaction (or enjoyment) and sexuality: Sexuation itself (sexual reproduction, and the death/negativity implied in it) does not yet amount to what one could call sexuality proper; sexuality proper involves a further step in which the 'minus', the negativity involved in sexuation and sexual reproduction, gets a positive existence in partial objects as involved in the topology of the drive. These partial objects are not just 'satisfactions as objects', they function at the same time as figures or representatives of that negativity. It is only with this double movement that we progress from sexuation to sexuality proper - a sexuality of speaking beings."

Alenka Zupančič, What is Sex

[ourladyofperpetualnaptime]

[W]e are indeed nothing more than what a brain scan reveals, but rather something less. [. . .] What makes us subjects (of the unconscious) is perhaps not something which doesn’t show on the brain scan, but rather something that shows only on the brain scan and cannot be mapped onto anything else…

alenka zupančič, interview with the european journal of psychoanalysis

#alenka zupančič #alenka zupancic

[xjmlm]

Fundamentally, irony is simply an assertion of the ego, and of its (often spiteful) supremacy.

Alenka Zupančič, The Shortest Shadow, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two

#Alenka Zupančič

[thinkingthinking]

excerpt from an Alenka Zupančič interview

How does such a position allow for a different take on contemporary political movements that are precisely trying to (again maybe) politicize sex (think of the LGBTQ+ but also of #MeToo)? I strongly believe, perhaps against all contemporary odds, that the inherent and radical political edge of sexuality consists in how it compels us to think the difference. A difference that makes the difference. This is what I tried to say earlier, concerning the question of “sexual difference” and feminism. In the LGBTQ+ movement I perceive a similar general course or destiny as in the feminist movement, that is a shift from struggle aligned with political struggle for social transformation, to identity movement and struggle for recognition. There are very few people who feel perfectly and completely at home in their bodies and sexual identities, starting with those who think of themselves as men and women. And one could plausibly argue that these (who feel perfectly and completely at home in their bodies and sexual identities) are not exactly what one would call ‘normal people’, since the latter are usually prone to have all kinds of tormenting doubts and uncertainties in this respect. There is a reason for this, and Freud was the first to point it out: sexuality appeared to Freud as redoubled by its own inherent impasse and difficulty. Ok, goes the objection, those who think of themselves as men and women may well have their own uncertainties and identity problems, but these are not problems of social discrimination based on their sexuality. Really? The history of feminism has a different story to tell. The fact that “woman” has always been a legitimate sexual position or “identity” did nothing to prevent all kinds of atrocities, injustices and discriminations being conducted against women. Do we need to remind ourselves, for example, that women only got the right to vote in 1920 in the US, in 1944 in France, in 1971 in Switzerland (at federal level), and in 1984 in Liechtenstein? And one would be wrong to assume that these battles were won once and for all. Recently the alt-right leader Richard Spencer openly said for Newsweek that he was not sure that women should vote. The fact that it is even possible to say something like this publicly should give us a strong jolt. The fact that to be a “woman” has always been a socially recognized sexual position, did little to protect women against harsh social discrimination (as well as physical mistreatment) based precisely on this “recognized” sexuality. Part of this discrimination, or the very way in which it was carried out, has always led through definitions (and images) of what exactly does it mean to be a woman. So a recognized identity itself does not necessarily help. And the point is also not to fill in the identity of “woman” with the right content, but to empty it of all content. More precisely, to recognize its form itself, its negativity, as its only positive content. To be a woman is to be nothing. And this is good, this should be the feminist slogan. Obviously, “nothing” is not used as an adjective here, describing a worth, it is used in the strong sense of the noun. So, what is sexual difference if we don’t shy away from thinking it? Sexual difference is not a difference between masculine and feminine “genders”; it doesn’t start out as a difference between different entities/ identities, but as an ontological impossibility inherent to the discursive order as such. Or, to use a Deleuzian parlance, it is the difference that precedes individuation, precedes differences between individual entities, yet is involved in their generation. This impossibility, this impasse of the discourse exists within the discourse as its division. And constitutes, or opens up, to a political dimension. This “radical” political dimension is what tends to get lost in identity-recognition politics, and in the terminological shift from “sex” (which originally refers to division, cut) to “gender”. What are genders, as different from sexes? They are seen as ways in which we construct our sexuality in relation to the sexual division which, in turn, is often reduced to a merely biological division. This retrospective naturalization of the “masculinity” and “femininity” is indeed a curious effect of switching from “sex” to indefinite number of gender(s). When it comes to describing specific features of these genders’ particular identities, terms “man” and “woman” are often used in these descriptions as natural elements which then get combined in different ways and in different compounds. There are several problems at work here, which should be discussed. It may be politically correct to sweep them under the carpet, but at the same time this is precisely politically wrong. Because this way, we also sweep politics (of sex) under the carpet. So let’s briefly discuss this. On the webpage containing a “Comprehensive list of LGBTQ+ vocabulary definitions” we read for example: “We [the creators of this webpage] are constantly honing and adjusting language to — our humble goal — have the definitions resonate with at least 51 out of 100 people who use the words. Identity terms are tricky, and trying to write a description that works perfectly for everyone using that label simply isn’t possible.” Language is understood and used here as a tool with which we try to fit some reality. The problem with this is not simply that this reality is already “constituted” through language; but also that language itself is “constituted” through a certain sexual impasse. This, at least, is a fundamental Freudo-Lacanian lesson: sex is not some realm or substance to be talked about, it is in the first place the inherent contradiction of speech, twisting its tongue, so to speak. Which is why we can cover sex with as many identities we like, the problem will not go away. It is in this sense that sex (as division, impossibility, as well as “sex struggle”) is sealed off when “sex” is replaced by “gender” and multiplicity of gender identities. But sex keeps returning in the form of the +. The + is not simply an indicator of our openness to future identities, it is the marker of Difference, and its repetition. As I put it some time ago: sex and sexual difference as understood by psychoanalysis are always in the +. Not because sex eludes any positive symbolic grasp or identity, but because sex is where the symbolic stumbles against its own lack of identity, its own impasse and impossibility. (“The Woman doesn’t exist” is a way of formulating this.) As it is sort of “visually striking” in the formula LGBTQ+, and many of its longer versions, identities are formed by way of externalizing the difference that always starts by barring them from within. And when a new identity is formed, and hence a new letter added, it just pushes the +, as the marker of the difference, a little bit further. The “bad infinity” (and so on …) suggested in this form of writing is a symptom of our inability or refusal to think the difference as the form of what Hegel would call a true infinity. The difference that is being thus repeated and externalized is one and the same difference. And this is the Difference (and not simply yet another identity) that makes a difference. This is the real meaning of “sexual difference”. There may be many genders, but there is only the singular sexual difference that is repeated with them, and expulsed/ pushed forward when they are constituted as identities. What I’m saying IS NOT that the difference between “men” and “women” is repeated with (the constitution of) all these different identities; no, I’m saying that what is repeated with them is the impossibility of this difference (the impossibility of a sexual “binary” as difference between two entities or identities), which is the real of sex. Emancipatory struggle never really works by way of enumerating a multiplicity of identities and then declaring and embracing them all equal (or the same). No, it works by mobilizing the absolute difference as means of universalization in an emancipatory struggle. There is a joke from the times of the Apartheid that can help us see what is at stake here: A violent fight starts on a bus between black people sitting in the back and white people sitting in front. The driver stops the bus, makes everybody get out, lines them up in front of the bus, and yells at them: “Stop this fight immediately! As far as I’m concerned, you are all green. Now, those of the lighter shade of green please get on the bus in front, and those of the darker shade, at the back.” What this joke exposes concisely, in my view, is how “neutralization” strategy can be rather ineffective in stopping the perpetuation of discrimination. (“Queer” or “third sex” strategy sometimes function like the “green” in the joke). If we forget, or decide to let go of the concept of sexual difference in this radical sense, we risk ending up like the passengers of this bus: declared non-sexual, yet continued to be discriminated and/or “framed” on the basis of sex(uality). As for #MeToo, it is a very significant movement, already and simply because it is a movement. But movements have a way of sometimes inhibiting their own power. #MeToo should not become about “joining the club” (of the victims), and about demanding that the Other (different social institutions and preventive measures) protect us against the villainy of power, but about women and all concerned being empowered to create social change, and to be its agents. Movements generate this power, and it is vital that one assumes it, which means leaving behind the identity of victimhood. And this necessarily implies engagement in broader social solidarity, recognizing the political edge of this struggle, and pursuing it. 

#Alenka Zupančič

[onetwofeb]

Alenka Zupančič - Let Them Rot: Antigone’s Parallax

#Youtube

[borderepisteme]

“Valorization of affectivity and feelings appears at the precise point when some problem — injustice, say — would demand a more radical systemic revision as to its causes and perpetuation. This would also involve naming — not only some people but also social and economic inequalities that we long stopped naming and questioning.

Social valorization of affects basically means that we pay the plaintiff with her own money: oh, but your feelings are so precious, you are so precious! The more you feel, the more precious you are. This is a typical neoliberal maneuver, which transforms even our traumatic experiences into possible social capital. If we can capitalize on our affects, we will limit out protests to declarations of these affects — say, declarations of suffering — rather than becoming active agents of social change. I’m of course not saying that suffering shouldn’t be expressed and talked about, but that this should not “freeze” the subject into the figure of the victim. The revolt should be precisely about refusing to be a victim, rejecting the position of the victim on all possible levels.”

Alenka Zupančič

[affirmation--negation]

#alenka zupančič

[s-hayashi]

Slavoj Zizek & Alenka Zupancic

Slavoj Žižek & Alenka Zupančič on philosophy, psychoanalysis, sex, Trump & October Revolution (Nov 14, 2017)

#Slavoj Zizek #Alenka Zupancic #Slavoj Žižek #Alenka Zupančič

[maxksx]

If I say to myself: "I know very well that the true object of my drive is not this man, or that steak, or dress, that I want at the moment, but only the satisfaction I shall feel, " that is to say, if I derealize completely the "elements a", I risk to miss the real by excess of efficiency. This is why Lacan maintains that the subject of the drive is an "acephalous" subject,

#alenka zupančič