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Her Honour was Their Honour

By Rahel Schneider

On February 7th 2005, Hatun Sürücü was killed by her brother Ayhan. He shot her in the head three times at a bus stop near her apartment in Berlin Tempelhof. During the trial he justified the crime by calling on his family’s honour.

           Hatun’s tragic death led to a fierce debate in the media on how this crime – a crime which stripped Hatun of her worth as an individual human being, wholly subordinating her to her family – could be committed right in the midst of a country valuing human dignity above all and awarding every citizen the right to personal freedom and development.[1] How was it possible that a boy could murder his sister, both born and raised in Berlin, in the name of honour? Why would someone take a life and break the law for something as impalpable as the concept of honour? From many perspectives there seem to be no adequate answers to these questions; no comprehensible reasons why Hatun and so many others like her have to die. From Ayhan’s perspective, however, there was no other way.

           He was raised in a strongly patriarchal and honour-oriented culture his parents imported from their community in Eastern Anatolia. For him as a man that meant he had to be tough, brave and respected. And it was his responsibility as a man to make sure that the women in his family acted according to what was expected of them: loyalty and purity. In those cultures, often emerging in economically unstable environments and lacking a solid judiciary system, family is the most important institution (Brown, Baughman, & Carvallo, 2017). And the family’s most important asset is its honour. This honour hinges on the proper behaviour of the female family members (Stadish, 2014). Hence, improper behaviour on the part of a female family member does not only reflect badly on her, but puts her entire family’s honour in jeopardy. This system of social conduct has been integrated into the institution of family over time and is firmly established in the universal knowledge shared by members of the community. Any sort of violation of this system warrants sanctions (Berger & Luckmann, 2002). In other words, sanctions – in this context honour based violence or honour crimes – are tools to uphold the social structure of the community. Honour crimes are violent actions usually directed at women in order to compensate for a perceived loss of honour brought on by the behaviour of the victim. These actions range from psychological pressure to beatings, mutilations, forced marriages and even honour killings (Prpic, 2015; Gill & Brah, 2014). Since those behaviours are deeply embedded in the social structures of these communities, they are not only practiced in their countries of origin, but are also exported to, for example, Germany or other Western countries when members of the community emigrate (Cooney, 2014). In these cultures the controlling character of the family is so dominant that other cultural assumptions and even institutional rules and laws which originated outside the community, such as the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, are irrelevant or even rejected.  

           Hatun’s “flaw” thus lay in her openness towards cultural assumptions that deviated from those of her family. Although the Sürücü family lived in Berlin, they held on tightly to the cultural beliefs and traditions of their Eastern Anatolian community. At age sixteen, Hatun was sent back to Turkey and forced to marry a cousin of hers. When she returned to Berlin she was already divorced and pregnant. Hatun and her son moved into their own apartment. She stopped wearing a headscarf but wore make-up instead. She learned to become an electrician, and she dated a German man. According to her younger brother Ayhan, Hatun was “too Western” and thus defiled his family’s honour. Killing her was the only way he knew how to restore it (Höppner, 2018; Kingsley, 2017; Hans, 2011).

While it would be wrong to generalise and equate certain cultures with honour based violence and honour killings, it is fair to say that the way people act is intertwined with their cultural background. Two dominant contrasting perspectives on the relationship between culture and actions have emerged in the field of sociology (Vaisey, 2009). Some assume that culture provides humans with a certain repertoire of skills, experiences, habits and so on, which they can utilise to form strategies of actions. In that sense, culture presents people with different sets of action strategies based on which they can act. However, there is a difference between settled and unsettled culture. In settled culture, the dominant assumptions and values making up that culture are not challenged by competing ideas. Hence, culture provides stable resources for people to form action strategies from. In an unsettled culture, on the other hand, the culture is being challenged by new ideas, which can lead to new strategies of action (Swidler, 1986). In that sense, in unsettled culture actions are run by ideas whereas in settled culture actions are run by habits. Others believe motivation to be the driving force behind human action – motivation being some kind of internal power that impels people to act in a certain way (Weber, as cited in Campbell, 2006). Since the motivations people have are influence by the culture they grow up in, people’s actions are dependent on their culture.

Relating this back to the phenomenon of honour killings, both perspectives seem to play into the initial build-up and also into the final execution of the crime. In honour-oriented cultures reputation is most important. That means that the members of the community have to act in certain ways: Women need to be devoted to their families and men have to protect their families by making sure that the women behave properly. Within those tight-knit communities, life and traditions are highly habitualised and culture is settled. However, mainly younger members of the communities are not only exposed to their traditional cultural practices at home, but also interact with Western cultural practices at school, work or other places outside their communities (Gill & Brah, 2014). Hence, certain elements of their parents’ culture, which they take for universal knowledge or external fact, can be challenged by ideas from outside their community (Berger & Luckmann, 2002; Swidler, 1986). A decrease in engagement with the traditional culture or an increase in interest in other cultural assumptions can cause tensions between family members. Hatun’s fate demonstrates these tensions: By divorcing the man chosen for her by her parents, moving out, taking off her headscarf, putting on make-up, learning to become an electrician and dating a German man, she distanced herself too much from her family’s culture and became “too Western” (Cooney, 2014; Idriss, 2017). She did not act according to her family’s cultural repertoire and thereby disrespected her family. This misbehaviour required sanctions and she needed to be punished according to the action strategies available in honour-based cultures. Especially male members of these communities are put under a particular psychological pressure which impels them to take action when the family honour is threatened (Brown et al., 2017; Campbell, 2006): If the (female) family member’s misdemeanour was so severe that the family name is on the line, the cultural repertoire offers different action strategies a man can take in order to right the woman’s wrong – one of them being the murder of that family member. According to cultural assumptions, this measure is a logical next step. If the man also contains an intense internal motivation within himself, which incites him to restore the family honour, murdering the one responsible for the loss of that honour is the only available action. Hence, the act of killing in the name of honour is at once driven by the selection of a certain action strategy and by an internal motivation.

           Does this consideration of culture and action make Hatun’s death any more comprehensible? Not really. It does, however, offer sociological insights into the cultural circumstances that might have moved Ayhan to shoot his sister. On the one hand, his cultural repertoire provided him with action strategies to react to Hatun’s behaviour – her murder being one of them. On the other hand, his internal motivation impelled him to compensate for his sister’s behaviour and to restore his family’s honour. This motivation only allowed for one action: Hatun’s murder.

References

Berger, P. & Luckmann, T. (2002). The social construction of reality. In: C. Calhoun, J. Gerteis, J. Moody, S. Pfaff & I. Virk (Eds.) Contemporary sociological theory (pp. 42-50). Malden: Blackwell.

Brown, R. P., Baughman, K. and Carvallo, M. (2017). Culture, Masculine Honor, and Violence Toward Women. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 44(4), 538-549.

Campbell, C. (2006). Do today’s sociologists really appreciate Weber’s essay The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism?. The Sociological Review, 54(2), 207-223.

Cooney, M. (2014). Family honour and social time. The Sociological Review, 62(82), 87-106.

Gill, A. K. & Brah, A. (2014). Interrogating cultural narratives about ‘honour’-based violence. European Journal of Women’s Studies, 21(1), 72-86.

Hans, B. (2011, July 28). The lost honor of the sürücü family. Spiegel Online. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/international

Höppner, S. (2018, February 8). ‘Honoe killings’ in germany: When families turn executioners. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en

Idriss, M. M. (2017). Not domestic violence of cultural tradition: Is honour-based violence distinct from domestic violence?. Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, 39(1), 3-21.

Kingsley, P. (2017, May 30). Turkey acquits 2 men in berlin ‘honor killing’ of their sister. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com

Prpic, M. (2015). Combating ‘honour’ crimes in the EU (Report No. PE 573.877) [Briefing]. Retrieved from European Parliament Research Service http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/573877/EPRS_BRI(2015)573877_EN.pdf

Standish, K. (2014). Understanding cultural violence and gender: Honour killings; dowry murder; the zina ordinance and blood-feuds.  Journal of Gender Studies, (23)2, 111-12.

Swidler, A. (1986). Culture in action: Symbols and strategies. American Sociological Review, 51(2), 273-286.

Vaisey, S. (2009). Motivation and justification: A dual-process model of culture in action. American   Journal of Sociology, 114(6), 1675-1715.

[1] Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Art. 1

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“Do you really need that much space?”: The sexual politics of manspreading

By Fernanda Rodriguez R.

At the end of September 2018, a video by Russian activist Anna Doygalyuk went viral (Toronto Sun, 2018). In the said video, it is possible to observe Doygalyuk throwing a liquid in the pelvic area of various men on public transport in order to interrupt their manspreading: the male practice or tendency to sit in public spaces with their legs wide open, occupying at least two single seats (Jane, 2017). During the “demonstration”, Doygalyuk accuses the men in her country of gender aggression and her obligation to do something about it (Torornto Sun, 2018). However, one of Doygalyuk’s victims in the video, Stanislav Kudrin, confessed right after the video went viral that the stunt was staged (Torornto Sun, 2018). Despite this, manspreading remains a popular and controversial subject among both men and women. Indeed, the practice was even outlawed from public transportation in Madrid during the summer of 2017, citing the campaign “#MadridSinManspreading”[1] as the reason for the ban (Ahluwalia, 2017). Consequently, theories on gender and symbolic interactionism may provide an interesting outlook concerning this practice, due to the relevance of commonplace interactions and the sexual politics involving the microaggression[2] that is manspreading.  

 Video: Manspreaders on the Subway

 According to Mead (1962), the self is wholeheartedly linked to the social experience. Individuals are able to acknowledge that within any given society there are certain values and norms, which need to be integrated into the self. This process of socialization persists as long as people engage in social interactions (Mead, 1962). Therefore, Mead’s theory presents itself as a gateway for social interactionism, which serves as a micro-theoretical schema that analyzes the actions and perceptions of individuals in relation to one another as the process that shapes social reality (Blumer, 1969). Likewise, Goffman (1959) argues that to better understand the mundane interactions of people, it is best to think of them as actors conducting a performance. Namely, individuals actively devise particular impressions in the presence of others. A decisive element of these impressions are sign vehicles, such as clothes, ethnicity or gender (Goffman, 1959). In fact, gender represents a crucial feature in an individual’s performance.    

According to West and Zimmerman (1987), gender is an acquired and enacted status, unlike sex, which is based in biologically received genitalia. They view gender as a resulting element of social circumstances since the classification of individuals into labels such as “man” or “woman” is conducted in a clear social manner, which makes them appear natural thus reinforcing the apotheosis of gender. In other words, the implication that gender distinctions are an intrinsic feature of human beings reinforce and maintain the patriarchal social order (West & Zimmerman, 1987). Moreover, in a social structure in which men exert their dominance and profit from it, the modification of such a system remains disadvantageous for men even when this transformation would benefit society as a whole (Connell, 1987). Accordingly, Jane (2017) argues that manspreading is a clear instance of latent sexism against women since it not solely displays the privileged status of these men, but is also devised as an effective symbol of what it means to be male in a social space.

The problem of manspreading, however, is not a “new” phenomenon as illustrated by a cartoon-campaign founded by CityLab dated back to 1918 (Grant, 2016). Likewise, feminist photographer Marianne Wex conducted a thorough photographic study of the subject in 1979 in her book “Let’s Take Back Our Space: Female and Male Body Language as a Result of Patriarchal Structures” (Bridges, 2017). Nevertheless, it is safe to say that the issue has escalated in recent years. Previous research conducted on the subject of body language has stated that positions involving the “exposure” of genitalia, as well as ample movements are more frequent in men than in women (Davis & Weitz, 1981). Furthermore, historically there has been an enduring social narrative for females of all ages to embrace closed and restrained positions in order to avoid any public display of control and openness (Jane, 2017). To many, these ideas may seem archaic and outdated, but empirical evidence has demonstrated that women’s physical stance nowadays remains in alignment with these confining “ladylike” poses (Jane, 2017). The human body is otherwise disciplined to the structures of inequality within the social order, and the idea that men require - and are entitled to - more space is one type of privilege from which plenty of men benefit (Bridges, 2017). Symbolically, positions that are broad and provide a significant degree of exposure are typically adopted by dominant individuals, while positions involving closed limbs and small gestures are common among deferential and meek individuals that make use of less amount of space (Jane, 2017). The perquisites linked with power carry the implication that individuals may exert their “claim” to behave in a particular manner without taking into consideration the social expectations regarding a specific situation. Therefore, a man that engages in manspreading can be perceived as an individual that it is not solely employing a gender-power marker, but that is also commanding the physical space: the adoption of such a dominant posture has the dual and co-constitutive function of both stimulating and reflecting a state of control (Jane, 2017).

Feminism allows individuals within this social order to challenge the current inequitable structure (West & Zimmerman, 1987). After all, as stated by West and Zimmerman (1987): “gender is a powerful ideological device, which produces, reproduces, and legitimates the choices and limits that are predicated…(p.147)”. Accordingly, feminist activists and groups have adopted a series of strategies in order to fight the “epidemic” of manspreading. First, there is the popular trend of “naming and shaming”: in said practice female activist have opted for taking forthright videos or photographs -occasionally with a somewhat humorous tone and other times in more seriousness- of men displaying obvious signs of manspreading (Jane, 2017). Later, these images are uploaded to social media platforms such as Instagram, Tumblr, among others. A second technique used by anti-manspreaders is that of directly confronting the culprits while also explaining to them their wrongdoing. Lastly, other activists have decided to “fight fire with fire” by sitting in a manspreading-manner on public spaces, sometimes even engaging in “leg battles” with the original manspreaders who try to intrude in their personal space (Jane, 2017). For instance, according to an article titled “Watch out, manspreaders: The womanspreading fightback starts now” by The Guardian, women in various parts of the world are appropriating the practice in the name of feminism (Sanghani, 2017). Big celebrity names such as Emily Ratajkowski, Bella Hadid, and Chrissy Teigen are rejecting the narrative that states that women should sit with modesty and coyness, instead they are sitting with their legs open and sharing the outcome online, thus motivating hundreds more to follow in their footsteps (Sanghani, 2017).  

Even if these encounters can be deemed as trivial when they occur as isolated cases of “micro” sexism, Jane (2017) argues that the rationale behind these protests is that when coupled together all these isolated incidents comprise a significant social issue. Namely, a single male commuter extending his dominance over several seats on a train, bus, or tram while other travelers are forced to stand may not be considered more than a small inconvenience at the time. However, this small gesture is but a symptom of a more substantial issue regarding the preservation and imposition of a male-dominated social order. Moreover, Jane (2017) argues that the development of a pattern concerning these “minor” actions may evolve into a powerful emblem of “toxic masculinity”.  

Video: When a "lady" manspreads

Nevertheless, the effort of these feminist to stop the practice of manspreading are not without opposition. While the feminist discourses have often made use of scholarly literature to support their claims, most of the claims produced by the male opposition have dubious argumentation (Jane, 2017). The most popular counter-claim is that men require to sit with enough space between their legs in order to guarantee the comfort and protection of their genitals. However, this claim has proved to be completely unsustainable by actual medical data, which conforms with West and Zimmerman (1987) argument regarding the naturalization of constructed criteria that comes with an individual’s biological sex. Meanwhile, others argue that the issue is a matter of etiquette and thus, should be genderless. Moreover, the discourse around manspreading is also often disregarded as merely another rant created by the desperate and troubled minds of feminists. In the meantime, what is certain is that those female activists concerned with the issue of manspreading have been successful at raising awareness regarding the prevalence and universality of this disrespectful practice since campaigns to “stop the spread” have gained a lot of negative and positive media coverage on the international stage (Jane, 2017).  

In conclusion, when considering the handling of space in relation to the performance of gender, the matter of power becomes fundamental since space communicates a non-spoken message of individual status (Jane, 2017; Macionis & Plummer, 2012). Arguably, males tend to occupy more space than females, whose femininity has been traditionally associated with how little space they cover (i.e. the positive connotations of the word petite to describe feminine-looking women). Meanwhile, masculinity is often connected to the portion of the area a man dominates (Macionis & Plummer, 2012). Through these interactions that are being challenged by the feminist movement, from which manspreading is a sterling example of “doing gender” in modern times, it is possible to observe the power relations in the everyday of men and women. Women, who more often than not, see their plea for privacy and personal space overtaken by men.    

 References

Ahluwalia, R. (2017, June 8). Madrid bans manspreading on public transport. Independent. October 3,

2018 from https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/mandspreading-madrid-spain-ban-public-transport-bus-metro-behaviour-etiquette-a7779041.html

Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic interactionism: Perspective and method. Berkeley: University of California Press

Bridges, T. (2017, February 8). Possibly the most exhaustive study of “manspreading” ever conducted. The Society Pages. Retrieved October 5, 2018 from https://thesocietypages.org/socimages/2017/02/08/possibly-the-most-exhaustive-study-of-manspreading-ever-conducted/

Connell, R. (1987). Gender and power: Society, the person and sexual politics. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Davis, M., & Weitz, S. (1981). Sex differences in body movements and positions. In C. Mayo & N. M.Henley (Eds.), Gender and Nonverbal Behavior (pp. 81–92). New York: Springer.

Jane, E.A. (2017). ‘Dude … stop the spread’: Antagonism, agonism, and #manspreading on social media. International Journal of Cultural Studies, 20(5), 459-475. doi:10.1177/1367877916637151

Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday life. Garden City, NY: Anchor

Grant, M. (2016, February 10). Anti-manspreading cartoon from 1918 shows that manspreading has been going on for longer than you thought. Bustle. Retrieved October 5, 2018 from https://www.bustle.com/articles/140936-anti-manspreading-cartoon-from-1918-shows-that-manspreading-has-been-going-on-for-longer-than-you-thought

Macionis, J., & Plummer, K. (2012). Sociology: A global introduction (5th ed.). Harlow, England: Pearson/Prentice Hall.

Mead, G.H. (1962). Mind, self and society from the standpoint of a social behaviorist. Charles W. Morrised. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Sanghani, R. (2017, November 23). Watch out, manspreaders: The womanspreading fightback starts now. The Guardian. Retrieved October 5, 2018 from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/23/manspreading-womanspreading-fightback-metoo-resistance-physical

Sue, D. W., Capodilupo, C. M., Torino, G. C., Bucceri, J. M., Holder, A. M. B., Nadal, K. L., & Esquilin, M. (2007). Racial microaggressions in everyday life: Implications for clinical practice. American Psychologist, 62(4), 271–286

Toronto Sun. (2018, September 27). Watch: Russian woman allegedly pours bleach on 'manspreading' train passengers. World News. Retrieved October 3, 2018 from https://torontosun.com/news/world/watch-russian-woman-allegedly-pours-bleach-on-manspreading-train-passengers/wcm/218dcb14-55bb-4665-80be-402c351b2d5e

West, C. & Zimmerman, D.H. (1987). Doing Gender. Gender & Society, 1(2), 125-151.doi:10.1177/0891243287001002002

[1] In English, it translates to #MadridWithoutManspreading

[2] Microaggression is defined in Sue et al. (2007) as: “brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioral, or environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative insults…(p.271)” against marginalized individuals or groups.

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“I’ll be right back! Just gonna go to the toilet…”: Politeness, Flirting and Rejection

By Maria Indjeian

Many of us have been there at some point or another. Loud music, cocktails and fluorescent lighting seem to be the universally known ingredients that combined form a “fun night out at the club”. Besides being seen as centers for leisure and fun, nightclubs are also highly regarded as the perfect place to find love. This perception is no novelty. In fact, in dense urban environments such as nightclubs, practicing informal sociability, conversation and fun with either acquainted or unacquainted individuals is an implicit universal understanding (Snow et al., 1991; Grazian, 2009).

For the sake brevity, this blogpost will focus on flirting encounters solemnly between members of the opposite sex. In attempt to successfully achieve a romantic and sexual adventure within these contexts, flirting has been determined as one of the most common mediums that men or women practice (Henningsen et al., 2008). The reason? Because it is a collective language that indicates an affiliative desire; believed to increase one’s chances at getting the attention from their person of interest (Henningsen et al., 2008). On the other hand, as skillful as one may be at flirting, it by no means guarantee a positive or aspired outcome, but can rather result in rejection. How is rejection conveyed in a social interaction? How do men and women differ when it comes to facing or transmitting rejection? This article will particularly concentrate on how women and men in communicate a disinterest towards flirting signals.

Although substantial research has focused on the execution and dynamics of flirting, the rejection of flirting has often been ignored (Goodboy and Brann, 2010).  Nevertheless, research by Goodboy and Brann (2010) has been found that women tend to adopt more polite or non-confrontational strategies when receiving unwanted flirtation. For example, women wanting to leave uncomfortable flirtateous situations may find excuses such needing the toilet, that they do not speak the same language as them, that they must go look for their friends or that that their boyfriend or partner is close by; the possibilities are endless. In many cases, being explicit in not wanting to get involved in a flirtatious activity could make the message easier to grasp; permitting the interaction to terminate quicker all together. Despite some women claiming that they indeed use more verbal rejection strategies such as brief responses, insults or straightforwardness in general to clarify their absence of interest for continuing the flirtatious engagement to its fullest potential (Sutter and Martin, 1991; Goodboy and Brann, 2010), why may some women prefer or adopt a non-verbal, indirect or polite etiquette to communicate the same message?

Goffman’s work on social interaction is key to decipher these circumstances; particularly the development of the “cooling out” concept (Goffman, 1952; Snow et al., 1991). For the sake of clarity, it is important to first determine one of Goffman’s most important terms. “Face” is defined as the image filled with positive socially approved elements that individuals create for themselves and present to the public (Goffman, 1955). In order to “maintain face” individuals have to work hard in terms of performing and keeping the claims they have made of themselves in line front other people through the supportive judgments of others. As a result of maintaining face, individuals have been said to embrace self-confidence, honor and pride. On the other hand, negative social evaluations can lead to “losing face” (Zhang et al., 2011). This can happen due to “slip-ups” on one’s performance that lead to feelings of embarrassment, humiliation and shame (Goffman, 1955; Mao, 1994; Zhang et al., 2011).

The “cooling out” process comes in as an attempt to save face after the “sting”; where the conned strives to adapt the self to the situation as best as possible in order to not feel too humiliated (Snow et al,. 1991). Upon failing to obtain a romantic or sexual relation from flirting and teasing skills towards women, men can find themselves humiliated and embarrassed upon rejection or denial; therefore, losing face.

As Goffman’s examination on social interaction continues, not only do individuals work towards saving their own face during social encounters, but they also make sure to enforce protective practices to save the face of others (Goffman, 1967; Bargiela-Chiappini, 2002). This is done to avoid any feelings of awkwardness and uncomfortableness between the members of the interaction, and work towards a smooth and composed interaction instead. Non-verbal or diffused rejection strategies among women in undesired flirtatious situations could therefore be popular due to the relentless pursuit of a peaceful and tranquil interplay. Instead of denying a flirtatious invitation by using direct language or words that may damage the man’s face by humiliation or embarrassment, women will adopt a “cooling out” process to soften or completely avoid the negative feelings that arise from being rejected in a man (Snow et al., 1991). Women have also shown a desire to stir away from “rude” or “degrading” connotations when rejecting the attention of men (Goodboy and Brann, 2010).  In other cases, it could also be argued that by entirely unacknowledging or escaping from the encounter altogether, it is a way for women to avoid witnessing or dealing with the uncomfortable sight of rejection or confrontation due to their actions.

This could relate to the recent rise of “ghosting”[1] in our technological age (LeFebvre, 2017). Moreover, as a result from cooling-out tactics, men would be expected and hoped to abandon the interaction without creating a scene, and fracturing the encounter even further; given that they still find themselves in a very public atmosphere.

Differently to women who employ polite and implicit excuses, men are less afraid to use verbal strategies and insults to communicate whenever they are uninterested in flirting with a woman (Goodboy and Brann, 2010; Sutter and Martin, 1998), What does this say about the role of women under these circumstances? Explanations for this could take us on an entirely different tangent concerning the relationship between the female gender roles and its historical issues of inferiority and submissiveness compared to men in society (Brown, 1980; Zimmerman & West, 1987).

Among many factors, one of the largest causes for assigned gender roles is popular culture such as books, television entertainment and magazines (West and Zimmerman, 1987). By reaching a significant part of the population, popular culture can be said to have become ‘rulebooks’ or “manuals of procedure” (West and Zimmerman, 1987:135) that individuals use to “do” their gender “appropriately”. In the battle towards a more equal and respected position within society, the concern of saving the face of others from saying ‘no’ to flirtatious intimacy with men could be argued to have become less of a priority among women. If a woman rejected a flirtatious interaction with a man by using candid language or mannerisms, she would risk being judged negatively as she would be ‘undoing gender’; hence, failing to accommodate social expectations of femininity for being ‘unladylike’ (West & Zimmerman, 1987). This issue has been understudied; but insight to this question would contribute towards gaining a larger understanding of women’s sense of empowerment and perception of entitlement within these situations. 

Men have also been proven to prefer to use non-verbal flirting tactics in order to reduce the risk of getting rejected and losing face. That is to say, rather than being open about their intentions with a woman, men adopt strategies like gazing and eye contact (de Weerth and Kalma, 1995). Using indirect flirting strategies are a good way to save face since in case of refusal; as one could say that flirting was not the intention in the first place. In other words, in attempt to protect and save face upon rejection, men may pretend that their intention was never to flirt and that the woman has misunderstood and consequently become embarrassed herself. In other cases, men may “downgrade the woman’s status to even the score” (Berk, 1977 cited in Snow et al., 1991:429) between them as an attempt to re-gain face; for example, replying something like “You’re not that hot anyway”, or “I was just looking a way to kill time while I wait for my mates”. This said, with women gaining more confidence towards unambiguously denying flirtatious contact with men, could it mean that women would be the ones losing face instead?

Overall, it has been outlined how women are more cautious about the face of others when entering an uncomfortable situation within a social interaction through the work of acclaimed scholars such as Goffman and Zimmerman. Developing more research on the rejection of flirting would allow a larger understanding of the evolution of women’s roles in society. Based on the research presenting a backfiring of losing face in women when it comes to the rejection of men, one could question the effectiveness of the fight against women as submissive and passive members in society.

 References:

- Brown, P. (1980). How and why are women more polite: Some evidence from a Mayan community. In: S. McConnell-Ginet, R. Borker and F. Furman, ed., Women and language in literature and society. Oxford: Blackwell.

- de Weerth, C. and Kalma, A. (1995). Gender Differences in Awareness of Courtship Initiation Tactics. Sex Roles, 32(11).

- Goffman, E. (1952). On Cooling the Mark Out. Psychiatry, 15(4), pp.451-463.

- Goffman, E. (1955). On Face-Work. Psychiatry, 18(3), pp.213-231.

- Goodboy, A. and Brann, M. (2010). Flirtation Rejection Strategies: Toward an Understanding of Communicative Disinterest in Flirting. The Qualitative Report, 15(2).

- Grazian, D. (2009). Urban Nightlife, Social Capital, and the Public Life of Cities. Sociological Forum, 24(4), pp.908-917.

- Henningsen, D., Braz, M. and Davies, E. (2008). Why do We Flirt? Flirting Motivations and Sex Differences in Working and Social Contexts. Journal of Business Communication, 45(4), pp.483-502.

- LeFebvre, L. (2017). Phantom Lovers: Ghosting as a Relationship Diffuser Strategy in our Technological Age. In: N. Punyanunt-Carter and J. Wrench, ed., The Impact of Social Media in Modern Romantic Relationships. Lanham: Lexington Books, pp.219-239.

- Mao, L. (1994). Beyond politeness theory: ‘Face’ revisited and renewed. Journal of Pragmatics, 21(5), pp.451-486.

- Sutter, D. L., & Martin, M. M. (1998). Verbal aggression during disengagement of dating relationships. Communication Research Reports, 15, pp. 318-326

- Snow, D., Robinson, C. and McCAll, P. (1991). "Cooling Out" Men in singles bars and nightclubs: Observations on the interpersonal survival strategies of women in public places. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 19(4), pp.423-449.

- West, C & Zimmerman, D.H. (1987). Doing gender. Gender & Society, 1(2): 125-151

- Zhang, X., Cao, Q. and Grigoriou, N. (2011). Consciousness of Social Face: The Development and Validation of a Scale Measuring Desire to Gain Face Versus Fear of Losing Face. The Journal of Social Psychology, 151(2), pp.129-149.

[1] “Ghosting” – A relationship dissolution strategy where communication is terminated through technological mediums. For example, stopping conversation through text messaging or unfollowing on social media platforms without an explanation to avoid confrontation.

[culturalsociologyblog-blog]

Cigarettes: the pollution of modern-day society?

By Inge Rots

Many will recognize the anecdote or at least a variant of it, in which people would tell about how back in their younger days, no one would be surprised if, on a party, the host would offer its guests plenty of cigarettes, in the same amount as there would be snacks or beer. Or how, when driving all the way to Spain for vacation, it would be ‘totally normal’ that the father of a young family would smoke inside of the car, while leaving the windows closed. Or how, during class, the teacher would continue smoking while at the same time explaining the workings of the Pythagorean theorem, even though the room would be filled with young, healthy, and above all, innocent children.

These memories stand in sharp contrast with the contemporary relationship of society with cigarettes, that has evolved over time. Currently, several developments coming from various groups of interest, seem to sharpen the debate, both about the question of smoking behavior as an individual choice versus individuals as being exploited and made addicted by the large tobacco industries, as well as the tension between a liberal versus a more conservative approach. For instance, in the month of October, in the Netherlands the campaign of “Stoptober” is being launched, stimulating people to throw away their packs of cigarettes and start living a healthier, nicotine- and smoke-free life (NOS, 2018). This fits within a line of tendencies that focuses on a (moral) reconsideration of what is the best, optimal way of living a healthy, as well as a conscious, sustainable life in which responsibility not just for oneself, but also for one’s surroundings is taken into account.  

What is more, since 2016, a large lobby against the tobacco industry, led by a well-known Dutch lawyer (De Volkskrant, 2018), is attempting to sue the big tobacco companies like Philip Morris from murder and attempted homicide, as they are claimed to be consciously making smokers addicted from an early age on, and in doing so, leave smokers without a real own voluntary choice in deciding whether or not to smoke. Rather, they are seen as ‘victims’ of the tobacco industry and should therefore be defended. Yet on the other hand, there is an increasing amount of local governments and campaigns throughout the Netherlands (as well as other countries) that is actively attempting to change smoking policies in public buildings, streets or entire cities, with the underlying aim of making smoking unacceptable and intolerable, in favor of all non-smokers. For example, the Rotterdam municipality wants to make the zone around its biggest hospital, Erasmus MC, smoke-free and with this, involve different institutions such as a high school as well in joining them (Morssinkhof, 2017). Moreover, the city of Groningen is actively attempting to shift the city into becoming even entirely smoke-free as a whole city. (NOS, 2018)

Particularly with the latter trend, the focus is shifting towards a further stigmatization, demonization and patronization of cigarette smoking, inclining towards the idea that smokers themselves are the ones to be blamed. This puts into question the tension between a more liberal versus a more conservative policy; should people be able to have freedom in making their own choices, or should their behavior be regulated? And how exactly are the boundaries within this tension divided? This will be further explored by viewing the phenomenon of smoking and smoking bans through the lens of structuralism.

The main idea of structuralism is that one can only understand something if the structure of relationships towards other elements that are relevant, is also taken into account and attempted to be understood, as only in their relationship towards one another, things will make sense. Thus, it is the structure that counts as meaningful in influencing how society perceives a particular phenomenon. As Cerulo’s (1998) study to newspaper reports on violence shows, it is not so much the content of the message that counts, but rather the context within which the message is presented, hence, the form or structure of the message, that influences the outcome and interpretation of the meaning. Speaking in McLuhan’s terms, “the medium is the message”. For instance, when media are reporting the news story about Rotterdam’s prospective smoking ban, initial differences in ‘sequencing’ could already be observed between different media organizations, resulting in differences in the emphasis on either people on the streets being interviewed about their opinion on the new smoking restrictions, or interviewing for instance the politicians behind the new policy, resulting in different interpretations that either emphasize the stigmatizing of smokers, or the banning of the tobacco industry.

The way in which a society perceives its citizens’ smoking habits, hence, its perception, is a socially mediated mechanism, meaning that nothing one is confronted with can be viewed unprejudiced, as every scheme with which one views the world is based on prior experiences that form expectations of how to approach something new that comes on an individual’s path (Zerubavel, 1997). Hence, the mental lens with which one looks at and interprets the surrounding world, in an attempt to find patterns and categorize knowledge and information in such a way that it fits into our schemes (Douglas, 1990), one is always unconsciously influenced by the social background and context one is placed in (Zerubavel, 1997). For instance, this has (and is still being done) on a large scale by conscious advertising, but also by priming techniques in cinema and on television, that help normalize and stimulate the smoking of cigarettes. Castaldelli-Maia, Ventriglio and Bhugra (2015) explain how particularly in the twentieth century, cinema has played a relevant role in encouraging or even propagating smoking behavior through the direct association with smoking being ‘glamorous’ and luxury, even connecting cigarettes to prominent, classic cinema characters, and in doing so, making tobacco companies benefit greatly from this. It took only until the end of the previous century before it became clear how this promotion of cigarettes through advertising was part of a large-scale effort to hide the real damages of smoking on health (Castaldelli-Maia et al., 2015). In the US, an agreement on banning conscious smoking advertisements in cinema happened in the late nineties, reflecting a historical shift of mental lenses (Zerubavel, 1997), a shift from classifying smoking as normalized towards classifying it as ‘morally bad’. With more knowledge on the deteriorating effects of cigarettes on one’s health, steered and influenced by large developments in health science that are subject to socio-political changes, old facts were subject to a re-examination and re-interpretation, as the marker of a shift into the stigmatization of smoking (Zerubavel, 1997).

This new mental lens through which the majority of society now considers smoking behavior as something bad, favors the smoking bans that are rapidly increasing worldwide (Castaldelli-Maia et al., 2015). Yet, despite of the positive impact of this new legislation, it simultaneously targets the group of smokers with a feeling of being discriminated through a growing public stigma on their behavior, as it has now gained the status of being socially undesirable (Castaldelli-Maia et al., 2015). Yet, as has become clear, this should be considered as being relative and symbolic, since although there is a general agreement upon the idea that smoking is bad for one’s health, “what may be a stigmatizing characteristic in one era may not be in another” (Dovido, Major, & Crocker, 2000 as cited in Farrimond & Joffe, 2006, p. 482).

Nevertheless, although being symbolic, the consequences are not less real: Farrimond & Joffe (2006) show that stigmatization is even becoming bigger with the segregating of public spaces into smoking versus non-smoking areas. What is more, their study shows that non-smokers tend to classify smokers as ‘pollutive’, not only dirtying themselves with the toxic, unhealthy ingredients of cigarettes, but also polluting their environment and especially the non-smoking group of people around them (Farrimond & Joffe, 2006). This fits not only metaphorically, but also literally within Mary Douglas’ idea (1990) that our pollution behavior is a reaction towards anything that contradicts with the classifications within our mental scheme.

Lastly, a structuralist view on smoking behavior adheres to the binary opposition of the ‘good’ non-smokers versus the ‘bad’ smokers not only meaningfulness, as they could not exist without one another, but moreover, it reveals some kind of pollution power (Douglas, 1990) in which this division of society into ‘healthy’ (mostly dominated with middle-class) versus ‘unhealthy’ (not represented by middle-class) becomes a means of legitimizing dominance of this middle-class and thus, serves as a means to reinforce already existing power relations and reproduces a social inequality (Farrimond & Joffe, 2006). Yet, as Douglas mentions, pollutions are fortunately often remedied relatively simply, and the effects can be undone through certain rites, as could be seen with the introduction of the Stoptober campaign. And also, as one man on the street, interviewed by a reporting team argues, there is pollution in the air that we should be really worried about, hence, this said pollutive behavior by the smokers is in this light only relative and symbolic.

 References

Castaldelli-Maia, J.M., Ventriglio, A., & Bhugra, D. (2016). Tobacco smoking: From ‘glamour’ to ‘stigma’. A comprehensive review. Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 70, 24–33.

Cerulo, K. (1998). Deciphering violence: The cognitive structure of right and wrong. In: Lyn Spillman (ed.). Cultural sociology. Maiden, MA: Blackwell.

De Volkskrant. (2018, February 22). OM ziet geen mogelijkheid tabaksfabrikanten te vervolgen – Advocaat Ficq stapt naar gerechtshof. De Volkskrant. Retrieved from https://www.volkskrant.nl/wetenschap/om-ziet-geen-mogelijkheid-tabaksfabrikanten-te-vervolgen-advocaat-ficq-stapt-naar-gerechtshof~b3a9550a/

Douglas, M. (1990). Symbolic pollution. In: Jeffrey Alexander and Steven Seidman (Eds.). Culture and   society: Contemporary debates. Cambridge, MA:  Cambridge University Press.

Farrimond, H.R., & Joffe, H. (2006). Pollution, Peril and Poverty: A British Study of the Stigmatization of Smokers. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 16, 481–491.

Morssinkhof, L. (2017, July 23). Groningen wil eerste rookvrije stad van Nederland worden. NOS. Retrieved from https://nos.nl/artikel/2184599-groningen-wil-eerste-rookvrije-stad-van-nederland-worden.html

NOS. (2018, August 3). Gaan we langzaam naar een compleet rookverbod? NOS. Retrieved from https://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2244453-gaan-we-langzaam-naar-een-compleet-rookverbod.html

NOS. (2018, September 30). Verliefd geworden in Stoptoberhuis, maar stoppen met roken lukte niet. NOS. Retrieved from https://nos.nl/artikel/2252815-verliefd-geworden-in-stoptoberhuis-maar-stoppen-met-roken-lukte-niet.html

Zerubavel, E. (1997). Social mindscapes: An invitation to cognitive sociology. Cambridge, MA:   Harvard University Press.

[culturalsociologyblog-blog]

Commodification of racial representation and diversity: The case of Crazy Rich Asians

by Roxi Cui-Olsson

In a better world, “Crazy Rich Asians” wouldn’t have to prove or represent anything but itself. But here we are. – Justin Chang, L.A. Times

In August 2018, a movie named Crazy Rich Asians has been released and quickly became the best-selling romantic comedy in six years at the box office (Mendelson, 2018). The plot is simple: girl falls in love with boy, girl meets the family of the boy, girl and boy get married. The “twist” is that the couple in the story are Asian and Asian American, and the boy’s family is crazy rich. As a matter of fact, they belong to Singapore’s top 1% class and they are not shy to display it. The movie has received positive reviews from critics (a whopping 93% on Rotten Tomatoes), with or without a good reason: it is, after all, the first Hollywood studio production to feature an all-Asian cast in 25 years (Ito, 2018). It makes one wonder, are the critics praising it because it is a well-made movie, or is it due to the backlash of whitewashing in Hollywood in recent years (Rose, 2017)? Is the film so well received because it does justice to representing Asians, or did it merely serve its role as an easy money grab?

#Diversity: “A movement[1]” or good business?

The heavy emphasis on the all-Asian ensemble during the promotion of the movie coincide with a severe social issue at present: the lack of and mis- representation of non-Whites in movies and television series. Morally, it seems like a good idea to support the movie. Indeed, research show that racial minorities are (still) grossly underrepresented on the small and big screen within the U.S. (Atkin, 1992; Maestro & Greenberg, 2000; Monk-Turner, Heiserman, Johnson, Cotton, & Jackson, 2010; Yuen, Chin, Deo, Lee, & Milman, 2005). Even though Blacks and Whites are overrepresented on American TV (Hunt, 2005), Black characters still face inaccurate and inadequate portrayals just like Asians and Latinos, including biased depictions of criminal activities, profession and interpersonal relationships compared to those of White characters (Beeman, 2007; Signorielli, 2009; Soulliere, 2003). Latest media report reveals that, Asians and Pacific Islanders are still treated as “tokens” and old negative stereotypes still persist on the small screen (Yuen, et al., 2017).

Within this context, it is not surprising that mainstream media, audiences and scholars welcome Crazy Rich Asians. The movie is said to have incorporated “universal themes about love, friendship and negotiating family dynamics” into a story consisting of diverse Asian characters (Chiu, 2018b). It is also praised as “a beacon for representation” (Lee, 2018) and a “barrier-breaking phenomenon” (Rubin, 2018). If we were to consider cultural products as a reflection of social structure, undoubtedly, Crazy Rich Asians could be perceived as good news. However, we cannot ignore the fact that Hollywood operates under the rule of capitalism and has every intention of maximizing profits.

“Minorities have become a highly sought-after target for advertisers”, explained communications scholar Atkin on the increase of minority-lead series in the 1970s within the U.S. (1992, p. 337). Even decades later, it is not far-fetched to assume that the purchasing power of Asian audiences influenced the making of Crazy Rich Asians. Even critic Justin Chang (2018) admits that “future Asian-led projects are riding on this movie’s box-office success”. Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) of the Frankfurt School would more than likely refute the idea this movie is as revolutionary or ground-breaking as their marketing suggests, due to its superficial entertainment. According to them, the cultural industry provides amusement that negate the mass from thinking independently or critically, not to mention social change.

Following their logic, Crazy Rich Asians is unlikely going to motivate Asian Americans to fight for their class interest as well as against the social system. It is formulaic at best and does not necessarily provide its audiences with much insight, be it about Asian culture, diaspora, or otherwise. This is likely due to the fact that the culture industry is characterized by rules, norms and conventions (see e.g. Bielby & Bielby, 1994), or in the words of Horkheimer and Adorno (2012), standardization. Intuitively, standardization and diversity are not compatible with one another. Although “cultural diversity” has become popular within media policy-making, research suggests that they are mere business strategies which essentialize and divide cultural audiences even further (Awad, 2012). Sometimes, racial inequality is even reproduced as a counter-effect, especially when cultural producers utilize discourses such as “Asian work for Asian audiences” to justify their hiring and marketing choices (Saha, 2017, p. 312). Additionally, David Oh (2012) suggests that, even when attempts are made to challenge the normative Whiteness in Hollywood movies, there is often an emphasis placed on individual Black or Asian characters to embody their “yellowness and blackness”. This brings us to the next question: is the representation done right in this movie?

Asian #representation on the big screen: Challenging the status quo?

Crazy Rich Asians has also faced some criticisms. Firstly, the film is said to be “not as diverse as many Asians had hoped” as it lacks brown-skinned non-East Asian characters despite the setting in Singapore, spurring social media outrage (Truong, 2018). Secondly, while some people expect the movie to have a positive change on the negative stereotypes and unfavorable impressions that Asian men generally receive (Chiu, 2018a; for empirical evidence on the romantic lives of Asian American men, see Balistreri, Joyner & Kao, 2015), the leading male character is played by a Eurasian actor, whose mixed heritage sparked discussions of whether he is “Asian enough” (Scaife, 2018). Sociologist Nancy Wang Yuen notes that the movie is indeed diverse for Hollywood standards, but it “doesn’t hit that mark” for representing all Asian and Asian American populations as the story is rather class- and ethnicity- specific (Ito, 2018).

I argue that the Asian representation within this movie still features dominant stereotypes about Asians. Instead of “yellow perils” or “model minority” (Yuen et al., 2017), the whole movie is based on a newer version of Asian stereotype, namely, the nouveau riche. The Asian family in the movie hold extraordinary economic capital and purchasing power and are not hesitant to show it off. However, their financial power must not be confused with symbolic power, which Bourdieu (1990) uses to signify the type of power to impose a vision of the legitimate world and its social orders. Indeed, even though the movie is based on an Asian bestselling novel and features an Asian director and cast, it still follows the logic of White normality (Oh, 2012) and ridicules its Asian characters for spectatorship and humor.

The movie reminds us of Fresh Off the Boat (2014- present), which features the same leading female actress Constance Wu. Similarly marketed as the first primetime situation comedy to feature an all Asian-American family in over two decades, Fresh Off the Boat is entirely based on the implicit jokes of an Asian immigrant father who runs a Western steakhouse, and an oldest son who is rebellious and tremendously interested in hip hop, as well as the typical racial/ethnic stereotypes of a “tiger mom”. Both Crazy Rich Asians and Fresh Off the Boat are grounded on the idea that Asian family relations are extremely close, sometimes borderline toxic, who often have values at odds with Western beliefs and norms, such as individualism.

Cultural Studies scholar Stuart Hall has once looked at the significance of representation in popular culture and determined that stereotyping is a type of signifying practice that serves to highlight differences between social groups, and it works by falsely assigning identities to minority groups and therefore “Othering” them (Hall, 2013). Seiter (1986) points out that stereotyping is “an operation of ideology” that not only justifies and reinforces social differences, but also serves to legitimize social inequality (p. 16). The culture industry, particularly Hollywood, still consciously or unconsciously construct a social reality where Asians are perpetually different, and safely placed at the periphery of the society. From a culture as an instrument of power perspective, the tropes of stereotypes can be seen as ways of evoking feelings or amusement within mainstream audiences, hence maintaining the cultural hegemony held by and serving the average White American.

Touted as the poster child for representation and diversity in Hollywood, Crazy Rich Asians is also guilty of treating Asian audiences as uniform but passive consumers, who should be satisfied by the quantity of the all-Asian cast, instead of the quality or the complexity of the Asian characters. However, the fact that the movie features an all-Asian cast is still worthy of celebration, regardless of the potential economic motivation. At the very least, it is better than using the rhetoric of “whitewashing is good business” (Rose, 2017) to justify not employing non-White actors and actresses in Hollywood productions. Perhaps more efforts should be put into creating actually diverse characters that are not based on or against existing stereotypes. Maybe then, the Asian characters we see on the big and small screen might reflect the complexity and varieties of the Asian population on earth.

 References

Atkin, D. (1992). An analysis of television series with minority‐lead characters. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 9(4), 337-349.

Awad, I. (2013). Desperately constructing ethnic audiences: Anti-immigration discourses and minority audience research in the Netherlands. European journal of communication, 28(2), 168-182.

Balistreri, K. S., Joyner, K., & Kao, G. (2015). Relationship involvement among young adults: Are Asian American men an exceptional case? Population research and policy review, 34(5), 709-732.

Beeman, A. (2007). Emotional segregation: A content analysis of institutional racism in U.S. films, 1980-2001. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 30(5), 687–712.

Bielby, W. T., & Bielby, D. D. (1994). "All hits are flukes": Institutionalized decision making and the rhetoric of network prime-time program development. American Journal of Sociology, 99(5), 1287-1313.

Bourdieu, P. (1990). Social space and symbolic power. In In other words: Essays toward a reflexive sociology (pp. 123-139). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Chang, J. (2018, August 8). Review: A flawed but vital milestone, ‘Crazy Rich Asians’ pays exuberant tribute to Singapore’s 1%. LA Times. Retrieved from http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/movies/la-et-mn-crazy-rich-asians-review-20180808-story.html#

Chiu, A. (2018a, August 3). 'Asian, ew gross': How the 'Crazy Rich Asians' movie could help change stereotypes about Asian men. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/08/03/asian-ew-gross-how-the-crazy-rich-asians-movie-could-help-change-stereotypes-about-asian-men/

Chiu, A. (2018b, August 10). Is ‘Crazy Rich Asians’ Asian enough? The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/08/10/is-crazy-rich-asians-asian-enough

Hall, S. (2013). The spectacle of the ‘Other’. In S. Hall, J. Evans, & S. Nixon (Eds)., Representation: Cultural representation and signifying practices (2nd ed., pp. 215-287). London: Sage.

Hunt, D. (2005). Black content, white control. In D. M. Hunt (Ed.), Channeling blackness: Studies on television and race in America (pp. 267–302). New York: Oxford University Press.

Horkheimer, M., & Adorno, T. W. (1944/2002). The cultural industry: Enlightenment as mass deception. In Dialectic of Enlightenment (pp. 94-136). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Ito, R. (2018, August 12). 'Crazy Rich Asians': Why did it take so long to see a cast like this? The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/08/movies/crazy-rich-asians-cast.html

Lee, C. (2018, August 11). ‘It’s not a movie, it’s a movement’: Crazy Rich Asians takes on Hollywood. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/film/2018/aug/11/crazy-rich-asians-movie-kevin-kwan-jon-m-chu-constance-wu

Mastro, D. E., & Greenberg, B. S. (2000). The portrayal of racial minorities on prime time television. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 44(4), 690-703.

Monk-Turner, E., Heiserman, M., Johnson, C., Cotton, V., & Jackson, M. (2010). The portrayal of racial minorities on prime time television: A replication of the Mastro and Greenberg study a decade later. Studies in Popular Culture, 32(2), 101-114.

Mendelson, S. (2018, September 5). Box Office: 'Crazy Rich Asians' is the biggest romcom in six years, not nine. Forbes. Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottmendelson/2018/09/05/crazy-rich-asians-and-silver-linings-playbook-are-both-romantic-comedies/#518f3f1d398d

Oh, D. C. (2012). Black-yellow fences: Multicultural boundaries and whiteness in the Rush Hour franchise. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 29(5), 349-366.

Rose, S. (2017, August 29). ‘The idea that it’s good business is a myth’ – why Hollywood whitewashing has become toxic. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/film/2017/aug/29/the-idea-that-its-good-business-is-a-myth-why-hollywood-whitewashing-has-become-toxic

Saha, A. (2017). The politics of race in cultural distribution: Addressing inequalities in British Asian theatre. Cultural Sociology, 11(3), 302-317.

Scaife, S. (2018, August 28). Crazy Rich Asians has survived impossible representation standards. The Verge. Retrieved from https://www.theverge.com/2018/8/28/17788198/crazy-rich-asians-movie-representation-diversity-constance-wu-henry-golding-awkwafina

Seiter, E. (1986). Stereotypes and the media: A re‐evaluation. Journal of communication, 36(2), 14-26.

Signorielli, N. (2009). Race and sex in prime time: A look at occupations and occupational prestige. Mass Communication and Society, 12(3), 332-352.

Soulliere, D. M. (2003). Prime-time crime: Presentations of crime and its participants on popular television justice programs. Journal of Crime and Justice, 26(2), 47-75.

Truong, A. (2018, April 24). Crazy Rich Asians trailer: South Asians criticize film for lack of ethnic diversity and Singaporean accent. Quartz. Retrieved from https://qz.com/quartzy/1260412/crazy-rich-asians-trailer-south-asians-criticize-film-for-lack-of-ethnic-diversity-and-singaporean-accent/

Rubin, R. (2018, September 10). What Can Hollywood Learn From #AsianAugust? Variety. Retrieved from https://variety.com/2018/film/news/crazy-rich-asians-black-panther-hollywood-diversity-1202926661/

Yuen, N. W., Chin, C. B., Deo, M. E., Lee, J. J., & Milman, N. (2005). Asian Pacific Americans in prime pime: Lights, camera, and little action [Media Report]. Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders (AAPIs) on television. Retrieved from https://www.aapisontv.com/uploads/3/8/1/3/38136681/yuen2005.pdf

Yuen, N. W., Chin, C. B., Deo, M. E., Lee, J. J., DuCros, F. M. & Milman, N. (2017). Tokens on the small screen: Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders in Prime Time and Streaming Television [Media Report]. Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders (AAPIs) on television. Retrieved from https://www.aapisontv.com/uploads/3/8/1/3/38136681/aapisontv.2017.pdf

[1] The director claims that Crazy Rich Asians is “not a movie, it’s a movement” (Ito, 2018).

[culturalsociologyblog-blog]

The dirty truth about ‘clean eating’

By Vivian Visser

Anyone who has the slightest interest in food, cannot have missed the recent trend of ‘clean eating’. A search for #cleaneating provides you with no more than 34.349.626 tags on Instagram. Bloggers and food writers such as Ella Woodward, Sarah Britton and the Hemsley sisters are immensely popular, especially among young middle-class women, on social media as well as in the offline world (Wilson, 2017)[1]. So what’s all that fuzz about? For sure, clean eating doesn’t mean devouring cupcakes while mopping the floor. Clean eating champions whole, natural, simple, honest and plant-based foods. It opposes processed foods, such as refined sugar and ready-to-serve meals. According to the advocates of clean eating, it’s not about diets or deprivations. It’s a lifestyle. A form of self-respect; allowing yourself to enjoy delicious food and be kind to yourself and your body. In short, clean eating helps you to live happy and healthy (Baggini, 2016).

Although it’s said not to be a diet, you can now find numerous guides on how to pursue a ‘clean eating diet’. Clean eating will not only make you happy and healthy, but also makes sure you’ll become fit and slender (Irvine, 2016), as is shown by the influential advocates of clean eating, who are all cheery, pretty ánd slim.

It is no surprise that a lifestyle build upon food is especially popular amongst women, when we take into account that food has almost always and everywhere been an inseparable part of  women’s lives (Jaggar & Bordo, 1989). Despite the fact that more and more women are currently employed outside the house, providing food still remains a predominant female activity (Hollows, 2003). Food and the body, and therewith dieting, belongs to the female sphere (Bordo, 2003).

Therefore I take a gender perspective to provide an understanding of this phenomenon. I will look into why clean eating appeals this much to young women in our society and therewith reveal a hidden dimension, the dirty truth, of this trend.

Femininity as embodied practice

In particular, gender as embodiment, offers a fruitful approach towards understanding the popularity of clean eating. When we prepare our food, we turn nature into culture. By cutting, mixing, kneeding, boiling, grilling, baking, we transform nature into cultural goods. It’s culture that we ingest and consume. It’s culture that becomes embodied (Douglas, 1966). All bodies are literally materialized through alimentation and dietetic principles, which is why food consumption and dietetic strategies can be considered critical sites for understanding the gendered female body (Spencer, 2013).  

Gender is a social and cultural construct, invoked and reinforced on the interactional level, as explained by West and Zimmerman (1987). They distinguish between sex, sex category and gender. Sex is the classification of being male or female based on biological criteria, usually one’s genitalia at birth. In everyday life, placement in a sex category is established and sustained trough behaviour that society recognizes as either male or female. So it is possible to claim membership of a sex category different from the one assigned to by sex criteria. Gender is doing practices that are socially accepted as appropriate for one’s sex category.

Butler (1988; 1990; 1993) continues this line of thinking, saying that gender is a performative act. According to her, it doesn’t even make sense to distinguish between sex and gender, since both are cultural. Both sex and gender only exist within sociocultural meanings and interpretations. Being female then is not a stable identity, but an identity that needs constant construction. Gender is a stylized repetitions of acts, a repetitive performance of gender and an imitation of the dominant conventions of gender. Gender is a performative act in both senses of the word performative: the acts change something in reality (gender comes into existence), and the acts are a performance, based on a social script.

So gender isn’t being, but doing; it is in practices that gender is constructed (Butler, 1988). One embodies the values, ideals, ideas and expectations of one’s time and culture and therewith becomes male or female. This brings about the illusion that something like a stable gender identity exists and produces normative constrains (Butler, 1990). Therefore one is careful not to deviate from the desirable settled standards and conventions. Deviant behaviour will be socially punished (Butler, 1988). 

The contradictory constructions of femininity          

Let us now return to the clean eating hysteria. What do the clean eating practices tell us about doing femininity in our time and culture? Well, it underscores that the contemporary Western construction of femininity is centred around contradictory ideals, expectations and directives (Woolhouse, Day, Rickett & Milnes, 2011). In short, ideals of passivity and activity are both imposed on women.

Within the constructions of femininity, values such as passivity, dependence and weakness are imbued (Wolf, 2002). Women are seen as consumers rather than producers (Van den Berg, 2012). These values coincide with the domestic constructions of femininity; the woman as caretaker, as the one nurturing the husband and children (Bordo, 2003). In this way, food is strongly related with femininity.

At the same time, it is expected from modern women to be active, to pursue for example a career and exhibit more (traditionally) masculine values (Cairns & Johnston, 2015; Woulhouse et al., 2011). They must learn to embody free thinking and exercise choice around their identities, activities and ways of being. Self-control and determination becomes more and more important. Since food and femininity are that closely linked, it comes as no surprise that the self-mastery of women concentrates around food intake.

Nowadays bodyweight, shape, size and body management are produced as powerful signifiers of the individual’s physical health, emotional and psychological status, morality and beauty (Johnston, Szabo & Rodney, 2011; Burns & Gavey, 2004). Slenderness and restrained eating are highly valued. The imperative for women is to be slim, because this is deemed heterosexually attractive. In the current cultural climate, being overweight is seen as morally weak, deviant, lacking in self-discipline and vulnerable to ill health (Woolhouse et al., 2011).

Already in primary school, young children are aware of differences in preferred male and female food practices. In general, primary school girls are more conscious of the social dimensions of  food and eating. Both boys and girls acknowledge that girls should eat less than boys and eat in a more fashionable manner. The awareness is smaller in younger children than in children reaching puberty (Roos, 2002). This underlines the findings that from a young age, the body is continuously disciplined in a gendered way which contributes to the embodiment of gender, through school curricula  and family upbringing (Martin, 1998). When it comes to food, girls start to embody the dominant constructions of femininity, as nurturing and restraining, from a young age.

Bordo (2003) asserts that denial of appetites is therefore central in the construction of femininity and a woman exhibiting control over her appetites and desires symbolises moral and sexual virtue. By disciplining the body in this way, the construction of femininity becomes embodied (Waquant, 1995). The embodied food practices of women mediate and reproduce cultural meanings attached to femininity.

Negotiating contradictory constructions

Young women today, implicitly or explicitly, seem to be aware of these contradictory constructions of femininity (Woolhouse et al., 2011). They firmly reject the idea of society imposing certain constraints on their behaviour and meanings. They refuse to be seen as mere passive and indulgent creatures and simultaneously dismiss the ideal of severe self-control over one’s body. Not being passive is shown by actively selecting and restricting one’s food intake. But this must not be done by abiding to the rules of an old-fashioned diet, blatantly aiming at reducing weight, because then one would be trapped by the ideal of an active, thin and attractive body. Hence, young women construct strict dietary rules as undesirable and something that must be avoided.  Instead, young women negotiate both dominant constructions of femininity by framing their eating practices as ‘choosing’ to eat ‘healthy’ because ‘you’re worth it’ (Woolhouse et al., 2011).

Clean eating provides the perfect background for doing this. Clean eating offers young women the opportunity to show they’re not passive, while leaving enough room for individual choices. After all, clean eating is not a diet, it’s a lifestyle, aiming for good physical and emotional health, not just superficial slenderness. Young women frame their practices in such a way that it positions them as healthy and responsible individuals, rather than women who give into social pressures of being passive and indulgent or active and thin.

A self-defeating strategy

At first sight, clean eating may seem a nice escape route for young women, to negotiate the contradicting ideals and directives imposed on them. But when we look more closely, clean eating is merely the dominant constructions of femininity in disguise. The healthy weight discourse can serve to legitimate oppressive disciplinary practices that many women engage in to achieve weight loss. It naturalizes weight loss. A slim body equates with a healthy body, and a body cannot be healthy if it’s not slim. When slenderness is framed as a requirement for good health rather than a cultural imperative, it becomes much harder to question and resist (Woolhouse et al., 2011).      

When young women frame their eating practices as individual choices and the recognition of one’s own health, this only obscures the highly gendered power relations operating in the sociocultural context. From this, the dirty truth about clean eating, unveils itself: instead of empowering women, by opposing dominant constructions of femininity, clean eating inscribes those dominant constructions on the body. The embodied clean eating food practices therewith confirm and reinforce gender inequalities.

 References

Baggini, J. (2016) Clean eating and dirty burgers: how food became a matter of morals. Retrieved on 22 September from https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/jul/17/clean-eating-dirty-burgers-food-morals-julian-baggini

Berg, M. van den (2011) Femininity As a City Marketing Strategy: Gender Bending Rotterdam. Urban Studies, 49(1), pp. 153-168

Bordo, S. (2003) Unbearable Weight. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Burns, M. & Gavey, N. (2004) Healthy weight at what cost? ‘Bulimia’ and a discourse of weight control. Journal of Health Psychology 9(4), 549-565

Butler, J. (1988) Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory. Theatre Journal, 40(4), 519-531

Butler, J. (1990) Gender trouble: feminism and the subversion of identity. New York: Routledge

Butler, J. (1993)  Bodies that matter: on the discursive limits of "sex". New York: Routledge

Cairns, K. & Johnston, J. (2015) Choosing health: embodied neoliberalism, postfeminism, and the “do-diet”. Theory and Society, 44(2), 153-175

Douglas, M. (1966) Purity and Danger. New York: Routledge

Hollows, J. (2003) Oliver’s twist: Leisure, Labour and Domestic Masculinity in The Naked Chef. International Journal of Cultural Studies, 6(2), 229-248

Irvine, B. (2016) On clean eating. Retrieved on 22 September from https://feministacademiccollective.com/2016/07/

Jaggar, A.M. & Bordo, S.R. (1989) Gender/Body/Knowledge. Feminist Reconstructions of Being and Knowing. New Brunswick, Jersey; Rutgers University Press

Johnston, J., Szabo, M. & Rodney, A. (2011) Good food, good people: Understanding the cultural repertoire of ethical eating. Journal of Consumer Culture, 11(3), pp. 293-318

Martin, K. (1998) Becoming a Gendered Body: Practices of Preschools. American Sociological Review, 63(4), 494-511

Roos, G. (2002) Our bodies are made of pizza—food and embodiment among children in Kentucky. Ecology of Food and Nutrition, 41(1), 1-19

Spencer, D.C. (2013) ‘Eating clean’ for a violent body: Mixed martial arts, diet and masculinities. Women’s Studies International Forum, 44, 247-254

Waquant, L. (1995) The Pugilistic Point of View: How Boxers Think and Feel about Their Trade.   Theory and Society, 24(4), 489-535

Wilson, B. (2016) Why we fell for clean eating. Retrieved on 23 September from https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2017/aug/11/why-we-fell-for-clean-eating

West, C. & Zimmerman, D.H. (1987) Doing Gender. Gender and Society. 1(2), 125-151

Wolf, N. (2002) The beauty myth. Toronto: Vintage Books, Random House

Woolhouse, M., Day, K., Rickett, B. & Milnes, K. (2011) ‘Cos girls aren’t supposed to eat like pigs are they?’ Young women negotiating gendered discursive constructions of food and eating. Journal of Health Psychology, 17(1), 46-56

[1] It must be said that the clean eating trend also encounters oppositions. A nice example is the Facebook event ‘Frikandellen gooien naar de Green Happiness dames op Lowlands’ (https://www.facebook.com/events/106605220059475/). The organizers invited people at the festival Lowlands to throw mince-meat sausages at the Dutch advocates of clean eating, known as the ladies of Green Happiness. More than five thousand people planned to attend. Despite these kind of rebellious and humorous outcries,  the success of Green Happiness continues (with over 764.000 followers on Instagram) and clean eating in general remains popular.

[culturalsociologyblog-blog]

Injecting gender

By Sabrina Huizenga

In 2016 the Dutch government announced to spend two million euros on educating health care professionals to better deal with vaccination critique (Volkskrant, 2017). While critique usually relates to safety and effectiveness of vaccinations in general, HPV vaccination became especially controversial. HPV stands for Human Papillomavirus, a sexually transmitted infection that effects about eighty percent of sexually active people. Generally, the virus clears itself and has no symptoms. Chances are that most people reading this blog post have (unknowingly) had the virus. Although chances are slim, a persisting virus can lead to cervical, throat, anal and penal cancer (Schurink-van 't Klooster & de Melker, 2016). Nowadays most (Western) governments advise HPV vaccination to young girls to prevent the risk of cervical cancer. While some have hailed this vaccination as a milestone in women’s health, serious critique has also been launched, which is very well captured in the documentary ‘de prik en het meisje’ (Nevejan, 2011). Here, we follow a mother and daughter in their struggle over the question whether to get vaccinated or not. It shows however, that public controversy is generally about safety and effectiveness.

Although criticism is expressed, this debate does not address the underlying structure of the biotechnological innovation that helps individuals with the dictate to ‘care for the self’ (Foucault, 1990). The current debate takes for granted the deeply gendered structure and performative, gendering effects that I argue, are at the core of this vaccine. By doing so, the debate contributes to the naturalization of the gendered character of the vaccine. To take a closer look at what is at stake within this specific vaccine it is helpful to make use of the sociological perspective of ‘culture as embodied practice’. This view helps to problematize and unveil the seemingly naturalness of this biotechnology. Furthermore, it helps to look at the vaccine not only as a disciplining instrument in the Foucauldian sense of disciplining the body (Foucault, 1979), but moreover as an embodied practice, disciplining it into a gendered performance (Butler, 1988). It shows that HPV vaccination is gendering the female body through the idea that only the female body has a vulnerable disposition and needs to be protected. This way it can even be argued that getting vaccinated against HPV is doing gender (West & Zimmerman, 1987). Doing gender and gender performances have in common that both suggest that managed and comported behaviour result in gender and gender relations, after which gender becomes embodied (Young, 1990) and profoundly determines who we ‘are’.

When we mention gender, performativity and the notion of ‘embodied practice’, the work of American philosopher Judith Butler cannot go unnoticed. Gender is then understood as a social construct meaning that it is subject to social and cultural influences. Biological bodily differences are however not denied, but are rather regarded as distinct from the process that gives cultural meanings to the body. A related term, performativity is defined by Butler (1993) as ‘that reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains’. When she speaks about gender performativity, Butler refers to the process of subjectification, roughly described as the process in which people are being controlled and disciplined to behave according to the way in which dominant culture or power expects them to (Graham, 2011). Within this understanding gender identity does not precede political action. It is (political) action that is responsible for constructing the gender identity, instead of representing an objective, neutral gender identity. The ground of gender identities is not a seemingly seamless identity but instead the stylized repeating of performances through time (Butler, 1988, p. 520).

Different institutions such as the family and school are responsible for gendering bodies. According to Martin (1998) childhood is the foundation on which further gendering takes place. Because this process already starts in early childhood, gender differences between men and women later on seem natural. The process of gendering the body usually begins in the family, but is carried out by different institutions such as the school. Research shows that bodily practices of children are being controlled which turns children that are alike in their conduct and practice into differentiated boys and girls, with corresponding differential practices. Next to the family and school, the healthcare system however can also be regarded as yet another institution responsible for gendering the body.

This brings us back to HPV vaccination and the notion of gender performativity. It could be questioned how protecting oneself against the potential harms of a sexually transmitted virus can possibly be problematized in this way? In order to reveal this seemingly neutral vaccine, it is crucial to explore the context of this biomedical technology. This is the first context where performativity comes to the fore. While the vaccine can be applied to boys and girls, the (Dutch) government only advises the vaccine for girls to prevent the risks of cervical cancer. Within the national vaccination program, the vaccine is only administered to girls while excluding boys. Though it can be argued that the risk women face regarding cervical cancer is significantly higher than the risk men face to get penal, anal or throat cancer, this argumentation obscures the fact that there has simply been a far greater focus on researching cervical cancer. There is a reciprocal relationship between knowledge about a disease and the elevated status risk that is attributed through that knowledge. A focus on cervixes in research ensures that more is known about the connection between the cervix and HPV which in turn results in more awareness and a greater perceived risk for regarding HPV and women. This focus on women and cervixes can clearly be characterized as performative; the medical discourse produces the phenomena that it regulates and constrains, a vulnerable female disposition. The production of gendered knowledge results in performativity of knowledge and hence in gendered embodied practices.

Unravelling these underlying processes are important. When we ignore the processes responsible for the gendering of bodies, we risk seeing these bodies as a natural given (Martin, 1998). In healthcare discourses surrounding HPV there is a clear analogy with binary gender oppositions. While men are depicted as active spreaders of the virus, women are portrayed as at risk, vulnerable and in need of vaccination. Through gendered knowledge the vaccine is actually reifying a female vulnerability in need of protection. Moreover, it reproduces the notion of a risky female sexuality. There seems to be ‘something’ about female sexuality that needs to be disciplined. The information provided to girls, the marketing campaigns and the female application can be regarded as a gendered performance. These performances assume a ‘natural’ anatomy, femaleness is naturalized which authorises controlling and disciplining the female body (Mishra & Graham, 2012). Just like Bourdieu (2001) argues in Masculine Domination, biological differences are being abused to naturalize the socially differentiated female and male body. Through the construction of a natural disposition, the female risk for cervical cancer, an embodiment of domination is legitimized naturally, resulting in a typical (fe)male habitus.

There are yet more ways in which the notion of performativity or embodied practice comes to the fore as gendered knowledge results in gendered behaviour. Depicting the act of getting vaccinated as the responsible choice for girls, because of their high-risk biology, confirms the idea of women as domestic (health)care provider. This results in the reproduction of traditional responsibilities like caring for the family, the home and the sick, but also in new duties in face of the risk of HPV as active, responsible citizens that choose to get vaccinated (Charles, 2013). Additionally, it can be argued that while the vaccine contributes to the construction of gender, this even includes the construction of normative notions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ women. It is this intersection of technology and the body where a certain ‘double standard’ is (re)produced (Carpenter and Casper, 2009). Not acting upon the imperative for vaccination is framed as irresponsible, dangerous and careless, which can cause women to feel notions as obligation and fear. This sense of fear permeates the governmental and public discourse and it impacts women’s subjectivities (Charles, 2013).

To conclude, instead of debating whether or not girls should get vaccinated because of notions of efficacy or safety, it is interesting to problematize an overlooked aspect, namely the gendered core of the vaccine. I would like to pose that the knowledge about the female risk for HPV related cervical cancer and the gendered application of the HPV vaccination program can be regarded as gender performativity. At the end of the documentary mentioned in the introduction, the daughter decides to get vaccinated because she believes it is the right decision. And just like this girl, every year girls have to deal with this question. For those girls that do decide to get vaccinated, at certain dates each year, sports halls throughout the Netherlands transform into places where they can get vaccinated against the HPV virus to prevent the risk of cervical cancer. Here, gender can be theorized as a very mundane illustration of how it is (innocently) ritualized, naturalized through apparent objective medical knowledge about the female body and vulnerable disposition, as a public performance. It is one of many repetitions of acts in which girls ritually enact their femininity, their supposed vulnerability and high risk biology, through the embodied practice of a gendered performance.

Literature

Bourdieu, P. (2001). Masculine Domination. Polity Press: Cambridge, UK.

Butler, J. (1988). Performative acts and gender constitution: An essay in phenomenology and feminist theory. Theatre Journal 40(4): 519-531.


Butler, J. (1990). Gender trouble: feminism and the subversion of identity. Routledge: New York.

Butler, J. (1993). Bodies that matter. On the discursive limits of “sex”. Routledge: New York & London.

Butler, J. (2000). Gender Turbulentie. Boom Perresia: Amsterdam.

Carpenter, L.M. & Casper, M.J. (2009). A tale of two technologies: HPV vaccination, male circumcision and sexual health. Gender and Society, 23, 6, 790-816.

Charles, N. (2013). Mobilizing the self-governance of pre-damaged bodies: neoliberal biological citizenship and HPV vaccination promotion in Canada. Citizenship Studies, 17 (6-7), 770-784.

Foucault, M. (1979). The history of sexuality: an introduction. London: Allen Lane.

Graham, L. J. (2011). The product of text and ‘other’ statements: Discourse analysis and the critical use of Foucault. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 43, 6, 663-674.

Martin, K.A. (1998). Becoming a gendered body: Practices of preschools. American Sociological Review 63(4): 494-511.

Mishra, A. & Graham, J.E. (2012). Risk, choice and the ‘girl vaccine’: unpacking Human Papillomavirus (HPV) immunization. Health, risk and society, 14, 1, 57-69.

Nevejan, M. (2011). De prik en het meisje. https://www.npo.nl/human-doc/19-05-2011/POW_00243805

Schurink-van 't Klooster, T.M. & de Melker, H.E. (2016) The National Immunisation Programme in the Netherlands : Surveillance and developments in 2015-2016. RIVM rapport, Nederland.

Volkskrant (2017). Overheid trekt 2 miljoen uit voor gesprekken met vaccinatietwijfelaars. Volkskrant. Retrieved at October 16th from: http://www.volkskrant.nl/wetenschap/overheid-trekt-2-miljoen-uit-voor-gesprekken-met-vaccinatietwijfelaars~a4416646/.

West, C. & Zimmerman, D. (1987). "Doing Gender". Gender and Society, 1, 127-51.

Young, I. (1990). Throwing Like a Girl. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

[culturalsociologyblog-blog]

‘Rest In Peach’ A language for sexting and the signification of emojis

By Chiara Modugno

“RIP to the peach emoji, the only way I knew what a butt looks like”

 That sexting has significantly unsettled youth’s sexuality is out of question (Lenhart, 2009). Not wanting to write one more line about sexting, teenagers, risk and so on, the focus here will instead be addressed to something else: emoji-sexting as signification. How? The main purpose of this blog post would be that of situating sexting – and, in particular, the use of emojis in its practice, especially by youth – inside the realm of culture as signification.

First things first, in order to do so, a brief introduction of linguistics in light of the future developments of this essay would be needed. The founder of linguistics himself, Ferdinand de Saussure, provided a fundamental distinction when he contrasted language, the (social!) structure aspect, and speech, the individual act (De Saussure, 1916). Only the former can be actually studied, since the true meaning of the latter gets lost the same second it is performed. Language, instead, is a socially organized system of signs. Every linguistic sign stands to represent a whole, in turn constituted by a signified – the meaning (more precisely, the concept) – and a signifier – the form, or sound-image, employed when referring to the concept (De Saussure, 1964).

Now it is time to go back to sexting: how could it possibly be entering the picture? To begin with, ‘sexting’ is defined by Merriam-Webster as “the sending of sexually explicit messages or images by cell phone”. The first fascinating aspect is indeed the simple fact that the term has actually entered dictionaries itself, allowing for its situation among the list of ‘proper’ kinds of languages (Thurlow, 2017). Young generations in particular form sexting’s community of speakers (De Saussure, 1964), similar to what Zerubavel would call ‘optic communities’ (1997); the continuous redefinition, modification and adaptation of such a language in current days also play a significant role in the negotiation of youth’s own identity (Ringrose & Harvey, 2015).

It is possible, for now, to think about sexting as a first-order semiological system, the one portrayed by de Saussure, where a brand new list of signifiers (the form, or sound/image) finds a satisfactory relationship with as many signifies (the concepts):

o   TDTM – Talk Dirty to Me

o   NSA – No Strings Attached

o   GNOC – Get Naked On Camera

o   POS – Parents Over Shoulder

o   FWB – Friends With Benefits

As any kind of language that is not instantly consumed, encoding/decoding processes are at work between the moment of execution and that of reception. As Stuart Hall would have pointed out, the correct reception of sexting messages lays in the relation of identity between the active and passive sides of the exchange (Hall, 1980). While among teenagers the symmetry stands, and they are able to successfully decode sexting messages, the degree of asymmetry between them and their parents’ codes leads often to ‘distortions’ (ibid.), the so-called ‘aberrant’ codes. The relative knowledge of recipients (age in particular) confines the language of sexting to a specific category – once again, sexting’s community of speakers. Members of this community own the means to properly comprehend sexting messages; however, as Hall points out, their decoding can still take several different forms:

a) Dominant code

Members of the same community of speakers correctly decode the message according to the dominant-hegemonic position. Sender and receiver both use the same codes in their communicative exchange.

b) Negotiated code

In this case, the decoding process takes place in a medium between ‘adaptive’ and ‘oppositional’ elements. The receiver understands the code (Talk Dirty to Me), and could then choose to respond in the same way (for example, ‘POS’ – Parents Over Shoulder); however, she replies with her own ‘ground rules’.

c) Oppositional code

In this final instance the receiver – while, once again, perfectly comprehending the sender code – responds contrarily to it, using an ‘alternative framework of reference’ (Hall, 1980, p. p.138).

Parents are left out of the community, and they would often need a ‘guide’ to understand their children’s rhetoric (Katzman, 2010). They would then employ yet another code: the aberrant code, belonging to all individuals who do not share the same language (Eco, 1972).

In order to go one step further with the semiotic-linguistic analysis of sexting, Roland Barthes must be included in the discourse. When discussing ‘myth as a type of speech’, the author introduces a second-order semiological system, one that goes beyond the signifier + signified = sign Saussurean equation (Barthes, 1957). In the mythical dimension, indeed, a shift in the relation of signifier and signified occurs when the linguistic sign (concept + sound-image) of the first (classical) system actually becomes just a signifier in a second system, that of metalanguage – namely, myth itself. What has been just described is a process of appropriation, whereby a sign is emptied of its literal meaning and is subsequently employed as mere form to express something else.

The long-shot moment has now arrived, since it is here believed that the realm of sexting provides for a metalanguage, as well: a second-order semiological system. The necessary shift in the relationship between signifies and signifiers happens, precisely, whenever emojis enter the game. It is exactly through emojis that a clearer description of Barthes’ theory will be carried out. A paradigmatic case is that of the aubergine: far from being a symbol for farmers’ markets and veganism, this vegetable lately underwent a ‘deformation’.

Once upon a time, its sign used to be:

Aubergine (the concept – signified)   +  the visual form (image – signifier)

However, when emojis started substituting for actual words in sexting practices, the above-mentioned sign ‘aubergine’ was actually emptied of content and became just pure form-signifier to a second semiological system, that of the sexting language. Nowadays, whenever the aubergine emoji is employed in sexting, even though its literal meaning is clearly visible, the reader would still grasp something different. Such a distortion of the form is allowed by the linguistical meaning that already lies behind it: the already-established connotation of aubergine-as-a-concept served the erotic intention of sexting, that of representing a phallic image. As a matter of fact, mythical language is characterized by intention, rather than form. The combination of the first-system sign (or second-system signifier) with its new signified generates a second system and a new sign, which Barthes calls signification.

Further support to this hypothesis comes from recent news reports. The ‘peach emoji’ case rapidly took over the Internet when, about a year ago, Apple released a beta version of iOS 10.2, which introduced a new-look version of the beloved peach emoji. The new image was more closely resembling the actual fruit: no problem would have arisen if the first-order semiological system – the one where ‘peach’ would actually mean a peach – was at work. However, that was not the case, as the peach emoji was in truth the most appreciated sexting symbol, in the guise of derrière (see the front page picture). A madness of tweets, Facebook posts and the like all went viral, so much that the original peach emoji was finally re-established in the next iOS upgrade. This event shows how emoji-sexting is a metalanguage, similar to Barthes’ second semiotic system, rather than a first-system language in the Saussurean conception.  

Analysing (emoji) sexting under semiotics’ and linguistics’ theoretical lenses allows for a better understanding of the rise of neologisms – as well as new languages altogether – in the digital era, as well as specific audiences’ ways of encoding and decoding them. The mutability/immutability paradox (De Saussure, 1964), supportive of both the impossibility by communities to actively and purposely perform change in language themselves, and, on the other side, the ever-lasting potential for modification – stemming from both the arbitrariness of the sign and the erosion of time – pose stimulating interrogatives on the next evolution the realm of sexting would undergo.

References

Barthes, R. (1957). Myth Today. In R. Barthes, Mythologies (p. 109-130). New York: Hill and Wang.

Eco, U. (1972). Towards a Semiotic Inquiry Into the Television Message. In t. P. Splendore, Working Papers in Cultural Studies 3 (p. 103-121). University of Birmingham.

De Saussure, F. (1916). Course in General Linguistics. New York: Columbia University Press.

De Saussure, F. (1964). Immutability and Mutability of the Sign. In F. De Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (p. 71-78). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Hall, S. (1980). Encoding/Decoding. In S. Hall, D. Hobson, A. Lowe, & P. e. Willis, Culture, Media, Language (p. 128-138). London: Hutchinson.

Katzman, D. (2010, Jan). Sexting: Keeping Teens Safe and Responsible in a Technologically Savvy World. Paediatrics & Child Health , 15 (1), p. 41-42.

Lenhart, A. (2009). Teens and Sexting: How and Why Minor Teens Are Sending Sexually Suggestive Nude or Nearly Nude Images via Text Messages. Tratto il giorno 10 17, 2017 da Pew Research Centre Report: http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/teens-and-sexting.pdf

Ringrose, J., & Harvey, L. (2015). Boobs, Back-off, Six Packs and Bits: Mediated Body Parts, Gendered Reward, and Sexual Shame in Teens' Sexting Images. Continuum , 29 (2), p. 205-217.

Thurlow, C. (2017). "Forget About the Words"? Tracking the Language, Media and Semiotic Ideologies of Digital Discourse: The Case of Sexting. Discourse, Contenxt & Media , 20, p. 10-19.

Zerubavel, E. (1997). Social Optics. In E. Zerubavel, Social Mindscapes: An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology (p. 23-34). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

[culturalsociologyblog-blog]

Pussy Riot: from blasphemy to prophesy and all the way back

By  Alina Pavlova

What could be wrong with an innocent women’s prayer? A lot when it’s a punk prayer preformed by Pussy Riot, one of the most scandalous and cherished by the Western media for political activism punk rock bands. Upon a controversial re-election of Vladimir Putin in 2012, political freedom in Russia was deteriorating. The fellow country (wo)(men), who were let to enjoy some openness for a while (remember the band called t.A.T.u?), were yet again constricted by the hegemony of the corrupt power. Investing heavily in Orthodox Church (Maloverjan, 2011), the government emphasized traditionalist views and docility from its citizens.

Many citizens’ rights, including women’s rights, were sacrificed again, let alone the rights of the LGBT community. With such developments, one did not have to wait too long for Pussy Riot’s performance. On the 21st of February, 2012, the band, comprising of 5 punker ladies’, appeared in the main Russian church, the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour. Covered in colorful balaclavas the artists started to jump around the altar and pray pretentiously, while the action was recorded for a consequent production of a video clip. In the video the inappropriateness of the action can be seen from the disapproval of the actions by the church’s clergy, who tried to disallow the deed. Yet, despite the church’s stuff’ effort, Pussy Riot succeeded in collecting the necessary material, producing a thematic song titled “Mother of God, Drive Putin Away”.

Following the distribution of the recorded performance, the band members were arrested by Russian state for “hooliganism driven by religious hatred” (Associated Press, 2012). And, while the Western press was shaken by the violation of human rights (Amnesty International, 2012), the band was loathed by the majority of Russian people (Romir, 2012). Consequently, this paradox of differences in perceptions lends to a question: Why Russians did not agree with Pussy Riot while the West did? To answer this question, I will try to decipher the Pussy Riot action from 3 different perspectives: the Russian audience, Putin’s government, and the West.

Pussy Riot Mythologies  

To better understand what the punk prayer was about, the mythology perspective can prove useful. Grounded in De Saussure’s (1964) study of signs, or semiology, a myth is studied as idea-in-form, a second-order semiological system. Thus, while De Saussure’s linguistic theory holds a sound-image as a signifier, a concept as a signified and a word representing a sign, the myth, as explained by Barthes (1999), is a meta-language in which the linguistic sign becomes a signifier. Moreover, unlike De Saussure’s study of signs, which mainly concerns language, the meta-language of myth can take different forms expressed in, but not limited to, the language itself, music, photography, painting or performed acts such as Pussy Riot’s punk prayer.  

This conceptual framework can be best explained in a graphical form. Take, for example, the title: “Mother of God, Drive Putin Away”. At a first sight, this sounds a little bit odd. How could Mother of God literally banish Putin?

To start from Saussure, the Mother of God can be depicted as something like this:

On the other hand, when we look at the same structure as an idea-in-form, the Mother of God as a sign becomes a form of signifier for a signified concept of Femininity, producing a signification by correlating the signifier and signified.

Likewise, Putin in this context will signify Power. Hence, the notion is clear – the Femininity is to banish Power. However, the second-level signifier is not as clear-cut and can imply a number of concepts. For some, Mother of God can also mean a concept of Devotion and Putin a concept Independence. Hence, unlike the arbitrary nature of De Saussure’s sign, the myth’s signification is not random. It operates in a certain time in history and is appropriated (Barthes, 1999, p.118) by a particular group which can interpret the signification as a natural relationship (Ibid, p.130). This, in turn, can explain the different perception of the Pussy Riot act by a different myth-consumer.

Punk Prayer Encoding

To analyze the perception, a good starting point would be in analyzing the preferred meaning Pussy Riot actually wanted to encode (Hall, 1980). According to Barthes (1999), the producer of the myth focuses on an empty signifier. Therefore, Pussy Riot have started with the concepts which important to them and for which the band stands (femininity, power abuse by government and church, lack of freedom (Pussy Riot, 2012)), and tried to find an appropriate signifier. As such, Mother of God was encoded to signify Femininity and Putin to signify Power (Hall, 1980). The act in itself, singing and dancing in the church, further signified the disobedience to dominant power with some cathartic distortion of a prayer to eradicate gender inequality and the corrupt government’s support of the corrupt church. Even the whole set up of a band, the punk rocker girls dressed as a rainbow, portrays an image of non-conformity to gender roles and supports the oppressed minorities (Hebdige, 1988).  During encoding, the band relied on some basic assumptions about the audience (Hall, 1980). This is exactly what went wrong.

Russian Audiences get reminded of Stalin

By and large, the Russian audiences have not accepted the Pussy Riot’s church performance, decoding the message “in a globally contrary way” (Hall, 1980) to what Pussy Riot were encoding. Even the population which is opposed to Putinism felt that the act was the matter out of place (Douglas, 1990). As Barthes (1999) described, this perception is situational. Here, the disagreement mainly stems from the perspective of religion. Drawing from history, Russian population religiosity was heavily suppressed by the Communist regime (Prozorov, 2013). When Stalin was in power, the churches were destroyed and the church’ bells were used to produce war machinery. With the fall of Communism, the Orthodox Christianity, which was the main religion before the Red October, had a massive come back. Unlike the West, which became more agnostic, Russians were jumping on a spirituality train which they have missed a time ago. As such, the punk band performance in the church, where the clergy tries to protect the sacred, in most post-soviet citizens’ views can be equated to the humiliation of the church by Stalin and blasphemy. Quite the opposite to what Pussy Riot intended.

The Putin-mythm

Just like Pussy Riot, Russian government also acknowledged high significance of the Church for an average Russian. Consequently, in recent years, the institutions of government and church have been heavily affiliated. As such, the government took the church as a mechanism of “soft power” to control its people, the point which Pussy Riot also emphasized (Smyth & Soboleva, 2013). However, as we saw, an ordinary citizen did not connect the church with the corrupt power, but more with the freedom of choice. By supporting the church, Russian government symbolized this freedom (Sharafutdinova, 2014). And, as a matter of timing, this myth had frozen in people’s minds, “establishing eternal reference of a concept” (Barthes, 1999, p. 124). This played out in favor of the Russian government imprisoning Pussy Riots, creating yet another myth of cleansing of devil and protecting the people from the seizure of freedom to the questioned by Pussy Riot religious belief (Hall, 1980). In can be said that in Russian society the dominant-hegemonic position of the government propaganda was fed (Ibid).

Pussy Riot & the Hegemony of the West

Where the Pussy Riot act played as a prophesy, however, is in the West. Having a different history and being a center of scientific revolution, the fall of religion in the West has come voluntarily and hasn’t been so dramatic. Additionally, the overall Western stability and freedom of press allows the society to tackle such issues as gender and power much better than it is in Russia. As such, Russia is heavily observed by the Western press watchdog as a bad example. By sympathizing with the Russian population, the Western press aims at educating its own citizens about gender inequality and flags the domestic issues in political sphere (Weij, Berkers & Engelbert, 2015). Thus, as soon as Pussy Riot were interrogated in the court with possibility of imprisonment, this not only was reported as human rights violation instance, of which in the world is plenty[1], but also as a feminism and freedom of speech act. And, although without a direct link to the dictator the Western discourse could not form an explicit political advocacy (Ibid), the message still operated inside the dominant code and was correctly decoded (Hall, 1980), using Pussy Riot in Hebdige’s (1988) sense of “object as image”.

Mythical Evolution 

In the concluding comments, I would like to add that the legitimacy of the protests lay within the society which will legitimize it. Whether Pussy Riot were speaking to Russian audiences, miscalculating their background, or were they targeting the attention of the West, we won’t know. Yet, when Russian press covered the court process and the custodial sentence, people were able to sympathies with Pussy Riot (Bernstein, 2013), creating some oppositional thoughts within the hegemonic legitimacy (Hall’s negotiation code). As such, we could witness the myth as meta-language evolve (De Saussure, 1964).

Lyrics of Punk Prayer

Virgin Mary, Mother of God, put Putin away Рut Putin away, put Putin away

Black robe, golden epaulettes All parishioners crawl to bow The phantom of liberty is in heaven Gay-pride sent to Siberia in chains

The head of the KGB, their chief saint Leads protesters to prison under escort In order not to offend His Holiness Women must give birth and love

Crap, crap, the Lord's crap! Crap, crap, the Lord's crap!

Virgin Mary, Mother of God, become a feminist Become a feminist, become a feminist

The Church's praise of rotten dictators The cross-bearer procession of black limousines A teacher-preacher will meet you at school Go to class - bring him money!

Patriarch Gundyaev believes in Putin Bitch, better believe in God instead The belt of the Virgin can't replace mass-meetings Mary, Mother of God, is with us in protest!

  References

Barthes, R. (1999). Mythologies. New York, NY: Hill and Wang, pp. 109-130, 148-156. (‘Myth today’)

Bernstein, A. (2013). An inadvertent sacrifice: Body politics and sovereign power in the Pussy Riot affair. Critical Inquiry, 40(1), 220-241.

De Saussure, F. (1964). Course in general linguistics. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, pp. 6-17, 65-78.

Hall, S. (1980). Encoding/decoding. In: Hall, S., Hobson, D., Lowe, A., and Willis, P., Eds. Culture, media, language. London: Hutchinson, pp. 128-138.

Hebdige, D. (1988). Hiding in the light: On images and things. London: Routledge, pp. 77-115. (‘Object as image: The Italian scooter cycle’)

Romir (2012). Pussy Riot act in the church: Audience perceptions. Romir Research Holding. Retrieved from:  http://romir.ru/studies/328_1334174400/

Pussy Riot (2012). Панк-Молебен "Богородица, Путина Прогони" В Храме Христа Спасителя. [Punk Prayer “Mother of God, Drive Putin Away” in Cathedral of Christ the Saviour]. Lifejournal. Retrieved from: http://pussy-riot.livejournal.com/12442.html

Prozorov, S. (2013). Pussy Riot and the politics of profanation: Parody, performativity, veridiction. Political Studies, 62(4), 766-783.

Sharafutdinova, G. (2014). The Pussy Riot affair and Putin's démarche from sovereign democracy to sovereign morality. Nationalities Papers, 42(4), 615-621.

Smyth, R., & Soboleva, I. (2014). Looking beyond the economy: Pussy Riot and the Kremlin's voting coalition. Post-Soviet Affairs, 30(4), 257-275.

 Other references

(consulted but not included)

Amnesty International (2017). Pussy Riot. Retrieved from: https://www.amnesty.org.uk/issues/pussy-riot

Astrasheuskaya, N. (2012). Russia's Pussy Riot spurn chance to cash in on fame. Reuters UK. Retrieved from: http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-russia-pussyriot-brand/russias-pussy-riot-spurn-chance-to-cash-in-on-fame-idUKBRE8AL0GH20121122

Lally, K. & Englund, W. (2012). Putin wins election as Russian president; opponents claim widespread fraud. The Washington Post. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russians-voting--and-watching/2012/03/04/gIQA3j6CqR_story.html?utm_term=.0658cc40fc6c

Levada (2012). Акции Групп “Femen” И “Pussy Rioт” [Acts of “Femen” and “Pussy Riot” bands]. Centre of Analytics of Yuri Levada. Retrieved from: https://www.levada.ru/2012/03/22/aktsii-grupp-femen-i-pussy-riot/

Lynskey, D. (2012). Pussy Riot: activists, not pin-ups. The Guardian. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/music/2012/dec/20/pussy-riot-activists-not-pin-ups

Maloveryan, Y. (2011). Несчитаные богатства Русской православной церкви. [The unaccountable wealth of Russian Orthodox Church]. BBC Russia. Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2011/08/110820_russian_orthodox_budget

Reiter, S., Napalkova, A. & Golunov, I (2016). Расследование РБК: на что живет церковь. [Investigation of RBC: what does the church live on?] Retrieved from: http://www.rbc.ru/investigation/society/24/02/2016/56c84fd49a7947ecbff1473d

Vasilyev, V. & Grigoryev, A. (2014). Pussy Riot в США: причины популярности. [Pussy Riot in USA: reasons for popularity]. Golos Ameriki [Voice of America]. Retrieved from: https://www.golos-ameriki.ru/a/pussy-riot/1845909.html

 [1] Take for example Indonesia female police officers “virginity test”

[culturalsociologyblog-blog]

“Piropo: compliment vs. harassment. The cultural practice of catcalling in South America”

By Pascuala Migone

“All women like to be complimented. Those who say they are offended by it, I don’t believe it. There is nothing nicer than a piropo, even if it is accompanied by a vulgarity.To be told what a nice ass you have, it’s fine”.

(Mauricio Macri, current Argentinean president, 2014).

Gendered violence towards women, in its various expressions, is a critical issue in Latin America[1]. While the alarmingly high rates of homicides and rapes of women are widely condemned, there is no consensus towards other -less evidently violent- practices in this line.

Piropos are unauthorized comments of implicit or explicit sexual connotation made in the public space, almost exclusively from men to women, in contexts where there is no affective relationship to justify it. Sometimes whispered to the ear, other times yelled, they can be also accompanied by gestures and meaningful looks. The degree of intensity varies from "flattery" on the physical appearance to remarks of a strong sexual nature.

Although street harassment is not exclusive of Latin America, its magnitude is exponentially greater than in other parts of the world. In Santiago, for example, 85% of women and 97% of young women (18 to 34 years) surveyed declared suffering from street harassment during the last year[2], while in a similar study in Amsterdam, the percentage falls to 59% and 80% respectively[3]. The major problem is that, although certain forms of harassment -such as public masturbation or groping- are socially condemned, catcalling is not. Moreover, it is deeply installed and even valued in contemporary Latin-American culture, as Macri's comment illustrates.

Symbolic interactionism can provide an interesting perspective to understand this phenomenon. This micro sociological paradigm suggests that individuals act toward things -including other people- based on the meanings they have for them, and these meanings are a result of social interaction. Thus, the social realities or cultures are not given, but created and modified through interpretation and collective action between individuals (Blumer, 1969).

Under this lens, piropos –on which historical origin there is no consensus[4]- do not come out of the blue, but are an outcome of the concrete social interactions. They are a symbol of female and male roles expectation (Schutz, 1962). They are also an expression of how social interaction between men and women is characterized by inequity at multiple levels in the region. The fact that this kind of interaction exists, that so many men feel the right to assess and judge unknown women’s physical appearance, reflects a more generalized social logic, where women continually occupy inferior positions when compared to men.

To make the point, it is important to describe this interaction in detail. Piropo is usually characterized by an asymmetry: it never occurs in a context where a woman is accompanied by one or more men, but only when she is alone or with other members of her gender. It usually involves a group of men and fewer or one woman, or an adult and a minor. Also, it is a verbal behavior that does not expect to obtain a positive response or even establish communication. The speech is addressed to someone unknown and it is not done as an honest seduction, but rather as an attention seeking and male power assertion in the public space (Gaytan, 2009). When walking down the streets, women are exposed to a large chance of being objectified because of their gender and its perception.

Gender studies perspective provides a key point here: gender is not biological, but socially constructed. What a society defines as male or female is not given, but arbitrarily constructed and context-dependent. In this way, norms and discourses influence how gender is perceived and constructed under given social and cultural conditions (Alsop et al, 2002). Based on these perceived sexual differences, in most cultures “femininity” and “masculinity” have been linked to the domestic and public life, respectively (Ortner, 1972). That being said, the focus here is not on delving into the roots of these associations, but on how piropos constitute a frequent interaction that expresses them.

In this line, West & Zimmerman (1987), provide an interesting interactionist analysis. They maintain that gender is not a quality of individuals, but a product of day-to-day practices and behaviors that emphasize "femininity" or "masculinity". Thus, gender is embedded in and constructed through everyday interactions. The category operates as an ideological device, which legitimates certain understandings and limits in a society. Along the same lines, Henley (1977) borrows Goffman's (1959) ideas of individuals as actors on a theatrical stage[5], to argue that gender is used in different ways in performances by men and women. Their behavior, use of space and body language all express different positions towards each other. For example, women are more likely to enjoy less personal space and freedom of expression in public spaces, while men express their dominance over them through behaviors such as staring.

In this way, piropo can be understood as an expression of masculinity, a form of performing and reaffirming masculinity and its dominance. On the other side of the interaction, the victims’ usual reactions involve trying to maximize personal space usage by walking faster, looking at the ground or changing body language in anticipation of piropos (Vallejo, 2013). When gender dictates relations of power, piropos become devices or expressions of how these hierarchical positions are maintained in a patriarchal social order.

The most complex aspect of this matter is that the practice is deeply rooted in Latin American culture, and even justified as part of the folklore. The Chilean case is a good example of how the unequal interaction described above is mirrored in the public debate. Three years ago, the Observatory Against Street Harassment was created. Through a strong campaign, this organization managed to install the discussion about street harassment in social discussion and across various media, and is currently seeking to push a law against it.

The discussion has elicited opposing views: those who defend it are mostly men. They argue that as long as the compliments are not "too explicit" or accompanied by physical aggression, they are harmless. Many even assume that women enjoy them. According to a survey of Inter-American Open University, among those who admitted giving piropos, almost 60% believed that women enjoyed them. Moreover, the fight against it has often been framed as a "feminist overreaction", showing that women's speeches and experiences are more easily trivialized or discarded in patriarchal systems.

The problem is that tolerating certain forms of gender violence leaves room for ambiguity. If it is taken as something subjective, the boundaries blur. Every unsolicited comment about a woman's body is violent, not only because it ignores the possible psychological consequences, but also because it expresses the legitimation of the implicit idea of ​​ownership over women bodies, as if they were objects that men have the right to classify. This is clear when considering that the more women exhibit their bodies, the bigger the chances of receiving this type of harassment.

In this essay, I illustrated how the piropo, as an everyday practice, made invisible and naturalized, expresses a gender inequality. In Latin America, protective legislation and preventive educational policies are urgently needed. Recognizing and condemning street sexual harassment, as a form of gender violence, is a way of rewriting our cultural codes and therefore, the way we interact on the street. As Blumer (1969) states, meaning- making is an ongoing, interpretative process. To reject this behavior, at all levels, is to understand that public space belongs to all of us, that walking on the street without fear is not a privilege, but a right that both men and women should enjoy.

 References

1.       Alsop et al. (2002). Theorizing Gender: An Introduction. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press in association with Blackwell.

2.       Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic interactionism: Perspective and method. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 1-47.

3.       Gaytan, P. (2009). From piropo to disenchantment. A sociological study. Biblioteca de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades. Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana México.

4.       Goffman, E. (2012 [1959]). The presentation of self in everyday life. In: Craig Calhoun et al., eds. Contemporary sociological theory. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 46-62.

5.       Henley, N. (1977). Body politics: Power, sex, and nonverbal communication. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

6.       Guerra contra el piropo: ahora lo definen como acoso callejero (2014) Retrieved from https://www.clarin.com/sociedad/Piropos-molestos-mayoria-mujeres-recibirlos_0_Syimvf05vmg.html

7.       Observatorio Contra el Acoso Callejero (2015). Encuesta 2015: ¿Está Chile dispuesto a sancionar el acoso callejero? Retrieved from https://www.ocac.cl/el-observatorio/

8.      Ortner, S. (1972) Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture? Feminist Studies, Vol. 1, No.2. pp. 5- 31.

9.      Schutz, A. (1962). Collected papers I. The Problem of Social Reality. Edited and introduced by Maurice Natanson, The Hague.

10.  Small Arms Survey (2016). Retrieved from http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/about-us/highlights/2016/highlight-rn63.html

11.  Vallejo, E. (2013). The Invisible Violence: Street Sexual Harassment in Metropolitan Lima. Retrieved from: https://www.ocac.cl/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/E.-Vallejo-Rivera-La-violencia-invisible-acoso-sexual-callejero-en-Lima-metropolitana.pdf

12.   West, C. and Zimmerman, D. H. (1987). Doing gender. Gender & Society 1(2): 125-151

[1] There is currently no comparable global data on the subject. However, the 2016 Small Arms Survey on violent deaths indicates that, among the 25 countries with the highest rates of femicides in the world, 14 are Latin American or Caribbean.

[2] Representative survey of women over 18 in Santiago, carried out by the Observatory Against Street Harassment (2015).

[3] Representative survey of women over 15 in Amsterdam, carried out by the City Council (2015).

[4]Although there are no reliable sources, the practice of the piropo is supposed to have a Spanish origin, derived from the Greek word pyropus (=fire red). This, given that during the Golden Age, men gave rubies to the women courted. Over time, this was associated to the act of "giving" something precious to a woman, including “compliments”.

[5] Goffman investigates social interaction from a dramaturgical perspective, where people interact with each other as actors performing on a stage.

[culturalsociologyblog-blog]

Football fans and symbolic interactionism – Ultras as idioculture

By  Maximilian Walder

With the recent developments in the German football sector we tend to forget one simple principle, football is entertainment for its audiences. In the recent years there has been a huge increase in popularity in the sport. This was most profitable for the professional leagues, which could now afford to build new stadiums and could invest in their clubs (in players, merchandise systems, fan experiences, training facilities etc.). This of course resulted in an even bigger boom of spectator numbers and a rising interest of investors, which again supported the modernization of German football even further (Winands 2015). Football has become commercialized and this has impacted not only the clubs and the game itself but also on the fan scene. Despite the huge media coverage, the stadium trip still remains the “true” football sensation, what Winands (2015) calls “the game besides the game”. Modern football games are more spectacle and show than sport event. This is greatly due to an upcoming new generation of football fans: the Ultras (Schwier 2005). These groups, which are experience-orientated, posing and known for their engagement in creating the stadium atmosphere (Winands 2015), are not new to the fan scene but for the first time have a big impact on the stadium life. Ultra groups are highly organized and share certain values, thus represent a public-oriented subculture (Schwier 2005). To see how these subcultures are formed and how the members establish their group culture in the interaction within the group and the interaction with the other audience(s) in the stadium, a symbolic interactionist approach could be very illuminating. In the following paragraphs I will try to apply Fine's theory on the Ultra scene and will additionally recommend further research perspectives regarding this matter. 

Idioculture Ultras

Fine (1979) is following Blumer's premise that meaning derives from interaction (Blumer 1969) and argues that culture, which is a set of shared understandings, is clearly part of this. Culture thus is the outcome of interaction and the prototype of such interacting units, for Fine, are small groups. Even though cultural elements are often known widely, they are still experienced within the context of a small group. This means that each small group has a culture on its own, which Fine calls idioculture (Fine 1979, 734). The idea of idioculture is very appropriate for the ultra scene. Although many might generalize the scene, the term Ultra does combine a lot of different subgroups. Idioculture consists of a system of knowledge, values, behaviours, and customs shared by the members of an interacting group (Fine 1979). The members know, that they all share experiences and based on these experiences they can expect that they will be understood by the other members. Ultra scenes form around football games. Fans meet in the stadium or in a bar to watch game. As they do, they interact with each other and already start to create a culture (e.g. just by asking for names). Over time and after the same group of people gathers frequently at the same place, a group structure starts to evolve.  This means that an in-group identification forms and common attitudes, such as nicknames or ways of doing things, build up. This can happen in a circle of friends, as this interviewee in the case of a Borussia Dortmund[1] Ultra group explains (Sat/Sieben 2014); it can happen in a circle of politically like-minded people (Strauß 2012), what was especially true in the origins of the Ultra groups in Italy, where the Ultras derived from engaging and polarizing student connections and labour movements (Heck 2015); or idioculture formation happens just in the stadium, as you meet the same people all over again in the ranks. One of the biggest Ultra groups of Bayern München[2], the “Schickeria”, was found on the stadium ranks, as different previous Ultra groups tried to be more engaged with the game and the stadium atmosphere and thus united (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2016). Even if Ultras vary in their specific emergence and group values, they all share general elements of group life: task orientation (here: supporting your football team) and socioemotional orientation (peer friendship)(Fine 1979, 737).

As Fine (1979) continues in his argument, only specific elements of the group's interaction are integrated in the system of the idioculture. He names five analytical criteria a cultural element has to satisfy in order to be incorporated: the item has to be known, usable, functional, appropriate and triggered (Fine 1979). To show that Ultra groups function as idioculture I will explain how the five filtering elements work based on the example of the Munich Ultra group “Schickeria”.

In order to be integrated, the cultural item has to be previously known by at least one member of the group. Ultra group members have access to other, latent idiocultures (e.g. strong connections to political groups), from which they can retrieve cultural knowledge to integrate it into the idioculture. Many members of the “Schickeria” have strong connections to left-wing parties[3]. Thus liberal symbols in form of rainbow flags and Rastafarian flags are used frequently.

Some elements of known latent cultures may not be shared publicly because they are not mentionable in the context of group interaction, thus they are not usable in this idioculture. So are some members proned to use pyrotechnik in the ranks, due to the in group taboos though, it is not integrated in the idioculture (TZ 2014).

One important aspect of elements of idioculture to be incorporated is its functionality for the group, its congruence with the goals and needs of the members of the group. Sometimes the group must define itself as having a problem and then a new cultural item might be the solution for this problem (Fine 1979). Sometimes fights in the stadium casts poor light on the “Schickeria” as other violent fans incite them and declare themselves as members of the group. To solve this problem the “Schickeria” decided not to wear any club colours but mostly black clothes (TZ 2014). This way they distinguish themselves from the others and prevent confusions.

A cultural item might be functional but in order to become established in the idioculture, it must be appropriate or it can undermine the group's social structure (Fine 1979). One crucial character inside every Ultra group is the cattle caller. He decides what to sing in the stands. In the “Schickeria” this cattle caller is likewise high in the hierarchy of the group and it would thus not be appropriate to announce a new, maybe not so established member of the group, as supportive cattle caller. Although it would be more functional, it would still undermine the cattle caller's authority.

In the uncountable pool of possible cultural items which are known, usable, functional, and appropriate, we still need an explanation why exactly this item is being incorporated in the idioculture. Fine (1979) explains such integration with triggering events, a bit of interaction, which provides a “spark which produces the specific content of the idioculture” (Fine 1979, 742). As mentioned before, such a triggering event could be a fight in the stadium and the following demarcation from violent fans through distinct clothing. Another example would be the integration of new fan song, triggered by the release of a record. The “Schickeria”, for example, rewrote the German Pop song “Wieder alles im Griff” by Jürgen Drews after its release and now have it in their standard repertoire. The fan song is known, usable, functional, appropriate and was triggered by the original song release.

Ultras in the light of symbolic interactionism

As shown, one can apply the idioculture theory very well to the Ultra scene. Furthermore there are other symbolic interactionist perspectives with which we can analyse this form of fandom.

Following Goffman's theory of the presentation of self Schwier (2005) evaluates facets of the ultra scene, focusing on their self-conception, their composition and organisation and their ways of expression, short: their performance. This performance in the stadium is similar to a ritual. People week by week pilgrim into stadiums or in bars to watch a football game. They dress up (jerseys and scarves) and celebrate their team. Goffman continued Durkheim's thoughts on religion and rituals, which don't have to be religious (Winands, 2015), and connected it to the interactionist perspective. Collective interactions, such as sport events, are coined with rituals, which arise from interaction. These rituals involves people jointly, promote communication and provides them with common symbols (a collective identity) (Tokke 2013). Collins (Greve 2012) argues that cultural symbols are powered by emotions, which construct the feeling of community. The use of interactional symbols thus establishes identity (Greve 2012).  The effect of emotionality is especially strong in big interacting groups, he argues, such as fan audiences in a stadium.

Another approach useful to understand Ultra groups could be the gender perspective. West and Zimmermann (1987) argue that gender is the product of daily social practise and doing gender is to perform in social interactions and gender is thus established by means of interaction and is displayed through it. Women in the Ultra scene are mostly excluded and have to fight many problems and obstacles (Schindler, 2015). It would be interesting to have a look at Ultra groups and how they establish and define gender roles in their idiocultures through interactions.

This shows that the Ultras scene is a valuable and informative case of idioculture and interacting groups, which calls for more research in this regard and might gather deeper insight in how culture (on a more micro- to meso-level) is formed, negotiated and established.

Literature:

Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic Interactionism. Perspective and method. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 1-47.

Fine, G.A. (1979). Small groups and cultural creation: the idioculture of little league baseball teams. In: American Sociological Review, Vol. 44, pp. 733-745.

Goffman, E. (2012)[1959]. The presentation of Self in Everyday Life. In: Craig, C. et a. (2012). Contemporary sociological theory. Malden: Wiley Blackwell, pp. 46-62.

Goffman, E. (1966). Behaviour in public places. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Greve, J. (2012). Randall Collins: Interaction Ritual Chains. In: Schützeichel, R. (ed.) (2012). Hauptwerke der Emotionssoziologie, S. 64-67.

Heck, R. (2015, December 30). Ultras in Italien. Retrieved from: https://www.freitag.de/autoren/footballuprising/ultras-in-italien (15.10.2017).

Jacobsen, B. (2003). The Social Psychology of the Creation of a Sports Fan Identity: A Theoretical Review of the Literature. In: Athletic Insight. The Online Journal of Sport Psychology, Vol. 5, Issue 2 (13.10.2017).

Sat, S./ Sieben, P. (2014, September 22). Schwarze Schafe oder wahre Fans – Ein Ultra packt aus. Retrieved from: https://www.derwesten.de/wochenende/schwarze-schafe-oder-wahre-fans-ein-ultra-packt-aus-id9843849.html (15.10.2017).

Schindler, F. (2015). "Einfach nur Ultra unter Ultras sein – das wär was!" – Ausschluss von Frauen in der Fankultur. Retrieved from: http://www.belltower.news/beitrag/frauen-in-der-ultraszene (15.10.2017).

Schwier, J. (2005). Die Welt der Ultras. Eine neue Generation von Fußballfans. In: Sport und Gesellschaft, Vol. 1, S. 21-38.

Strauß, B. (2012). Sportzuschauer. Sportpsychologie. Göttingen: Hogrefe Verlag.

Süddeutsche Zeitung (2016, December 19). Wie die “Schickeria” bis heute polarisiert. Retrieved from: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/ultras-in-den-stadien-wie-die-schickeria-bis-heute-polarisiert-1.3299888 (15.10.2016).

Tokke, H. E. (2013). Football fandom: An ethnographic study of community building, social interactins, and rituals at a suburban New York City high school. Ann Harbor: ProQuest.

TZ (2014, November 11). Schickeria München: das steckt dahinter. Retrieved from: https://www.tz.de/sport/fc-bayern/schickeria-muenchen-ultras-fc-bayern-das-steckt-dahinter-4145942.html (15.10.2017).

West, C./ Zimmermann, D.H. (1987). Doing gender. In: Gender & Society, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 125-151.

Winands, M. (2015). Interaktionen von Fußballfans: Das Spiel am Rande des Spiels. Wiesbaden: Springer Verlag.

Záboji, N. (2017, May 28). Wie brutal sind Ultras? Retrieved from: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/zum-polizeiruf-110-wie-brutal-sind-ultras-wirklich-15034813.html?printPagedArticle=true#pageIndex_0 (10.10.2017).

[1]A professional german football club, based in Dortmund.

[2]A professional german football club, based in Munich.

[3]„Schickeria“ is regarded a left-wing, liberal Ultra group. For their commitment against racism and persecution they got awarded with the Julius-Hirsch-Preis for freedom, tolerance and humaneness in 2014.

[culturalsociologyblog-blog]

Is there homophobia in Poland?

By Bartosz Zerebecki

Poland lies in the middle of Europe. The country is located between Germany, which just legalized same-sex marriage (Zajęcki, 2017) and Russia, which banned promoting “non-traditional” sexual relationships in 2013 (Szeląg, 2013). This geographical centrality mirrors another central position of Poland, the one on the implied homophobia scale, i.e., no Poland does not criminalize gays and lesbians but does nothing, as a state, to protect sexual minorities. Such ideological formation makes studying homophobia in Poland relevant because it showcases the logic of tacit tolerance without institutional support.

While there are multiple cases of homophobic attacks in Poland (Białach, 2017; natemat.pl, 2013; tvn24, 2017), be it verbal or physical, there are hardly any people who call for open violence or an outright erasure of same-sex unions from the public sphere. The issues of same-sex partnership, gay adoption or sexual discrimination do not attract much attention in political discourse. Polish lesbians cannot file their taxes together or benefit otherwise from the institutionalization of their relationship but can enjoyment freedom from arbitrary police raids or legal charges for being in a non-traditional union. The described Polish passivity towards same-sex couples is an “accepted” type of homophobia, one that does not warrant much international attention, as compared to “unacceptable” homophobia such as a systemic extermination of men accused of homosexual practices in Chechnya (Vasilyeva & Roslyakov, 2017).

Polish homophobic discourse is worth an in-depth study because such analysis sheds light on the pertaining homophobia in countries, which already support same-sex marriage. Both cases have a varying degree of seemingly residual homophobia within their cultures. I do not intend to conduct a systematic review of political debates surrounding gays and lesbians in Poland. I rather draw on examples from political and everyday discourse, which illuminate the logic of homophobia. I will explore how various people, be it political or non-political actors, employ tradition and culture to explain the passive, acceptable homophobia in Poland.

The interaction between culture and behavior has been a central sociological problem since the conception of the discipline. Max Weber’s ([1905], 2014) famously argued that the Protestant culture was conducive to an enterprising behavior, which enabled the rise of capitalism. Could it be the case then, that Polish culture promotes certain behaviors and values, which enabled the rise of homophobia?  Variations of this cultural motivation argument often come from the Catholic Church officials who stress that “gender ideology” (an umbrella term for gay rights and protection) is a foreign, Western construct, which aims to destroy the traditional understanding of family – an alleged centerpiece of the Polish culture (Konferencja Episkopatu Polski, 2013). The pervasiveness of this logic had become evident during an Oxford University debate about Polish constitution. Professor Lech Morawski, prompted by an unexpected question from the audience about gay rights in Poland, stated that the government does not support gays but does not persecute them either (Kolanko, 2017). The professor was sincerely stunned at the media backlash he received afterwards. He claimed he did not mean to call for discrimination of sexual minorities. He merely wanted to explain that Polish constitution does not recognize same-sex unions as legitimate (Gierak-Onoszko, 2016). In a sense, Morawski hinted that same-sex problems are not contained within the Polish law. Therefore, legally they are ignored or, in more positive terms, left alone. Such logic frames Poland as tolerant in comparison to much worse states that actively curb freedom of gays and lesbians to exist.

My opening question “Is Poland homophobic?” was meant to be provocative because of its formulation and the impossibility to provide an unequivocal answer. While some people in Poland might be homophobic, there are also queer allies and champions of minority rights. The initiatives range from Poznan’s mayor support for Pride Parade (Nyczka, 2017) to a viral Polish gay couple’s holidays video that gathered worldly support (Baresford, 2016). These people act according to a different cultural logic, citing a claimed European tradition of tolerance and openness, which is their central aspect of Polishness. The existence of the alternative accounts of Polish culture challenges the monolithic view of culture. Under the Weberian approach, the two different attitudes towards homosexuality in Poland, followed by two different practices, should be motivated differently, i.e., by different cultures. Divergent cultural practices take away parsimony of explanation from the cultural motivation theory. While it might be interesting to examine genealogies of practices and ideologies in Poland, it is necessary to acknowledge that presently Polish culture is quite homogenous. Polish people share common cultural ancestry based on Judeo-Christian values and history of statehood reaching early medieval times. Another explanation of how culture links with behavior is necessary to see how divergent cultural practices and their explanations can coexist within a single culture.

Swidler (1986) asserts that culture “is not a unified system that pushes action in a concrete direction. Rather it is like a tool kit or a repertoire.” Moreover, she distinguishes between settled and unsettled times, when culture is not unified with action. In a sense, Polish passive homophobia is an example of the settled lifestyle, where people consistently choose particular homophobic behaviors. The crafted unity between chosen cultural tool and action makes culture appear to be a motivation for behavior. Nonetheless, Swidler argues that inconsistency in accounting behavior and providing motivations points to the fact that culture is actually a repertoire of justifications. Actors are not motivated by culture directly but rather choose culturally acceptable justifications for their behaviors. Homophobia and its seeming unity with “Polish tradition” become rationalizations of specific attitudes such as the silencing of sexual minorities.

This theoretical lens allows me to look at Lech Morawski’s words in a new light. Seeming tolerance, phrased as freedom from persecution, masks the passive homophobia of the actual, legal non-existence. Both of these attitudes, tolerance and avoidance, could coexist as different tools of Polish cultural repertoire. They justify the specific “no-existence” of sexual minorities within the legal framework. Similarly, queer activists and homophobes can use different rationales for their behaviors and still occupy the same, Polish cultural framework. While this approach to culture explains Polish homophobic discourses, it still necessary to explain what homophobia actually means.

Gary Weinberg coined the term “homophobia” in the 1970s to describe a pathological fear and visceral, negative reaction to gay people (Frank, 2014). The term has grown to include various meanings since then. Nowadays, homophobia manifests itself differently. The examples include fear becoming aggression and fear becoming exclusion. How is it possible, then, that such seemingly divergent phenomenon is a unified cultural practice? Vaisey (2009) provides a nuanced critique of culture, as either motivation or justification, from the cognitive point of view. He argues that humans employ a dual mental mechanism while making decisions. We have a slow, strong elephant- a site of deeply entrenched cultural assumptions (similar to motivations). We also have a rider- a quick, discursive site of rational justifications for given behaviors. Vaisey’s paradigm shows that culture is processed through both sites. Homophobic arguments are a work of a rider. Protecting the traditional understanding of family is a rhetorical justification for opposing gay rights. This is the narration that accompanies the behavior after it happened. However, there is also a work of the elephant involved in processing and enacting homophobia.

Interestingly enough, Inbar’s 2009 study links the sensitivity to disgust with a heightened chance of implicit homophobia. He measured students’ levels of sensitivity to disgust and gave them different scenarios to assess. The materials he shared, showed a campaign that caused homosexuals or heterosexuals to kiss publically more often. The experiment asked participant whether the campaign purposively promoted public kissing, whether it is wrong for couples to display affection publically and whether it was inappropriate of the campaign to promote this behavior. He found out that people reported that campaign purposively promoted kissing more often when shown the gay couple scenario. These judgments, implicit biases towards gays, were positively correlated with disgust sensitivity. These results seem to align with Vaisey’s theory.

I am arguing that the deeply entrenched assumption of homophobia is a disgust at the difference. The deviation from the norm threatens cultural reproduction and unity of cultural assumptions. This shared reaction is processed in elephant part of the brain, yet the rider overwrites this disgust with different textual explanations. The disgust reaction is an unconscious part of the cultural repertoire. Nevertheless, there are other deeply entrenched cultural assumptions used by, for instance, Polish queer activists opposing discriminatory practices. The power of the application of this model is that it explains why homophobic logic pertains even when same-sex marriage is legal and overt, aggressive homophobia rare. The cultural repertoire still holds these homophobic justification narratives as tools, even when homosexuals enjoy relative freedom and equal rights. Additionally, the elephant always processes some reactions, be it disgust or not. Therefore, there is always a possibility of some discriminatory behaviors and reactions to occur.

It would be interesting to examine how does the acceptance of homosexuality happen within this model of culture. Is it that the difference does not elicit fear in some people but rather a creative excitement? The entrenched elephantine reaction can be more positive and inductive. Can the work of the rider change the elephant, though? Vaisey argues that while it is a tedious process, a repetitive training makes it possible to control an otherwise stubborn animal. Similarly, positive narrations of homosexuality as a source of pride and a normal life could change the seemingly intrinsic behavior. On the one hand, positive behaviors would become more prominent in the cultural repertoire and on the other hand, the deeply entrenched cultural assumptions would change and align more with the positive pro-gay narratives.

I have been discussing homophobia in Poland, gradually showing how different sociological theories explain various aspects of this cultural phenomenon. While I tried to approach the topic objectively, I need to reflect on my personal investment in the subject. As a gay man, I have experienced homophobia and often wondered about the logic of negativity that I encountered. My analysis shows that while homophobia would probably not die out, its prevalence can decrease. Cognitive science shows proofs that learning can give us agency and free us from our cultural presuppositions. While there is optimism in this theoretical rendition of homophobia, the answer to the opening question is still yes, Poland is a homophobic country, but it does not have to be so forever…

References

Atak na Kampanię Przeciw Homofobii. "Motywy tych ludzi są jasne". [Campaign Against Homophobia attacked. “Motivations of these people are clear”.] (2017, May 9). tvn24.pl. Retrieved October 2, 2017, from https://tvnwarszawa.tvn24.pl/informacje,news,atak-na-kampanie-przeciw-homofobii-br-motywy-tych-ludzi-sa-jasne,231424.html

Baresford, M. (2016, September 9). Gay couple received death threats after releasing coming out video. Pinknews.co.uk. Retrieved October 2, 2017, from http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2016/09/09/gay-couple-received-death-threats-after-releasing-coming-out-video/

Białach, S. (2017, October 2). Niedoszły radny PiS o homoseksualistach: tępić jak zarazę. [Almost a local PiS MP about homosexuals: exterminate like a pest.] Onet.pl. Retrieved October 2, 2017, from http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/niedoszly-radny-pis-o-homoseksualistach-tepic-jak-zaraze/1m2rgl6

Gierak-Onoszko, J. (2017, May 19). Homofobiczne wypowiedzi sędziego Morawskiego nie powinny dziwić. Podziela poglądy władzy. [Homophobic comments from justice Morawski should not surprise. They are in line with the government.] Polityka.pl. Retrieved October 2, 2017, from http://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/1705376,1,homofobiczne-wypowiedzi-sedziego-morawskiego-nie-powinny-dziwic-podziela-poglady-wladzy.read

Frank, N. (2014, February 21). How the Mind Rationalizes Homophobia. The Atlantic. Retrieved October 2, 2017, from https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/02/how-the-mind-rationalizes-homophobia/283998/

Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D. A., Knobe, J., & Bloom, P. (2009). Disgust sensitivity predicts intuitive disapproval of gays. Emotion, 9(3), 435-439. doi:10.1037/a0015960

Kolanko, M. (2017, May 11). Jak prof. Lech Morawski Oxford zaskoczył. [On professor Lech Morawski’s surprise in Oxford] Rp.pl. Retrieved October 2, 2017, from http://www.rp.pl/Polityka/170519745-Jak-prof-Lech-Morawski-Oxford-zaskoczyl.html#ap-1

Konferencja Episkopatu Polski (2013, December 29). List pasterski na Niedzielę Świętej Rodziny 2013 roku. [Pastoral letter for Holy Family Sunday in 2013.] Retrieved October 2, 2017, from http://episkopat.pl/list-pasterski-na-niedziele-swietej-rodziny-2013-roku/

Nyczka, T. (2017, September 21). Marsz Równości 2017. Prezydent Poznania Jacek Jaśkowiak znów weźmie w nim udział. Wyborcza.pl. Retrieved October 2, 2017, from http://poznan.wyborcza.pl/poznan/7,36001,22404632,marsz-rownosci-2017-prezydent-jacek-jaskowiak-znow-wezmie-w.html

Robert Biedroń został pobity w centrum Warszawy. "Mam dość homofobii". [Robert Biedron was beaten in the center of Warsaw. “I am fed up with homopobia”.] (2013, June 16). natemat.pl. Retrieved October 2, 2017, from http://natemat.pl/64857,robert-biedron-zostal-pobity-w-centrum-warszawy-mam-dosc-homofobii

Swidler, Ann. 1986. Culture in action: Symbols and strategies. American Sociological Review 51(2): 273-286

Szeląg, T. (2013, August 25). Rosja w ogniu krytyki po przyjęciu ustawy dot. homoseksualizmu. [Russia in crossfire of criticism after passing bill on homosexuality.] Onet.pl. Retrieved October 2, 2017 from Http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/swiat/rosja-w-ogniu-krytyki-po-przyjeciu-ustawy-dot-homoseksualizmu/lc81v.

Vaisey, Stephen. 2009. Motivation and justification: A dual-process model of culture in action. American Journal of Sociology 114(6): 1675-1715

Vasilyeva, N., & Roslyakov, A. (2017, May 2). Gay Chechens report days of beatings and electro-shock torture at hands of Russian government-backed thugs. The Independent. Retrieved October 2, 2017, from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/gay-chechens-beating-electro-shock-torture-detain-camps-chechnya-russia-thugs-homophobia-human-a7713391.html

Weber, M. (2014). The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism (T. Parsons, Trans.). Kettering, OH: Angelico Press.

Zajęcki, K. (2017, June 30). Niemcy zdecydowali. Małżeństwa homoseksualne zgodne z prawem. [Germans decided. Homosexual marriages are legal.] WP.PL. Retrieved October 2, 2017, from https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/niemcy-zdecydowali-malzenstwa-homoseksualne-zgodne-z-prawem-6139115714688641a

[culturalsociologyblog-blog]

Fashion In Action – Uses and meanings of dress style among hip-hop fans

By Victoria Balan

Hip-hop fashion is a phenomenon of great cultural influence worldwide, although marked by controversial history: while some perceived it as a celebration of youth culture and African-American heritage, others were threatened by the negative associations of the style with gang culture, and interpreted its meanings according to racist stereotypes (Morgado, 2007). When gangster rap started spreading in white suburbs in the 1980s, concerned parents and authorities reacted in a “moral panic” (Baxter & Marina, 2008), although the obvious issue at work was not the style itself: rather, it was the meanings that it embodied and the messages expressed through fashion by fans.  In this paper, I apply a Culture in Action approach to analyse how hip-hop fans make active use of fashion consumption to express identity, group belonging and resistance towards dominant culture.

Culture in Action is best explained in the works of Swidler (1986), who proposes an interpretation of culture as “toolkit”, or a repertoire that includes styles, habits, worldviews and strategies which people use selectively and in different combinations when looking for solutions to life problems. People draw on these repertoires and their cultural components in constructing “strategies of action”, which are stable patterns of organising action (Swidler, 1986). Similarly, Berger & Luckmann (2002) explain how all activity enacted by humans is subject to habitualisation: when repeated regularly, it becomes embedded into a pattern that can be reproduced by individuals with an “economy of effort”. Although the meanings of these actions are taken for granted as routines in a person’s stock of knowledge, they maintain their meaningful nature for the individuals (Berger & Luckmann, 2002).

Moreover, people pursue lines of action consistent with their “cultural equipment” – the know-how with regards to elements such as dress, language, behaviour - so that both their actions and their values are oriented towards taking advantage of these cultural aptitudes in solving different problems and attempting to reach certain goals (Swidler, 1986). She observes individuals not as passive, uninvolved “cultural dopes” but as active actors who make use of the available cultural tools in constructing their diverse lines of action (Swidler, 1986).

Vaisey expands on theories of culture in action, proposing a dual-process model of cultural cognition. He employs the metaphor of the elephant and the rider to illustrate how actors are driven by their habitus, their “deeply internalized schematic processes” and at the same time they are able to deliberate and justify action employing discursive consciousness whenever social interaction demands it (Vaisey, 2009). Thus, interaction plays a crucial role both in the constitution of people’s cultural schemas and in the actions which are shaped by these schemas (Strauss and Quinn 1997).

Drawing from culture in action theories, DeNora’s (2000) study of music “in action” illustrates that individuals actively use music as a tool in constituting and regulating their self-identities. She demonstrates the role of music as a resource that people use to modulate their actions, behaviours, motivations; and how it is reflexively employed on different levels according to situational circumstances influencing cognition (how a person thinks), emotion (how a person feels), action (how a person acts/behaves) and identity (who a person is) (DeNora, 2000).  

The links between music and fashion have a long-standing history: fashion can be identified in various domains of life resulting from social influences, and this includes the music area (McKintyre & Miller, 1992). When fashion is defined as “the process of adopting symbols primarily to provide the individual an identity relative to others” (Reynolds, 1968), it can be argued that popularisation of music is an occurrence characteristic of fashion (Sproles, 1979). Because music is fashionable, the musical consumption value – meaning the “degree to which consumer needs are fulfilled by consumer behaviour” – may be dependent on the individual’s degree of fashion involvement (Chen et al., 2008).

Thus, I argue that subcultural fashion consumption can successfully illustrate the ways in which culture shapes action, when interpreted as a “toolkit” from which individuals pick and choose elements, enabling them to pursue specific lines of action (Swidler, 1986). This paper is an attempt to demonstrate how fashion operates “in action”, by examining the active use of hip-hop dress code among fan communities, particularly with regards to identity construction and social relationships.

When describing hip-hop fashion, there is no single unified and coherent aesthetic (Lewis & Grey, 2013) – it’s a diverse world of subcultural expressions that combine fashion elements such as tracksuits, oversized clothes, (fake) designer insignia, ice-hockey shirts (Lewis, 2003), all-black outfits, sagging pants, braided hair (Baxter & Marina, 2008) and many other aesthetic characteristics that differ historically, geographically and contextually. In line with the culture in action approach, these fashion choices are not arbitrary, but context-dependent meaning-making processes.

One way in which this happens relates to the construction and reinforcement of masculinity. In their analysis of the hip-hop subculture in New Orleans, Baxter & Marina (2008) bring the example of the all-black style adopted by fans, interpreted as the “standard for defiant masculinity” that youths use to acquire a sense of personal strength and subcultural capital.  The “right” of wearing all-black clothes is not acquired lightly: it’s a status symbol meant to be worn by “real gangstas” as opposed to “studio thugs”, and defending this right can go as far as sparking up violence between individuals (Baxter & Marina, 2008). Thus, we can see how in the world of hip-hop fashion, all-black clothing is not merely an aleatory choice of style, but a symbolically charged, expressive and efficient way of communicating identity.

Another example of fashion as a tool for identity construction can be observed in the prominent use of high fashion labels/brands in hip-hop subculture. Torelli et al. (2010) discuss how consumers make use of well—known brands to send a message to others expressing their identity or aspirations. And indeed, this is also the case for hip-hop fans: how much money one spends on clothes reflects one’s social position, his “strength, power and upward mobility within the subculture” (Baxter & Marina, 2008). When high-status fashion labels are selectively worn by individuals as defining items of style, they also act as vehicles for meaning in the hip-hop subculture: it communicates the individual’s real or perceived social status and wealth.  

These situations illustrate how fashion acts as a resource for defining, constructing and expressing an identity among members of the hip-hop subculture. But the impact of these fashion choices expands further into the general behaviour and lifestyle of individuals. In fact, that’s where the distinction between “real” and “studio” thugs lies: authenticity of their actions and behaviour, as judged by community standards. There is an expectation for “real gangstas” to justify their style with action, in line with the rules of the “street life”- whereas ��studio thugs” are generally looked down upon in the subculture because of their reluctance to break behavioural or social norms in real life, despite their choice for a defiant fashion (Baxter & Marina, 2008). This shows how subcultural fashion consumption affects culture in two ways: while some community members fully embrace the connotations of their style and transpose them directly into daily-life behaviour, others mainstream oriented fans appropriate the hip-hop fashion for personal aesthetic reasons and have little in common with the realities of “gangster life”.

Lastly, Swidler (2001) argues that culture is both enabling and constraining. We already observed how fashion enables individuals to communicate and make sense of their identities, but there is another level where subcultural fashion carries weight: the social relationships within the community and manifestations of group belonging. In the all-black style example, such a fashion choice doesn’t only express individual identities, but also communicates the identity of a group of “real thugs” that one belongs to. Toughness in dress style must be backed up by toughness in action, and this is often manifested in commitment to one’s group, to the subcultural ideas and values upheld by their communities (Baxter & Marina, 2008). While some “real gangstas” may tolerate or be friendly with “studio gangstas”, real loyalties lie in authenticity in behaviour that supports the identity projected through fashion (Baxter & Marina, 2008). This example illustrates how the construction of identity through consumption requires skilful balancing of individuality and group conformity (Hauge and Hracs, 2010). Therefore, hip-hop fashion acts as open door to the subcultural “inner circle” as long as it is truly “lived”, experienced by its members in action and incorporated into their general behaviour.

Berger & Luckmann (2002) argue that institutions imply historicity and control, and their constraining qualities can be identified in subcultural fashion consumption as well: this is best exemplified by the long-standing resistance of authorities to accept this style in institutions (such as schools and workplaces) who encourage dress codes, uniforms and conformity (Baxter & Marina, 2008) by enforcing rules and applying sanctions to those who deviate from them. The oversized clothing characteristic of the hip-hop style, for example, is often considered inappropriate by the enforcers of the dominant culture because it is perceived not only as a material, stylistic opposition but as a broader challenge of the cultural values of those who adhere to “normal behaviour”.

In this paper, I attempted to explore how fashion in action enables individuals to select different elements from culture to actively use of them in their daily lives as a meaningful process. Hip-hop fashion represents an interesting case for inquiring how people actively endow dress styles with meaning because of the following considerations: first, I argued that hip-hop fans are selective in choosing and combining elements of fashion, which are used to signal and justify behaviour. Second, members of the hip-hop subculture incorporate their fashion consumption behaviour into patterns or “strategies of action” that preserve their meaning for individuals despite being incorporated in habitual routines. Individuals draw from their “cultural equipment” to pursue goals such as projecting a hegemonic masculine identity, expressing authenticity, aspirational values or resistance towards dominant culture. Thus, these subcultural fashion consumption choices are not merely passive elements of daily life: they affect in their turn other choices, the general conduct and lifestyle of actors that employ them.

References:

Baxter, K. and Marina, P. (2008). Cultural meaning and hip-hop fashion in the African-American male  youth subculture of New Orleans, Journal of Youth Studies, Volume 11, Number 2,  pp. 93-113.

Berger, P. and Luckmann, T. (2002). The social construction of Reality. In: Craig Calhoun, Joseph Gerteis, James Moody, Steven Pfaff and Indermohan Virk, eds. Contemporary sociological  theory. Malden: Blackwell, pp. 42-50.

Chen, Y.-C., Shang, R.-A. and Lin, A.-K. (2008) The intention to download music files in a P2P  environment: Consumption value, fashion, and ethical decision perspectives. Electronic  Commerce Research and Applications, Nr. 7, pp. 411–422.

DeNora, T. (2000). Music in everyday life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 46-74.

Hauge A. and Hracs, B. J. (2010). “See the sound, hear the style: collaborative linkages between indie musicians and fashion designers in local scenes” Industry and Innovation 17(1), pp. 113–129.

Lewis, T. and Gray, N. (2013). The Maturation of Hip-Hop's Menswear Brands: Outfitting the Urban  Consumer, Fashion Practice, Volume 5, Number 2, pp. 229-243.

Lewis, V. D. (2003). Dilemmas in African Diaspora Fashion. Fashion Theory, Volume 7, Number 2, pp. 163–90.

McKintyre, S.H. and Miller, C.M. (1992). Social utility and fashion behaviour, Marketing Letters 3 (4), pp. 371–382.

Morgado, M. A. (2007). The Semiotics of Extraordinary Dress. A Structural Analysis and Interpretation of Hip-Hop Style. Clothing & Textiles Research Journal, Volume 25, Number 2,  pp. 131-155.

Reynolds, W. H. (1968). Cars and clothing: understanding fashion trends. Journal of Marketing, Nr. 32, pp. 44–49.

Sproles, G.B. (1979). Fashion: Consumer Behavior toward Dress, Burgess, Minneapolis.

Strauss, C. and Quinn, N. (1997). A Cognitive Theory of Cultural Meaning. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Swidler, A. (1986). Culture in action: Symbols and strategies. American Sociological Review, Volume 51, Number 2, pp. 273-286.

Swidler, A. (2001). Talk of love: How culture matters. Chicago: Chicago University Press, pp. 1-8; 111-134.

Torelli, C. J., Keh, H. T., and Chiu, C-Y. (2010). Cultural Symbolism of Brands. In Barbara Loken, Rohini     Ahluwalia and Michael J. Houston (eds) Brands and Brand Management, New York: Routledge, pp. 113–29.

Vaisey, S. (2009). Motivation and justification: A dual-process model of culture in action American Journal of Sociology 114(6), pp. 1675-1715.

[culturalsociologyblog-blog]

“While you were sleeping… We were out creeping”

By  Laura Wondolleck

At the end of 2016, Brussels was ‘bombed’ with enormous graffiti murals. Some citizens were shocked by these graffiti murals who were made from one day to the other, since the topics of the graffiti murals were highly erotic. In their vision, this was vandalism and should be removed right away. These citizens view graffiti as dirt, something that does not belong in the city. In more sociological terms, according to them, graffiti artists are polluting persons and their ‘art’ does not fit their conservative view (Douglas, 1990, p. 156-9). However, other citizens thought the topics were quite funny, not that shocking and viewed the graffiti as art (Vervaeke, 2016). This example shows that nowadays, graffiti is either viewed as vandalism or as art. In order to give an answer to why these two different discourses exist, the graffiti subculture will be examined from a structural and cognitive perspective. In other words, how our social environment influences our way of thinking (Zerubavel, 1997, p. 24).

The way men interpret, in this case graffiti, is dependent on how others interpret graffiti. This is what Zerubavel (1997) calls the sociology of perception. It holds that the mind is not a tabula rasa, which means that the mind is a blank slate (Dooremalen et al., 2013, p.32). So there are always some expectations when interpreting a situation (Zerubavel, 1997, p. 24). Those expectations are influenced by the mental lens one uses, which entails the specific political or social climate one lives in (Zerubavel, 1997, p. 28). When adapting the sociology of perception on the case of graffiti, a brief history on graffiti is necessary. Graffiti exist of mainly four forms, which are tagging, pieces, throw-ups and slogans (Halsey & Young, 2002, p. 172). This blog will only focus on the first two forms of graffiti to narrow the scope.

According to Ferrell (1998, p. 587), graffiti emerged around 1973 in New York City, especially in the Bronx. It blossomed from the hip hop culture, who started (illegally) tagging walls, cars, trains and other public places. Tagging entails the most well-known form of graffiti, which is writing a derivative name in – for outsiders of the graffiti subculture – illegible letters that looks like a signature (Halsey & Young, 2002, p. 169). Especially this variant of graffiti is commonly viewed as vandalism or, as Douglas (1990) would say, ‘dirt’. In Douglas (1990) view, dirt is something that is out of place. One thing that is extremely important is that dirt cannot exist without a system. Hence, there must be a system where graffiti can happen and can be viewed as something out of place, something that does not belong in the system (Douglas, 1990, p. 155).

 Another form of graffiti are the pieces, distracted from the word masterpiece, are the more colorful, stylized words or texts. As with tags, the words are often derivative names of the writers or include their crew (Halsey & Young, 2002, p. 168; McAuliffe, 2012, p. 190). However, one main difference nowadays is that pieces can also be legal or commissioned, thereby indicating that pieces can be acknowledged as legitimate art by the mainstream (Halsey & Young, 2002, p. 173). A perfect example of legitimate graffiti pieces is the initiative by Rewriters, an organization that promotes en stimulates graffiti and street art, to paint a building in the city of Rotterdam (Berkelder, 2017). This indicates that the ‘optical’ socialization of men has undergo a process. The optical socialization entails the impersonal view of the world and its specific facets, whereby the way that things are perceived is shared by the community (Zerubavel, 1997, p. 33). In other words, whereas graffiti used to be viewed as vandalism by the majority of a population, this discourse is nowadays shifting. The optical traditions of some (sub)cultures – outside the graffiti subculture – do perceive graffiti as legitimized art, otherwise organizations that stimulate graffiti (legally) would not exist. So it could be stated that the sociomental lenses of the consumers of graffiti, thus the way graffiti is perceived, is positively changing.

However, not all pieces are legally made. In the graffiti subculture, writers who make pieces made on difficult and challenging places acquire a lot of prestige. One of the most prominent places to write a piece is on a train, because a train travels from A to B. Thereby, the artwork (as perceived in the cognitive structure of the graffiti artist) is visible for everyone, which increases the graffiti’s prestige in the graffiti scene. This type of practicing graffiti is seen as vandalism and most authorities try to clean the trains as soon as the piece(s) (or tags, throw-ups or slogans) are discovered (Halsey & Young, 2002, p. 172). Therefore, it could be stated that the graffiti artist who paint on trains is a ‘polluting person’. They perform an act that does not fit the established assumptions, the way the dominant culture is structured (Douglas, 1990, p. 159). So this way of practicing graffiti, painting on trains, is always perceived as dirt, something out of place, whereas (il)legal graffiti on for example walls, can nowadays be seen as art. The latter is confirmed by the example of the erotic graffiti in Brussels.

 As mentioned, the greatest prestige a graffiti artist can get is writing on a train (Halsey & Young, 2002, p. 172). This is not an easy task to complete, since there are a lot of security guards but also watchful cleaners at most train or subway stations. Hence, a professional graffiti writer has to know the working schemes of the security guards and cleaners in order to successfully paint a train. There is also another factor that is important whether one succeeds at painting a train, namely the graffiti subculture itself. Graffiti artists who know one another are like family, hence they can paint together and even form a crew. Their culture is about prestige and recognition (Halsey & Young, 2006, p. 279-80). This means that if a graffiti artist is new, in the subculture called toy, (s)he has to earn its place. Thus if a toy, or an unknown-artist, tries to paint a train at a specific station where most likely highly recognized graffiti artists and crews work, this person will probably find itself in a fight (Kulper, 2017).

The structure of the graffiti subculture described in the former paragraph, entails that this subculture knows a vertical classification. Basically, vertical classification entails social distinction, but with an ordering principle. This means that in vertical classification there is no such thing as equality, it is based on who has the most social power and authority. In most cases, the top of the vertical classification is assumed to be the one that has the most social power and authority. The lowest level of vertical classification are the ones that are subordinated, thus social inferior (Schwartz, 1981, p. 35-7). As seen in the description of the graffiti subculture, vertical classification is evident in the fact that artists that manage to paint on trains earn a high prestige, thereby being recognized by other members of the subculture. The graffiti artists that earned their place in the subculture, and in a crew, have the social power and authority to dismiss other graffiti artists from ‘their’, for instance, station. Hence, recognition, prestige but also the quantity that one has written its graffiti name are determining factors for ‘getting up’ (Merrill, 2015, p. 372).

However, the same can be said for the dominant culture that either perceives graffiti as art or vandalism also because of vertical classification. In the case of writing graffiti on trains or illegal on public or private property, the dominant culture usually views these graffiti artists as dirt, as vandalisms. They cannot understand why somebody would lack so much of respect (Halsey & Young, 2006, p. 279). The dominant culture places this group in the lowest part of the vertical stratification, since vandals are not the ones that have authority or social power. Hence, seeing graffiti as vandalism has to do with the cognitive structure of the dominant culture in the vertical classification, whereby the highest categories look down on the graffiti artists as vandals, thereby labeling them as a polluting person. Vandalistic graffiti artists also confirm this discourse by the dominant class, since they distinguishes themselves as outsiders (Merrill, 2015, p. 382).

The fact that graffiti is now also be considered to be art, has mainly to do with the fact that our mental lenses are constantly changing, thereby changing our cognitive structure and the way we interpret things (Zerubavel, 1997, p. 29). Banksy – although perceived as a street artist by the graffiti subculture – is a perfect example to explain the changing mental lenses of cultures. He started as an illegal graffiti artist, placing his humorous and ironic stencils on public and private buildings. People appreciated his art and aesthetic style, which resulted in commercialization of his art. Since he’s now an appreciated artist, even his illegal work gets protected and is seen as art (Merrill, 2015, p. 375-6). Therefore, Banksy is a graffiti artist that is highly valued by the dominant class, thereby higher in the vertical classification. Hence, from the perspective of the dominant culture, the mental lens has changed in that some graffiti is now interpreted as art. However, especially graffiti on train’s is something that is still vandalism – and will probably never change –, since authorities, the ones that are ‘higher’, still clean them as soon as they are discovered (Halsey & Young, 2002, p. 172). Besides, the ‘true’ graffiti artists in the graffiti subculture, despise the commercialization of Banksy and want to be outsiders from the dominant class (Merrill, 2015, p. 376, 382). Therefore, their graffiti art can never be viewed as art by the dominant class, because it is in contradiction with the graffiti subculture.

 Literature

Berkelder, N. (February 20, 2017). New Yorkse streetart naar Rotterdam. Algemeen Dagblad.   Retrieved on September 27 from: https://www.ad.nl/rotterdam/new-yorkse-streetart-    naar-rotterdam~aea8171a/

Dooremalen, H. et al. (2013). Exploring Humans. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Boom

Douglas, M. (1990). Symbolic Pollution. In: Alexander, J. and Seidman, S. Culture and             society: Contemporary debates. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Ferrell, J. (1998). Freight train graffiti: Subculture, crime, dislocation. Justice Quarterly 15(4):  587-608

Halsey, M. & Young, A. (2002). The Meanings of Graffiti and Municipal Administration. The   Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 35(2): 165-186

Halsey, M. & Young, A. (2006). ‘Our desires are ungovernable’: Writing graffiti in urban space.            Theoretical Criminology 10(3): 275-306

Kulper, M. (February 5, 2017). Hoe doen ze dat toch? Op pad met een graffitispuiter. NRC        Handelsblad. Retrieved on September 30 from: https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2017/02/05/            hier-mogen-spuiten-dat-moet-je-verdienen-6563798-a1544596

Merrill, S. (2015) Keeping it real? Subcultural graffiti, street art, heritage and authenticity.        International Journal of Heritage Studies 21(4): 369-389

Schwartz, B. (1981). Vertical classification: A study in structuralism and the sociology of          knowledge. Chicago: Chicago University Press

Vervaeke, L (October 2, 2016). Deze straatkunst wordt in Brussel niet gepikt. De Volkskrant.    Retrieved on September 26 from: https://www.volkskrant.nl/beeldende-kunst/deze-      straatkunst-wordt-in-brussel-niet-gepikt~a4387908/

Zerubavel, E. (1997). Social mindscapes: An invitation to cognitive sociology. Cambridge:       Harvard University Press

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What Mental Lenses Do You Wear? Abortion with Dirt or Fetus with Hygiene

By  Yu-Chin Ho

“Most opposition to abortion relies on the premise that the fetus is a human being, a person, from the moment of conception (Thomson, 1971, p. 47).”

In contemporary society, the opponents of abortion spend most of their time establishing the thoughts that the fetus is a person; every person has a right to life, so the fetus has a right to life. In contrast, many of those who defend abortion rely on the premise that the fetus is not a person but will become a person at birth (Thomson, 1971). Judith Jarvis Thomson inclined to and thought we probably shall agree that the fetus has already become a human being well before his or her birth. However, she defended abortion from a unique “mental lenses” (Zerubavel, 1997). The quoted passage below might sound outrageous, but from here Judith Jarvis Thomson structured her argument.

‘Now let me ask you to imagine this. You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist’s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of the hospital now tells you, “Look, we’re sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you – we would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, and the violinist now is plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it’s only for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely unplugged from you.” Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to it? What if it were not nine months, but nine years? Or longer still? What if the director of the hospital says, “Tough luck, I agree, but you’ve now got to stay in bed, with the violinist plugged into you, for the rest of your life. But remember this, all persons have the right to life, and violinists are persons...” (Thomson, 1971, pp. 48-49)’

Different mental lenses: Fetus or mother’s right to life

Even if the above mentioned case is just a hypothetical situation, it may still trigger us to think of the issue of abortion from the sociology of perception point of view (Zerubavel, 1997). Referring back to the abortion issue, when the violinist and you become a fetus and a mother-to-be, what if the duration of pregnancy were not nine months but nine years or even the whole life of the mother, would or should those opponents still be opposed to abortion? Assuming if women only needed to wait nine days until the baby is born, would those feminists or ordinary women defend abortion as much? The abortion issue, from Thomson’s (1971) point of view, is not completely an unequal societal issue regarding who possesses more rights or power but a contemporary debate depending on the community one belongs to and the “mental lenses” one wears. This debate, could be thus explained by the different “social optics” different group of people possess (Zerubavel, 1997).

For Zerubavel (1997), people who came from the same religion, social class, education, or just the same social background belong to the same optical community. They view the world with the same mental lenses and possess the same optical style of viewing the world (Zerubavel, 1997). Regarding the right of mother versus the right of fetus, Zerubavel’s notion of social optics is also applicable, in the sense that the opponents and the defenders of abortion wear different, or say opposite mental lenses. On one hand, in the community of the opponents, they may share the same optical norm that no one has the right to deprive the unborn child’ life. They view abortion in the lenses that everyone has a right to life, and a fetus is also a person, at least from what they perceive conception (BBC Ethics, 2014; Thomson, 1971). The community of the defenders, on the other hand, may wear the “any woman’s body is her own body” lenses. They perceive that the relationship between an unborn child (a fetus) and a mother-to-be is not like two tenants in a small house that has been rented to both by an unfortunate mistake. Instead, the mother owns the house (Thomson, 1971). The defenders thus have the genuinely collective perception that women have the right to decide what can happen in and to her body (Zerubavel, 1997; Thomson, 1971). Not surprisingly, the feminists wear similar mental lenses with the defenders. The community of the feminists do also collectively believe that women must and can retain control over their bodies instead of surrendering their rights to the collective (Petchesky, 1984).

Hygienic fetus from the religious communities

When speaking about the supporters of feminism, one may also think of the supporters of various religions. Taiwan, for example, has the social optics of the haunting fetus due to the belief of Buddhism (Moskowitz, 2001). Though not forbidden, abortion is certainly not widely and generally recognized by Buddhism (Karunaratne, 2017). For the community of people who have faith in Buddhism in Taiwan, they believe in fetus ghosts and their spiritual existence. Some people in the community even appease fetus ghosts and take the haunting fetus as a natural part of the world. In Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, and the Buddhist congregation in Hawaii, the belief in fetus ghost is also prevalent and can be considered one of their social optics. On contrary, some Americans in Taiwan view the idea of fetus ghosts as the stuff crazy people’s dreams were made of (Moskowitz, 2001). Thereby, people who belong to the Buddhist community, from either Taiwan or other East Asian countries, and those outside the community have different mental lenses and perceive fetus and the abortion issue differently (Karunaratne, 2017; Zerubavel, 1997).

 Another example would be Mormonism. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints has been opposed to selective abortion for personal or social convenience since they believe in the sanctity of human life (Mormon Newsroom, 2017). People from the community of Mormonism are not allowed to perform abortion except when: pregnancy results from rape or incest; a competent physician determines that the mother’s life or health is in jeopardy; or a competent physician determines that the fetus will not be able to survive after birth (Mormon Newsroom, 2017). Even so, its members can only conduct abortion after consulting with the local church leaders and feeling through personal prayer that their decision is correct (Mormon Newsroom, 2017). That is to say, not only does Mormonism has their own “optical” socialization, the strict mental vision and optical norms of their religion also try to constrain any possible optical deviants (Zerubavel, 1997).

 Furthermore, abortion, for both Buddhism and Mormonism may be also viewed as symbolic pollution, while fetus, for them, may be viewed as hygiene instead of dirt (Douglas, 1990). Douglas (1990) showed that whether dirt is dirt or not is a matter out of place. “Shoes are not dirty in themselves, but it is dirty to place them on the dinning-table (Douglas, 1990, p. 155).” Similarly, either the permission of abortion or fetus spirit is also a matter out of space. Within the religious communities of Buddhism and Mormonism (in the space), abortion is perceived as dirt, and as a pollution behavior. While out of the religious communities (out of the space), especially in the community of defenders of abortion or feminists, abortion is not viewed as a systematic label implying dirt but occasionally even as necessary hygiene.  

Abortion from generation to generation  

Different attitudes and perception towards abortion express the social conditions existing at various times and places (Petchesky, 1984). For instance, the 1973 decision supporting abortion was not a victory for women but medical professionals and physicians. It is only when women became to have more educational and career opportunities abortion became more common, became a choice and an alternative. As a result, a rise of abortion voices and rates can be an indicator that women have gained power gradually (Petchesky, 1984). This may also imply that the general optical style of perceiving abortion has changed from time to time and from generation to generation. As Zerubavel (1997) pointed out, the mental lenses, through which we perceive the world is in fact not standing still but keeping changing all the time.

Certain community has certain social optics, and everyone who wears the community’s distinctive mental lenses often tends to perceive things somewhat similarly (Zerubavel, 1997). For the feminist community and the people who defend abortion, women may be self-centered, callous or indecent towards abortion as long as not being unjust (Thomson, 1971). They consider that nobody is morally required to make such huge sacrifices, of health, of all other interests, duties and concerns, regardless nine years or nine months, to keep another person alive (Thomson, 1971). However, for some religious communities and people who are opposed to abortion, the sanctity and spirit of a fetus is praised. Their mental lenses views that that fetus is a person from the point of conception and has a right to life (Moskowitz, 2001; Thomson, 1971; BBC Ethics, 2014).

References

BBC Ethics. (2014). “When is the foetus 'alive'?” Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/abortion/child/alive_1.shtml

Douglas, M. (1990). Symbolic Pollution. In Alexander, J. & Seidman, S. (Eds.), Culture and Society: Contemporary Debates (pp. 153-159). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Karunaratne, K. (2017, Sep 26). Buddhist, Muslim and Christian leaders oppose abortion. The Union of Catholic Asian News (UCAN). Retrieved from: http://www.ucanews.com/news/buddhist-muslim-and-christian-leaders-oppose-abortion/80326

Mormon Newsroom. (2017). “Abortion”. Retrieved from: http://www.mormonnewsroom.org/official-statement/abortion

Moskowitz, M. L. (2001). The Haunting Fetus: Abortion, Sexuality, and the Spirit World in Taiwan. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press.

Petchesky, R. P. (1984). Abortion and Woman’s Choice: The State, Sexuality, and Reproductive Freedom. Harlow: Longman.

Thomson, J. J. (1971). A defense of abortion. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1(1), 47-66

Zerubavel, E. (1997). Social Mindscapes: An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 23-34. (‘Social Optics’)

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