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[hegelkegel]

短篇小說「電視中」

改編自芥川龍之介「竹藪中」

內容純屬虛構

看不了長文的朋友們將就點

過個幾天海綿寶寶就會出現了

「觀眾被盤問時的筆錄」

是的，最初發現中天被關台的，就是我。

在那天的十點左右，我躺在床上準備睡了，只是當時不知道怎麼了，總有種不詳的預感，翻來覆去好幾遍，就是睡不著，只好起身看電視去了，想著或許看一看就會入眠也說不定。

我愛看的頻道不多，除了講經台以外，就只剩中天新聞，我按下五和二兩個數字，轉到中天，卻看到一群人正在玩團康遊戲，我當時嚇了一跳，心裡想著這不是我認識的中天新聞，我之後又來回轉台了好幾次，才意識到那的確是中天。

後來看了看節目內容，大致了解了事情經過，似乎是中天新聞要被關台了，雖然不知道是什麼原因，但還是感到相當扼腕。

你問我當時在播什麼？主要就是許多主播和董事長聚在一起臭罵政府吧，只是也沒罵多久，因為很快就要到關台時間了，我當時正好鬧肚子，便去廁所解放了一下，在馬桶上只隱隱約約地聽到倒數的聲音，之後我上完廁所走了出來，整個頻道就沒了。我當時只能長歎一口氣，乖乖地按下中天youtube頻道的訂閱鍵。

「韓喇嘛被盤問的筆錄」

中天的董事長，確實和我有些交情。那天的正午，我看到了蔡演明董事長，他當時腰間別著兩罐水神，左手拿著一個漆黑的袋子，要前往中天電視台去。

我和蔡董見過幾次面，也就禮貌性地和他打了聲招呼，蔡董也很熱情，從袋子裡掏出了兩包旺旺仙貝要送給我，我這個出家人怕東西不是素的，想要回絕，卻突然瞄到了兩包仙貝之間夾著一張小紙條，我知道這肯定是重要資訊，便收下了，畢竟出家人胸懷宇宙，能幫上忙自然是要幫的。送了仙貝後，蔡董便匆匆地走了。

袋子裡還有什麼東西？就只是兩百多包仙貝罷了，應該沒有其他東西。紙條的內容？這可是我們的隱私，為何得說給你聽，你以為你是誰？我為何要站在這邊像小學生一樣......（中斷盤問）

「國民黨員被盤問的筆錄」

你說我抓到的那個婦人？沒錯，他就是台灣大名鼎鼎的總統英襄丸！說起我擒住她的過程，也是挺離奇的。她當時似乎是自己開著車，車卻栽進了一條水溝裡，她自己則是趴在水溝旁，不斷地掙扎著。我馬上推測出來，她肯定是吃了自家進口的萊豬，現在中了毒，正痛得打滾呢。如今讓我不費吹灰之力就把他捉住了，真是報應啊！（戲謔的嘲笑）

她當時身上配著一個寫著NCC的牌子，趴著的地方周圍還散落著旺旺仙貝......什麼，你說中天被關台了？那看來肯定也和這傢伙有關係。

相信我，大人，我以我黨百年的信譽擔保，這個婦人肯定是這場事件的主謀。本黨許多優秀的老前輩們，都被這傢伙用些烏漆抹黑的手段害得相當慘，沒想到現在還把手伸到媒體身上去了，請一定要為我們主持公道！

「主播被盤問的筆錄」

大人好，我是中天主播、超美型花美男王右政。抱歉大人，我不會再講無關案情的事了。

總之，我是在中天新聞台工作的，自身也算是主持了不少節目，得到了不少名氣和粉絲，只是如今被關了台，只能在網路上發展了。

蔡演明董事長是一個很偉大的人，為我們國家貢獻良多，還經常協助調和兩岸關係，只是當今政府昏庸，三不五時便要抹紅他，想著要把他打進深淵，但蔡董事長哪是那麼輕易就能扳倒的，他仍始終領導著我們播報全台最中立客觀的新聞。

不過這個政府實在太陰險，如今竟然使用關台的手段掐斷我們的生路！不過沒關係，我們還是有網路的力量！我們的觀眾是不會離......（之後的言論過於興奮激昂，已然聽不清了）

　　

「嫌疑犯英襄丸的筆錄」

你說的沒錯，NCC的委員的確是我提名的，中天新聞也的確是NCC關的，但要因此說我箝制自由，也太沒道理了。

這個中天新聞，明明是自己害死自己的，老早在前任總統執政的時候，他就險些不能換照了，為什麼呢？你看看這個頻道，一點自律都沒有，讓一些亂七八糟的人摻進來，播的新聞也總被檢舉，難道被關台是件很奇怪的事嗎？成天放什麼奇怪的前世今生，還有政客喝茶翹小指，與其把中天擺在那，不如換成宗教台或娛樂台還比較合理一點。

關台那天的行程？我那天中午搭著座車外出，中間正巧有一段空閒時間，我就下車在街上遊蕩偷閒一下，哪知道冤家路窄，在一間小吃店旁碰到了蔡演明，他當時手上握著一個黑色大袋子，正往中天電視台的方向走。我怕他想在最後幾個小時耍些小手段，就問他袋子裡裝的是什麼東西，他態度非常惡劣，回道「干你什麼事」，還推了我幾下。我當時咽不下這口氣，就和他打了起來，這老頭畢竟沒在立法院待過，不到三十秒便倒在了地上，我拾起那袋子想探個究竟，卻發現裡面只有幾百包仙貝。

我之後也沒想那麼多，趁著他還沒站起身時，我抓了幾包仙貝當作他的賠禮就跑了。回到總統座車上後，我叫司機趕緊開車，不巧司機也下車抽煙去了，我看著不遠處就要追上的蔡衍明，只好爬到前座自己駕駛。

後來......現在想一想，那天真是太倒楣了！我在路上又碰到了一個國民黨員，那傢伙對我像是有血海深仇似的，也騎上摩托車追了過來。

看到了這樣的雙面夾攻，我慌了神，一不小心栽進了一條水溝裡，腳踝在撞擊中受了點傷。之後我打開車門，勉強地爬了出來，蔡演明早已被我甩在後面，但那國民黨員騎著車趕了上來，我大意了，被他擒住扭送到了這裡，事後才發現他是因為進口萊豬才要把我拉來這邊審判的，太愚蠢了！

不過縱然如此，關台還是進行的很順利，等蔡演明數完了十秒，電視台就黑掉了，這些決策都是NCC作為獨立機關決議的，和我有什麼關係？難道只因為我碰上了蔡衍明還被他挑釁嗎？

如今都已經到這裡來了，接下來要怎麼處置是你們的事，就算你敲桌子，我也不會再回答你的問題了。

　　

「蔡演明對媽祖婆的自述」

媽祖婆���，弟子做錯了什麼，要被這樣處罰？我家新聞台要被關台已經害得我一個月睡不好覺了。

我在關台那天，什麼事都辦得妥當，不僅做好了防疫措施，帶著水神隨時消毒，還準備了幾百包仙貝要犒賞主播們，雖然......媽祖婆，我的確是在仙貝裡藏了一些要給韓喇嘛的東西，但也不至於要讓我之後碰上英襄丸嘛！

碰到土匪或強制推銷都好，怎麼剛好就遇到她了呢？我只是半路餓了想去吃點小吃，卻在店門口撞見了她，她一看到我，先是像個國家級的流氓喊了我幾聲，然後就開始動手動腳，拍了我的肩膀和肚子，我堂堂一個董事長，怎麼能忍受這樣的恥辱。

只是在我出手之前，他搞了偷襲，先是扒走了我的水神，往我的眼睛噴了兩下，雖然水神乾淨無毒，但我的眼睛短時間內還是睜不開了，左手也把袋子扔在地上去揉眼睛。接著他就趁我自顧不暇時，像縮頭烏龜一般跑走了。

我恢復視力之後，去搜了搜袋子，發現少了一大半仙貝，雖然當下心裡憤慨，卻也不願再去費力和這麼幼稚的人做爭鬥了。

媽祖婆，雖說我的確對左岸的政府比較友善一點，收了一點點的小利，但有至於被圍攻成現在這般田地嗎？說實話，哪怕是那個英襄丸和他的嘍囉們，不也都不想打仗嗎？真是一群假清高的傢伙，抓著獨立機關排擠異己，他們才應該是被懲罰的人哪！

不過多說無益，當天凌晨十二點，我數了十下，電視台就沒了，等到我回家打開五十二台，才意識到我受到了如此龐大的侮辱，一定得在其他地方重新開始才行。沒錯，網路，我得趕緊教觀眾們怎麼訂閱頻道......

「中天電視台附身在宗教大師身上的筆錄」

蔡董和英襄丸的爭執，我是有看到的，原因是他們相遇的小吃店的電視，正好在播放命不久矣的中天電視台，也就是我。

小吃店老闆是個狂熱的中天粉絲，每次蔡董來都要招待免錢小菜，這一招挺有用的，果然讓他成為了常客。關台那一天，老闆早餐似乎吃了壞掉的包子，整天都在鬧肚子，連蔡董這樣的貴賓來時，他都還在廁所裡坐著，因此也就有了後面的驚險場面。

起先，蔡董和英襄丸一看見對方，只是裝作對方不存在，蔡董仍是等著老闆出來接待，英襄丸也還是在那附近閒晃。直到我播出了中天主播製作早餐的新聞時，英襄丸短暫地瞥了我一眼，當下她似乎是無意地冷笑了一聲，蔡董聽到了聲音，轉頭瞪著她。此時雙方各懷鬼胎，似乎都不想招惹對方，先是蔡董從袋子裡抓出了一把旺旺仙貝，要送英襄丸。英襄丸只是冷冷的收下，接著若無其事地走離這個地方，而蔡董看起來也沒了吃小吃的興致，尷尬地繼續往中天新聞台前進。

不久之後，我聽到了巨大的撞擊聲，這才注意到遠方有一台車摔進了一條小水溝裡頭，雖然因為距離太遠，視線有些模糊，但我還是隱約看到了車上有兩個乘客。坐前面的那個駕駛沒受什麼傷，勉強打開了前車門走出來，接著又打開了後車門，將一個婦人扶出來，那婦人腳受了傷，倒在地上起不來，駕駛便去找人求援。在這樣無人看顧的情況下，突然有一個人騎了機車過來，把倒地的人抓去了，讓我有些不能理解。英襄丸？我看得出那是個女人，不過其他地方就看不清了，如果真的是她，那也太不小心了，我想或許是被人追趕，才會開快車撞進溝裡的？

在那之後，我就沒看到什麼奇特的景象了，又或許只是我沒注意到，畢竟當時離關台也不到半天了，滿腦子想的只是自己的慘況。

在當天夜晚十一點多，小吃店老闆家裡的電視仍播放著我，蔡董仍然在控訴著政府的惡行，主播還在玩團康遊戲，而電視機前的小吃店老闆似乎有些無動於衷，彷彿搞不清楚究竟發生了什麼。

不久後，蔡董便帶著主播們開始倒數了，雖說早有心理準備，但聽到那一齊喊出的數字，我仍舊有些緊張，想著關台後自己會是什麼畫面。小吃店老闆在倒數前幾分鐘離開，似乎又跑去拉肚子了，而我只能無奈地接受自己二十餘年壽命的終結。

你問我覺得是誰的錯？不不不，我不能也不想去責怪任何人，畢竟作為一個電視台，只不過是順著公司的想法，播民眾愛看的東西而已，至於什麼新聞道德之類的空話，我是完全不懂的，而如今因此而死，我也是相當不解。

總而言之，在那十秒過去後，我感受到身體倏地震動了一下，隨後開始失去意識，那些嘈雜的聲音消失了，蔡董帶著大家手舞足蹈的畫面沒了，一切都開始發黑。

此時我聽到了一點鬼祟的腳步聲，原本想盡力的去看那是誰，卻突然感受到一隻手指伸了過來，點在了我youtube頻道的訂閱鍵上。

　　

判官的總結

結束盤問，把這些資料全部銷毀掉吧，沒有人會相信的。

#提督製造

[hegelkegel]

The End of Friedmanomics

The famed economist’s theories were embraced by Beltway power brokers in both parties. Finally, a Democratic president is turning the page on a legacy of ruin. 

Zachary D. Carter/June 17, 2021

When he arrived in South Africa on March 20, 1976, Milton Friedman was a bona fide celebrity. He had been invited by the University of Cape Town to deliver a series of lectures on economic policy, but his itinerary was jammed with interviews, fetes, and gaudy extravagances fit for a senator or Hollywood royalty. Newspaper reporters harangued him, the crowded pre-cable TV spectrum reserved room for his insights, and he spent so much of the ensuing three weeks being whirlwinded by the local elite that he barely carved out time to enjoy the wildlife.

A 42-page travelogue recorded by Friedman recounts the experience. Milton and his wife, Rose, slept late after their arrival, savoring an afternoon walk along the glittering Sea Point Promenade in the shadow of Lion’s Head mountain before dinner with the chairmen of a burgeoning fashion chain and a prominent investment house. Two newspaper interviews the next day were followed by an evening at the Dutch country estate of tobacco magnate Anton Rupert. Cocktails at the U.S. Embassy, lunch with the chairman of Mobil Oil South Africa, and a black-tie dinner with the head of the De Beers diamond monopoly would ensue.

After two decades on the intellectual front lines of American politics, Friedman was a bestselling author and no stranger to fine living. But he was astonished by both “the extraordinary affluence of the White community” and the “extraordinary inequality of wealth” in South Africa. Friedman was not a man to scold opulence, and yet he found the tension permeating apartheid South Africa palpable in both taxicabs and hotel ballrooms. The “hardboiled attitudes” of Mobil chairman Bill Beck and his friends were difficult for him to endure. The “complete segregation” of the population was “striking.”

All of which makes a contemporary reading of Friedman’s Cape Town lectures a harrowing experience. His first speech was an unremitting diatribe against political democracy—an explicit rejection of, in Friedman’s words, “one person, one vote,” delivered to a nation in which more than half of the population was disenfranchised by race. Voting, Friedman declared, was inescapably corrupt, a distorted “market” in which “special interests” inevitably dictated the course of public life. Most voters were “ill-informed.” Voting was a “highly weighted” process that created the illusion of social cooperation that whitewashed a reality of “coercion and force.” True democracy, Friedman insisted, was to be found not through the franchise, but the free market, where consumers could express their preferences with their unencumbered wallets. South Africa, he warned, should avoid the example of the United States, which since 1929 had allowed political democracy to steadily encroach on the domain of the “economic market,” resulting in “a drastic restriction in economic, personal, and political freedom.”

The idea that America experienced an erosion of political liberty amid the destruction of Jim Crow is simply impossible to take seriously. Between 1929 and 1976, in addition to the advances in civil rights, explicitly racist immigration quotas were eliminated, prohibition was repealed, and legal barriers to birth control were abolished, as poverty rates plunged across demographic groups and American income inequality reached the lowest levels on record. And yet, as he toured South Africa, Friedman did not retreat from his conviction that the state had dealt a perilous blow to American freedom. In a conversation with the courageous anti-apartheid politician Helen Suzman, Friedman expressed his belief that “a laissez-faire economic policy” was “the only way in which you could get a multiracial community going” in South Africa. And the free market had to be insulated from democratic pressure. The burgeoning activist movement to “urge all foreign enterprises to boycott investment in South Africa,” Friedman believed, would ultimately serve to “hurt the Blacks, not to help them.”

Friedman did not subscribe to biological theories of racial inferiority. His time in South Africa does not instruct us on his moral character or any unique failures of political judgment. It offers instead a window into the deepest currents of his intellectual contributions. The program Friedman prescribed for apartheid South Africa in 1976 was essentially the same agenda he called for in America over his entire career as a public intellectual—unrestrained commerce as a cure-all for inequality and unrest.

That this prescription found political purchase with the American right in the 1960s is not a surprise. Friedman’s opposition to state power during an era of liberal reform offered conservatives an intellectual justification to defend the old order. What remains remarkable is the extent to which the Democratic Party—Friedman’s lifelong political adversary—came to embrace core tenets of Friedmanism. When Friedman passed away in 2006, Larry Summers, who had advised Bill Clinton and would soon do the same for Barack Obama, acknowledged the success of Friedman’s attack on the very legitimacy of public power within his own party. “Any honest Democrat will admit that we are now all Friedmanites,” he declared in The New York Times.

No longer. In the early months of his presidency, Joe Biden has pursued policy ambitions unseen from American leaders since the 1960s. If implemented, the agenda he described in an April 28 address to Congress would transform the country—slashing poverty, assuaging inequality, reviving the infrastructure that supports daily economic life, and relieving the financial strains that childcare and medical care put on families everywhere. It will cost a lot of money, and so far at least, Biden isn’t letting the price tag intimidate him. “I want to change the paradigm,” he repeated three times at a press conference in March.

But the real turn is not about deficits or spending levels. It is the relationship between economic policy and democracy itself. For Friedman, liberty lived in the marketplace, rendering government a necessary evil under the best of circumstances. Today’s Democrats, by contrast, have reclaimed state power as an essential component of self-government. When he laid out his agenda in April, Biden declared “it’s time to remember that ‘We the People’ are the government—you and I. Not some force in a distant capital. Not some powerful force that we have no control over. It’s us.”

The new consensus on Friedman’s work among economists has essentially reversed Summers’s verdict from 2006. “Almost nothing remains of his intellectual legacy,” according to Columbia University economist Jeffrey Sachs. “It has proven to be a disastrous misdirection for the world’s economies.”

In 2021, 15 years after his body gave out, Milton Friedman is finally dead.

Act I: His Rise to Fame Friedman was born in 1912 to Hungarian Jewish immigrants who ran a dry goods store in Rahway, New Jersey. Recognized as brilliant from an early age, he graduated from high school at 16 and earned a degree from Rutgers before his twentieth birthday. Though he would pursue graduate studies in economics on an on-again, off-again basis for the next 14 years, Friedman spent most of the Great Depression and World War II in the employ of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s federal government, moving between influential positions at the National Resources Planning Board and the Treasury Department, where he helped establish the modern income tax withholding system to help finance the war effort.

On paper, Friedman was a gifted New Dealer with sterling credentials. He had opposed the right-wing America First isolationism and supported the U.S. entry into the war, and he then devoted himself to the statistical efficiency of the war program. But intellectually he had fallen under the sway of conservative University of Chicago economists Frank Knight and Henry Simons, who had helped him earn a master’s degree in the early 1930s. When he at last won his Ph.D. from Columbia in 1946, Friedman shipped out to Chicago to join a fringe right-wing intellectual movement calling itself “neoliberalism.” Despite their chosen moniker, the neoliberals loathed the politics of the New Deal, seeking instead to revive the most conservative strands of Enlightenment-era economic thought, so-called classical liberalism, for the twenty-first century.

Friedman made quite a splash. His dissertation, based on research he co-conducted with future Nobel laureate Simon Kuznets, suggested that professional licensing regulations raised the cost of important expert services—including medical services. But it was a 1946 pamphlet on housing policy co-written with fellow Chicagoan George Stigler that transformed Friedman from an obscure ex-bureaucrat into an academic sensation. Titled “Roofs or Ceilings? The Current Housing Problem,” Friedman and Stigler’s paper argued that California’s rent regulations ultimately ended up raising the price of housing, hurting the very low-income people politicians sought to help. The argument was simple: By artificially depressing the price of housing, regulators deprived potential homebuilders of an incentive—higher profits—to build more homes, which would in time bring down housing costs.

The blunt unsophistication of the pamphlet was an intellectual call to arms. Friedman and Stigler weren’t really writing about housing at all—they were writing about economics itself, calling for a return to the simple nineteenth-century analyses that Friedman would later credit for producing the “free market” and “the greatest expansion of human freedom the world had ever seen.” The reaction was furious. Writing in The Washington Post, economist Robert Bangs decried the “drivel” in Friedman’s “insidious little pamphlet,” and denounced him for publishing it through a “propaganda front for reactionary interests” (which was true—“Roofs or Ceilings?” was released by the Foundation for Economic Education, one of a handful of specialty right-wing organizations that sprang up in the postwar world aiming to unwind the New Deal).

Friedman had thus cultivated a very particular brand. Academically he was a succès de scandale—not many economists in 1946 were being written up in The Washington Post. Politically, though, the pamphlet was a dead letter. Whatever people thought about Friedman himself, arguing that government regulation simply couldn’t work had been losing at the ballot box for 14 years. The country did not recall the Hoover years with fondness; Harry Truman’s biggest electoral problem was the fact that he wasn’t FDR. Friedman had made a name for himself, but in doing so he had yoked himself to a far fringe of American politics that exercised almost no influence over public discourse—yet.

There were some very wealthy people on that fringe, however. In 1947, a Kansas City home furnishing heir named Harold Luhnow paid for Friedman to travel to Switzerland for a meeting of leading neoliberals that would become known as the Mont Pèlerin Society. Friedman was young and relatively unaccomplished for the group, which included titans of the European intellectual right like Ludwig von Mises and Lionel Robbins, but the organization proved to be a forum that would help foster his professional ambitions and those of his new allies. Though it began as an obscure elite salon, the Mont Pèlerin Society would grow into one of the most influential intellectual bodies in the world, with the University of Chicago serving as its principal American outpost. Luhnow underwrote a position at the University of Chicago Law School for Friedman’s brother-in-law Aaron Director, who soon went to work attacking New Deal antitrust rules as counterproductive. Luhnow also financed a job at Chicago for Friedrich Hayek, whose 1944 political tract The Road to Serfdom had transformed him into a hero for American businessmen by arguing that Roosevelt’s New Deal had turned the United States away from Western individualism and risked sending the country headlong into Soviet-style domestic butchery.

Friedman spent most of the 1950s trying to shore up his reputation as an academic, which had taken a hit for his associations with the hard right. In 1953, he published one of his most influential works of theory, “The Methodology of Positive Economics”—a sweeping statement on the power of economics to break down barriers between people and resolve political disagreements. It was a declaration of principles from a man who recognized he lived on the political outskirts. Liberals might disagree with his ideas, Friedman suggested, but their complaints were really superficial—ultimately, he argued, he was engaged in the same intellectual project and motivated by the same values as his opponents: building a fair and prosperous society.

It was a brilliant essay that captured the imaginations of people far to Friedman’s political left in the profession. It also wasn’t true. The chief political disputes of the 1950s and 1960s, as today, really were about moral values, not technical predictions. And by 1954, that conflict erupted spectacularly with the Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of Education decision that prohibited segregation in public schools.

Act II: The Entry Into Politics—and Race Friedman responded to Brown in 1955 with “The Role of Government in Education,” an essay that called for the ostensibly race-neutral program of privatizing the school system by providing families with education vouchers that could be spent where parents wished. As in his essay on housing nine years before, Friedman appealed to the simple nineteenth-century logic of market competition and equilibrium to make his case. Public schools were a “monopoly” that put private schools at an unfair “disadvantage.” By transitioning from public schools to vouchers, families would enjoy a diversity of education options, and market competition over the quality of education would in time enhance the lot of students everywhere.

It was every bit as neat and tidy as Friedman’s case against rent regulations. But as Leo Casey has detailed for Dissent magazine, Friedman gave away the political game in a lengthy footnote. Though he insisted, “I deplore segregation and racial prejudice,” Friedman nevertheless believed in the right of the private market to develop “exclusively white schools, exclusively colored schools, and mixed schools.” If multiracial education was really so good, it would get better results, and segregated schools would wither away.

Though Friedman claimed to be striking a middle ground between “forced nonsegregation” and “forced segregation,” he was in practice taking the side of the segregationists.

His voucher proposal wasn’t original—Southern segregationists had already suggested it to get around Brown and allow white families to maintain a separate, publicly financed all-white educational system. Friedman lamely acknowledged this in an infamous footnote, “This fact came to my attention after this paper was essentially in its present form.” When the state of Virginia went on to implement a voucher system to resist school integration, Friedman defended the program in his 1962 book Capitalism and Freedom, arguing that the law would backfire on its authors.*

Much of Friedman’s political relevance within the Republican Party derived from his willingness to defend conservative policies on race during the 1950s and 1960s. “Missing from most analyses of Friedman’s economic thought is the inseparable role of race,” said Darrick Hamilton, the director of the New School’s Institute on Race and Political Economy. “The racialization of poverty and ideas about those who are deserving and undeserving allows us to have a system without empathy where those in despair are treated as surplus populations.”

“The Role of Government in Education” marks the earliest appearance of what remains Friedman’s most damaging belief—the idea that bigotry and violence could be forced out of public life by the magic of the market. Friedman would insist on this basic proposition again and again throughout his career. In 1972, he would go so far as to suggest that the free market could have put a stop to the war in Vietnam if people had really wanted it to end. Enough chemists would have refused to make napalm that the cost of producing the explosive would have become prohibitively high. This was the appropriate way to stop a war—not the crude “voting mechanism” of “the political system.”

Such arguments are difficult to take seriously today, but they worked with a substantial slice of the political spectrum in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly liberals. Where most hard-nosed conservatives were content to espouse white supremacy or pro-war attitudes, Friedman instead appealed to the liberal faith in the basic decency of humanity. Surely government intervention would not be necessary if people were the generally kind and caring sort that liberals imagined them to be. His appeal to liberal sensibilities was more than accidental. Throughout his life, Friedman preferred to be identified as either a “neoliberal” or a “classical liberal,” invoking the prestige of the great eighteenth- and nineteenth-century economists—while conveniently gliding past their often profound differences with his political project. (John Stuart Mill, for instance, identified as a “socialist,” while Adam Smith supported a variety of incursions against laissez-faire in the name of the public interest.) While many of his friends embraced the label of “conservative,” Friedman resisted. “Good God, don’t call me that,” he told an interviewer in 1978. “The conservatives are the New Dealers like [John Kenneth] Galbraith who want to keep things the way they are. They want to conserve the programs of the New Deal.”

But whatever the semantics, the political alliance was unmistakable. Friedman began contributing to William F. Buckley’s National Review and turned down an offer to join Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Council of Economic Advisers, concluding that the moderate Eisenhower would demand too many intellectual concessions of him: “I think society needs a few kooks, a few extremists.” (Friedman’s quote is recorded by historian Angus Burgin in his wonderful 2012 book, The Great Persuasion.) But being a professional kook was a lonely crusade. In 1962, Friedman’s neoliberal colleague Friedrich Hayek left the University of Chicago and decamped to the political wilderness of the University of Freiburg in West Germany. Friedman’s longtime benefactor Harold Luhnow had gone insane, financing Holocaust-deniers and claiming the supernatural ability to connect his mind with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev before shuttering his philanthropy outright.

But before he did so, Luhnow had paid Friedman to develop a series of lectures that the two men hoped could be collected into a Cold War–era update on Hayek’s aging publishing smash, The Road to Serfdom. The product of that effort, 1962’s Capitalism and Freedom, became the bestselling work of Friedman’s career and a rallying cry for young American free marketeers. Capitalism and Freedom argued that the market was the true realm of democratic expression. People voiced their preferences for the way society ought to be ordered with their pocketbooks, and industry responded by providing what was profitable. The political system, by contrast, inherently functioned as a restriction on individual liberty by limiting the kinds of preferences people could demand from the market. Democracies could choose between “laissez-faire” freedom or state socialism, but they could not have both—and in Friedman’s telling, the style of government the United States had been pursuing since the New Deal was on the wrong side of that line.

In 1964, Friedman tried to put these ideas into practice by advising the presidential campaign of far-right Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater. As the Republican nominee toured the country insisting that he agreed personally with the goals of the Civil Rights Act and the Brown decision, Goldwater voiced an objection in principle to the use of federal power to “impose that judgment … on the people of Mississippi or South Carolina.” Segregation was “their business, not mine.” Advising Goldwater, Friedman called this attack on the legal foundation of the civil rights movement an “excellent” expression of the principle of “equal treatment of all, regardless of race.”

Friedman wrote: “The man who objects to buying from or working alongside a Negro, for example, thereby limits his range of choice. He will generally have to pay a higher price for what he buys or receive a lower return for his work. Or, put the other way, those of us who regard color of skin or religion as irrelevant can buy some things more cheaply as a result.” The relentless logic of the market would drive such inefficiency from public life.

Of course, the voters who backed Goldwater in 1964 didn’t believe a word of that. They supported Goldwater because they believed he would maintain the Jim Crow order, not because they expected economic freedom to unleash a wave of radical egalitarian social change across the South. This was clear to conservative political commentators during the campaign. As Robert Novak wrote (with his partner Rowland Evans) for The Washington Post in June 1963, “These Republicans want to unmistakably establish the Party of Lincoln as the white man’s party.”

From the twenty-first century, it is hard to believe Friedman was merely naïve and not breathtakingly cynical about these political judgments, particularly given the extreme rhetoric he used to attack anti-discrimination efforts. In Capitalism and Freedom, he even compared the Fair Employment Practices Commission that FDR established to prohibit discrimination in the defense industry to “the Hitler Nuremberg laws,” arguing that prohibiting discrimination and promoting discrimination both “involve a kind of state action that ought not to be permitted.” And yet he appears to have genuinely believed what he said about markets eliminating racism. Friedman’s travelogue from South Africa was a private recording he created to help him remember his trip. It contains the same basic political ideas Friedman presented in the Goldwater campaign, alongside clear discomfort with the racist attitudes of the South African business elite. Friedman knew that he was entering a political coalition with violent racists by joining the Goldwater effort, but, as he had stated in Capitalism and Freedom, he believed politics to be an inherently dirty business. There had been a paranoid catastrophism to much of the right since The Road to Serfdom. The belief that America was on the verge of full-blown communism could make ugly compromises appear necessary.

It is worth noting, however, that not everyone made the same compromises. Hayek, for instance, supported the Civil Rights Act. Backing Goldwater was an all-in career gamble that isolated Friedman from nearly every mainstream Republican leader, from Nelson Rockefeller to George Romney. But it paid off in one key respect: Goldwater’s landslide loss accelerated the purge of moderates from the party. The future of the party would belong to men like Milton Friedman. Though Republicans emerged from the 1964 election in a state of historic political weakness, Friedman had leaped to the top of the heap. In just a few years, his gamble would bear fruit.

Act III: Taking on Keynes This open association with the radical right would have destroyed Friedman’s professional reputation had he not continued to publish top-tier economic research. In 1963, he at last delivered on the empirical promises he made to the field in 1953, publishing the work that made him the most famous economic thinker of his era, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960. Co-written with Anna Jacobson Schwartz, the book offered a sweeping, meticulous account of changes in the quantity of money across the American economy over the course of nearly a century, with detailed explanations for the various forms of currency creation and destruction that occurred along the way. Friedman had never published anything nearly so ambitious, and would never do so again.

Constructing a 93-year account of fluctuations in the money supply is a curious endeavor to assume for its own sake. But of course Friedman had an intellectual motivation, which he detailed in a famous 1967 speech before the American Economic Association: He hoped to dethrone the ghost of John Maynard Keynes.

Ever since the publication of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money in 1936, Keynes and his theory of effective demand had dominated policymaking around the world. In Keynesian theory, the price of credit and the quantity of money were sideshows to the real drivers of economic activity: the purchasing power of the consumer and the investment decisions of the state. In the Keynesian framework, if the economy was in recession, it was because somebody, somewhere wasn’t spending enough. If people were being laid off, that meant somebody, somewhere couldn’t afford to buy whatever it was that person might have produced. The political corollary was straightforward: If people were out of work, the government should spend money—preferably at a deficit—to create employment. If you wanted to fix unemployment, you paid people to work.

The Keynesian aura of authority, Friedman recognized, resulted from the consensus opinion that Keynes had cured the Depression with his appeal to deficits and public works spending. And so Friedman’s book took direct aim at the Keynesian account of the Great Depression, hoping to show that the entire Keynesian project of the subsequent quarter-century was based on a mistake. He called his alternative macroeconomic framework “monetarism.” The problem in the 1920s and 1930s, Friedman argued, was not a collapse in consumer demand—it was a collapse in the quantity of money. The Federal Reserve had botched the job—where it should have maintained a healthy amount of money in the economy, it had instead allowed the money supply to fall by failing to rescue the banking system when it fell apart in the early years of the Depression. There was truth to this. The Fed really did botch the Great Depression. Letting the banks fail in multiple waves between 1929 and 1932 was a disastrous policy choice that subsequent central bankers have strenuously avoided.

Friedman elevated this account to a comprehensive theory of money and the economy. Everything important in the economy—inflation, deflation, unemployment—was a product of changes in the money supply, or expectations about changes in the money supply. And if you allowed a little inflation to take hold by letting too much money into the economy, a catastrophic spiral could set in, as consumers and businesses bid up prices inexorably without regard to how much money was really in circulation.

Friedman’s book did make many scholars revisit the Depression years. But it did not make an immediate dent in the Keynesian consensus. The history of inflation in the postwar period just didn’t fit his narrative. Outbreaks of inflation had occurred, but they had been brief and quickly contained—not some irrepressible spiral of chaos.

Act IV: The Age of Friedman Dawns… All of that would change in the 1970s. The name given to the economic dilemma of that era reflects the assumptions of the Keynesian economists who interpreted it. “Stagflation”—persistent high inflation and high unemployment at the same time, producing stagnant demand—became a concept because, under the existing doctrine, it should have been impossible.

Keynes himself never said anything about stagflation. But in the early 1960s, his most influential American interpreter, Paul Samuelson, had identified a remarkable statistical trend in U.S. inflation and unemployment data. There seemed to be a very clear trade-off between the two. More inflation meant lower unemployment. Higher unemployment indicated lower inflation. Policymakers, it seemed, could pick and choose how much of either evil they wanted. It worked for most of the 1960s. But during the 1970s the correlation fell apart. Unemployment and inflation rose together, and the era of “stagflation” was on. It wasn’t just an embarrassment for Samuelson and his Keynesian academic allies. It presented a genuine policy crisis.

Just why unemployment and inflation soared together in the 1970s remains in dispute to this day. Multiple oil crises were obviously part of the problem. When OPEC cut off the supply of fuel, the price of fuel increased, along with the price of everything that needed fuel to be shipped—in other words, everything. But the Johnson and Nixon administrations also spent an enormous amount of money on just about everything—from welfare to war to long-term investments in research, development, and infrastructure. Some of these investments were simply sunk costs—higher napalm output did not increase the productivity of any society. But there were almost certainly some time lags involved in the grander infrastructure upgrades. Faster trains, more efficient electrical grids, and early research into the internet elevated the long-run productive power of the economy. But in the short-term, they produced a lot of paychecks while the economy waited for its big boost.

Whatever the cocktail, stagflation arrived. And it gave Friedman the opportunity he had been waiting for. He was ready. In 1966, he had accepted a position with Newsweek that would allow him to maintain the public profile he craved without the weird right-wing associations that besmirched his academic reputation. His columns expressed essentially the same worldview he had espoused in National Review in the 1950s, but now it reached a far wider and politically diverse middle-class audience. By the Carter years, Friedman’s ideas had been reaching households for a decade. Free-market evangelism was no longer the domain of kooks—it was on the coffee tables in the homes of die-hard Democrats. When Friedman was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in 1976, it bestowed a new aura of prestige on the simple story Friedman offered to explain the economic frustrations of the era: All of this Keynesian meddling had pushed the economy beyond its natural constraints, creating unnecessary economic pain. The very interventions that had been intended to help the most vulnerable had, in the long run, hurt them. Roofs, ceilings, vouchers, and votes.

Friedman was inspiring enormous changes not only to the politics of inflation, but also on another key front where long-held presumptions were suddenly under attack: the idea of corporate responsibility. In 1970, he had published what may be his single most influential piece of writing, this time for The New York Times Magazine, and it formed the core of what the magazine called the “Friedman doctrine.” Titled “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,” the essay was a simple, powerful distillation of his beliefs about the power of the free market—and the horrors that lay outside it.

“Businessmen believe that they are defending free enterprise when they declaim that business is not concerned ‘merely’ with profit but also with promoting desirable ‘social’ ends; that business has a ‘social conscience’ and takes seriously its responsibilities for providing employment, eliminating discrimination, avoiding pollution and whatever else may be the catchwords of the contemporary crop of reformers,” Friedman wrote. “In fact they are—or would be if they or anyone else took them seriously— preaching pure and unadulterated socialism.”

Markets, Friedman claimed, established arenas for individual choice, allowing consumers to express themselves with their wallets. To pursue profit was to seek a legitimate reward from satisfied customers. Any activity that interfered with profits—however noble in appearance—thus undermined the ability of a business to do what the consuming public wanted it to do. Worse, Friedman claimed, by “spending someone else’s money for a general social interest,” socially conscious businessmen were in effect levying taxes on their shareholders and then deciding how to spend that tax revenue.

Friedman’s paean to greed continued themes that he had been presenting for years. When Friedman warned that socially conscious businessmen were the “unwitting puppets of the intellectual forces that have been undermining the basis of a free society these past decades,” he was trafficking in familiar Cold War paranoia. There were, as ever in Friedman’s writing, only two choices facing society—freedom or socialism. The New Dealers and their Keynesian accomplices had cast their lot with socialism, and it was essential that corporate executives not fall into the trap.

The Friedman doctrine is an embarrassment borne of overconfidence. If profit maximization is really the sole responsibility of each business, then why are there so many different kinds of business? Why settle for the meager profits of, say, automobile manufacturing when the blockbuster returns of high-leveraged financial speculation are available? And if profit is proof of true social value, then on what grounds could a society ever outlaw anything a profitable business does? And yet by the late 1970s, the intellectual alternatives to Friedmanism weren’t looking so hot. Friedman’s simple stories about how the economy worked—inflation and profit, freedom and competition—filled an intellectual void in a world where Keynesian economists struggled to explain stagflation.

What’s more, Friedman in the 1970s took care to highlight the areas in which he agreed with the cultural left. His repeatedly stated opposition to the draft was no small matter in the era of the Vietnam War, and his support for the legalization of recreational drugs created a bridge between hippies and neoliberals that remains intact today. Nouveau-hippies and conventional libertarians both love jam bands. It is astonishing to see so many different ideological adherents to music that is, let us not mince words, terrible.

Fundamentally however, Friedman won by losing. America in the late 1970s was a frustrated and angry place, and however weird some of Friedman’s ideas might have been, nobody in their right mind would have held him responsible for the condition of the country. He hadn’t been in power. Goldwater lost. The Civil Rights Act passed. Even Richard Nixon had declared himself a “Keynesian,” prompting Friedman to denounce the man he’d advised as a “socialist.”

All of that finally changed in August 1979, when a new Federal Reserve chairman named Paul Volcker began putting Friedman’s monetary ideas into practice.

Act V: …and Conquers Monetarism gave Friedman a unique policy flexibility that many of his neoliberal allies lacked. Friedrich Hayek, for instance, had maintained in the 1930s that recessions were an inevitable price to be paid for prior periods of economic excess. But Friedman recognized that telling the public “you just have to let the bottom drop out of the world” wasn’t a politically viable option, and his emphasis on the money supply gave him a policy lever to pull when the going got rough.

Manipulating the money supply had, however, never been attempted. Instead of doing that, the Fed regulated the price of credit, buying and selling securities to move interest rates up or down. But interest rates, Friedman insisted, were ultimately controlled by financial markets, not the government. The failure to cure inflation over the previous decade was a result of this persistent tactical error. When Volcker took office, inflation had eclipsed double digits for the second time in five years.

“My condolences to you on your ‘promotion,’” Friedman wrote sardonically to Volcker. “As you know, I do not believe that the System can rise to that challenge without major changes in its method of operation.” Volcker’s success or failure, Friedman argued in Newsweek, would rest on whether or not he would “renounce” the Fed’s “love affair with controlling interest rates” and switch to targeting the money supply.

Volcker did it almost immediately. That fall, he gave a press conference stating that he would curb growth in the money supply no matter what the implications might be for interest rates. The results were horrific. When Volcker ascended to the chairmanship of the Federal Reserve, the unemployment rate had been slowly but steadily declining for more than four years, from a peak of 9.0 percent in May 1975 to a more respectable 6.0 percent. Under Volcker’s new monetary management, interest rates skyrocketed, slamming the economy into recession and driving unemployment to 10.8 percent in 1982, a level it would not match again for more than 37 years.

With even Friedman himself on the run from Volcker, the punishing recession of the early 1980s should have afforded Keynesian economists and the Democratic Party with opportunities to reassert the value and utility of political democracy. The program Friedman had pursued for decades was proving to be a disaster.

But by 1981, Friedman’s 35 years of laissez-faire evangelism had established a new rhetorical reality. The ascension of Ronald Reagan had moved Barry Goldwater’s fringe ideas about small government to the seat of American power. In 1980, PBS aired a show written and narrated by Friedman called Free to Choose, about the virtues of free markets and the inevitable failures of government intervention. This was an extraordinary level of visibility for an economist, something that had only been achieved previously by John Kenneth Galbraith, a member of the Kennedy-Camelot royalty. Friedman’s ideas not only dominated the bully pulpit, they had taken over the liberal redoubt of public television.

And his political opposition had collapsed. It was a Democrat, Jimmy Carter, who had nominated Volcker to the Fed to pursue Friedman’s monetarism. Ted Kennedy’s failed primary challenge to Carter was the last gasp of the old-line New Deal, Great Society–oriented Democratic Party (and even Kennedy backed deregulation of the airlines and trucking industry). When Jesse Jackson attempted to revive the old vision in 1984, the rank and file were no longer interested, and Jackson was able to secure only 18 percent of the popular vote. Without political patrons in Washington, the once-dominant Keynesian economists were reduced to oddball status in academia, writing for obscure left-wing journals or overhauling their intellectual framework to embrace core tenets of Friedmanism while attempting to make room for the occasional embarrassing budget deficit.

Friedman didn’t achieve this intellectual conquest alone. He had an entire academic and political movement behind him, replete with deep-pocketed funders. But he was the most prominent voice of that movement around the world, having advised not only American presidents but a military dictator in Chile, the communist government in China, and leaders of three political parties in apartheid South Africa. Friedman never warmed to the Democratic Party, but when Bill Clinton declared “the era of big government is over,” pursuing a policy of balanced budgets, free trade, and financial deregulation, he was, with a few exceptions, attempting to out-Friedman the Republicans. There was a fight within the Clinton administration over this turn, and many of Clinton’s oldest political allies felt betrayed—but the Friedman wing, represented by Robert Rubin and his protégé Larry Summers, emerged victorious.

Despite this comprehensive intellectual victory, Friedman could claim few policy achievements when he died in 2006. Volck­er eventually abandoned his efforts to directly target the money supply, and no Fed chair has tried doing so since. Even under Ronald Reagan, the overall size of the government did not really decrease—government spending as a percentage of GDP was about where it had been in the 1960s and 1970s; its targets had simply shifted from social welfare to defense contracting.

But the intellectual assumptions of the entire political class had become Friedmanesque. This is what Larry Summers meant by his claim from the eve of the financial crisis that “we are now all Friedmanites”—everyone took the social benefits of laissez-faire for granted; political conflict was largely waged over which edges to sand off.

The financial crisis of 2008 should have demolished this thinking. Markets, the crash made clear, often simply don’t serve the public interest. But the Democratic leaders who ascended to power in the Obama administration had been educated at the height of Friedman’s intellectual hegemony. There simply weren’t many New Deal–style thinkers in the top echelons of the Democratic Party anymore. Obama was as intellectually serious as American presidents get, but his coterie of intellectuals had been working under Friedmanesque assumptions for so long that they could not adapt to the reality that events had discredited those assumptions. Obama ultimately devoted more political energy to reducing the long-term federal budget deficit than to combating economic inequality. A unique historical moment to reclaim political democracy became, instead, the era of bending the cost curve.

If Obama’s presidency revealed the durability of Friedman’s legacy within the Democratic Party, Donald Trump’s presidency revealed its fragility among Republicans. On an almost weekly basis, Trump subjected sacred tenets of Friedman’s worldview—from free trade to monetary policy to fiscal stimulus—to overt rhetorical abuse. And the party faithful loved it. But some of Trump’s most consequential policies—a massive tax cut for the rich and a big bank deregulation bill—were perfectly aligned with 1980s-era Friedmanism. For today’s GOP, Friedman’s ideas seem to be valuable only insofar as they can be used to persecute undesirable elements in a political milieu constructed almost entirely of identitarian grievance—Keynes for me, Friedman for thee.

Epilogue: What’s Next? Predicting the future course of Republican ideas is like estimating the blast radius of a bag of unlit fireworks. But whatever the GOP chooses to do with Friedman’s ghost, the future of his legacy—or lack thereof—lies with the Democratic Party. Friedman may have devoted his life to the American right, but the political magic of his persona was always on the left. His insistence that market mechanisms could be used to promote essentially progressive social values was the key to popularizing a worldview that ultimately amounted to little more than the celebration of political rule by the rich. In 2021, it is extremely difficult to imagine a Republican leader persuading Democrats that the QAnon brigade is really on board with Black Lives Matter, if you could just see it from the perspective of consumer choice.

Whatever the GOP chooses to do with Friedman’s ghost, the future of his legacy— or lack thereof—lies with the Democratic Party.

Friedman’s major theoretical contribution to economics—the belief that prices rose or fell depending on the money supply—simply fell apart during the crash of 2008. “Whether people openly admit it or not, his monetary views are no longer included in serious analysis and forecasting,” said Skanda Amarnath, research director at Employ America, a think tank focused on economic policy. “The Fed’s balance sheet swelled enormously during and after the financial crisis, and it did not matter a lick for inflation. There was a huge role for fiscal policy that Friedman just ignored.”

And few serious economists today accept Friedman’s hard divide between economic fact and political reality. “Friedman developed a fantasy land of theory that ignored the way economic power can be used to capture elements of the political system to generate additional economic gains for those at the top,” said the New School’s Hamilton.

This vicious cycle has been degrading American democracy for decades. Joe Biden is the first president to desecrate not only the tenets of Friedman’s economic ideas, but the anti-democratic implications of his entire philosophy. He is also the first Democratic president since the 1960s who has formulated and publicly endorsed a coherent defense of American government as an expression of democratic energy. It is a powerful vision that enjoys the support of a large majority of American citizens. He has nothing to fear but Friedman himself.

* A previous version of this article misstated when the voucher system was implemented.

Zachary D. Carter @zachdcarter Zachary D. Carter is a writer in residence with the Omidyar Network and the Hewlett Foundation, and the author of The Price of Peace: Money, Democracy, and the Life of John Maynard Keynes.

#economy

[hegelkegel]

The Congressman Behind the House Infrastructure Bill Is Miffed About the Bipartisan Deal

Grace Segers/August 3, 2021 Peter DeFazio, who chairs the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, is frustrated by the way the Senate has warped his original bill.

It’s hardly a secret that many House Democrats are frustrated with the infrastructure bill cooked up by a bipartisan group of senators that’s currently wending its way through the upper chamber. While the plan, which has the enthusiastic backing of President Joe Biden, has $550 billion worth of new spending baked into its pages, several members of the House Democratic Caucus have denounced the bill as woefully insufficient to address the crises facing the country—particularly climate change.

Representative Peter DeFazio, the chair of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, has been notably vocal in his criticism of the bipartisan deal. DeFazio told The New Republic that while he has not yet gotten the chance to read the text of the bill, which was only released late Sunday night and clocks in at 2,702 pages, previous drafts of the bill, which he characterized as too “status quo” and “highway-centric,” left him unimpressed.

“We are not moving their so-called bipartisan bill until we have reconciliation in hand passed by the Senate,” DeFazio said about the prospects of the Senate bipartisan infrastructure bill in the House. “At this point, we don’t know what will be in it, but hopefully we will fix some of the issues that have been created by this so-called bipartisan bill.”

A number of Democrats in both chambers have insisted that they are unwilling to support the bipartisan bill unless they get commitments that a larger measure, which includes more of their key priorities, follows in its wake. This second bill would necessarily have to be passed through the reconciliation process, a complicated maneuver that would allow it to be approved in the Senate without any Republican votes.

DeFazio reiterated the bipartisan deal “is not going anywhere” until House Democrats could see “what we can fix and improve in the reconciliation process before making any final judgments.” The Senate may vote on a budget resolution, which lays out the instructions for budget reconciliation, as soon as this week, but the House is in recess until the end of September.

DeFazio has proposed his own $715 billion surface transportation bill, which passed in the House in June. He argues that his measure is truly “the first twenty-first-century transportation bill,” in that it includes policies “oriented toward reducing fossil fuel pollution, electrifying the national highway network, or using alternate fuels robustly.”

The bipartisan infrastructure plan does include several climate-related provisions, including funding for more electric vehicle charging stations and improvements to the nation’s electrical grid. However, it dedicates significantly less funding to climate change than Biden originally sought and still promotes the usage of fossil fuels: It would, for instance, dedicate funding to establishing “regional clean hydrogen hubs,” one of which would generate hydrogen from fossil fuels. Natural gas and coal are also proposed as options for generating hydrogen in the bipartisan framework.

DeFazio says that he’s heartened by provisions in the bipartisan measure that would reduce the use of diesel fuels, but that these fall short of “where we need to go to save the planet.” He also noted that the provision for “reconnecting communities” in the bipartisan bill, aimed at helping disproportionately Black and poor neighborhoods divided by highways, fails to include the necessary safeguards to prevent displacement due to gentrification—which he had included in his bill.

While DeFazio has been in conversation with both Senate colleagues and the White House about adding amendments to improve the bipartisan bill, he’s largely in the dark about “what the amendment process is going to be,” and frustrated by the way the Senate’s measure, the product of lengthy negotiations between a core group of 10 senators—five from each side of the aisle—was crafted.

“Not only was the House excluded, but the chairs of the committees of jurisdiction in the Senate, for the most part, were excluded,” he said. Some committee chairs, like Senator Tom Carper of the Environment and Public Works Committee, had previously expressed concerns about the way water infrastructure provisions were negotiated in the bipartisan bill. (Carper has since endorsed the bill wholeheartedly.)

DeFazio argued that his original bill was all the better for having been passed by the House twice, after considerable seasoning from debate and amendments. His bill also included several earmarks—funding for district projects—after House Democrats ended their self-imposed ban on the practice. “We went through a real legislative process and hammered it out.”

“This is essentially a backroom deal,” DeFazio said, referring to the bipartisan bill.

Technically, DeFazio’s bill is being considered in the Senate—but only as the vehicle for the bipartisan bill. Its language will be replaced by the text of the bipartisan bill, which will have to be adopted as a substitute amendment. The bill will keep the number that it had in the House but have a new title to go along with its replacement text.

“I don’t understand the rules of the Senate, I don’t know why they chose to do that,” DeFazio said. “From what I know of their bill, I don’t want to put my name on it as an author.”

#economy

[hegelkegel]

debate 1

He mostly wrote on the process of meditation and attaining enlightenment, I doubt the texts would be useful to anyone who was examining it outside of the scope of Zen[21:53]His dialogue I assume you mean by the koans relating to Bodhidharma[21:55]The most famous is the "pacifying the mind" one I've heard.[21:57]Daruma faced toward the wall. The Second Ancestor (Eka/Huike) stood in the snow, cut off his arm, and said, “This disciple’s heart-mind has not yet been pacified. I beg teacher to pacify my heart-mind.” Daruma said, “Come here with your heart-mind, and I will pacify it for you.” Ancestor said, “My searching for heart-mind is completed, and I’m not able to obtain it!” Daruma said, "I have finished pacifying your heart-mind for you.” Mumon's comment: That broken-toothed old Hindu, Bodhidharma, came thousands of miles over the sea from India to China as if he had something wonderful. He is like raising waves without wind. After he remained years in China he had only one disciple and that one lost his arm and was deformed. Alas, ever since he has had brainless disciples. Why did Bodhidharma come to China? For years monks have discussed this. All the troubles that have followed since Came from that teacher and disciple.kefir55 — 20/03/2021One asked him: what is the word meant? He replied: This district's carrot is 108 kilograms In a sense he has those smugness in rejecting these question seemingly wanted to know the ontology of everything...トイレッタ — 20/03/2021Ah, those types of koans are very common.kefir55 — 20/03/2021Similar to the what you said before, why look for elephant if you are on it[21:59]And then some asked the Buddha what is the origin of the world buddha answered : i dont understand your question[21:59]for them, those question is wrongトイレッタ — 20/03/2021tbh, that is one of the "unanswered questions"kefir55 — 20/03/2021For me, those are puzzling.. and then I heard someone discussing about first you need to know semantic and pragmatic(edited)[22:00]to understand chinese philosophyトイレッタ — 20/03/2021He had a disdain for those sort of questions, thinking that they werent helpful[22:01]I doubt it was more of disdain at the end, but part of the poisoned arrow parable[22:02]Basically the Buddha countered one of those questions with a parable, saying: It's just as if a man were wounded with an arrow thickly smeared with poison. His friends & companions, kinsmen & relatives would provide him with a surgeon, and the man would say, 'I won't have this arrow removed until I know whether the man who wounded me was a noble warrior, a priest, a merchant, or a worker.' He would say, 'I won't have this arrow removed until I know the given name & clan name of the man who wounded me... until I know whether he was tall, medium, or short... until I know whether he was dark, ruddy-brown, or golden-colored... until I know his home village, town, or city... until I know whether the bow with which I was wounded was a long bow or a crossbow... until I know whether the bowstring with which I was wounded was fiber, bamboo threads, sinew, hemp, or bark... until I know whether the shaft with which I was wounded was wild or cultivated... until I know whether the feathers of the shaft with which I was wounded were those of a vulture, a stork, a hawk, a peacock, or another bird... until I know whether the shaft with which I was wounded was bound with the sinew of an ox, a water buffalo, a langur, or a monkey.' He would say, 'I won't have this arrow removed until I know whether the shaft with which I was wounded was that of a common arrow, a curved arrow, a barbed, a calf-toothed, or an oleander arrow.' The man would die and those things would still remain unknown to him.kefir55 — 20/03/2021Yes that oneトイレッタ — 20/03/2021Metaphysical speculation does not truth make[22:03]"Whether the world is finite or infinite, limited or unlimited, the problem of your liberation remains the same." -The Buddhakefir55 — 20/03/2021But it is really interesting that western philosophy would try to come up with some explanation like aristotle's unmoved moverトイレッタ — 20/03/2021eh, the west did have pyrrhokefir55 — 20/03/2021(not a cheap shot to western metaphysics tho)トイレッタ — 20/03/2021altho he was influenced by buddhism[22:05]western metaphysics is fine, but i mean[22:06]when u get to the point of aquinas declaring that time is not made out of instances in time.... perhaps take a step back?kefir55 — 20/03/2021why he said that?[22:07]is that because of religious concernトイレッタ — 20/03/2021No he was trying to jump out of Zeno's paradoxeskefir55 — 20/03/2021like reconcile man's agency with god's willトイレッタ — 20/03/2021But fell into a larger hole....[22:08]Basically guy thinks he has bigger head than he actually haskefir55 — 20/03/2021So he is not like Kant trying to prove man has the ability to start a new causal chain?[22:09]i doubt maybe he has religious reason behind his reasoningトイレッタ — 20/03/2021No, he is making a metaphysical conclusion to prove that a smart guy like him is obviously too smart for Zeno's paradoxes[22:10]"Instants are not parts of time, for time is not made up of instants any more than a magnitude is made of points, as we have already proved. Hence it does not follow that a thing is not in motion in a given time, just because it is not in motion in any instant of that time."[22:11]If instants are not part of time.... how can it not be in motion in any instant of that time... I dont understand, maybe i am too small brain[22:11]Needless to say Aquinas is not very well-known for his commentary on Aristotle physics...kefir55 — 20/03/2021I read some about the time concept of Augustine, Nietsczhe, Heidegger, Aquinas, Aristotle[22:14]let me find it tookefir55 — 20/03/2021That there could be an activity that has its end in itseH and therefore can be understood outside the means-end category never enters Thomas' considerations. For him, "every agent acts for an end . . . the principle of this motion lies in the end. Hence it is that the art, which is concerned with the end, by its command moves the art which is concerned with the means; just as the art of sailing commands the art of shipbullding."[22:39]They all have their own time speculation (I read from Arendt's The Life of the Mind)[22:42]But this seeming spatiality of a temporal phenomenon is an error, caused by the metaphors we traditionally use in terminology dealing with the phenomenon of Time. As Bergson first discovered, they are all terms "borrowed from spatial language. If we want to reflect on time, it is space that responds." Thus duration is always expressed as extension," and the past is understood as something lying behind us, the future as lying somewhere ahead of us.@kefir55> That there could be an activity that has its end in itseH and therefore can be understood outside the means-end category never enters Thomas' considerations. For him, "every agent acts for an end . . . the principle of this motion lies in the end. Hence it is that the art, which is concerned with the end, by its command moves the art which is concerned with the means; just as the art of sailing commands the art of shipbullding."トイレッタ — 20/03/2021Means-end is very important for Christians.@kefir55> But this seeming spatiality of a temporal phenomenon is an error, caused by the metaphors we traditionally use in terminology dealing with the phenomenon of Time. As Bergson first discovered, they are all terms "borrowed from spatial language. If we want to reflect on time, it is space that responds." Thus duration is always expressed as extension," and the past is understood as something lying behind us, the future as lying somewhere ahead of us.トイレッタ — 20/03/2021And neither the past, nor the future, is us per sekefir55 — 20/03/2021They have wacked philosophical speculation\ (even if it could be a good resource for future generation)(edited)[23:10]especially in the era of German Idealism[23:10]esp. Hegel[23:11]Almost unfettered creative freedom (to use our buzzword)[23:13]I wonder what would their philosophical speculation be like if they live in this era It's fine to speculate, but looking at it all, there is a certain.... "beauty" in that creation process, be they the products of suffering, or the "simple" elucidations of looking at the world around us. In Zen there is a koan abt this: Sôzan  asked  Elder  Toku, “'The  true  Dharma-body  of  Buddha  is like  the  empty  sky.It manifests  its  form  corresponding  to  things –just  like  the  moon  on  the  water.' How  do  you explain the principle of this corresponding?” Toku said, “It is like a donkey looking into a well.” Sôzan said, “You put it in a nice way, but you were able to say only eighty percent.” Toku said, “How about you, Master?” Sôzan said, “It is like a well looking at a donkey.” The donkey looks into the well, the well looks at the donkey. Wisdom embraces all, without anything outside it; Purity prevails, with excessive abundance. Who can deliver the seal behind the elbow? No books are stocked in the entire house. With no thread in the loom the shuttle does the work, Beautiful patterns, vertical and horizontal, With exquisite designs, appearing of themselves.(edited)[00:16]The German Idealism that is, let's say "created", are they not products of people who live and are not merely the scribbles upon a page? Perhaps to even say this is to resort to humanism, but is it not much easier to deal with humans than to deal with, say, God?kefir55 — Yesterday at 00:33But then a lot of ink spilled just to deal with the textual analysis without looking at them with the huge historical context.. But then if you interpret every philosophy under its historical context, are we making the mistake of assuming the past with the present, and hence diminishing the insights they might have?[00:34]So I am torn on that...トイレッタ — Yesterday at 02:11I wasnt talking much abt that. I was thinking more abt thinking abt philosophy as a representation of a "world", manifesting and corresponding to things.[02:12]As for the interpretation of philosophy textually or historically.... why cant we do both? Or perhaps, even include the fact that the ink was spilled by humans?kefir55 — Yesterday at 03:26Agreed What, really, is the difference between a "path" and a "belief"? Take for example, the Eastern religions. The Buddhists have the Noble Eightfold Path, the Tao has the Tao (literally meaning "Way"), the Hindus have the Yogas (Karma Yoga (path of action), Bhakti Yoga (path of devotion), Jnana Yoga (path of knowledge), etc.). It also happens that the Eastern religions have many schools that do not necessarily exist in extreme antagonism to each other on religious grounds (politics will always be a factor between schools/sects). The common layman even in an Asian country may not recognise the difference all that much. Looking towards the Abrahamic religions, they appear to be more cemented upon beliefs, whereby it is dogma that distinguishes schools and the content of the beliefs that results in distinguishment from different schools/sects. From the very beginning of anathema and declaring heresies, what that results are dogmatic differences that are very hard to bridge. It also happens that the different schools/sects are always antagonistic to each other, even escalating often to that of violence. (Wars of religion, catholics vs protestants, etc.) Also, the differences of Catholics and Protestants and the other schools are quite prominent and sometimes even exaggerated. What then really differentiates these two approaches? One might say that both has a bit of each: no religion ever exists without beliefs, and even in Abrahamic paths there is a form of "laws" or morale code that sets a certain "path". Perhaps what that may be different here is a "progress of time". In these paths, one continuously acquaints oneself more and more with the "general" flow and growth of a person. To "stray from the path" is not stemming from the action of the instantaneous moment of time, but from a change in "orientation". To compare with the "beliefs", there appears to be "fixed" moments, i.e a moment of salvation, etc. Focus is placed upon that event past or future.[13:10]Hence consider the Abrahamic sin, posited as events frozen in instants for which a "payback" in terms of repent, forgiveness, etc. has to be achieved, and this seemingly tends towards the recuperance of a deficit, and results in a 0-sum game. It is like a.... ECG curve, going up and down. Karma of the Dharmic religions operates differently, in that since the cause and effects are never "set in stone" nor do they merely "mete out" in isolation, what that exists appears more of a... "web", move but a singular point and the whole web moves in unision, an action has "echoes" that transcend time.[13:13]For one to that "belief" to exist, there has to be a continuous investment without compromise in it, or else it sways into dogmatic differentiation. For a "path" to exist, it too has to be continuously invested. But the belief puts it "right here", a "path" puts it "there". But how can this account for the differences of the "progress of time"?[13:15]Perhaps consider a mountain analogy: a belief puts one directly below the peak, and the "verticality" of it is the investment required, and due to its impracticality there is always going to be a difference in that peak and oneself, so that investment is really a sink. But with "paths" as those leading up to the peak, there also has to be a "horizontality", that which is acheived in time towards a peak, so that investment results towards that (albeit also with much difficulty and time). Take Christ: he was the Son of God since before He was born. But the old Indian (Gautama) was not always a Buddha. "Man made in the image of God"... and then it led to endless debate to reconcile our innate sense of free will and then God's will, and then it extended to the debate on the evil and good (Who willed Evil to happen). For me, this process is interesting.

Hence, when we come to Paul, the accent shifts entirely from doing to believing, from the outward man living in a world of appearances (himself an appearance among appearances and therefore subject to semblance and illusion) to an inwardness which by definition never unequivocally manifests itself and can be scrutiuized only by a God who also never appears unequivocally.

トイレッタ — Yesterday at 14:55

That accent shift is significant: many of the Eastern religions, particularly the Dharmic ones, stress the differences of the illusory and the real. That "path" makes some sense in terms of this "doing". The "belief" however, seems to be inward in a perverse fashion: Man's inner nature is subject to the most external force possible, that of God.

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14:55

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God never manifests "inwardly", I posit. Congregation is key to the Christians.

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14:56

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The confession too is committed between one and a pastor, an ordained who is initiated.

kefir55 — Yesterday at 14:56

Paul would said because Jesus's demand of doing (in Old Testament) is too overwhelming

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14:57

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Then he introduced this concept of eternal self through salvation to move into kingdoms of god when the world ended(edited)

トイレッタ — Yesterday at 14:57

>a man who is deemed perfect in every way demands you to be like him >its too overwhelming for man gee i wonder...

kefir55 — Yesterday at 14:57

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14:58

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dialectics

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14:58

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The impossibility to be a Perfect Man whipped you into a BETTER MAN

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14:58

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joke

トイレッタ — Yesterday at 14:58

The "better man" will always be lesser.(edited)

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14:59

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Hence what that is created is a hole, digging itself deeper with the ever-continuing investment, as a man's efforts sweat more vulgarity in the chastity of perfection

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15:00

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why else is the "baptism at birth" the apex of purity?

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15:00

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Purity exemplified through the infant of Jesus?

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15:00

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The precise moment where all is wiped clear.

kefir55 — Yesterday at 15:00

It is a hole in the beginning

トイレッタ — Yesterday at 15:01

That is more or less agreed upon across religions.

kefir55 — Yesterday at 15:01

A trap that set off more inquiries

トイレッタ — Yesterday at 15:01

The question is, what of it?

kefir55 — Yesterday at 15:02

Probability to be a good person with your innate sense? Like Job?(edited)

トイレッタ — Yesterday at 15:03

As if there is always a "true" innate: then what of internal conflict?

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Is that an innate sense that is the conflict itself? An innate pitched against another? A corruption?

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15:03

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It would be possible, to have an innate that is always "clear". But they tend to be called "simple-minded".

kefir55 — Yesterday at 15:03

It is a conflict always

トイレッタ — Yesterday at 15:05

If it is a conflict, what determines the victor? If it is one's own discernment, then the innate is not "good", since one can choose either (and free will has to come into place here). If it is not, then who decides?

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15:05

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But then there is another question: how is there a "discernment" separate from these two opposing forces?

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15:05

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they are all innate or are they not?

kefir55 — Yesterday at 15:05

I should have quotation mark "innate"

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15:06

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I am not saying we have a true innate sense like an organ that independent of all the flux

トイレッタ — Yesterday at 15:08

If there is conflict, which side do we choose? When we choose one side, do we automatically discredit a part of it for another? Or perhaps it now changes the dialectic again, that an internal decision just "decides" the discernment of innate vs that which is external? Or is the conflict that exists not one that exists "innately", but if so then why is it a conflict internally? Even the "flux" is hinted to be external: but decision rests like a hair resting on a pin.(edited)

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15:10

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But.... truthfully, none of these questions compare than to take a good look yourself....

kefir55 — Yesterday at 15:11

In the book I read, Arendt's The life of mind, she tried to answer your questions. She surveyed about how philosophers see about the conflict within one self. Is it about conflict between will and intellect, or is it about the faculty of Judgement we have (acquired from others?)

トイレッタ — Yesterday at 15:12

I think it is multi-faceted, altho the misanthropist me will devolve it into a matter of "selfish introspection".

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15:12

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The "will" or the "intellect" will be as according to what "I see fit".

kefir55 — Yesterday at 15:15

Although the past philosophers, when they tried to figure out when our decision flows from, are fixated into reconcile "this or that created the space of decision-making" with the external authority, be it God, their pressupposed physical law (bad science?), or their time-concept stemmed from their own political ideal (Hegel, Heidegger..).

[

15:15

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So...

トイレッタ — Yesterday at 15:15

Meta-analysis: when reading the different opinions, what discerns? I say that is where the decision flows from.

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15:16

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But perhaps that is only the clearest image of the fog I can provide. Still, if it is a fog it is a fog.

kefir55 — Yesterday at 15:17

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15:17

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"Clearest image"

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15:17

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Impossible

トイレッタ — Yesterday at 15:17

Why, are words going to put it even clearer?

kefir55 — Yesterday at 15:18

Then what is metaphor?

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15:18

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Words invoke imagery

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15:19

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Is true picture gave power to the words through association? Or the words created the imagery through playing on our imagination

トイレッタ — Yesterday at 15:19

This is ignoring the fact that sometimes people just would fail to comprehend the metaphor.

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15:20

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Or perhaps it is us who want to impose our own image....

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15:20

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Words be the tool, but perhaps we are happy as long as the congregation nods their heads sheepishly.

@トイレッタWhy, are words going to put it even clearer?

kefir55 — Yesterday at 15:20

why do you think like this? Is there some influences you can recommend?

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15:21

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is it like those poetic x Heidegger?

@kefir55why do you think like this? Is there some influences you can recommend?

トイレッタ — Yesterday at 15:21

I think this part comes from influence from Zen, which is very much anti-"words" in a sense.

kefir55 — Yesterday at 15:23

i think western philosophers also gone into question the problem of words in philosophical inquiry

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15:23

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it goes into direction of poetic appraisal,... aestheticatization of words/sentences for _leaving a blank pretentiously?(edited)

トイレッタ — Yesterday at 15:26

If a blank is pretentious, is silence pretentious? Or how about a pause in music...? Is there any point where really there is nothing in that trains of thought? Or are they simply leaving a space for our own introspection and expression of something, despite already set the stage, the actors and the props? Is that then manipulation of the stone to want to form a statue from itself, or simply letting the uneeded bits fall off?

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15:28

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Or perhaps we are pretentious in thinking that there is anything expected but oneself, whatever it may be? Perhaps they exist as a "poke" towards one's own thinking of oneself from oneself? Perhaps the silence is an indication like tempo in music, to just tell us shut up of what we think and just.... watch, listen.(edited)

kefir55 — Yesterday at 15:29

Sometimes I felt like they are trying to induce expression of something, with the stage, the actors and the props already set, and let ourselves to bring out the conclusion he would have hoped for

[hegelkegel]

David Graeber and David Wengrow: Palaeolithic Politics and Why It Still Matters

> Marxist political parties quickly developed their own version of the story, fusing together Rousseau’s State of Nature and the Scottish Enlightenment idea of developmental stages. The result was a formula for world history that began with original ‘primitive communism’, overcome by the dawn of private property, but someday destined to return. > > Instead of imagining some primordial utopia, they can draw on a more mixed and complicated narrative. Indeed, there seems to be a growing recognition, in revolutionary circles, that freedom, tradition, and the imagination have always, and will always be entangled, in ways we do not completely understand. It’s about time the rest of us catch up, and start to consider what a non-Biblical version of human history might be like. > > Quite independently, archaeological evidence suggests that in the highly seasonal environments of the last Ice Age, our remote ancestors were behaving in broadly similar ways: shifting back and forth between alternative social arrangements, permitting the rise of authoritarian structures during certain times of year, on the proviso that they could not last; on the understanding that no particular social order was ever fixed or immutable. > > Modern authors have a tendency to use prehistory as a canvas for working out philosophical problems: are humans fundamentally good or evil, cooperative or competitive, egalitarian or hierarchical? As a result, they also tend to write as if for 95% of our species history, human societies were all much the same. > > If so, then the real question is not ‘what are the origins of social inequality?’, but, having lived so much of our history moving back and forth between different political systems, ‘how did we get so stuck?’ > > Back in the ‘70s, the brilliant Cambridge archaeologist David Clarke predicted that, with modern research, almost every aspect of the old edifice of human evolution, ‘the explanations of the development of modern man, domestication, metallurgy, urbanization and civilisation – may in perspective emerge as semantic snares and metaphysical mirages.’ > > The pieces are all there to create an entirely different world history. For the most part, we’re just too blinded by our prejudices to see the implications. For instance, almost everyone nowadays insists that participatory democracy, or social equality, can work in a small community or activist group, but cannot possibly ‘scale up’ to anything like a city, a region, or a nation-state. > > Once the historical verdict is in, we will see that the most painful loss of human freedoms began at the small scale – the level of gender relations, age groups, and domestic servitude – the kind of relationships that contain at once the greatest intimacy and the deepest forms of structural violence. > > If we really want to understand how it first became acceptable for some to turn wealth into power, and for others to end up being told their needs and lives don’t count, it is here that we should look. Here too, we predict, is where the most difficult work of creating a free society will have to take place.

#politics

[hegelkegel]

韓非子‧顯學

世之顯學，儒、墨也。儒之所至，孔丘也；墨之所至，墨翟也。自孔子之死也，有子張之儒，有子思之儒，有顏氏之儒，有孟氏之儒，有漆雕氏之儒，有仲良氏之儒，有孫氏之儒，有樂正氏之儒。自墨子之死也，有相里氏之墨，有相夫氏之墨，有鄧陵氏之墨。故孔、墨之後，儒分為八，墨離為三，取舍相反不同，而皆自謂真孔、墨。孔、墨不可復生，將誰使定世之學乎？

孔子、墨子俱道堯、舜，而取舍不同，皆自謂真堯、舜。堯、舜不復生，將誰使定儒、墨之誠乎？殷、周七百餘歲，虞、夏二千餘歲，而不能定儒、墨之真。今乃欲審堯、舜之道於三千歲之前，意者其不可必乎！無參驗而必之者、愚也；弗能必而據之者、誣也。故明據先王，必定堯、舜者，非愚則誣也。愚誣之學，雜反之行，明主弗受也。 墨者之葬也，冬日冬服，夏日夏服，桐棺三寸，服喪三月，世主以為儉而禮之。儒者破家而葬，服喪三年，大毀扶杖，世主以為孝而禮之。夫是墨子之儉，將非孔子之侈也；是孔子之孝，將非墨子之戾也。今孝戾、侈儉俱在儒、墨，而上兼禮之。 漆雕之議，不色撓，不目逃，行曲則違於臧獲，行直則怒於諸侯，世主以為廉而禮之。宋榮子之議，設不鬥爭，取不隨仇，不羞囹圄，見侮不辱，世主以為寬而禮之。夫是漆雕之廉，將非宋榮之恕也；是宋榮之寬，將非漆雕之暴也。今寬廉、恕暴俱在二子，人主兼而禮之。 自愚誣之學、雜反之辭爭，而人主俱聽之，故海內之士，言無定術，行無常議。夫冰炭不同器而久，寒暑不兼時而至，雜反之學不兩立而治。今兼聽雜學繆行同異之辭，安得無亂乎？聽行如此，其於治人又必然矣。 今世之學士語治者多曰：『與貧窮地以實無資。』今夫與人相若也，無豐年旁入之利而獨以完給者，非力則儉也。與人相若也，無饑饉疾疚禍罪之殃，獨以貧窮者，非侈則墯也。侈而墯者貧，而力而儉者富。今上徵斂於富人以布施於貧家，是奪力儉而與侈墯也。而欲索民之疾作而節用，不可得也。 今有人於此，義不入危城，不處軍旅，不以天下大利易其脛一毛。世主必從而禮之，貴其智而高其行，以為輕物重生之士也。夫上所以陳良田大宅、設爵祿，所以易民死命也。今上尊貴輕物重生之士，而索民之出死而重殉上事，不可得也。 藏書策、習談論、聚徒役、服文學而議說。世主必從而禮之，曰：『敬賢士，先王之道也。』夫吏之所稅，耕者也；而上之所養，學士也。耕者則重稅，學士則多賞，而索民之疾作而少言談，不可得也。 立節參明，執操不侵，怨言過於耳必隨之以劍。世主必從而禮之，以為自好之士。夫斬首之勞不賞，而家鬥之勇尊顯，而索民之疾戰距敵而無私鬥，不可得也。 國平則養儒俠，難至則用介士，所養者非所用，所用者非所養，此所以亂也。且夫人主於聽學也，若是其言，宜布之官而用其身；若非其言，宜去其身而息其端。今以為是也而弗布於官，以為非也而不息其端，是而不用，非而不息，亂亡之道也。 澹臺子羽，君子之容也，仲尼幾而取之，與處久而行不稱其貌。宰予之辭，雅而文也，仲尼幾而取之，與處而智不充其辯。故孔子曰：『以容取人乎，失之子羽；以言取人乎，失之宰予。』故以仲尼之智而有失實之聲。今之新辯濫乎宰予，而世主之聽眩乎仲尼。為悅其言，因任其身，則焉得無失乎？是以魏任孟卯之辯而有華下之患，趙任馬服之辯而有長平之禍；此二者，任辯之失也。夫視鍛錫而察青黃，區冶不能以必劍。水擊鵠雁，陸斷駒馬，則臧獲不疑鈍利。發齒吻形容，伯樂不能以必馬。授車就駕而觀其末塗，則臧獲不疑駑良。觀容服，聽辭言，仲尼不能以必士。試之官職，課其功伐，則庸人不疑於愚智。故明主之吏，宰相必起於州部，猛將必發於卒伍。夫有功者必賞，則爵祿厚而愈勸；遷官襲級，則官職大而愈治。夫爵祿大而官職治，王之道也。 磐石千里，不可謂富；象人百萬，不可謂強。石非不大，數非不眾也，而不可謂富強者─磐不生粟，象人不可使距敵也。今商官技藝之士亦不墾而食，是地不墾與磐石一貫也。儒俠毋軍勞、顯而榮者則民不使，與象人同事也。夫禍知磐石象人，而不知禍商官儒俠為不墾之地、不使之民，不知事類者也。 故敵國之君王雖說吾義，吾弗入貢而臣；關內之侯雖非吾行，吾必使執禽而朝。是故力多則人朝，力寡則朝於人，故明君務力。夫嚴家無悍虜，而慈母有敗子，吾以此知威勢之可以禁暴，而德厚之不足以止亂也。夫聖人之治國，不恃人之為吾善也，而用其不得為非也。恃人之為吾善也，境內不什數；用人不得為非，一國可使齊。為治者用眾而舍寡，故不務德而務法。 夫必恃自直之箭，百世無矢；恃自圜之木，千世無輪矣。自直之箭、自圜之木，百世無有一，然而世皆乘車射禽者何也？隱栝之道用也。雖有不恃隱栝而有自直之箭、自圜之木，良工弗貴也，何則？乘者非一人，射者非一發也。不恃賞罰而恃自善之民，明主弗貴也，何則？國法不可失，而所治非一人也。故有術之君，不隨適然之善，而行必然之道。 今或謂人曰：『使子必智而壽』，則世必以為狂。夫智、性也，壽、命也，性命者，非所學於人也，而以人之所不能為說人，此世之所以謂之為狂也，謂之不能。然則是諭也，夫諭、性也。以仁義教人，是以智與壽說也，有度之主弗受也。故善毛嗇、西施之美，無益吾面，用脂澤粉黛則倍其初。言先王之仁義，無益於治，明吾法度，必吾賞罰者亦��之脂澤粉黛也。故明主急其助而緩其頌，故不道仁義。今巫祝之祝人曰：『使若千秋萬歲。』千秋萬歲之聲聒耳，而一日之壽無徵於人，此人所以簡巫祝也。今世儒者之說人主，不善今之所以為治，而語已治之功；不審官法之事，不察姦邪之情，而皆道上古之傳，譽先王之成功。儒者飾辭曰：『聽吾言則可以霸王。』此說者之巫祝，有度之主不受也。 故明主舉實事，去無用，不道仁義者，故不聽學者之言。今不知治者必曰：『得民之心。』欲得民之心而可以為治，則是伊尹、管仲無所用也，將聽民而已矣。民智之不可用，猶嬰兒之心也。夫嬰兒不剔首則腹痛，不揊痤則寖益，剔首、揊痤必一人抱之，慈母治之，然猶啼呼不止，嬰兒子不知 犯其所小苦致其所大利也。今上急耕田墾草以厚民產也，而以上為酷；修刑重罰以為禁邪也，而以上為嚴；徵賦錢粟以實倉庫且以救饑饉備軍旅也，而以上為貪；境內必知介，而無私解，并力疾鬥所以禽虜也，而以上為暴。此四者所以治安也，而民不知悅也。夫求聖通之士者，為民知之不足師用。昔禹決江濬河而民聚瓦石，子產開畝樹桑鄭人謗訾。禹利天下，子產存鄭，皆以受謗，夫民智之不足用亦明矣。故舉士而求賢智，為政而期適民，皆亂之端，未可與為治也。

<翻譯> 世之顯學，儒、墨也。儒之所至，孔丘也；墨之所至，墨翟也。自孔子之死也，有子張之儒，有子思之儒，有顏氏之儒，有孟氏之儒，有漆雕氏之儒，有仲良氏之儒，有孫氏之儒，有樂正氏之儒。自墨子之死也，有相里氏之墨，有相夫氏之墨，有鄧陵氏之墨。故孔、墨之後，儒分為八，墨離為三，取舍相反不同，而皆自謂真孔、墨。孔、墨不可復生，將誰使定世之學乎？ 當今最顯赫的學派當屬儒家和墨家。儒家最被推崇的是孔丘，墨家最被推崇的是墨翟。自從孔子死後，儒家的分支有子張的儒學，有子思的儒學，有顔氏的儒學，有孟氏的儒學，有漆雕氏的儒學，有仲良氏的儒學，有孫氏的儒學，有樂正氏的儒學。自從墨子死後，墨家的分支有相里氏的墨學，有相夫氏的墨學，有鄧陵氏的墨學。所以孔子、墨子死後，儒家分爲八個派別，墨家分爲三個派別，各個派別取捨當然不同，甚至相互矛盾，然而他們卻都自稱是得了孔、墨的真傳。孔子、墨子是不可能復活了，要叫誰來判定當今這些學派的真假呢？

孔子、墨子俱道堯、舜，而取舍不同，皆自謂真堯、舜。堯、舜不復生，將誰使定儒、墨之誠乎？殷、周七百餘歲，虞、夏二千餘歲，而不能定儒、墨之真。今乃欲審堯、舜之道於三千歲之前，意者其不可必乎！無參驗而必之者、愚也；弗能必而據之者、誣也。故明據先王，必定堯、舜者，非愚則誣也。愚誣之學，雜反之行，明主弗受也。 同理，孔子、墨子都宣稱繼承了堯、舜的道統，然而他們的取捨也是大不相同，卻都自稱得了堯、舜的真傳。堯和舜是不可能復活了，這又該叫誰來判定儒、墨兩家的真假呢？商朝與周朝替換到現在約七百多年，虞舜和夏朝替換到現在兩千多年，就已經無法判定儒、墨兩家究竟哪家才是堯、舜的真傳。現在竟想要判定堯、舜的道統是不是三千多年前先王之道的真傳，想來是不可能做到的吧！沒能驗證就輕易相信事情，那是愚蠢；把不能確定的事情拿來做爲處事的依據，那就是欺騙。所以，那些明著標榜是依據先王之道，一口咬定是承襲了堯舜道統的學派，不是自身愚蠢，就是欺騙大眾。對於這種不是愚蠢就是欺騙的學說，雜亂相反的行爲，英明的君主是不受他們耍弄的。

墨者之葬也，冬日冬服，夏日夏服，桐棺三寸，服喪三月，世主以為儉而禮之。儒者破家而葬，服喪三年，大毀扶杖，世主以為孝而禮之。夫是墨子之儉，將非孔子之侈也；是孔子之孝，將非墨子之戾也。今孝戾、侈儉俱在儒、墨，而上兼禮之。 依墨家的葬禮，在冬天死的就穿冬天的衣服入殮，在夏天死的就穿夏天的衣服入殮；只用三寸厚的桐木棺材，守喪只守三個月，當世君主認爲這是節儉因而尊崇他們。儒家主張要傾家蕩產大辦葬禮，守喪三年，要悲傷到形銷骨立扶杖而行，當今君主認爲這樣盡孝而尊崇他們。照理說，要是贊同墨子的節儉，就應該非議孔子的奢侈；要是贊同孔子的盡孝，那就應該非議墨子的乖戾。現在盡孝和乖戾、奢侈和節儉同時存在儒、墨兩家的學說之中，而君主卻都要加以禮遇。

漆雕之議，不色撓，不目逃，行曲則違於臧獲，行直則怒於諸侯，世主以為廉而禮之。宋榮子之議，設不鬥爭，取不隨仇，不羞囹圄，見侮不辱，世主以為寬而禮之。夫是漆雕之廉，將非宋榮之恕也；是宋榮之寬，將非漆雕之暴也。今寬廉、恕暴俱在二子，人主兼而禮之。 漆雕氏主張面對脅迫也不能有屈撓之色，眼神不能怯懦逃避；若自己有錯，即使對奴僕也要低頭；若自己沒錯，即使對諸侯也是理直氣壯。當今君主認爲這樣廉貞而加以禮遇。宋榮子則主張不要鬥爭，不要報仇，不羞辱囚犯，被人欺侮不自以為恥辱。當今君主認爲這是爲人寬厚而加以尊崇。照理說，若要贊同漆雕氏的廉貞，就應該非議宋榮子過於隨和；若要贊同宋榮子的寬厚，那就應該非議漆雕氏的粗暴。現在寬厚與廉貞、隨和與粗暴同時存在於這兩個人的主張中，而君主卻對他們都加以尊禮。

自愚誣之學、雜反之辭爭，而人主俱聽之，故海內之士，言無定術，行無常議。夫冰炭不同器而久，寒暑不兼時而至，雜反之學不兩立而治。今兼聽雜學繆行同異之辭，安得無亂乎？聽行如此，其於治人又必然矣。 自從愚蠢欺騙的學說、雜亂相反的言論爭相出現，而君主卻都表示聽從，造成國內的讀書人，言論沒有依據固定的學術，辦事也沒有常規來遵循。要知道，冰和炭火要放在不同的容器中才能儲存長久，寒冷和暑熱不能同時到來，雜亂相反的學說不能同時用來治理國家。當今君主不懂 因時制宜 而對那些雜亂的學說、謬誤的行事和似是而非的言辭都同時聽從，怎麽能不混亂呢？聽話行事都這樣了，治理人民必定是同樣的混亂了。

今世之學士語治者多曰：『與貧窮地以實無資。』今夫與人相若也，無豐年旁入之利而獨以完給者，非力則儉也。與人相若也，無饑饉疾疚禍罪之殃，獨以貧窮者，非侈則墯也。侈而墯者貧，而力而儉者富。今上徵斂於富人以布施於貧家，是奪力儉而與侈墯也。而欲索民之疾作而節用，不可得也。 當今的學者說起治理國家，總是說：「給窮人土地，以充實他們的匱乏。」���設現在有人在條件和別人差不多的情況下，沒碰上豐年又沒有業外收入，而能自給自足的，那他不是由於勤勞，就是由於節儉。如果有人在條件和別人差不多的情況下，沒碰上饑荒、疾病、橫禍、入罪等意外，卻獨有他貧窮，那他不是由於奢侈，就是由於懶惰。照理說，奢侈和懶惰的人就會貧窮，而勤勞和節儉的人就應該富有。然而，現在君主卻向富人徵收財物再發給窮人，這等於是搶奪勤勞節儉者的財富來贈與奢侈懶惰的人。這樣還想要求人民能努力耕作並省吃儉用，那是不可能辦到的。

今有人於此，義不入危城，不處軍旅，不以天下大利易其脛一毛。世主必從而禮之，貴其智而高其行，以為輕物重生之士也。夫上所以陳良田大宅、設爵祿，所以易民死命也。今上尊貴輕物重生之士，而索民之出死而重殉上事，不可得也。 此時此地若有人，主張「不要進入危險地區，不要當兵，拔一毛以利天下不為也」；當今君主一定聽從而禮遇他，稱許他的智慧，讚揚他的行爲，認爲他是輕視財物愛惜生命的人。卻忘了君主之所以要展示良田和大宅做為賞賜，設置爵位和俸祿，爲的就是要換取民衆能拼死效命；現在君主去尊崇輕視財物愛惜生命的人，這樣想去要求人民出生入死爲君主犧牲，是不可能的。

藏書策、習談論、聚徒役、服文學而議說。世主必從而禮之，曰：『敬賢士，先王之道也。』夫吏之所稅，耕者也；而上之所養，學士也。耕者則重稅，學士則多賞，而索民之疾作而少言談，不可得也。 收集書冊，學習辯論，聚集徒眾，依附學術文章而高談闊論；當代君主一定聽從而禮遇他們，說：「尊敬賢士是先王的道統」。殊不知，官吏們徵收的稅來自農民，而君主卻拿去供養那些沒有實際功勞的文人。對於辛苦耕作的農人就徵收重稅，對於成天空談的文人卻給予厚賞，這樣，想去要求人民努力耕作而少說廢話，是不可能的。

立節參明，執操不侵，怨言過於耳必隨之以劍。世主必從而禮之，以為自好之士。夫斬首之勞不賞，而家鬥之勇尊顯，而索民之疾戰距敵而無私鬥，不可得也。 樹立氣節恩怨分明，堅持操守不容侵犯，聽到有怨恨自己的馬上拔劍理論，當代君主一定會禮遇他，認爲這是潔身自好的人。對戰場上殺敵立功的人不予獎賞，而對那些逞勇鬥狠報私仇的反要使他尊貴顯耀，這樣要想求得人民奮勇殺敵而不去私鬥，是不可能的。

國平則養儒俠，難至則用介士，所養者非所用，所用者非所養，此所以亂也。且夫人主於聽學也，若是其言，宜布之官而用其身；若非其言，宜去其身而息其端。今以為是也而弗布於官，以為非也而不息其端，是而不用，非而不息，亂亡之道也。 國家太平時供養儒生和俠客，危難來時卻要用士兵打仗。所供養的不是所需要用的人，所要用的人不是受供養的人，這就是國家發生禍亂的原因。再說，君主在聽取學說的時候，如果認同它，就應該交由官府公佈，並任用他。如果不認同，就應該驅離他，並遏止其言論。現在卻是認同的，不交由官府公佈；不認同的，又不加以禁止。對的不採用，錯的不止息，這就是國家混亂和滅亡的原因。

澹臺子羽，君子之容也，仲尼幾而取之，與處久而行不稱其貌。宰予之辭，雅而文也，仲尼幾而取之，與處而智不充其辯。故孔子曰：『以容取人乎，失之子羽；以言取人乎，失之宰予。』故以仲尼之智而有失實之聲。今之新辯濫乎宰予，而世主之聽眩乎仲尼。為悅其言，因任其身，則焉得無失乎？是以魏任孟卯之辯而有華下之患，趙任馬服之辯而有長平之禍；此二者，任辯之失也。夫視鍛錫而察青黃，區冶不能以必劍。水擊鵠雁，陸斷駒馬，則臧獲不疑鈍利。發齒吻形容，伯樂不能以必馬。授車就駕而觀其末塗，則臧獲不疑駑良。觀容服，聽辭言，仲尼不能以必士。試之官職，課其功伐，則庸人不疑於愚智。故明主之吏，宰相必起於州部，猛將必發於卒伍。夫有功者必賞，則爵祿厚而愈勸；遷官襲級，則官職大而愈治。夫爵祿大而官職治，王之道也。 澹臺子羽有著君子般的容貌，孔子因而收他爲徒，與他相處久了，才發現他的品行和他的容貌根本是兩回事。宰予言談文雅，孔子因而收他爲徒，與他相處才發現他的智慧遠不及他的辯才。所以孔子才說：「以容貌取人，子羽讓我失察了；以言辭取人，宰予讓我失察了。」因此即使像孔子那樣有智慧的人，也蒙受了識人不明的名聲。如今新式的辯辭氾濫超過宰予，而當今君主對聽講的判斷卻遠比孔子眩惑；只因爲喜歡他的言論，就任用他這個人，這麼不務實怎能不出錯呢？像是魏國聽信孟卯的巧辯，結果帶來華陽的慘敗；趙國聽信趙括的巧辯，造成了長平的戰禍。這兩個事件，都是只因能言善道就任以大權所鑄成的錯。就好比煉銅造劍若只看火候色澤，就是善於造劍的區冶也不能判斷劍的好壞；可是用這把劍到水上砍擊鵠雁，在陸上劈殺駒馬，就是奴僕也不會把劍的利鈍搞錯。如果只是看馬的牙齒外觀，就是伯樂也不能判斷馬的好壞；一旦讓馬套上馬車去跑，看馬跑到終點的樣子，就是奴僕也不會把馬的優劣搞錯。如果只看人的相貌、服飾，聽他說話議論，就是孔子也不能判斷這個人的能力；可是用官職的實務，考核他的功過，就是庸人也不會搞錯他是愚蠢還是明智了。所以，明君手下的官員，宰相一定是從地方官中選拔上來的，猛將一定是從士兵隊伍中挑選出來的。如果有功勞的人必定給予獎賞，那麽俸祿越優厚他們就越勤快；有能力的人就能升官晉級，那麽官職越高他們就越能辦好事情。落實用高官厚祿來治理官員，才是王天下的正道。

磐石千里，不可謂富；象人百萬，不可謂強。石非不大，數非不眾也，而不可謂富強者─磐不生粟，象人不可使距敵也。今商官技藝之士亦不墾而食，是地不墾與磐石一貫也。儒俠毋軍勞、顯而榮者則民不使，與象人同事也。夫禍知磐石象人，而不知禍商官儒俠為不墾之地、不使之民，不知事類者也。 擁有千里的巨石，不能算富有；擁有百萬個假人，不能算強大。石頭雖然不算小，假人也不算少，但卻稱不上是富強，原因是：巨石不能生産五穀，而假人也不能用來對抗敵人。今日那些只想藉由經商謀官和淫巧技藝來牟利的人不就是想要不耕作就能有飯吃嗎？這種鼓勵不耕作的效果與巨石的效果是一樣的。如果沒有功勞的儒生和遊俠可以顯貴和榮耀，那麼人民就會使喚不動，因為這種鼓勵不勞而獲的事和製造假人的事功是相同的。只知道巨石和假人的禍害，卻不知道若去鼓勵經商謀官儒生遊俠會造成土地無人開墾、人民無法使喚的後果，這就是不懂得類比事情的人。

故敵國之君王雖說吾義，吾弗入貢而臣；關內之侯雖非吾行，吾必使執禽而朝。是故力多則人朝，力寡則朝於人，故明君務力。夫嚴家無悍虜，而慈母有敗子，吾以此知威勢之可以禁暴，而德厚之不足以止亂也。夫聖人之治國，不恃人之為吾善也，而用其不得為非也。恃人之為吾善也，境內不什數；用人不得為非，一國可使齊。為治者用眾而舍寡，故不務德而務法。 因此，��使國力與我相當的君王崇拜我的道義，我卻不能讓他來進貢稱臣；然而關內諸侯雖然反對我的行事，我卻一定要使他拿著禮來朝貢。這是因為力量大就要人家來朝拜，力量小的就得去朝拜別人，所以明君務求的是實力。在管理嚴格的家中不會有強悍不馴的奴僕。然而在慈母的嬌縱下卻會出現敗家子。我由此得知威嚴權勢可以禁止暴戾，而德行厚道卻不足以制止混亂。聖人治理國家，並不奢望人民能自動把事情做好，而是憑藉著人民不敢做錯事。要靠人民自動把事情做好，國內找不出十個；要人民不敢做錯事，卻是全國人民都可做到的。治理國家要採用多數人都能做到的方法去管理，而不能用只有少數人做得到的辦法，因此不能一味地推崇德治，而應該全面的實行法治。

夫必恃自直之箭，百世無矢；恃自圜之木，千世無輪矣。自直之箭、自圜之木，百世無有一，然而世皆乘車射禽者何也？隱栝之道用也。雖有不恃隱栝而有自直之箭、自圜之木，良工弗貴也，何則？乘者非一人，射者非一發也。不恃賞罰而恃自善之民，明主弗貴也，何則？國法不可失，而所治非一人也。故有術之君，不隨適然之善，而行必然之道。 一定要靠自然長直的枝條才能拿來造箭，則幾千年也造不出箭來；一定要靠自然長成的圓木才能取來做輪子，則幾萬年也造不成車輪。自然長成的直枝和圓木，千年萬載也沒有一個，然而世人卻都有車坐、有箭射飛鳥為什麼呢？因爲應用了對木材加工的工具和方法。所以即使有不需加工就自然可用的直枝和圓木，但好的工匠也不看重，爲什麽呢？因爲要坐車的不只一個人，要射的箭也不只一支。同理，即使有不用賞罰就能自動做好事情的人，明君也不看重，為什麽呢？因爲國法不可喪失，而且所要治理的也不只一個人。所以有法度的君主，不標榜偶遇的好人，而是要推行必能達成的政治措施。

今或謂人曰：『使子必智而壽』，則世必以為狂。夫智、性也，壽、命也，性命者，非所學於人也，而以人之所不能為說人，此世之所以謂之為狂也，謂之不能。然則是諭也，夫諭、性也。以仁義教人，是以智與壽說也，有度之主弗受也。故善毛嗇、西施之美，無益吾面，用脂澤粉黛則倍其初。言先王之仁義，無益於治，明吾法度，必吾賞罰者亦國之脂澤粉黛也。故明主急其助而緩其頌，故不道仁義。 如果現在有個人對人說：「我能使你聰明長壽。」那麽大家一定會認爲這是騙人的。因爲一個人的智力，是先天就決定的本性；一個人的壽命，也是命中注定的。這些屬於先天和命定的東西是學不來的。用人所無法做到的事情去說服人家，大家都知道他在騙人，因為那是不可能做到的。如果這種道理聽懂了，就了解本性的特質了。想用仁義去規範人，就跟用智力和壽命去說服人一樣，有法度的君主是不接受的。好比，去稱讚毛嗇、西施的美麗，並不能使自己變美麗；使用脂澤粉黛來化妝，就能比原來漂亮好幾倍。同理，空談先王的仁義，對於治理國家沒有好處；明定自己的法度，堅決實行賞罰，就如同化妝用的脂澤粉黛一樣，能使國家富強起來。所以明君注重的是有效的手段，而不急於做虛華的讚頌，所以不會老把仁義掛在嘴上。

今巫祝之祝人曰：『使若千秋萬歲。』千秋萬歲之聲聒耳，而一日之壽無徵於人，此人所以簡巫祝也。今世儒者之說人主，不善今之所以為治，而語已治之功；不審官法之事，不察姦邪之情，而皆道上古之傳，譽先王之成功。儒者飾辭曰：『聽吾言則可以霸王。』此說者之巫祝，有度之主不受也。 如今的巫祝爲人祈福總是說：「願你長生千秋，萬壽無疆！」這種千秋萬歲的聲音在耳邊響個不停，然而能使人多活一天的證據卻從沒出現過，因此人們就看不起巫祝了。現在世上的儒家遊說君主時，不好好闡述當下如何把國家治理好，反而說那些古代治世的功績；不審視官府法令的基礎事務，不詳察作奸犯科的實情，卻都去稱道上古的美傳和讚譽先王的功業。這些沉睡在歷史夢境中的儒家美其名說：「聽從我的主張，就可以稱王稱霸。」這就等於是 說客中的巫祝，有法度的君主是不接受的。

故明主舉實事，去無用，不道仁義者，故不聽學者之言。今不知治者必曰：『得民之心。』欲得民之心而可以為治，則是伊尹、管仲無所用也，將聽民而已矣。民智之不可用，猶嬰兒之心也。夫嬰兒不剔首則腹痛，不揊痤則寖益，剔首、揊痤必一人抱之，慈母治之，然猶啼呼不止，嬰兒子不知 犯其所小苦致其所大利也。今上急耕田墾草以厚民產也，而以上為酷；修刑重罰以為禁邪也，而以上為嚴；徵賦錢粟以實倉庫且以救饑饉備軍旅也，而以上為貪；境內必知介，而無私解，并力疾鬥所以禽虜也，而以上為暴。此四者所以治安也，而民不知悅也。夫求聖通之士者，為民知之不足師用。昔禹決江濬河而民聚瓦石，子產開畝樹桑鄭人謗訾。禹利天下，子產存鄭，皆以受謗，夫民智之不足用亦明矣。故舉士而求賢智，為政而期適民，皆亂之端，未可與為治也。 所以，明君提舉 實事求是的人，革去空談無用的人，不會整天把仁義掛在嘴上，也不盲目聽從學者的言論。現在，不懂治國之道的人總是說：“要得民心。”如果光靠得民心就可以治理好國家，那麽伊尹、管仲就沒有用處，只要聽任民衆要求就萬事OK了。但是，一般民衆的見識淺薄就像嬰兒的心智是不可以做為依據的。嬰兒不剃頭就容易感染而腹痛，不把膿擠出疱瘡就更加嚴重；然而要幫嬰兒剃頭和擠膿，必須有一個人抱著約束他，再由慈母幫他醫治；即使這樣他還是哭喊不停，因爲嬰兒不知道吃點小苦頭會有大的益處。如今君主督促開荒種田以增加人民的家產，卻被認爲君主太嚴酷；制定刑法加重罰則爲的是禁止奸邪，卻被認爲君主太嚴厲；徵收錢糧賦稅爲的是用於救濟饑荒、供養軍隊，卻被認爲君主太貪婪；使國內民衆都知道披甲上陣為國從軍，而不准私自逃兵，爲的是能合力戰鬥而擄獲敵人，卻被認爲君主太殘暴。這四項措施，是爲了治國安民，可是人民卻不喜歡。君主所以要尋求聖明通達的人，是因爲民衆的見識不足以師法運用。就像當初大禹疏通江河時，民衆卻忙著用瓦石去填塞；子産開墾田畝種植桑樹，而鄭國民衆卻責駡他。大禹使天下人獲益，子産使鄭國得以保全，但都受到人民的誹謗，可見人民的見識短淺不足為憑是非常清楚的。 所以舉用相士官員時，若去求用徒有賢智之名而無執政經驗的人，或將人民都當作是聖賢才智而附和其要求來治理國家，這都是造成亂世的原因，可不能用來治理國家。

#chinese philosophy

[hegelkegel]

Master-slave relationship

The working of master-slave dialectic is similar to how the liberal guilt functioned the current era, abeit invented again. Master-slave dialectic: One wants and does not want to dominate his opponents, at one and the same time. If I dominated you completely with ease, You are deemed as an unworthy opponent. Thus my domination is considered by others and myself as a fluke. Hence, no one would shout to the world, "I conquered a **cougar**!" Liberal guilt: I want to help you but I dont want you to be considered as a sucker [in an extreme display of altruism, I don't want you to think yourself as a sucker from my altruism], or else, I would be a bad person. Interesting thought.[13:09] Although tbh the same could be said of many things[13:09] From lifters to pronoun enforcers. Ya, this master-slave relationship is really easier to misuse[13:23] Because in general, this topic should have just framed as moral responsibility toward others, conscience, progressive movement, anti-establishment.[13:26] If you just interpret this liberal guilt as excessive sentimentality, you are a conservative who hold his freedom to feel and enjoy what he has (including his misery?) to be a personal matter.

#politics

[hegelkegel]

Liberal guilt? Good for you

Theo Hobson

This article is more than 10 years old Sun 29 Aug 2010 20.00 BST

It's right to be anxious. To be completely fatly smugly relaxed about our problematic world is the definition of the Tory soul

A basic British political division is not between left and right, or liberal and conservative, but between Schlegel and Wilcox. What separates the two families of EM Forster's novel Howards End is that the Schlegels worry about how to make the world fairer, with occasionally embarrassing consequences, while the Wilcoxes worry about their stocks and shares. In other words, the Schlegels are afflicted by the complaint we sneeringly call liberal guilt.

Sneer ye not. Liberal guilt is nothing to be ashamed of. It's really just the political expression of that rather old-fashioned thing, conscience.

To "suffer" from liberal guilt means that you are somewhat uneasy about all sorts of awkward things that it is tempting to harden your heart against, like global injustice, global warming, racism. It means that you are troubled by the stubborn persistence of our class system, though you personally have done fine by it. It means you sometimes worry that you might be prejudiced against all sorts of people. It means that your vague patriotism is laced with uncertainty about whether our ancient constitution is able to be truly inclusive. It means, for goodness sake, that you fail to be completely fatly smugly relaxed about this problematic world we inhabit. Is that really so shameful and wet, so laughably mentally effeminate?

If this little parade of privileged anxiety fills you with derision, then you are a Tory. Rejection of liberal guilt is the very cornerstone of the Tory soul, the unofficial definition of Tory. "Look how relaxed I am about my place at the feast," says the Tory. "Regard my sense of entitlement. Inequality and privilege are nothing to be ashamed of; they are part of life, and life is good, n'est-ce pas? So please: no more strident student-union hectoring stuff about how evil the 'system' is." In other words, Toryism is a posture of world affirmation. It works by rubbishing reformist angst, painting it as neurotic hypocrisy. The phrase liberal guilt is obviously a Tory coinage. It ought to be called "the necessary self-accusing anxiety accompanying liberal idealism". Or something.

This is the thing that unites every sort of Tory, from Norman Tebbit to Nick Boles. They all find liberal guilt risible and dangerous. Its risibility is highlighted by fat jocular types like Boris Johnson. Its peril is highlighted by wide-eyed humourless skinny types like Thatcher. Beware the "socialist" puritans, they say, who want the world to be radically different, who dream dreams and scheme schemes, and worry that someone somewhere is having fun. Don't be anxious about your status as a comfy bourgeoisie, but blumming well rejoice in it, you chump!

On Any Questions recently, someone asked the panellists whether they intended to cut down on their meat consumption, for environmental reasons. There were a couple of hesitant, nondescript answers and then Ken Clarke calmly guffawed at the whole idea. Like I'm going to cut down on my merry feasting, he basically said. And the audience found his cavalier confidence sort of reassuring, and laughed. Here, it struck me, is the very nub of the Tory soul: it enjoys showing its lack of angst. And such confidence impresses people. Let us be ruled by these Nietzschean strong souls, we cravenly feel, who are too busy living well to entertain cowardly moral scruples.

There is really no excuse for failing to feel liberal guilt about global warming. No excuse. It is a fact that our affluent lifestyles are endangering the planet, to some maddeningly unknown degree. What is wrong with someone who is not made uneasy by this? What is wrong with someone who affects (or, worse, genuinely feels) indifference to this fact, and sneers at the muddled, hesitant, hypocritical responses of the conscience-pricked rest of us? Of course we don't know if cutting down on meat will really help things, and make future flooding of distant lands less likely. But those farting cows are a problem, and maybe one should sponsor slightly fewer of them. To be a bit anxious about this is just to acknowledge the strange moral universe we seemingly inhabit.

Similarly, there is no excuse for failing to feel liberal guilt about race and class. The fact is that it is excessively hard for the vast majority of people from ethnic minorities, and from economically disadvantaged backgrounds, to attain the cushy lifestyle that one was born into and takes for granted. One can either react to this fact by pretending that one's good fortune is one's natural right, and by boasting that one has "worked hard" for it (well done, for turning up to banker school, or to that internship your uncle wangled); or one can react with humble awareness that our social world is still packed with injustice – an awareness known as liberal guilt.

Liberal guilt is one of the key factors in the ebb and flow of British politics. New Labour was propelled by a wave of liberal guilt. As it ran aground, fat jocular Toryism was limbering up in the wings, and learning to mask its braying tones with a new liberal urbanity. It found a new figurehead (Boris), and a soberer practitioner, and it rides high.

In Howards End, Margaret Schlegel eventually forms a surprising coalition with Mr Wilcox. It won't last; it can't. You're either a Schlegel or a Wilcox. And I assure you that Schlegelism will bounce back.

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